What if The Japanese won WWII?

[Confederatepatriot1025]

if the Japanese Won the second world war. What do Ya'll think would happen

[Fenwick]

Define win. The japanese do not have the resources, nor the ability to defeat America utterly. You could never see the rising sun, and marching victory columns in Washington. You could however see Japan in a position to have peace with terms they themselves set.

[Confederatepatriot1025]

I define winning as getting a cease fire and holding on to their gains in the pacific. Maybe getting a cease fire after conquering Hawiaii

[Dean_the_Young]

I define winning as getting a cease fire and holding on to their gains in the pacific. Maybe getting a cease fire after conquering Hawiaii

Japan victory in WW2 is near ASB as soon as it becomes a grapple. And considering the numerous stupidities in the Japanese philosophy (such as wanting a big-gun battle around the Philippines), even a cease fire would be near-impossible.

Here's a good few links. One is about the Pearl invasion myth and why it was impossible. The other is to stress how out of their weightclass Japan was.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

There are more articles from the same source. I highly recommend them.

[Confederatepatriot1025]

I know it was impossible just suppose what do you think would happen afterwards

[Dean_the_Young]

I know it was impossible just suppose what do you think would happen afterwards

Oh, a "I don't care how it happened" topic? Alright.

Short answer, Japan suffers economically as long as a US embargo is in place (no large market to ship to, short of trying to use the USSR or the poor colonials), and far too much of its industry is devoted to trying to hold down an empire far bigger and larger than it can handle. Japanese shipping, already hurt by the war and insufficient in the first place, struggles to keep up with shipping oil from the Dutch Indies to Japan. Domestic manufacturing is devoted to maintaining control over China and the colonies, but US and Soviet aid to the natives makes the cost of possession skyrocket.

Japan tries to keep up with the rest of the world, but Japanese hardware falls increasingly behind and the economy suffers the impending pre-war meltdown, and Japan is forced to abandon much it has bloodily won in order to keep the rest.

[Confederatepatriot1025]

An interesting theory. Probably true and makes sense pre-war Japan had limited shipping. and it's economy would hurt not being able to ship to it's large market. With most of the other country's recovering from war.

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Assuming for some reason the Russians don't decide after the defeat of Germany to just march over and take away all of Japan's continental territory, they will certainly open a supply line to the Chinese, who are going to be an increasingly difficult adversary, as guerilla networks are organized and the interior regions develop an infrastructure with which to fight.

All-in-all, the Japanese were completely crazy. It's been convincingly argued that Japan's problem was a lack of leadership - i.e. that junior people dragged Japan into an unplanned and increasingly belligerent stance that backed them into the corner that they ended up in.

Oh, a "I don't care how it happened" topic? Alright.

Short answer, Japan suffers economically as long as a US embargo is in place (no large market to ship to, short of trying to use the USSR or the poor colonials), and far too much of its industry is devoted to trying to hold down an empire far bigger and larger than it can handle. Japanese shipping, already hurt by the war and insufficient in the first place, struggles to keep up with shipping oil from the Dutch Indies to Japan. Domestic manufacturing is devoted to maintaining control over China and the colonies, but US and Soviet aid to the natives makes the cost of possession skyrocket.

Japan tries to keep up with the rest of the world, but Japanese hardware falls increasingly behind and the economy suffers the impending pre-war meltdown, and Japan is forced to abandon much it has bloodily won in order to keep the rest.

[Fenwick]

*cracks knuckles*

Alright the key here is not 43-44, but 42-43. Japan had almost an entire year, before any serious allied offensive was made upon them. Japan was considered a secondary threat to Germany, and for the most part was treated that way.

Now Japan needs the following. Pay attention for these, are not "the carriers do not refuel," but things that the General staff thought of, or actually attempted.

1.) No victory disease-
The IJA knew that expanding after the intial gains would destroy the proposed defense. Instead of the narrow straits between China and the Philipines the merchant marine would have to go far distances, bringing ever bullet, quart of oil, and grain of rice with them. That meant a single sunken ship could prove fatal to the defense.

2.) Defense in depth-
Japan orginally planned to build up the newly conquered regions and await the Americans. Instead they tried to make a strong out defense, which is a bad idea given the size of the Pacific. The philipines where to have various airfields, the same with the Java sea, allowing for quick assistance, and scouting for the region. What japan did was instead of having a brick, you had an egg, and once the shell cracked it was easy to get inside.

3.) A fleet in being-
It is hard to fight a larger navy. So the options are limited to two, either search out that knock out punch, or simply maintain a fleet to give the enemy pause before moving out. American can replace any ship it looses, but like any navy is fearful of wasting its resources.

4.) Defend the Merchant marine-
The Japanese did not use the convoy system until 44, which saved quite a few ships. Now imagine such a system in 42. Now the arguement against this is that now ships must wait for others, and thus delay raw materials receaching industrial home islands, of course this also gives a small amount of targets for the allies to go after. By smaller amount I mean areas of targets not number.

5.) Limit strategic bombinb capabilites-
This means defend the marianas. Once the US took these islands bombing was quick and easy. Without them nothing but the simplest attacks, more moral boosting, could be preformed. To prove this compare Japan who went almsot four years with the home islands for the most part secure, to Germany who was attacked since 1939.

6.) Submairnes are for sinking supplies-
Japan saw the submarine as a weapon to use against warships, or in case of blockade send troops, and supplies to needed areas. The submarine commanders since the first day wanted to go and attack allied shipping. The B-1 submarines had a range of 14,000 nautical miles, and started the war with twenty such boats. At the start of the war Germany sent 6 u-boats to the Gulf, that was in January and the US did not start the convoy system until May. During that time the germans sank 2 out of 11 million tons of shipping, more U-boats joined as time went on but a clear dent was made to shipping.


Now this will not make the rising sun fly in California, but it would save a great deal of Japanese equipment, and give them the time to reinforce, and prepare the region for America's attack.

[Dean_the_Young]

Assuming for some reason the Russians don't decide after the defeat of Germany to just march over and take away all of Japan's continental territory, they will certainly open a supply line to the Chinese, who are going to be an increasingly difficult adversary, as guerilla networks are organized and the interior regions develop an infrastructure with which to fight.

All-in-all, the Japanese were completely crazy. It's been convincingly argued that Japan's problem was a lack of leadership - i.e. that junior people dragged Japan into an unplanned and increasingly belligerent stance that backed them into the corner that they ended up in.

Obviously, any TL in which Japan wins must also feature, in parallel, a Nazi victory. Those bees the rules, Abdul. Having beaten the US, Japan must never lose their possessions. :D

[adam888]

The only way Japan could emerge in one piece would be an dominant Germany.

The finding of Oil in Manchuria thread would allow the Japanese
sufficient fuel to turn away from provoking the USA. There
would be great fear of the Russians eventually wanting those
same Manchurian resources under development by the
Japanese so an invasion of Siberia in September of 1941
might be inevitable.

I don't see any alternative of winning for there is no way the
Japanese could project sufficient power to threaten the
Middle East Oil Fields. Where else could they go for their Oil
but the way they did?

[Riain]

I think Australia would find itself with a number of countires who declined statehood 35 years previously would reconsider ther position. Australia would become a semi-independent military power. The north would have much infrastructure development to support our strong defence forces which would proabably be a major boost to the mining and oil industries up there.

[ZaphodBeeblebrox]

IOW Fenwick, Fight Dirty, VERY Dirty ...

Unfortunately, The Japanese of The Time, Considered themselves Above, Just that Sort of Thing ...

However, if Combined with an Attack into Siberia, Mainly Designed to Throw The Soviets Off their Step, it May Actually Work!

:eek:

[BrotherToAll]

Japan sealed her fate when she attacked Pearl Harbor, once America was brought into WW2 Japan and Germany were doomed end of story there was no way the Japanese and Germans could compete with American industry and numbers while fighting everyone else at the same time.

[Redbeard]

I define winning as getting a cease fire and holding on to their gains in the pacific. Maybe getting a cease fire after conquering Hawiaii

The first part can be arranged, no ASBs needed, the second part - forget it.

First we need to remove the "day of infamy" factor creating practically unlimited US determination. That can be done by entirely focussing on Dutch and British possessions in the Far East - avoid and/or bypass any US holdings.

That leaves it up to USA to declare war, and she probably will, as FDR had promised Churchill to do so in case of Japanese aggression. It will take many months before the USN is ready to cross the Pacific in force though, and until then a few squadrons of B17 bombers on Phillippines Islands is the main US threat to Japanese forces. By 1941 level bombers by most were considdered efficient towards naval targets, but war experience soon showed that not to be the case. So nothing to worry about from the Japanese, but we probably need some visionary person in the Japanese armed forces realisng this a bit before everybody else.

If/when the US declaration of war comes operations against US tagerts can of course commence, but mainly to have something to give back in the comming armistice negotiations. Focus should be put on taking the Dutch and British possessions holding the vital resources needed by Japan.

If the USN tries an early crossing in force of the Pacific, the IJN will have a decent chance of defeating it in the decisive battle the IJN had been preparing for since WWI. But that really just brings them back to OTL, as the USA now really can't back out.

The best option for the Japanese would however be the USA waiting to sortie until feeling ready (appr. 6 months). By that time all significant objectives should be taken in SEA and it will be time for soft talk. Announce the whole operation as a liberation of the colonies held by European Imperialistic powers and declare them independent. If necesssary agree to free elections controlled by US observes etc. But be firm on Japanese base and trade rights and on European withdrawal.

That will put FDR in a very difficult situation as a serious Pacific war will draw resources from the war against Germany he had planned for all the time, and which perhaps alreday has broken out. Next a major war to help the European powers keep their colonies will be very unpopular in USA.

The big PoD will be, that we need a new Japanese leadership - and culture. The OTL weren't capable of such refined considerations, but only capable of frontal assault in one pre-set direction - and all in a spirit where selfdestructiveness was considered an asset!

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[MerryPrankster]

I don't think butchering a foolhardy "Charge of the Battleships" will PO the American population the same way the "cowardly" Pearl Harbor attack did.

If the Japanese can win quickly and present an (acceptable) "fait accompli" to the West, they can survive.

If it turns into a dragged-out conflict, the US will outproduce them and outnumber them and eventually destroy them.

[CalBear]

If the Japanese had managed to hold off the U.S. (something that would require a FLOCK of ASBs) they would enjoy their vistory for a very brief period of time.

Stalin would have, quite correctly, have seen their continental territory as ripe for the picking. As I have mentioned in the past, the Japanese NEVER won an even up fight (e.g. no massive surprise, against colonial forces, etc.) against a modern opponent on the ground. This includes combat on the Asian Mainland against the British & American in Burma and on large islands, including against green forces like the U.S. troops on the 'Canal, not just when facing the massive overmatch that happened when the USN would appear over the horizon and pound the crap out of an isolated island garrision followed by a bloody fight where both sides showed more bravery than sanity. Post Hitler, the Red Army was probably the strongest land army seen to that time; it would have carved through the IJA, even an IJA at a theoretical peak never seen IOTL.

Without the U.S, and it's nuclear weapons, to deter the Soviets, the Japanese would have been overwhelmed in short order, probably even losing the Home Islands by the end of 1948 (The distance between the Soviet Mainland and Japan means that the entire space is in range of Soviet ground based air cover & by 1945 Yak had come up with a very nice fighter in the -9, not to mention the jets that would be appearing in short order. This would very nicely negate the IJN). That would mean that the U.S, would almost certainly scoop up all the same Island groups it did during ITTL, simply to keep them out of Soviet hands, while the British & French moved back into their former colonies for the same reason.

Strange as it sounds, the Japanese would up in a better long term situation by losing to the U.S. than it would have by winning.

[TFLGuitar]

I think a Japanese victory would have been quite difficult under realistic circumstances...

Perhaps if right after Pearl Harbor if they were able somehow keep going and pull off some attacks on the West Coast of the US.. Negotiate a quick settlement....Was this even possible though?

[Fenwick]

If the Japanese had managed to hold off the U.S. (something that would require a FLOCK of ASBs) they would enjoy their vistory for a very brief period of time.

Stalin would have, quite correctly, have seen their continental territory as ripe for the picking. As I have mentioned in the past, the Japanese NEVER won an even up fight (e.g. no massive surprise, against colonial forces, etc.) against a modern opponent on the ground. This includes combat on the Asian Mainland against the British & American in Burma and on large islands, including against green forces like the U.S. troops on the 'Canal, not just when facing the massive overmatch that happened when the USN would appear over the horizon and pound the crap out of an isolated island garrision followed by a bloody fight where both sides showed more bravery than sanity. Post Hitler, the Red Army was probably the strongest land army seen to that time; it would have carved through the IJA, even an IJA at a theoretical peak never seen IOTL.

Without the U.S, and it's nuclear weapons, to deter the Soviets, the Japanese would have been overwhelmed in short order, probably even losing the Home Islands by the end of 1948 (The distance between the Soviet Mainland and Japan means that the entire space is in range of Soviet ground based air cover & by 1945 Yak had come up with a very nice fighter in the -9, not to mention the jets that would be appearing in short order. This would very nicely negate the IJN). That would mean that the U.S, would almost certainly scoop up all the same Island groups it did during ITTL, simply to keep them out of Soviet hands, while the British & French moved back into their former colonies for the same reason.

Strange as it sounds, the Japanese would up in a better long term situation by losing to the U.S. than it would have by winning.

I can see the mainland getting run over, but the Home islands? Where do the Soviets get the naval, and airpower to do that? True it is 1948 when you say this will happen, but that is also a buildup time for the Japanese as well.

Stalin went into Japan because in 1945 its industry was in shambles, and it was not the coordinated fighting force it once was. Picture instead Japan as a nation with much of its industry intact, its army not spread out along the pacific, and heck throw in the fleet-in-being idea, and the nation seems very frightening. Also Soviet tanks are amazing, but how do you get them onto the home islands?

Also in response to Zaphod fighting dirty. What i presented was not such a thing, making a convoy, defense in depth, using submarines to attack shipping these are rational, and in fact winnable war tactics. Japan had these ideas as well, but started them after America started attacking, not before.

Japan is either two things for people: A hot headed, fanatical, nation of poorly equiped soldiers, or a strict, and ethical land living by the warrior code. The fact is say what you want but it wasn't the small click of young officers that started the war, the older, wiser, more experinced ones who planned it. Yes Yamamoto said "we have a year of fighting before then a year two years tops," most take this as him being aginst the attack, but to me it is a military leader advocating a quick war. Of course after quick victories they got cocky, and thats what screwed them up.

So if Japan used its year setting up defenses, and building up with its new materials, it could be in a great postion once the Americans come along. Do recall military planning to take out Japan was extremly vague consisting of, "Once Germany is gone three years. So most imagined Japan in the war by 46-47. It was due to the over extension that America was able to push forward and get victory when it did. Add to that American's having just beaten a strong determined enemy, now having to face the Japanese.

Without the intial victories would the people been as willing to fight? Picture your friends, and family going to war and fighting for three years, only to have the government return and say "we need another three years." Add to that having no serious victory, and what would happen? People would be angry, sure they'd fight if they have to, but imagine fighting for six years, adding to that having to occupy Germany, and keep your eye on Russia. Japan asking to keep old european colonies may seem like an easy out.

[Amerigo Vespucci]

How's this:

There's no Spanish-American war. The U.S. never acquires the Philippines or any of a number of Pacific islands, which instead are acquired either through war or purchase by Japan during its expansionist period. Japan fights Russia, annexes Korea, joins the Allies during WWI, all as in OTL.

There's a spate of fighting in an alt-WWII, but with no interest in the western Pacific, the U.S. never declares war on Japan, instead choosing to focus on Germany, and Great Britain eventually comes to an arrangement with Japan, getting Hong Kong and Singapore back in exchange for recognizing Japanese possession of pretty much everything north of Papua New Guinea.

Now here's where it gets interesting.

After Germany goes down around 1944-ish, Japan's still at war with China. There's a lot of Allied sentiment against the Japanese, and aid continues to the Chinese. Japan, with the resources of the Dutch East Indies, doesn't hurt for oil like it did in OTL. Stalin aids the Chinese as well, but his main focus is in Europe, where the Allies have advanced further east, thanks to not being as distracted in Asia.

What happens now?

Well, Japan isn't going to leave China easily. After all, they've been involved there in a big way since the late 19th century, and their history goes back a lot further than that. They're fairly self-sufficient in oil, so the war isn't hampered by the Western embargo. But their situation is still akin to a cross between North Korea today and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

They've got a massive military weighted down by prestige projects like the Yamato, plus an incredibly draining guerrilla war in China. The Chinese aren't going to give up as long as Western aid continues, and there's no real reason for that to stop. No one's willing to go to war against Japan simply because of China, and Great Britain's just been through a five-year conflict with Germany, and now has all sorts of problems with its transition out of empire.

Japan's going to have problems of its own in that area -- Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Korea, etc. are all going to want some sort of independence, and the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere's promises are going to start to ring hollow after a decade or so of military government. In the meantime, the home front in Japan is going to start to become rather bleak.

With so much investment going to the military -- impractical projects like the Yamato, a draining war in China, and any insurrections along the fringes of its empire -- there's no room for the civilian economy to grow. As its military involvement drags on, more and more of Japan's GDP is going to be devoted to the military, and more and more young men will die fighting the immense Chinese manpower resources. If the Japanese military isn't brought to heel by a public tired of war (and nothing during OTL's WWII makes me believe this would happen in TTL), it's going to end up like a giant North Korea.

There won't be room for investment into things like a revived steel or automotive industry, or a big commercial electronics industry. And if the bleeding (both economic and physical) continues, a collapse will come sooner or later -- when there's no more money to spend, no more men to send. Japan will become another Soviet Union, and with such a big war in China and a (potentially) more hostile empire to tie down resources, the collapse will come even quicker than it did for the Soviets.

[Mike Stearns]

Hmmm, interesting. The Sino-Japanese war becomes an American proxy war, maybe?

[Amerigo Vespucci]

Hmmm, interesting. The Sino-Japanese war becomes an American proxy war, maybe?

Not just American. I'm sure the British, French, Dutch, and Soviets would all have a bone to pick with Japan. Seeing that all five nations have just finished up a war against Germany, I don't think they'd be willing to engage in all-out war against Japan immediately afterward, either.

[Fenwick]

Not just American. I'm sure the British, French, Dutch, and Soviets would all have a bone to pick with Japan. Seeing that all five nations have just finished up a war against Germany, I don't think they'd be willing to engage in all-out war against Japan immediately afterward, either.

The problem with America not fighting Spain, is that one could easily butterfly away the naval build up, that would make America able to threaten the Japanese in the pacific.

[HurganPL]

I think I saw a whole book about possible variants of Japanese victory on Amazon.

Edit:here it is:
http://www.amazon.ca/Rising-Sun-Victorious-Alternate-Japanese/dp/185367446X
In his fourth alternate history, Tsouras (Disaster at D-Day, etc.), a senior analyst of the U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center, brings together a number of experts in the Pacific war to show how, with only some minor adjustments to actual events, the Japanese could have either won the war in the Pacific or else so stymied the Allies that Japan would have been able to keep some of its early conquests. The 10 chapters by 10 authors cover the gamut from an early conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union to the invasion of Japan. When American planes low on fuel had a choice while searching for the Japanese carriers at Midway, what if their commander had decided to fly to Midway to refuel rather than continue toward the last reported position of the enemy? (All three American carriers might have been sunk and the Japanese would have gone on to neutralize Hawaii and move in on the U.S. West Coast from there.) Other scenarios include a Japanese invasion of Australia (which is eventually defeated), a thrust into British India, an American evacuation of Guadalcanal, a disaster at Leyte Gulf and heavy losses during the invasion of Japan. Complementing 24 illustrations (not seen by PW) and 15 maps scattered throughout, brief summaries at the end of each chapter inform readers of what actually happened most will be relieved.

Mind you that I think there is also another book with this topic.

[Fenwick]

I think I saw a whole book about possible variants of Japanese victory on Amazon.

Was it a red book with a picture of guys with rifles on the front?

[HurganPL]

See above, of course I do recall that there was also another one.

[CalBear]

I can see the mainland getting run over, but the Home islands? Where do the Soviets get the naval, and airpower to do that? True it is 1948 when you say this will happen, but that is also a buildup time for the Japanese as well.

In 1945 the Red Air force was HUGE, with tons of veteran pilots (who had, BTW survived the best that the Luftwaffe had, all the top German aces were in the East, while compiling quite impressive numbers of victories) and nearly 15,000 combat aircraft, most of them of 1944 & later vintage. It was the largest tactical air force in the world. Ships? Well Ivan didn't have many of those, but he did have LOTS of submarines, and plenty of slave labor, given the haul of German POWs collected by the Red Army, to build more. The Soviets, especially Stalin, didn't like to let little things like Siberia get in the way. Just as the Red Army had shipped so much FROM the East, it could send it TO the East, including Malutka, "K", "L", & "S" class boats, either in sections, or given the Soviet love for doing it in a big way, whole. Landing ships? In that immediate post-war lovefest that lasted until around early 1948 they could have BOUGHT LST's from the British (who, IOTL, sold them the jet engine designs used in the Mig-15)

Stalin went into Japan because in 1945 its industry was in shambles, and it was not the coordinated fighting force it once was. Picture instead Japan as a nation with much of its industry intact, its army not spread out along the pacific, and heck throw in the fleet-in-being idea, and the nation seems very frightening. Also Soviet tanks are amazing, but how do you get them onto the home islands?

Stalin went after the IRA in Manchuria because he had promised he would (for all of his faults, which were legion, Joe was generally pretty good about meeting the LETTER, if not the intent of treaties he signed). He went in with both feet becuase he knew, as sure as the Sun would rise, that the IJA was no match for the Red Army. The Kwangtung Army hadn't been a match for the Red Army in 1938 (the same overall system, BTW, Zurkov or no, that could barely handle the Finns, and were scattered like leaves by the Wermacht) and the IJA was absolutely overmatched by the Red Army of 1945. As mentioned the IJA never did get the whole concept of combined arms operation, depite being provided MANY lessons by the U.S., as well as information from their milittary attachés with the Wermacht. Imagine who well Banazi charges would have worked against a Guards Army.

As far as crossing the straits between Sakhalin or from Pusan, it simply would not be as hard as imagined. The only really effective weapons that the Japanese produced against invasion forces were the suicide attack boat & plane, something that the High Command didn't accept until mid 1944. Without several years of getting chased across the Pacific, that tool would not exist. Would it be easy? No. Likely at least one or two attempts would be repulsed, but we are talking STALIN here; this is the leader who moved an entire Front away from Berlin to cut off his allies in order to be sure that Red Army troops took the City (losing 100,000 men in the process), 3/4 of which he had to turn over to the Western allies anyway.

Where would he get the lift? Again, the post-war UK Labor Government was desperate to produce income, not to mention reduce the size of the RN. There were shipyards around the Empire looking for work come January of '45, when it became clear that much of the shipping on the ways was no longer needed. A number of partly finished vessels, including DD, DDE, and sea-going amphibious hulls would up getting broken up IOTL, ITTL Labor can keep the shipyards working for an extra 18 months, perhaps even two years, id not a while longer (I can see the USSR playing nice until it got the gear needed to go after the Japanese.) Hell, with no Pacific War, I can see the U.S. selling some shipping to the Soviets, them being our allies. Stalin had LOTS of hard currency right after the Reich fell, what with German banks (not to mention ordinary German citizens) no longer needed their gold or foreign currency reserves. The U.S was, for a brief period after Berlin fell, and before FDR died still quite willing to sell equipment to the Soviets. Alternately, the Soviets could have BUILT a lot of the lift themselves (the Soviets rarely get their due credit as far as production output goes during the war), at least what the UK (& perhaps the U.S.) wouldn't/couldn't provide

Also in response to Zaphod fighting dirty. What i presented was not such a thing, making a convoy, defense in depth, using submarines to attack shipping these are rational, and in fact winnable war tactics. Japan had these ideas as well, but started them after America started attacking, not before.

Japan is either two things for people: A hot headed, fanatical, nation of poorly equiped soldiers, or a strict, and ethical land living by the warrior code. The fact is say what you want but it wasn't the small click of young officers that started the war, the older, wiser, more experinced ones who planned it. Yes Yamamoto said "we have a year of fighting before then a year two years tops," most take this as him being aginst the attack, but to me it is a military leader advocating a quick war. Of course after quick victories they got cocky, and thats what screwed them up.

So if Japan used its year setting up defenses, and building up with its new materials, it could be in a great postion once the Americans come along. Do recall military planning to take out Japan was extremly vague consisting of, "Once Germany is gone three years. So most imagined Japan in the war by 46-47. It was due to the over extension that America was able to push forward and get victory when it did. Add to that American's having just beaten a strong determined enemy, now having to face the Japanese.

Without the intial victories would the people been as willing to fight? Picture your friends, and family going to war and fighting for three years, only to have the government return and say "we need another three years." Add to that having no serious victory, and what would happen? People would be angry, sure they'd fight if they have to, but imagine fighting for six years, adding to that having to occupy Germany, and keep your eye on Russia. Japan asking to keep old european colonies may seem like an easy out.

As noted in a different thread, all the items to mention are quite sensible and reasonable, from sixty years later. The Japanese military, the Navy in particular, simply did not think that way, had no tradition of thinking that way, and never, ever, acted that way until the war was lost & they had no alternative.

It is often said, with great justification, that the Royal Navy in WW I was caught in the shadow of Trafalger, with it's officers steeped in a century of Nelsonian tactics, with only minor updates inserted as needed to keep up with technology. The same can be said for the IJN, except in this case the strategic god was Admiral T?g? Heihachir?, the victor at Tsushima Strait (who also worshipped at the alter of Lord Nelson). EVERY officer and officer cadet in the IJA was indoctrinated in the Cult of the Decisive Battle. This was both from the RN influence on the early modern Japanese Navy AND, more importantly, because of Tsushima, where all was settled in a single great battle (the Japanese were FAR from the only proponents of this strategy, the U.S. Plan Orange called for much the same thing, however, as WW II demonstrated, USN tactics were far more flexible than the IJN's). To even mummur anything that did not cleave to this belief was to commit career suicide. Yamamota was HUGE proponent of the decisive battle, as were his subordinates. (It can easily be said that his entire Pacific strategy bears an uncally resembelence to that of Togo durring the Japanese/Russian conflict of 1905, from the surprise strike to the attempt to finish the enemy fleet off in a single great battle, in this case, Midway.) Anything that did not aid in bringing about & winning the Great Clash was, not even secondary, it was not even worth considering. All the tactics you outlined, which were used with varying degrees of success by the Western Allies during WW II, effectively spit on the beliefs of the IJN. They were not just faintly dishonorable, they were WEAK, unfitting for servants of the Son of Heaven. Only when the War was lost, when there was no hope of bringing about the Great Clash, did the Japanese even begin to use any worthwhile defensive tactics, even then these were meant more to bleed the enemy, than to actually HOLD a position.

The same has to be said for IJN convoy tactics, which were, at best, pitifully too little, too late. Most escorts consisted of a couple of corvettes or minelayers, with the occasional destroyer, escorting five or six vessels. The Angle-American version of the convoy, with 20 - 30 ships and eight to ten DD/DE/FF as sheepdogs was never even conceptualized, nor was the really effective ASW tactic of the Atlantic War even considered, the Hunter Killer Group. Such a group, centered as it was on an escort or light carrier, was, in the eyes of the IJN, a massive waste of resources. That size force could be used for REAL offensive operations, at the leat used to shape the battlefield before the Great Clash.

In order to get the Japanese to act as posited (and which would have been a far wiser, less costly, if no more long run effective strategy) one would have to completely knock the foundations of the IJN away, all the way back to the 1870's. Of course, if one does that, what kind of IJN emerges? Would THAT IJN ever have WON at Tsushima, or even attempted the gamble that was the Pacific war?

The answer to both questions is the same: Probably not, making the speculation moot.

[Fenwick]

I'm sticking with what I say because all that I outlined in my second post in this thread where actual things the Japanese thought of. If only they thought of them sooner. While yes many within the IJN spoke ill of change, there where just as many who spoke for change, the submarine branch being a good example of this.

[CalBear]

I'm sticking with what I say because all that I outlined in my second post in this thread where actual things the Japanese thought of. If only they thought of them sooner. While yes many within the IJN spoke ill of change, there where just as many who spoke for change, the submarine branch being a good example of this.

Okay.:)

Just remember, most of them were also fairly junior officers and were IGNORED until there was no alternative.

[Fenwick]

Okay.:)

Just remember, most of them were also fairly junior officers and were IGNORED until there was no alternative.

Right but there is a difference between actual people recommending things at the time, and arm chair generals sixty years later, as you yourself spoke of.

[ZaphodBeeblebrox]

Right but there is a difference between actual people recommending things at the time, and arm chair generals sixty years later, as you yourself spoke of.
The Point is, as I Noted ...

It Would Have Been Considered DIRTY Pool, Like Mixing Rock Salt in with your Gunpowder ...

The Japanese of The Period May Very Well Have Ironically Borrowed a British Idiom, "Well, That's Just Not Cricket!"

:eek:

[Fenwick]

The Point is, as I Noted ...

It Would Have Been Considered DIRTY Pool, Like Mixing Rock Salt in with your Gunpowder ...

The Japanese of The Period May Very Well Have Ironically Borrowed a British Idiom, "Well, That's Just Not Cricket!"

:eek:

I don't understand how it can be "dirty pool" as you say it. Convey systems, better defenses, only invading what you can hold. How can fighting conservativly be considered bad?

Plus this is Japan, how on earth can a surprise attack be acceptable, and sending submarines out to attack shipping not be?

[Mike Stearns]

Not just American. I'm sure the British, French, Dutch, and Soviets would all have a bone to pick with Japan. Seeing that all five nations have just finished up a war against Germany, I don't think they'd be willing to engage in all-out war against Japan immediately afterward, either.

That's true, but there's a flip side. All have just finished a war with Germany, aren't in the mood to take any crap from anyone and all have REALLY big armies.

[ZaphodBeeblebrox]

I don't understand how it can be "dirty pool" as you say it. Convey systems, better defenses, only invading what you can hold. How can fighting conservativly be considered bad?

Plus this is Japan, how on earth can a surprise attack be acceptable, and sending submarines out to attack shipping not be?
I'll Admit it's Hard for Westerners to Understand, But I've Immersed Myself in Japanese, And Especially South Korean Culture, Through Martial Arts Training and they Simply Have Different Visions of What Constitutes Honour than Those of us of European Descent ...

The Bushido Code Specifically Hearkens Back to The Days of The Shogunate, Wherein it was Considered an Honourable Act to Sneak up Upon a Fellow Samurai, Particularly One Who Was a Better Swordsman, And Attach him from Behind, Provided you Screamed a Fighting Yell as The Strike Went Home; This is What was Attempted at Pearl Harbour, However The Notifying Yell, In the Guise of a Formal Declaration of War, Came Late, And was Not Recieved By The American Government Until Well After The Attack had Ended ...

By Contrast, Under NO Means was One to Attack Unarmed Civillians, Even Those Carrying Supplies to your Enemy, This was Part of Why European Merchants were Even Allowed to Do Business in Japan, During The Age of The Warring Empires!

[Fenwick]

By Contrast, Under NO Means was One to Attack Unarmed Civillians, Even Those Carrying Supplies to your Enemy, This was Part of Why European Merchants were Even Allowed to Do Business in Japan, During The Age of The Warring Empires!

Uhhh... now I do not like speaking ill of other posters, without really debating them, but you have no clue about Japan in WWII at all do you?

You say the Japanese think it is wrong to attack unarmed civilians?

Well then who on earth was responsible for the Nanking Massacre, Changjiao massacre, the Three Alls Policy in china ("Kill All", "Burn All" and "Loot All"), Unit 731, forced labour by Asian civilians, and the list goes on from torture, to "comfort woman."

[ZaphodBeeblebrox]

Uhhh... now I do not like speaking ill of other posters, without really debating them, but you have no clue about Japan in WWII at all do you?

You say the Japanese think it is wrong to attack unarmed civilians?

Well then who on earth was responsible for the Nanking Massacre, Changjiao massacre, the Three Alls Policy in china ("Kill All", "Burn All" and "Loot All"), Unit 731, forced labour by Asian civilians, and the list goes on from torture, to "comfort woman."
That was All Because The Japanese Did Not Consider The Chinese of The Time, to Be Proper Warriors at ALL ...

And Part of Why they're Very Reticent to Talk About it Even Today ...

However, Against a Foe they Considered if Not an Equal, than at Least a Worthy Opponent, The Outlook of The Japanese Changed to One of Warriors Fighting Warriors, Not Civilians, This is Why Westerners During The War were Treated Much Better than Chinese of a Similar Standing, And Unfortunately The Reason Why Westerners Find it Hard to Understand Pan-Asian Racism, Especially Writ as Large as it Was in The Chinese Theatre!

:eek:

[Fenwick]

That was All Because The Japanese Did Not Consider The Chinese of The Time, to Be Proper Warriors at ALL ...

And Part of Why they're Very Reticent to Talk About it Even Today ...

However, Against a Foe they Considered if Not an Equal, than at Least a Worthy Opponent, The Outlook of The Japanese Changed to One of Warriors Fighting Warriors, Not Civilians, This is Why Westerners During The War were Treated Much Better than Chinese of a Similar Standing, And Unfortunately The Reason Why Westerners Find it Hard to Understand Pan-Asian Racism, Especially Writ as Large as it Was in The Chinese Theatre!

:eek:

Bullshit! :D

The Japanese attacked without thinking of the warrior code, they wanted oil. The warrior code only came into play once they started loosing and needed fantics to hold the Americans back. Otherwise we would have had airplanes crashing into ships on day one, not years later when a weapon was needed. The Empire of Japan went to war because they believed they where better then everyone else, the same reason the Nazi's went to war.

Besides the seven virtues of Bushido where created by the Shogun to keep Samurai, with no wars to fight, busy as not to effect his power base. And if you really want to get into that the virtue of respect calls for a samurai not to be cruel, and having no need to prove their strength.

Lets see showing ones strength... say war, invading other nations? Not being cruel... well I guess all those POW's had it coming then. :rolleyes:

[NapoleonXIV]

Howsabout this. The war goes very badly in the West, England is defeated then Russia drops out.

Now America alone faces a Germany which rules from the Thames to the Vistula. We might be very willing to give Japan a few colonies and some oil in exchange for ending a two front war.

As far as what would happen afterward I think German Japanese relations would be very cool, to say the least, and the Americans would be reminding the Japanese that they really hadn't started the fracas, and we were usually friends before....

[Dean_the_Young]

Howsabout this. The war goes very badly in the West, England is defeated then Russia drops out.

Now America alone faces a Germany which rules from the Thames to the Vistula. We might be very willing to give Japan a few colonies and some oil in exchange for ending a two front war.

As far as what would happen afterward I think German Japanese relations would be very cool, to say the least, and the Americans would be reminding the Japanese that they really hadn't started the fracas, and we were usually friends before....

:confused:

We would stop a war against the nation who attacked and humiliated US, an enemy we are in contact with and we outweigh... to wage a European War (the more unpopular kind) against an enemy who has mastery of the Continent but can't reach us? An enemy, I might add, who really hasn't done anything to the US besides a symbolic gesture, and an enemy that has stopped Britain from being our launch pad.

...WTF? Why focus on a war against someone we don't really care about and can't really reach, while giving up against the one who performed a humiliating (and somewhat treacherous, as it was still during potential negoitations) surprise attack? The world doesn't revolve around Europe, even in WW2.

[Earling]

Japan cannot win OTL WW2.
It could possibly win "crazy fantasy where one man controls the actions of the entire empire and has a deep long term vision on building up Japan".

With that in mind, here is my version.

1. Avoid a Pearl Harbour.
2. Avoid a Tsushima/Trafalgar.

Both are just "Japan loses". Both inspire the average American voter to rally to the flag and both will render any political deal impossible. A treaty would look like giving up or surrender. Given the obvious industrial mis-match such would be unthinkable. The US builds up a new and improved navy and has another go. Japan barring ASB like luck, loses.

What Japan wants is a nothing war, barely makes the headlines in mainland USA. Let the USN steam to the Phillipines. Then trap them there. Fight evasive nothing naval skirmishes with few losses on either side. As far as I can tell, pacific bases or no, the USN is going to struggle to operate properly in strength 7000~ miles from the Mainland. Thats a very long and tenuous supply line. Don't force the issue of the Philippines. Try to convince the USN it has to withdraw from the Phillipines and if it does do not pursue to any great extent.

While this is going on take the Dutch East Indies/Malaysia but avoid attrocities. In China have the army withdraw to a few coastal enclaves and let the hinterlands fall into chaos. Let the Nationalists have it out with the Communists.

Somehow hope Roosevelt loses in '44 (or perhaps dies beforehand) and offer major contracts with American big business. Make a peace deal with whoever wins in '44.

At the table be extremely generous since your taking the long term view. What you want is the Japanese empire to remain (even if it back to its 1936~ border) but all the others to be dissolved or on the way to dissolving. Japan is always going to be in East Asia. The USA on the otherhand is going to be across the Pacific. Britain's position in India is crumbling and the USSR for all its strength is primarilly a European power.

The optimal situation for Japan is in my oppinion as follows. A disunited China beset by infighting. A free Philippines. The Dutch, French and the British out of East Asia (or atleast in a position of extreme weakness.) This will leave Japan in the position (which argueably she was in prior to the war) to build a strong informal empire over much of East Asia. All that remains is to become extremely wealthy on the profits.

The result: Japan has "won" the 20th century.

Unfortunately this requires completely changing the psyche of a nation and taking a long term view probably impossible to reach except through hindsight.

In regards to OTL victory is just not possible. Even if it does (roll on the ASBs) Japans "new" empire is going to be extremely fragile. The USSR will turn up with a shopping list circa 1945-6 in regards to mainland Asia and an embittened USN will be chewing at the bit to wash away the stain failure in the war shall leave.

[NapoleonXIV]

:confused:

We would stop a war against the nation who attacked and humiliated US, an enemy we are in contact with and we outweigh... to wage a European War (the more unpopular kind) against an enemy who has mastery of the Continent but can't reach us? An enemy, I might add, who really hasn't done anything to the US besides a symbolic gesture, and an enemy that has stopped Britain from being our launch pad.

...WTF? Why focus on a war against someone we don't really care about and can't really reach, while giving up against the one who performed a humiliating (and somewhat treacherous, as it was still during potential negoitations) surprise attack? The world doesn't revolve around Europe, even in WW2.

It's what we did in OTL. Japan was put on the back burner early on, the idea was "Europe first"

Given that Russia is out by early 1943 we have ocean spanning bombers raiding NYC and Washington by 1944 at the latest, probably supported by jets based on captured British carriers. We also have major naval engagements in the Atlantic, where we are fighting both Germans and the remnants of the French and British Fleets. By this time we also pretty much know what Hitler has been doing to the Jews and have some idea how much he can be reasoned with. The Japanese are pretty much looking like the lesser of these two evils.

[ZaphodBeeblebrox]

Bullshit! :D

The Japanese attacked without thinking of the warrior code, they wanted oil. The warrior code only came into play once they started loosing and needed fantics to hold the Americans back. Otherwise we would have had airplanes crashing into ships on day one, not years later when a weapon was needed. The Empire of Japan went to war because they believed they where better then everyone else, the same reason the Nazi's went to war.

Besides the seven virtues of Bushido where created by the Shogun to keep Samurai, with no wars to fight, busy as not to effect his power base. And if you really want to get into that the virtue of respect calls for a samurai not to be cruel, and having no need to prove their strength.

Lets see showing ones strength... say war, invading other nations? Not being cruel... well I guess all those POW's had it coming then. :rolleyes:
That Being Said, WW II Can't Be Completely Understood without Understanding The Close-Cousin Racism Inherent in Pretty Much EVERY Theatre ...

Furthermore if The IJA and The IJN Seem to Be Reading from Incompatibly Different Play-Books, That's Because in a Strong Sense they are!

Starting in The Late 19th Century, The Army was Trained By Prussian Drill Sergeants Straight from The German Empire, who Taught The Green Japanese That No One was Better than they Were with The Possible Exception of Germany himself, with Even this Caveat Tending to Get Waived as Soon as The Instructors were Out of Earshot ...

Meanwhile at Almost The Exact Same Time, as CalBear Noted, British Navel Instructors were Schooling The Fledgling Japanese in the Art of The Decisive Battle, Quite Frankly The Differing Lessons Couldn't Have Been More Suited to Driving Apart The Rival Services if they'd Tried!

Thus, you have an Army that Believes The Ends Justify The Means and a Navy that Believes The Means Justify The Ends, whereas By The Time World War II Rolls Around it was Now The Reverse, with The Army Needing to Score War-Winning Victories and The Navy that is Tasked with Achieving a Difficult Stalemate ...

Moreover, this Would Have Ameliorated My Previous Point of The Army Having a Philosophy of Loot and Pillage and The Navy Having an Attitude Often Mistaken for European Chivalry, And May Have Allowed them to Get Over their Differences and Actually Work Together Every Once-in-a-While!

[Dean_the_Young]

It's what we did in OTL. Japan was put on the back burner early on, the idea was "Europe first"

Given that Russia is out by early 1943 we have ocean spanning bombers raiding NYC and Washington by 1944 at the latest, probably supported by jets based on captured British carriers. We also have major naval engagements in the Atlantic, where we are fighting both Germans and the remnants of the French and British Fleets. By this time we also pretty much know what Hitler has been doing to the Jews and have some idea how much he can be reasoned with. The Japanese are pretty much looking like the lesser of these two evils.

Yes, but we were also crushing Japan with our leftovers. There was never any intention to let up on Japan. The public opinion alone...

With Russia and England out, what's the point for Germany, or the US, to keep fighting? Ignoring the impossibility of a German invasion of Britain (though I could see part of the peace being no American troops in Britain), any war with Germany becomes a naval war. Not a trans-oceanic bombing fight (which was as much a pipe dream of Germany, and the US could have convenient radar ships and aircover to match and beat down German bombers), not a jet fight (the German jet program would have been slowed down by not being sought as a last resort weapon, not sped up), not even a fair naval fight considering that Germany getting British carriers is close enough to ASB, but also that America has the naval tradition, practice, and expertise with carriers that Germany doesn't.

And as for the Jews, so what? The war was not fought about the Holocaust. The Japanese were killing just as many Asians, and were much more brutal to POWs than Germany ever was outside of the Gestapo.

A naval war with Germany is more a sideshow than the Pacific ever could be. Germany isn't going to be sinking convoys (for no convoys will need to go to Britain, and the rump-USSR could be supplied through the Pacific). Germany isn't going to take any place in the Western hemisphere. Germany is going to focus on preventing the US from landing on North Africa so as to keep the Mediterranean a German lake. There is not driving impetus for the US to swim to Africa, go up through Italy, and fight Germany if it doesn't have to. Especially when Germany can be limited by just having a presence in sub-Saharan Africa (such as from Liberia).

WW2 is not some destined struggle against the Nazis. There is no driving reason why the US has to save Europe from a European state. FDR had more sympathy for the USSR than for the old European states, and quite frankly thought Europe had brought this all down upon itself.

[Thunderfire]

if the Japanese Won the second world war. What do Ya'll think would happen

Depends on how the win. Turn then into an allied power would be the easiest solution for a japanese victory - they most likely gain some territory and the bargain table. A more aggresive and successfull sovietunion would be PoD in this TL.

[Bulldawg85]

By Contrast, Under NO Means was One to Attack Unarmed Civillians, Even Those Carrying Supplies to your Enemy, This was Part of Why European Merchants were Even Allowed to Do Business in Japan, During The Age of The Warring Empires!

Well then who on earth was responsible for the Nanking Massacre, Changjiao massacre, the Three Alls Policy in china ("Kill All", "Burn All" and "Loot All"), Unit 731, forced labour by Asian civilians, and the list goes on from torture, to "comfort woman."

Not to mention a little thing called the Bataan Death March. Considering how many US servicemen died on that march either from malnourishment, dehydration, or the bayonet when they couldn't keep up. Any claims that the Japanese treated westerners better than Chinese rings a little hollow.

[ZaphodBeeblebrox]

Not to mention a little thing called the Bataan Death March. Considering how many US servicemen died on that march either from malnourishment, dehydration, or the bayonet when they couldn't keep up. Any claims that the Japanese treated westerners better than Chinese rings a little hollow.
As Noted ...

Any Comparison of The Actions of The Japanese Army with The Japanese Navy, is as Useless as Comparing Apples and Oranges ...

The Two Rival Services Not Only Had a COMPLETELY Different Ethos, they Actively Hated Each Other Because of it!

:eek:

[Prinz Richard Eugen]

Many posters seem to feel that if Japan avoids war with the United States, it would easily be smashed by the Soviet war machine - once the Germans had been defeated by the Allies.

The major problem with this concept is the matter of logistics. The main line of supply is still the Trans-Siberian RR. Sovet ships would be unable to bring any significant supplies to the Soviet Far Eastern Territories. Transport by air would beminor in comparison to the other sources. Assuming the Soviets could supply even more than OTL 1945 build-up without provoking a Japanese attack, the RR would be difficult, if not impossible, to guard against once the war began.

In this time line, the Japanese would have even more troops in China and Manchuria/Korea. They would be better quality and would have more supplies. When Japan sees Stalin re-enforcing the Far East, even more ,en and equipment would be sent there. There would be no loss of equipment caused by bombing and sinking of the Japanese merchant marine. The well-trained pilots of the IJN and IJA would be available in larger numbers. The blueprints suplied by the Germans would transformed into better weapons for the Japanese.

I think the prospects of a Soviet victory would not be as good as implied by these posters.

[CalBear]

Many posters seem to feel that if Japan avoids war with the United States, it would easily be smashed by the Soviet war machine - once the Germans had been defeated by the Allies.

The major problem with this concept is the matter of logistics. The main line of supply is still the Trans-Siberian RR. Sovet ships would be unable to bring any significant supplies to the Soviet Far Eastern Territories. Transport by air would beminor in comparison to the other sources. Assuming the Soviets could supply even more than OTL 1945 build-up without provoking a Japanese attack, the RR would be difficult, if not impossible, to guard against once the war began.

In this time line, the Japanese would have even more troops in China and Manchuria/Korea. They would be better quality and would have more supplies. When Japan sees Stalin re-enforcing the Far East, even more ,en and equipment would be sent there. There would be no loss of equipment caused by bombing and sinking of the Japanese merchant marine. The well-trained pilots of the IJN and IJA would be available in larger numbers. The blueprints suplied by the Germans would transformed into better weapons for the Japanese.

I think the prospects of a Soviet victory would not be as good as implied by these posters.

The IJA was, simply put, utterly incapable of facing ANY combined Arms army, regardless of origin. The example of the Red Army, both in 1938, against the Kwangtung Army (which was Japan's best & brightest) and then in 1945 against what was still the best supplied IJA force, are the endleaves of the same book; in between is the sad history of IJA failure to moderize in any practical way coupled with a belief that elan was more important than proper tactics and weapons that had been bled out of European armies well before the beginning of the 2nd decade of the 20th Century.

In 1945 the number of Tanks/SP assigned to the Trans-Bakail FRONT of the Red Army equaled more than 50% of the armored platforms the entire Japanese army had possessed from 1939-45 in toto (and it was one of THREE Fronts, just in the Far East Command). Not only was the quanitity of the USSR's armor much higher, but the QUALITY of the tracked component was also much higher. Japan had, at most, 200 tanks that could even be placed onto a battlefied with their Soviet counterparts (the Chi-Nu AKA Type-3, 75mm gun, 50mm max armor) with the slightest hope of use. The rest of the Japanese tank inventory were little more than impromptu gas powered roasters in a combined arms combat enviroment, the type 97, the "medium" tank, had 33 mm of armor, as a comparative the lightly regarded U.S M-3 Stuart light tank of 1941 vintage had 44 mm of protection (the 1945 solid core AP shell fired by the 76mm gun of the T-34 penetrated 60mm of armor at 1,000 meters).

The same sort of overmatch exists throughout the Red Army/IJA inventory. The later version of the YAK-9 were far superior to any Japanese design of the war (at least those that reached prototype stage), with the MIG-15 just 15 months from 1st flight (December 1947) and were built in HUGE numbers (sources vary from 16,500 - 17,800, this is due, in part, to the number of variants and where one draws the line at what really is a YaK-9), as was the La-7 (around 5,500)and the immediate post war La-9 (1,500), The Japanese also had no comparitive to the justly famed Il-2 Sturmovik in the ground attack role (while not personally a fan, one can not deny the effectiveness of the Il-2 in combat). Soviet infantry weapons are also a step ahead of the best that the IJA has to offer, both in the small arms and support weapons category.

Even more importantly, the Red Army UNDERSTOOD how to make these different weapons work as more than just the sum of the individual parts. The war against the Wermacht had produced what might well have been the strongest ground combat force the world had seen to date. The Red Army was, on paper, a major overmatch for the Western allies in 1945, especially if the medium/heavy bomber factor is ignored, against the IJA? No contest.

The transportation difficulties of shipping forces to Siberia didn't prevent the Red Army from shifting 80 DIVISIONS (the entire U.S. Army, in all theaters, mustered 91 divisions) including all their heavy equipment & supplies from Europe to the Far East in the three months immediately following VE Day, while at the same time glowering at the Allies and occupying Eastern Europe.

The Red Army offensive in August of 1945 was not just a matter of running through a thin crust of Japanese troops that had been fought out. The IJA in Manchuria was a winning force and had been for the past five years. They just looked like a bunch of combat rejects because of the way that the Red Army manhandled them through use of fire, manuever, and shock effect (not unlike the way that the Coalition handled the Iraqi Army in 1991).

There is little, if anything that I find worthy of admiration that came out of the USSR, with the exception of the military it built from 1940-45 (and a few rather pretty female athletes). That force, from commanders to foot soldier, I respect immensely. There is little doubt that it could have utterly destroyed the IJA on the Asian mainland regardless of the time frame or the morale level of the IJA just as it did in 1945 (& 1938).

[Amerigo Vespucci]

...in between is the sad history of IJA failure to moderize in any practical way coupled with a belief that elan was more important than proper tactics and weapons that had been bled out of European armies well before the beginning of the 2nd decade of the 20th Century.

Which raises an interesting point. If anyone's interested in how the world might've developed militarily without WWI or with a smaller version of that war, simply look at the Japanese land forces of WWII, and you'll have a pretty good idea. Note that this obviously doesn't address air power.

[ZaphodBeeblebrox]

Which raises an interesting point. If anyone's interested in how the world might've developed militarily without WWI or with a smaller version of that war, simply look at the Japanese land forces of WWII, and you'll have a pretty good idea. Note that this obviously doesn't address air power.
Well, a LOT of that is Because they Found themselves on The Wrong Side of that War ...

Against their Former Trainers ...

In Fact, that Alone Contributed More than Anything Else to The Mutual Animosity Between The IJA and The IJN!

:eek:

[OperationGreen]

I think I saw a whole book about possible variants of Japanese victory on Amazon.

Edit:here it is:
http://www.amazon.ca/Rising-Sun-Victorious-Alternate-Japanese/dp/185367446X


Mind you that I think there is also another book with this topic.

Got the book and its very interesting reading.

[NHBL]

Suppose that the various European governments in exile ofered to sell mineral rights, or even entire colonies, to Japan so as to raise money for their causes. Now the US embargo isn't as painful as it was in OTL.
Sure the price is low, because the negotiations include hints of, "If you don't sell, we'll take it," but it is legally sold.

Still Britian's obstruction is becoming a headache for Japan, and Japan attacks British posessions such as Singapore, and seizes them. They are careful not to attack anything belonging to the USA. The ideal time to launch such an attack is right after Germany does something to piss off the USA again, like another Reuben James sinking.

Now Japan is at war Britian, but not the USA, and might be able to keep what it takes. For that matter, Japan could make an offer to assist the USSR in exchange for British recognition of its conquests...and put itself on the winning side. (I don't see Japan allowing a little thing like an alliance with Germany standing in the way of expediancy. If they wanted to, they could always say that Germany's sneak attack on a nation it had a non-agression pact with was an act of unspeakable treachery that rendered Germany unfit to associate with an honorable nation. Wartime propaganda doesn't resemble truth in any way.)

[antisocrates]

IRL, Japan had no chance of anything except defeat of one form or another. Perhaps they get lucky and coughs up everything except Korea and Formosa, and that's the best case scenario. Now, if we start fantasizing, well, anything can happen. The line between fantasy and even a sliver of verislimitude lies in that in any AH where verislimitude matters, the Nazis win in Europe. One such scenario might be if Japan and Germany coordinated Operation Barbarosa.Yes, by 1945, the Red Army was so overwhelming that the IJA had no chance. Not so in 1941. Japan did not take 1938 seriously, which is why they allowed Zhukov the time to build an overwhelming materiel advantage, given the disparity in logistics between the T-S railway and Japan to Machuria. Furthermore, at the time of Barbarosa, Japan had superior pilots and equivalent planes to make up for its lack of tanks. If Germany and Japan simultaneously attacked the USSR, Japan would've had air superiority in the East, which would've gone a long way in making up for its shitty, nonexistent armored forces. Now let's posit a slightly smarter Hitler. It's still a slim chance, given the logistic difficulties Wehrmacht faced, but it's conceivable that a twin assault against the USSR from West and East, and Manstein in operational command (without Hitler's interference) might just tip the scale and take out Stalin by 1942. In this scenario, the Axis Powers would be in a great position. Especially if we diverge from RL and posit that Germany started on the total war economy from the very beginning. If Germany can successfully take out Britain by 1943 (overwhelming air superiority due to massively increased fighter production and no Eastern Front, ergo British navy either flees or gets sunk to the bottom of the Channel, the Krauts land, blah blah blah), then the US would not have the necessary base to conduct a war in Europe. Who cares if the US develops A-bomb? Not when there's no way to deliver it to Berlin.

[antisocrates]

Now comes the fantasy. Let's say that Japan began developing abombs in the early 30's. The leaders believe they will have one by 1938 at the latest, and will have them in mass production by 41. (In another fit of fantasy, Hokkaido has massive deposits of Uranium... ) Japan goes to war in 41 in completely rational calculation, thinking that abombs would negate American industrial advantage. So they start the war with over 100 abombs. They gradually build up a link across the Pacific, until they have enough bases to provide logistical support for invading Alaska and Hawaii. Both Alaska and Hawaii are protected by massive forces so overwhelming that the US thinks it would be suicidal for Japan to attack either. And it would be, in conventional sense. Japan just drops abombs and mops up the rest, taking over both. From there, Japan repeatedly stymies all attempts to relieve them by dropping abombs to prevent any US troop concentrations and make possible for overwhelming Japanese superiority in any operational encounters. Thus Japan builds a corridor from Alaska to Washington, a corridor that should not exist because they were vulnerable to turning movements at any point in that long distance, except Japanese abombs make any American troop concentration necessary to cut off Japanese impossible. From there, Japan successfully lands on San Fran and builds a beachhead, thanks again to abombs. By this time, so much resources are being used against Japan, that the Nazis start winning. The US asks for a negotiated settlement, and Japan agrees. Voilla! Or if this is too far-fetched, then just send abomb-armed Japan in a romp across Siberia all the way to Moscow, ending the war in the East by 42 and the two empires joining forces against the Allies. London is nuked and the Brits surrender. Only in fantasy white supremacists wholly embrace Asian monkeys, and together they build bases from the North Sea to Canada, utilizing latest Uboats, German fighters, surface fleet, and a part of IJN carrier force brought through Suez when the Brits surrendered. The Axis nukes DC (and NYC if FDR proves stubborn). Game over.

[Max Sinister]

(In another fit of fantasy, Hokkaido has massive deposits of Uranium... )

Now that bit is ASBish. Was there uranium in Manchuria?

[Dean_the_Young]

Now that bit is ASBish. Was there uranium in Manchuria?

"A bit" ASBish? Japan neither had the scientists, the technology, or the industry to run anything approaching the Manhattan project. Much of the theory the prompted the race for the bomb came from Europe across the 30s.

[Wendell]

Want Japan to win? Don't have them fight the Americans.

[Bavarian Raven]

...they could have come to a "truce" with america if they had fought smartly and done a few things right...i'll explain tomorrow, my battery is dying so i got to go...

[Wendell]

...they could have come to a "truce" with america if they had fought smartly and done a few things right...i'll explain tomorrow, my battery is dying so i got to go...

I'd like this explanation. Maybe you could get the Americans to surrender Guam, and grant early independence to the Philippines, but it won't be easy.

[Boydfish]

I'll freely grant that this idea is a bit on far side, but hear me out, will ya?

The Japanese obtaining a favourable end of conflict situation requires a few things. First, they need to create a resource and industry base that will allow them to be essentially self-sufficient. Second, they need to do that without getting into a shooting war with the US. As we saw in our world, the US industrial capacity would eventually fall on them like a pack of hungry wolves on a sheep.

The blow to the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour was impressive, but it really did little to advance the Japanese war effort: It simply gave the US a reason to make war on them. The keys to Japan's success were the resources and industry in Manchuria(Manchuko) and the oil in the DEIs. Toss in grabbing Hong Kong simply because it was nearby and there you have the big efforts done.

The departure I'm suggesting is that the Japanese bypass Pearl, as well as Kiska and Attu and...attack Esquimalt and sieze Vancouver Island, along with the Queen Charlotte Islands. The elegance of the plan is brilliant. The defences in British Columbia were at that point, as close to zero as you can get without being totally uninhabited. Yes, the IJN would be arriving on station with dry fuel bunkers, but the opposing fleet would be one obsolete frigate and a few militia regiments that were already stripped bare for the war in Europe. British Columbia was never a real priority for the Canadians.

Figure landings near Victoria, Nanaimo, Port Alberni and near the north end of the island and you've got the whole thing bottled up. Victoria would see the most resistance, but as I noted before, these are old men and young boys manning the positions.

The justification for war would be along the lines of claiming support for it's allies in Berlin by waging war on Britain. The benefit for Germany would be massive. First, it would take the Canadian war effort right out of the war for at least 5 years. The Canadians wouldn't be able to get anything to British Columbia in force, then spooled up to cross the Georgia Strait for that long, especially with Japanese bombers hitting into the mainland. Japan also gets the coal and lumber resources(Funny side note, if you read the memoirs of the Canadian PM at the time, Japan briefly continued to get lumber shipments from BC after Pearl Harbour)as a bonus.

Now, the US would certainly be unhappy with the Japanese, but there wouldn't be a big enough rage to wage war. With no German declaration of war and no bombing of US territory, it wouldn't be "their" war. As well, the fear would be that with Japan now in North America, the US would need to shift a great deal of defence infrastructure to the Pacific North West and Alaska. The US attention would also slip away from Asia as a result. It's hard to argue that the US needs a big presence in the Phillipines when the IJN can now fly and sail right up to Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego. America does not want to fight on it's own shores.

The idea would be that with a solid hold in North America, the US and Japan settle down into a Cold War, with both sides not looking to fight for their own reasons.

[adam888]

The Japanese never had the military power to project sufficient force
to threaten the American coast. It took the US Navy until the fall of
1943 with task force 50 to even begin a Central Pacific Offensive.

I really think the only way for the Japanese to come out of WW2
intact was to partner with Germany and help defeat the Russians.
A strong Germany would require the maximum effort of the allies
and take pressure off of the Japanese. It's possible an agreement
could be reached with Roosevelt to scale back Japanese
expansion in the Pacific by allowing Oil and Steel trade with the
USA so that the most of the resources could be switched to
Europe.

If the Japanese withdrew from Indochina and much of China, the
resources from Korea, Manchuria and Siberia might have given
them powerful incentive to become neutral in any major war
with the allies. If they could get enough oil out of Sakhalin
and with trade with the USA, they could emerge out of WW2
intact.

[Dean_the_Young]

I'll freely grant that this idea is a bit on far side, but hear me out, will ya?

The Japanese obtaining a favourable end of conflict situation requires a few things. First, they need to create a resource and industry base that will allow them to be essentially self-sufficient. Second, they need to do that without getting into a shooting war with the US. As we saw in our world, the US industrial capacity would eventually fall on them like a pack of hungry wolves on a sheep.

The blow to the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour was impressive, but it really did little to advance the Japanese war effort: It simply gave the US a reason to make war on them. The keys to Japan's success were the resources and industry in Manchuria(Manchuko) and the oil in the DEIs. Toss in grabbing Hong Kong simply because it was nearby and there you have the big efforts done.

The departure I'm suggesting is that the Japanese bypass Pearl, as well as Kiska and Attu and...attack Esquimalt and sieze Vancouver Island, along with the Queen Charlotte Islands. The elegance of the plan is brilliant. The defences in British Columbia were at that point, as close to zero as you can get without being totally uninhabited. Yes, the IJN would be arriving on station with dry fuel bunkers, but the opposing fleet would be one obsolete frigate and a few militia regiments that were already stripped bare for the war in Europe. British Columbia was never a real priority for the Canadians.

Figure landings near Victoria, Nanaimo, Port Alberni and near the north end of the island and you've got the whole thing bottled up. Victoria would see the most resistance, but as I noted before, these are old men and young boys manning the positions.

The justification for war would be along the lines of claiming support for it's allies in Berlin by waging war on Britain. The benefit for Germany would be massive. First, it would take the Canadian war effort right out of the war for at least 5 years. The Canadians wouldn't be able to get anything to British Columbia in force, then spooled up to cross the Georgia Strait for that long, especially with Japanese bombers hitting into the mainland. Japan also gets the coal and lumber resources(Funny side note, if you read the memoirs of the Canadian PM at the time, Japan briefly continued to get lumber shipments from BC after Pearl Harbour)as a bonus.

Now, the US would certainly be unhappy with the Japanese, but there wouldn't be a big enough rage to wage war. With no German declaration of war and no bombing of US territory, it wouldn't be "their" war. As well, the fear would be that with Japan now in North America, the US would need to shift a great deal of defence infrastructure to the Pacific North West and Alaska. The US attention would also slip away from Asia as a result. It's hard to argue that the US needs a big presence in the Phillipines when the IJN can now fly and sail right up to Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego. America does not want to fight on it's own shores.

The idea would be that with a solid hold in North America, the US and Japan settle down into a Cold War, with both sides not looking to fight for their own reasons.

Two reasons this is pure ASB. First, Japan never had the capability to reach the West Coast in any force; even Hawaii was beyond Japan's troop reach, and Japan already had all its troops committed elsewhere. Any Japanese force that reached Canada would immediately start dying of starvation and from Canadian and American forces, and no supplies worth the cost would be returned to Japan. And America would get involved in any invasion in North America, or even Axis influence in South America; it's just too close to home to NOT be a strategic issue.

And also, everyone who says "if Japan had ignored Peal, the US wouldn't have entered the war, etc. etc. etc." ignore the very important fact that it wasn't Pearl that Japan cared about, but that it was the Philippines. The Philippines that sit right between Japan and South East Asia, the Philippines from which any hostile power could easily cut off the Japanese supply lines. The US was already embargoing Japan, was already increasingly hostile to Japanese actions in the Pacific, and was taking a very big interest into the status of the European colonies in the Pacific. The US did not want Japan to have them, and the Philippines were the perfect tool to keep Japan from having any benefit received. To have any certain control over the DEI, Japan must have the Philippines. To have the Philippines, Japan must be able to beat the US navy long enough to be able to draw the US into negotiations, of which concessions were expected to be made. And if the US navy must be weakened for the Final Battle, you have to strike it where it ports; Pearl.

[CalBear]

I'll freely grant that this idea is a bit on far side, but hear me out, will ya?

The Japanese obtaining a favourable end of conflict situation requires a few things. First, they need to create a resource and industry base that will allow them to be essentially self-sufficient. Second, they need to do that without getting into a shooting war with the US. As we saw in our world, the US industrial capacity would eventually fall on them like a pack of hungry wolves on a sheep.

The blow to the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour was impressive, but it really did little to advance the Japanese war effort: It simply gave the US a reason to make war on them. The keys to Japan's success were the resources and industry in Manchuria(Manchuko) and the oil in the DEIs. Toss in grabbing Hong Kong simply because it was nearby and there you have the big efforts done.

The departure I'm suggesting is that the Japanese bypass Pearl, as well as Kiska and Attu and...attack Esquimalt and sieze Vancouver Island, along with the Queen Charlotte Islands. The elegance of the plan is brilliant. The defences in British Columbia were at that point, as close to zero as you can get without being totally uninhabited. Yes, the IJN would be arriving on station with dry fuel bunkers, but the opposing fleet would be one obsolete frigate and a few militia regiments that were already stripped bare for the war in Europe. British Columbia was never a real priority for the Canadians.

Figure landings near Victoria, Nanaimo, Port Alberni and near the north end of the island and you've got the whole thing bottled up. Victoria would see the most resistance, but as I noted before, these are old men and young boys manning the positions.

The justification for war would be along the lines of claiming support for it's allies in Berlin by waging war on Britain. The benefit for Germany would be massive. First, it would take the Canadian war effort right out of the war for at least 5 years. The Canadians wouldn't be able to get anything to British Columbia in force, then spooled up to cross the Georgia Strait for that long, especially with Japanese bombers hitting into the mainland. Japan also gets the coal and lumber resources(Funny side note, if you read the memoirs of the Canadian PM at the time, Japan briefly continued to get lumber shipments from BC after Pearl Harbour)as a bonus.

Now, the US would certainly be unhappy with the Japanese, but there wouldn't be a big enough rage to wage war. With no German declaration of war and no bombing of US territory, it wouldn't be "their" war. As well, the fear would be that with Japan now in North America, the US would need to shift a great deal of defence infrastructure to the Pacific North West and Alaska. The US attention would also slip away from Asia as a result. It's hard to argue that the US needs a big presence in the Phillipines when the IJN can now fly and sail right up to Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego. America does not want to fight on it's own shores.

The idea would be that with a solid hold in North America, the US and Japan settle down into a Cold War, with both sides not looking to fight for their own reasons.


Are you familiar withe Monroe Doctrine?

You are very correct that the U.S. doesn't want to fight along it's own shores. The best way to ensure this is to keep an enemy several thousand miles away. ANY Japanese invasion of B.C. (even if they COULD have projected force that far, which they couldn't) would have been met by robust American AND Canadian response. THis would have put the Japanese into the position of attempting to defend a forward position within land based air range of the entire USAAF & RCAF (Guadacanal but far, far worse). War would have been over in 1943.

Also, as Dean has noted, the real key was the Philippines, and to much lesser extent Guam and Wake. From these locations the U.S was positioned to interdict Japanese shipping from Taiwan to the Java Sea and well within the mid-Pacific defensive perimeter that Japan needed for strategic depth.

Putting themselves into a position where thay couldn't get the supplies from the Java Sea AND having American forces well within their defensive perimeter while having to support an untenable forward base? Even the maddest Japanese planner wouldn't have dreamed of it.

[Boydfish]

First, Japan never had the capability to reach the West Coast in any force; even Hawaii was beyond Japan's troop reach, and Japan already had all its troops committed elsewhere.

Sure they did. I don't know where you got the idea they couldn't. First, they managed to patrol the BC coast with battleships in WW1 without coming into port. Second, the Japanese were able to sail subs up to the coast and shell, so not really that hard. Third, the Pearl operation was done as a giant loop, not a one-way like an invasion of Vancouver Island would be.

Any Japanese force that reached Canada would immediately start dying of starvation and from Canadian and American forces, and no supplies worth the cost would be returned to Japan.

Dying of starvation? Hardly. There are numerous port facilities at that point and all would be able to seamlessly handle the Japanese merchant shipping. Why can I say that with certainty? Because they were already shipping to Japan.

There wouldn't be any US troops involved. The US was strictly isolationist at that point. Remember, thye aren't interested in foriegn wars, except for perhaps Roosevelt. Vancouver Island is a foriegn land, part of the British Empire and it's going to be hard to justify that.

There would also be no credible response from Canada for a looooong time. The Canadians had next to no ability to reach BC in force. Even if they could try to get there, they couldn't mount anything resembling an invasion across the Georgia Strait for years. The bulk of the Canadian Army and the RCAF were oriented towards the war in Europe.

And America would get involved in any invasion in North America, or even Axis influence in South America; it's just too close to home to NOT be a strategic issue.

I'd hardly say that it would be as cut and dried as you're envisioning. The US got invaded at Kiska and Attu around the time of Pearl Harbour, but few Americans rose up over that like they did over Pearl.

Are you familiar withe Monroe Doctrine?

I'm apparently more familiar with it than you; the Monroe Doctrine was specific in that the US would act to prevent any European power from trying to retake it's colonies in the western hemisphere. I don't think that Japan qualifies as "European".

ANY Japanese invasion of B.C....would have been met by robust American AND Canadian response.

First, there is NO robust Canadian response available. The Canadians can't do much and the British naval power in the north eastern Pacific was the single obsolete frigate in Esquimalt(Which after the initial assault would likely be toast). The Canadians were all over in Britain at that point. In 1939, the Canadians wrapped up every man who could still hoist a rifle and wear a uniform. By 1941, the forces left in BC were literally old men and young boys.

Second, it is highly likely that both the British and Canadian governments would have been highly resistive to the US deploying into BC, especially in a combat role. Look at the position of the Canadian government in response to the stationing of US troops in Newfoundland during WW2: The Canadians insisted that they maintain absolute parity with the number of US troops to prevent any ideas of annexation. You'd likely see the same policy invoked by both the British and the Canadians over Vancouver Island. This means that if the US wants to send help, they'll be numerically limited to equal the paltry Canadian response of a few hundred troops. While that might not make sense to Americans, the reality is that both Canadians and British Columbians viewed the US with a high degree of distrust in terms of their ability to keep to their own borders. The Canadians would have rather seen the Japanese occupy Vancouver Island for a few years rather than let the US occupy it for even a day.

[Dean_the_Young]

Sure they did. I don't know where you got the idea they couldn't. First, they managed to patrol the BC coast with battleships in WW1 without coming into port. Second, the Japanese were able to sail subs up to the coast and shell, so not really that hard. Third, the Pearl operation was done as a giant loop, not a one-way like an invasion of Vancouver Island would be.

1. In WW1, they could use American, British, and Canadian coaling ships for resupply. And did. They did not sail from Japan, sail at battle speed (which uses more than 4 times the coal), and return to Japan on their own.

2. Said subs, surprise surprise, having to sail at the extreme edge of their range after mid-transit resupplying from another sub in order to bombard... a field. And considering how subs have a much longer range and a much smaller resource requirement, that says nothing about how a Japanese force (with troops ships!) could get there.

3. Pearl was at a giant loop which was at the far end of the Japanese carrier range (not troop transport or BB range, which is shorter). The Japanese were essentially completely vulnerable in the raid, and they knew it; Japanese headquarters was prepared to except the loss of most of the task force in exchange for less damage than they actually received. As Japanese carriers, troop ships, warships, and supply convoys would not have use of ports to resupply from, and were also detailed for other operations in the South East Pacific (another article in the website below), they would not have the resources or range to... basically achieve nothing. Holding BC does nothing to alter the effect of American Philippines and Hawaii, which were the whole purpose of being involved in the East/Central Pacific.

Here's a very good article on Japanese power projection capability of WW2 Japan. Remember also that the NA west coast is much, much farther than Pearl, which was in itself just a raid, not an invasion.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/pearlops.htm


Dying of starvation? Hardly. There are numerous port facilities at that point and all would be able to seamlessly handle the Japanese merchant shipping. Why can I say that with certainty? Because they were already shipping to Japan.


Er, what ports? What ports are going to provide supplies to an invading Japanese force? Where are these ports located? Canada didn't keep shipping much longer after Pearl, remember. (Don't say American; embargo, remember?) That leaves... a Russian Siberian port, which considering the relations at the time is a no-go.

There wouldn't be any US troops involved. The US was strictly isolationist at that point. Remember, thye aren't interested in foriegn wars, except for perhaps Roosevelt. Vancouver Island is a foriegn land, part of the British Empire and it's going to be hard to justify that.

American isolationism has always been aimed at Europe first and foremost, not Asia and especially not the rest of the Americas post-Civil War. Those have always been two areas in the interest of American politics. The China Lobby was a very influential group in Washington at the time. You're also forgetting the Monroe Doctrine (always popular and already pulled in regards to South American colonies) and Fortress America. Key word there being America, and not "USA". US policy (and public oppinion) has always been strongly opposed to anyone getting extra influence/presence in the Americas. Japan was already embargoed as well.

There would also be no credible response from Canada for a looooong time. The Canadians had next to no ability to reach BC in force. Even if they could try to get there, they couldn't mount anything resembling an invasion across the Georgia Strait for years. The bulk of the Canadian Army and the RCAF were oriented towards the war in Europe.

And, lo and behold, when someone shows up on the West Coast the Canadian government is going to shift priorities. American infrastructure will be quickly loaned (just as the road to Alaska used resources from both parts of the border), and the American navy will be present, through. After all, what's BC between? Alaska and the US. American shipping will have to be defended, after all.

And there's always lend-lease. Fighters and destroyers and uniforms, oh my!

I'd hardly say that it would be as cut and dried as you're envisioning. The US got invaded at Kiska and Attu around the time of Pearl Harbour, but few Americans rose up over that like they did over Pearl.


Some strange voice is speaking in my head... it's saying something about how Pearl was a surprise attack on a major American base with massive causalities and damage to the Pacific Fleet that started a war while negotiations were still ongoing, and that the Aleutian Islands were a few unpopulated icy rocks holding a weather station that were seized after a big surprise attack elsewhere. As I don't listen to the voices in my head (I call it L&R, the true name being banned on AH.com), I suppose I can see your point about how there really is no difference between the two.


Ignoring the point of voices, the Japanese force of under 2,500 was denied supply by anything other than submarines after a single naval battle against an outnumbered US force of 6 ships, four of them being destroyers and two cruisers, one being a very old one.

I'm apparently more familiar with it than you; the Monroe Doctrine was specific in that the US would act to prevent any European power from trying to retake it's colonies in the western hemisphere. I don't think that Japan qualifies as "European".

And apparently I'm more familiar than you; the US had already invoked and expanded the Monroe Doctrine against Japan when Japan looked at leasing a port from Mexico.

Japan backed off.



First, there is NO robust Canadian response available. The Canadians can't do much and the British naval power in the north eastern Pacific was the single obsolete frigate in Esquimalt(Which after the initial assault would likely be toast). The Canadians were all over in Britain at that point. In 1939, the Canadians wrapped up every man who could still hoist a rifle and wear a uniform. By 1941, the forces left in BC were literally old men and young boys.

Nice hyperbole, here's another one. No Royal Naval presence will get shifted to Canada from India and Australia while the Japanese navy invests much of its naval capacity into Pacific North East.

Second, it is highly likely that both the British and Canadian governments would have been highly resistive to the US deploying into BC, especially in a combat role. Look at the position of the Canadian government in response to the stationing of US troops in Newfoundland during WW2: The Canadians insisted that they maintain absolute parity with the number of US troops to prevent any ideas of annexation. You'd likely see the same policy invoked by both the British and the Canadians over Vancouver Island. This means that if the US wants to send help, they'll be numerically limited to equal the paltry Canadian response of a few hundred troops. While that might not make sense to Americans, the reality is that both Canadians and British Columbians viewed the US with a high degree of distrust in terms of their ability to keep to their own borders. The Canadians would have rather seen the Japanese occupy Vancouver Island for a few years rather than let the US occupy it for even a day.

Nice point, especially the last one. Clearly, the US could not be trusted in the borders of an ally, at least without having an equal number of local troops present. Which was why American troops in Britain, Greenland, France, and various islands across the Pacific were only permitted when an equal number of local troops were present. And especially why the US navy had to be escorted by an equal force of British/Commonwealth ships, so that the US didn't feel frisky.

Yes, totally have to agree. Uhuh.

And in case you missed the sarcasm, :rolleyes:. The US doesn't even have to send a single trooper into Canada, though it would be likely. Blockading and isolating the Japanese force would be child's play, lend-lease planes and ships could be given to Canada like most everywhere else (and even be gotten back sooner rather than later), and Canadian troops could easily be used in parity to US forces for the amphibious landing once shipped back from Africa and elsewhere. Even Australia might be able to lend some help, as a Japanese push into BC would take much pressure off of the South East Pacific.

[Boydfish]

1. In WW1, they could use American, British, and Canadian coaling ships for resupply. And did. They did not sail from Japan, sail at battle speed (which uses more than 4 times the coal), and return to Japan on their own.

In an age where there is no space borne recon like we have today and where the entire BC coast is unmonitored by air or naval forces, the entire Japanese invasion fleet could advance at it's most economical speed.

2. Said subs, surprise surprise, having to sail at the extreme edge of their range after mid-transit resupplying from another sub in order to bombard... a field. And considering how subs have a much longer range and a much smaller resource requirement, that says nothing about how a Japanese force (with troops ships!) could get there.

The inherent difficulty of resupplying a task force at sea is no greater at that point. I hate to tell you this, but since ships sail every day to and from Japan to south western British Columbia and have for decades at the time in question, you're going to have to accept that it's rather easy. Heck, the Japanese could send a telegram with their intentions to London as they sailed out of Tokyo Harbour: Even if the British know the IJN is going to Vancouver Island, there is nothing they can do about it.

3. Pearl was at a giant loop which was at the far end of the Japanese carrier range (not troop transport or BB range, which is shorter). The Japanese were essentially completely vulnerable in the raid, and they knew it; Japanese headquarters was prepared to except the loss of most of the task force in exchange for less damage than they actually received. As Japanese carriers, troop ships, warships, and supply convoys would not have use of ports to resupply from, and were also detailed for other operations in the South East Pacific (another article in the website below), they would not have the resources or range to... basically achieve nothing. Holding BC does nothing to alter the effect of American Philippines and Hawaii, which were the whole purpose of being involved in the East/Central Pacific.

I think you're conflating the invasion requirements for Vancouver Island with the requirements for invading the Hawaiian island chain. They are vastly different. Hawaii had a massive air, sea and land defence infrastructure. BC had next to none. The small amount of military manpower that BC did have was stripped away almost entirely in 1939 forward for that minor conflict happening in Europe. I suspect you're envisioning a multi-corps level invasion, when the reality is that the entire Japanese invasion force for Vancouver Island would easily be done by 2-3 small brigade groups, plus an initial surge of air assets that would intially be heavily supplemented by the carrier air groups. Once the small amount of resistance was finished off, the carrier air assets would be replaced with a larger shore based contingent to support the occupation forces(Along with dropping the occasional bombs on Vancouver, New Westminster and Prince Rupert).

Er, what ports? What ports are going to provide supplies to an invading Japanese force? Where are these ports located? Canada didn't keep shipping much longer after Pearl, remember. (Don't say American; embargo, remember?) That leaves... a Russian Siberian port, which considering the relations at the time is a no-go.

The ports I was referencing were the porting facilities on Vancouver island itself, in specific, Victoria, Nanaimo and Port Alberni(This one would be highly useful due to it's mid-island location, but with it's channel leading directly to the Pacific).

The supplying ports would be the Japanese ports themselves, both in Japan and on the mainland of Asia.

American isolationism has always been aimed at Europe first and foremost, not Asia and especially not the rest of the Americas post-Civil War.
You're also forgetting the Monroe Doctrine (always popular and already pulled in regards to South American colonies) and Fortress America.
Nice point, especially the last one. Clearly, the US could not be trusted in the borders of an ally, at least without having an equal number of local troops present. Which was why American troops in Britain, Greenland, France, and various islands across the Pacific were only permitted when an equal number of local troops were present. And especially why the US navy had to be escorted by an equal force of British/Commonwealth ships, so that the US didn't feel frisky.

I'll tackle these three together because they are sort of answered by one point. The US Monroe Doctrine cannot be applied. Why? Because the British, the Canadians and the British Columbians would not recognize nor support it, especially in this case. Why? Because the entire idea of the MD is that European countries can't expand or reclaim their territories in the western hemisphere. If the Americans are coming in under the MD, they'd actually have to fight to eject the British Columbian government, the Canadians and the British, along with the Japanese. Remember, the British Crown reclaiming British Columbia might just violate that whole doctrine.

Assuming that the US government was able to try and wrap the Monroe Doctrine up in some way to allow it to come in on the side of the British Empire, the domestic opposition is going to have a field day with that. What you have is US troops fighting and dying to restore the authority of the British Crown over territory in North America. While Reagan certainly got away with that in Grenada(Doubtful that it could be pulled off in this case), if the US government did not make serious, in full and complete public commitments to a restoral of the political order in British Columbia prior to Japanese attack, the British Columbians, the Canadians and British would not permit the US to enter their territory. This would be political suicide for the US government, as a election slogan of "Fight to restore the British Crown in North America!" might not be the best approach.

The only way that the US can get into this war is when somebody throws a punch directly at them. The only thing that overcame the strong US isolationism support was a direct attack on US territory. Taking a punch at the British Empire doesn't meet that threshold.

And, lo and behold, when someone shows up on the West Coast the Canadian government is going to shift priorities. American infrastructure will be quickly loaned (just as the road to Alaska used resources from both parts of the border), and the American navy will be present, through.

The priorities can shift, but the ability to do anything about it is unlikely. First, no matter how you slice it, a small Japanese lodgement on the west coast of North America doesn't compare as a threat to the security of the empire like, say, the German Army camped out in Paris. The British Empire was rather more concerned about Great Britain than Vancouver Island. So the Brits will send less than zero to defend it. In fact, the British are counting on buttloads of support from the Canadians.

But, let's say that you're right and the Canadians withdraw wholesale from Europe and shift all of their military/industrial infrastructure to prepare to take back the islands off the coast of BC. What does that do to Britain's war effort in Europe? Chances are good that they'd collapse at that point. The US isn't in it, they are almost bankrupt and are getting further and further behind. Congrats, the war is over in Europe, leaving Hitler with even more resources to throw into Russia.

After all, what's BC between? Alaska and the US. American shipping will have to be defended, after all.

Defend it to your hearts content. The entire idea is that the Japanese do not want to be in a shooting war with the US. If they do so, it ends with a dose of instant sunrise in Japan, sort of like it did. The Japanese can freely allow US shipping to travel anywhere it likes; there is zero British or Canadian warships in the north eastern Pacific, so they can essentially send the bulk of the fleet back to Japan and simply send everything via container vessels.

And there's always lend-lease. Fighters and destroyers and uniforms, oh my!

Yet again, those industrial resources can be applied to the war in Europe or to fighting in BC. Not both.

By the way, where is the RCN going to pick up these destroyers? Or perhaps more pointedly, where are they going to find the crews to man them? Every destroyer in the world is badly needed in the North Atlantic.

it's saying something about how Pearl was a surprise attack on a major American base with massive causalities and damage to the Pacific Fleet that started a war while negotiations were still ongoing, and that the Aleutian Islands were a few unpopulated icy rocks holding a weather station that were seized after a big surprise attack elsewhere.

In 1941, I seriously doubt 5% of the US population and 10% of Canadian population could find British Columbia on a map. The Canadians only care about BC to the point that they do not want the US or anybody else to occupy it. Telling the average American in 1941 that the Japanese have invaded Vancouver Island would be met with a shrug and a blank stare. Telling the average Canadian would have been met with a Gaullic shrug, a blank stare and a rant about the 'tinking Anglos.

Ignoring the point of voices, the Japanese force of under 2,500 was denied supply by anything other than submarines after a single naval battle against an outnumbered US force of 6 ships, four of them being destroyers and two cruisers, one being a very old one.

Yes, and that was fighting the USN. The US is sitting this one out, remember? They are not only not being attacked, the people being attacked would pointedly not welcome their assistance without them adopting some pretty hard to support from the domestic side of things positions.

No Royal Naval presence will get shifted to Canada from India and Australia while the Japanese navy invests much of its naval capacity into Pacific North East.

Once the Japanese are lodged in Vancouver Island, the naval commitment required drops severely. There is no RN presence there and even less of the RCN(It is ALL in the Atlantic). For the RN to get there, they'd have to sail diagonally across the entire Pacific. Once the Japanese have shore based aircraft operating, any RN force that tried to approach the area would do so with empty fuel bunkers and would be slaughtered.

Unlike the Japanese approach, the RN would be approaching a hostile shore with encamped Japanese troops dug into well defended mountain positions. Go ask a USMC WW2 vet how easy that goes.

The US doesn't even have to send a single trooper into Canada, though it would be likely. Blockading and isolating the Japanese force would be child's play, lend-lease planes and ships could be given to Canada like most everywhere else (and even be gotten back sooner rather than later), and Canadian troops could easily be used in parity to US forces for the amphibious landing once shipped back from Africa and elsewhere.

Assuming that the US is willing to take a stance that is a complete reversal of the basic founding principles of the republic that arose from the intial revolt(I seriously can't see how you're going to make a convincing case that US soldiers should fight and die to restore the British Crown in North America), I'd say that you simply do not understand the essential nature of the problem. There is nothing to send and even if Lend-Lease was used(Disregarding that whole "Handing Hitler Europe" problem), there is no Canadian army in being to use said equipment independently. It took until August 1942 for the Canadians, heavily supported by the British, to undertake the raid on Dieppe, after having started preparing in 1939. Moving that force, then retasking it to try and take Vancouver Island is going to slow it up even further.

[Wendell]

I'll freely grant that this idea is a bit on far side, but hear me out, will ya?

The Japanese obtaining a favourable end of conflict situation requires a few things. First, they need to create a resource and industry base that will allow them to be essentially self-sufficient. Second, they need to do that without getting into a shooting war with the US. As we saw in our world, the US industrial capacity would eventually fall on them like a pack of hungry wolves on a sheep.

The blow to the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbour was impressive, but it really did little to advance the Japanese war effort: It simply gave the US a reason to make war on them. The keys to Japan's success were the resources and industry in Manchuria(Manchuko) and the oil in the DEIs. Toss in grabbing Hong Kong simply because it was nearby and there you have the big efforts done.

The departure I'm suggesting is that the Japanese bypass Pearl, as well as Kiska and Attu and...attack Esquimalt and sieze Vancouver Island, along with the Queen Charlotte Islands. The elegance of the plan is brilliant. The defences in British Columbia were at that point, as close to zero as you can get without being totally uninhabited. Yes, the IJN would be arriving on station with dry fuel bunkers, but the opposing fleet would be one obsolete frigate and a few militia regiments that were already stripped bare for the war in Europe. British Columbia was never a real priority for the Canadians.

Figure landings near Victoria, Nanaimo, Port Alberni and near the north end of the island and you've got the whole thing bottled up. Victoria would see the most resistance, but as I noted before, these are old men and young boys manning the positions.

The justification for war would be along the lines of claiming support for it's allies in Berlin by waging war on Britain. The benefit for Germany would be massive. First, it would take the Canadian war effort right out of the war for at least 5 years. The Canadians wouldn't be able to get anything to British Columbia in force, then spooled up to cross the Georgia Strait for that long, especially with Japanese bombers hitting into the mainland. Japan also gets the coal and lumber resources(Funny side note, if you read the memoirs of the Canadian PM at the time, Japan briefly continued to get lumber shipments from BC after Pearl Harbour)as a bonus.

Now, the US would certainly be unhappy with the Japanese, but there wouldn't be a big enough rage to wage war. With no German declaration of war and no bombing of US territory, it wouldn't be "their" war. As well, the fear would be that with Japan now in North America, the US would need to shift a great deal of defence infrastructure to the Pacific North West and Alaska. The US attention would also slip away from Asia as a result. It's hard to argue that the US needs a big presence in the Phillipines when the IJN can now fly and sail right up to Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San Diego. America does not want to fight on it's own shores.

The idea would be that with a solid hold in North America, the US and Japan settle down into a Cold War, with both sides not looking to fight for their own reasons.

Can you say Vancouver Island Missile Crisis?:p

Seriously, interesting idea, but logistically unfeasible.

[CalBear]

In an age where there is no space borne recon like we have today and where the entire BC coast is unmonitored by air or naval forces, the entire Japanese invasion fleet could advance at it's most economical speed.

And of course the USAAF, USN, RCAF possessed ANY long range air assets, nor did they fly training missions or test flights out ovver the Pacific at any point.



The inherent difficulty of resupplying a task force at sea is no greater at that point. I hate to tell you this, but since ships sail every day to and from Japan to south western British Columbia and have for decades at the time in question, you're going to have to accept that it's rather easy.

The entire point, which seems to be missed here, is that we are talking 1941, not 2007 or even 1961. The refueling of escort ships was an exceptionally difficult evolution, especially for the IJN. It was the USN beginning in late 1943 that more or less invented effective underway replenishment at considerable distance from friendly ports (it was a skill that the RN had never been forced to develop since there wasn't anyplace that far from British territory). The Japanese ability to replenish was rudimentary, especially at this point in time.

Regarding your point from an earlier post on IJN battleships operating near U.S. waters during WW I without need for refueling I would point out that these were COAL fired vessels, oil burning ships require more frequent refueling, especially if they, as carriers must do to conduct air operations, are operating in excess of 25 knots. If you are screening a carrier going 25 knots into the wind (which BTW at this latitude requires you to steer AWAY from North America most of the time) that means you have to be going at least the same speed, in the case of DD, CL & CA units, faster, again burning off fuel at a spectacular rate.


Heck, the Japanese could send a telegram with their intentions to London as they sailed out of Tokyo Harbour: Even if the British know the IJN is going to Vancouver Island, there is nothing they can do about it.


This is just silly hyperboyle, although it is interesting to see. It seems that the British were NOT obtaining Lend-Lease ITTL; if they were they could divert some of the hundreds of planes and pilots WITHIN Canada to the Northwest. Of course since Canada appears to not have a military at this time, it probably wouldn't matter



I think you're conflating the invasion requirements for Vancouver Island with the requirements for invading the Hawaiian island chain. They are vastly different. Hawaii had a massive air, sea and land defence infrastructure. BC had next to none. The small amount of military manpower that BC did have was stripped away almost entirely in 1939 forward for that minor conflict happening in Europe. I suspect you're envisioning a multi-corps level invasion, when the reality is that the entire Japanese invasion force for Vancouver Island would easily be done by 2-3 small brigade groups, plus an initial surge of air assets that would intially be heavily supplemented by the carrier air groups. Once the small amount of resistance was finished off, the carrier air assets would be replaced with a larger shore based contingent to support the occupation forces(Along with dropping the occasional bombs on Vancouver, New Westminster and Prince Rupert).

It is rather stunning the utter lack of understanding of logistics that this paragraph presents. Two or three Brigades? The IJN couldn't have provided FOOD for three Brigades at that distance, even against fairly minor opposition. (Again I would point the disaster that befell the Japanese garrision on Guadacanal, this was in an AO where Japan had close to air parity AND effective parity, if not superiority over the naval forces that the allies could muster) Even if the British couldn't send a surface force, which is not factually correct (since ITTL the PoW & Repulse would not be sitting a the bottom of the Gulf of Siam nee: Thailand), they could certainly send some subs. History has shown quite conclusively how vulnerable Japanese supply vessels were to submarine attack (any conjecture regarding a sudden Japanese convoy system adoption is both excluded by the evidence of OTL AND by IJN strategic & tactical doctrine). Even if the U.S. had no interest in engaging the Japanese directly (a point that is ludicrious to the point of being ASB), there is no doubt that the U.S. would provide, at the least, logistical facilities to the RN that was engaging the Japanese.

I am also quite curious about this "initial surge" of air assets 'that would be INITIALLY heavily supplemented by carrier air groups". When did the Japanese develop air assets capable of crossing the Pacific, even at the latitude under discussion, to support any military operation. For that matter which WW II combatant had that sort of ability during the war? (IIRC the first combat aircraft with this sort of range was the B-36, and it didn't even fly for the first time until August 1946.) In fact, given the sea state in the region in winter, any carrier based air operation is something of a crapshoot, even today (several of the IJN carriers had less than stellar handling characteristics in heavy seas).



The ports I was referencing were the porting facilities on Vancouver island itself, in specific, Victoria, Nanaimo and Port Alberni(This one would be highly useful due to it's mid-island location, but with it's channel leading directly to the Pacific).

All of which would, of course be captured intact, no one on the island having time to plant any explosives, even as the invasion slowly developed

The supplying ports would be the Japanese ports themselves, both in Japan and on the mainland of Asia.

Which are several thousand miles from B.C.





I'll tackle these three together because they are sort of answered by one point. The US Monroe Doctrine cannot be applied. Why? Because the British, the Canadians and the British Columbians would not recognize nor support it, especially in this case. Why? Because the entire idea of the MD is that European countries can't expand or reclaim their territories in the western hemisphere. If the Americans are coming in under the MD, they'd actually have to fight to eject the British Columbian government, the Canadians and the British, along with the Japanese. Remember, the British Crown reclaiming British Columbia might just violate that whole doctrine.

Assuming that the US government was able to try and wrap the Monroe Doctrine up in some way to allow it to come in on the side of the British Empire, the domestic opposition is going to have a field day with that. What you have is US troops fighting and dying to restore the authority of the British Crown over territory in North America. While Reagan certainly got away with that in Grenada(Doubtful that it could be pulled off in this case), if the US government did not make serious, in full and complete public commitments to a restoral of the political order in British Columbia prior to Japanese attack, the British Columbians, the Canadians and British would not permit the US to enter their territory. This would be political suicide for the US government, as a election slogan of "Fight to restore the British Crown in North America!" might not be the best approach.

The only way that the US can get into this war is when somebody throws a punch directly at them. The only thing that overcame the strong US isolationism support was a direct attack on US territory. Taking a punch at the British Empire doesn't meet that threshold.

Where to begin...

Ah, yes... It really doesn't MATTER if Canada, London, Delhi, Paris, Tokyo or anywhere else recognizes the U.S authority to invoke the Doctrine, it is just going to be invoked. Somehow, given the scenario, I can't see Churchill objecting to the U.S. throwing in on this, even if it took the Doctrine to make it happen (which it wouldn't).

The U.S. was isolationist, although to a much lesser degree in 1940-41 than in 1931 or even 1936, towards Europe. About the Japanese? Different matter entirely. Beyond the threat that a Japanese base would so clearly present to America, even beyond the fact that, since Naking, the Japanese had been painted as pointed (if buck)-toothed demons in the American media, there is the simple, if distastful, fact of American rascism. ALLOW the (insert racist phrase of choice here) to rule over white men? Allow the YELLOW PERIL to establish a base right off the American coast? Yea, that would have happened.

The U.S. put thousands of AMERICAN CITIZENS who were of Japanese ancestry into prison camps out of fear and racism. It was illegal for a person of Japanese decent to MARRY a white person in 30 of U.S. states, including all those on the West coast. Let the IJN establish a base inside of spitting distance of American territory? Not a chance in hell.

You are a war & a half late to have any political party play the anti-Britain card as protrayed (and an election & a half late to play the isolationist card). American ships were already fighting a shadow war in support of the British in the Atlantic, the Germans had already sunk the Reuben James while it was escorting a BRITISH convoy. American volunteer pilots were, with the consent of the U.S. government, already flying for the RAF (and, it should be noted, against the Japanese in China as the Flying Tigers in American supplied P-40's, this was like a squadron of F-15's being flown by Americans in support of the Afghans against the USSR in 1979). The U.S. was sending the British as much equipment as could be loaded off American docks.



The priorities can shift, but the ability to do anything about it is unlikely. First, no matter how you slice it, a small Japanese lodgement on the west coast of North America doesn't compare as a threat to the security of the empire like, say, the German Army camped out in Paris. The British Empire was rather more concerned about Great Britain than Vancouver Island. So the Brits will send less than zero to defend it. In fact, the British are counting on buttloads of support from the Canadians.

But, let's say that you're right and the Canadians withdraw wholesale from Europe and shift all of their military/industrial infrastructure to prepare to take back the islands off the coast of BC. What does that do to Britain's war effort in Europe? Chances are good that they'd collapse at that point. The US isn't in it, they are almost bankrupt and are getting further and further behind. Congrats, the war is over in Europe, leaving Hitler with even more resources to throw into Russia.

You may be right that the British couldn't afford to send forces to dislodge the Japanese (although I doubt it, by December of '41, the crisis point had passed, if one had ever existed). They wouldn't have had to, the U.S. would do it for them



Defend it to your hearts content. The entire idea is that the Japanese do not want to be in a shooting war with the US. If they do so, it ends with a dose of instant sunrise in Japan, sort of like it did. The Japanese can freely allow US shipping to travel anywhere it likes; there is zero British or Canadian warships in the north eastern Pacific, so they can essentially send the bulk of the fleet back to Japan and simply send everything via container vessels.



Yet again, those industrial resources can be applied to the war in Europe or to fighting in BC. Not both.

By the way, where is the RCN going to pick up these destroyers? Or perhaps more pointedly, where are they going to find the crews to man them? Every destroyer in the world is badly needed in the North Atlantic.



In 1941, I seriously doubt 5% of the US population and 10% of Canadian population could find British Columbia on a map. The Canadians only care about BC to the point that they do not want the US or anybody else to occupy it. Telling the average American in 1941 that the Japanese have invaded Vancouver Island would be met with a shrug and a blank stare. Telling the average Canadian would have been met with a Gaullic shrug, a blank stare and a rant about the 'tinking Anglos.



Yes, and that was fighting the USN. The US is sitting this one out, remember? They are not only not being attacked, the people being attacked would pointedly not welcome their assistance without them adopting some pretty hard to support from the domestic side of things positions.



Once the Japanese are lodged in Vancouver Island, the naval commitment required drops severely. There is no RN presence there and even less of the RCN(It is ALL in the Atlantic). For the RN to get there, they'd have to sail diagonally across the entire Pacific. Once the Japanese have shore based aircraft operating, any RN force that tried to approach the area would do so with empty fuel bunkers and would be slaughtered.

Unlike the Japanese approach, the RN would be approaching a hostile shore with encamped Japanese troops dug into well defended mountain positions. Go ask a USMC WW2 vet how easy that goes.



Assuming that the US is willing to take a stance that is a complete reversal of the basic founding principles of the republic that arose from the intial revolt(I seriously can't see how you're going to make a convincing case that US soldiers should fight and die to restore the British Crown in North America), I'd say that you simply do not understand the essential nature of the problem. There is nothing to send and even if Lend-Lease was used(Disregarding that whole "Handing Hitler Europe" problem), there is no Canadian army in being to use said equipment independently. It took until August 1942 for the Canadians, heavily supported by the British, to undertake the raid on Dieppe, after having started preparing in 1939. Moving that force, then retasking it to try and take Vancouver Island is going to slow it up even further.

Rather than debunk every other point individually (mostly because they are rehashes of the points already discussed), I will just state this:

If you believe that, despite all the points that have been already noted that illustrate that this rather unique scenario is utterly untennable there is no reason to continue any conversation. The facts, logistical realities, force limitations, political and cultural realities of the era, and strategic necessities of the American position, most especially concerning Alaska (and the Japanese strategic realities regarding the Philippines) all make this idea pure ASB. One thing about this board is that one learns to stop fighting an ASB idea that someone refuses to see as ASB.

[Dean_the_Young]

Thank you, Calbear! You said most of what I was going to, but I don't have the time today for such a drawn out quoting.

To Boydfish, read the articles from that website I indicated (and which you apparently did not read). It is a comprehensive site on the IJN, with analysis of the ships, the doctrines, and underlying strategies/necessities of the Japanese war. Not everyone will present any site at all, let alone one as comprehensive and well researched as this one. Don't waste it.