A Fitter Italian Military

[Croesus]

Discussion thread

Il Duce said many things. Some he meant, others he did not. He liked to say one thing and then another; it confused issues and attracted attention. However there were things that he consistently said over the years that he consistently meant. One of those things, and certainly the most significant thing, was that he meant to make war. His sometime rival and sometime ally Adolf Hitler knew this; “So long as the Duce lives, one can rest assured that Italy will seize every opportunity to achieve its imperialistic aims”. Whatever the situation that confronted him, there was no doubt in Il Duce’s mind as to who was in charge; "You must all understand that I am not be contradicted because it only raises bouts in my mind and diverts me from what I know to be the right path, whereas my own animal instincts are always right".

Il Duce preferred a foreign policy of making a nuisance of himself by small-scale provocation in the hope that a situation might emerge that he could exploit. He saw war as a path to glory, as a means to an immortal end, as a right of passage that would transform Italy, and by extension himself, into something great and powerful. He would say that “… war alone could make a people truly noble…” that “"... [Italian] policy would continue to be based on a strong army and on the fact it was war and not peace that would bring the necessary change to Europe..."

He saw the challenge that faced Italy in very clear terms; “Italy… is bathed by a landlocked sea that communicates with the oceans through the Suez Canal, an artificial link easily blocked even by improvised methods, and through the straits of Gibraltar, dominated by the cannons of Great Britain. Italy therefore does not have free connection with the oceans. Italy is therefore in truth a prisoner of the Mediterranean, and the more populous and prosper Italy becomes, the more its imprisonment will gall. The bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunis, Malta, Cyprus. The sentinels of this prison are Gibraltar and Suez. Corsica is a pistol pointed at the heart of Italy; Tunisia at Sicily; while Malta and Cyprus constitute a threat to all our positions in the eastern and western Mediterranean. Greece, Turkey, Egypt have been ready to form a chain with Great Britain and to complete the politico-military encirclement of Italy. Greece, Turkey, Egypt must be considered virtual enemies of Italy and of its expansion”.

On May 22 1939 Italy and Germany joined in the ‘Pact of Steel’, a purely offensive alliance that was the culmination in an often stormy relationship that extended back to the Abyssinian crisis of 1935 and the mutual interests in the Spanish Civil War, not to mention the commonalities between Fascism and National Socialism, and the personal relationship between the two dictators. In August 1939 Il Duce was invited to get in step with the Fuhrer as he prepared for the invasion of Poland; in the event Il Duce balked because he knew that Italy could not make war as it’s army was at that time incapable.

This TL sets out to examine how a more capable Italian army might have developed and what it may have looked like; it looks at the impact such an army would have had in those dangerous years of 1939/40 as well as seeing how things might have resulted. It is not a 360-degree look at Fascist Italy and focuses primarily on the fundamental direction of Italian foreign policy, the nature and makeup of the army, and economic issues affecting the military’s ability to make war.

It is appropriate for a moment to pause and remember that Il Duce was removed from power in 1943 by his generals after only three years of general war before considering closely, what might have happened if there had been a Fitter Italian Military?

The First Half of the 1920’s

Italy asserted a right to special responsibility in the Balkans because she had a common frontier with the newly created state of Yugoslavia and had ambitions over Albania; control of Albania was seen as giving effective control of the Adriatic by virtue of holding both shores of the Strait of Otranto. Strategically and economically this area was full of promise to anyone who thought imperially and it was there that Il Duce first began to show his hand. He confessed that his long-term aim to win political primacy in the Balkans and called the Adriatic by rights Italian.

In keeping with this he first negotiates the transfer of the border port Fiume from Yugoslavia to Italy and then seeks to control the mouth of the Adriatic by annexing the strategically placed island of Corfu. Obliged to back down he would call his attack on Greece Italy’s most important action since 1860.

Another issue of importance for him was his frustration with the Italian reputation for a disinclination to fight and he became determined to change this, and make the Italians less nice, more hateful and more violent. He held that “only blood could turn the bloodstained wheels of history.” During his tenure as Prime Minister he told Italians to consider themselves in a permanent state of war and remarked that his first priority was to increase military readiness to the very maximum.

1925

Il Duce creates the post of Chief of General Staff in an effort to circumvent the position of the King as commander of the armed forces. IOTL Marshal Badoglio held this post. ITTL Badoglio is not summoned back from his posting-in-exile of Ambassador of Brazil and the position goes to his rival Marshal Cavallero.

A series of campaigns is launched to reduce the semi-independent north of Somalia. It will not be until 1927 until the region is brought into line.

1926

Albania is made into an Italian satellite. The geopolitical aims for this are to create a threat along the Yugoslav frontier; to counter French influence in the Balkans; and to extend Italian economic and political influence in the region before Germany was strong enough to compete.

The establishment of the Italian state hydrocarbons agency Azienda Generali Italiana Petroli (AGIP) challenges the market dominance of the large multinational oil companies (primarily SIAP, Standard Oil & Shell). While there are no large hydrocarbon reserves present, Italy was one of the first countries in the 1860's that established an industrial level search for oil. AGIP concentrated its efforts on acquiring its own oil supplies in other countries considered promising as sources of oil.

1927

In a speech Il Duce held that set himself ten years to militarise Italy so as to be able to force a war upon Europe and obtain for Italy what he called her due.

Il Duce separates the roles of Army and General Chief of Staff in an effort to curtail the power of the incumbent Marshal Cavallero, reducing him to the role of 'technical consultant to the head of government', with some role in war planning.

By this time the revision of the Treaty of Versailles had become the major theme of Italian foreign policy. Italy signs a treaty with Hungary and makes common ground as ‘unsatisfied powers’ with regard to the Versailles settlement and henceforth tends to take up position against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, both of whom had gained from the settlement. It was considered that Italy could undermine both countries such that they would split and give way to Italian influence along and south of the Danube.

Italian diplomats began to keep in touch with separatist movements throughout all the Balkan states. Italy provided weapons for insurgent groups in Hungary and Austria, and sent arms to Greece. The Balkan policy was to encourage irredentist movements that might help to multiply tension.

With Yugoslavia the aim was either to replace France as patron, or that if exposed to sufficient pressure it might disintegrate, in which case Italy was ready with her claims on Croatia and the Dalmatian coast. Plans were formed for a possible invasion as a means of asserting Italy’s position as chief power in the Balkans and Danube basin, which Il Duce called Italy’s hinterland. Soon, Italian officers would begin training the Albanian army in expectation of a war with Yugoslavia.

AGIP enters the Rumanian oil market through a major share purchase of the national company Prahova. Some fields were discovered and by 1930 production had risen to 130,000 tons. The Rumanian government required refinement in Rumania, which cut out the margins AGIP sought for it's product and so the Rumanian oil could not satisfy the need of the Italian refineries for raw product. However important technical competencies were obtained as a result of exposure into the industry and these techniques were imported back into the Italian industry.

1928

The Italian Army Chief of Staff, Giuseppe Ferrari, confronts Il Duce with evidence of the parlous state of the Italian military. IOTL Il Duce would choose a tank by looking at a collection of drawings and, with a wave of his hand, say, "Build that one". ITTL, when Gen Ferrari outlined several options as to what was needed to modernise the armed forces, Il Duce waved his hand and commanded his Chief of General Staff to 'build that one'. General Ferrari did not leave the Palazzo Venezia with increased confidence in Il Duce but at least he left with a writ to begin some reforms.

The Ferrari Reforms imparted fresh energy into the Supreme Defence Commission (SDC) which had until now idled. The SDC over the next decade gradually manages to reduce, although not eliminate, the administrative confusion, jurisdictional conflict and dispersal of effort that so characterised Italian military procurement. Marshal Cavallero also heads the National Research Council and imparts some degree of military reality to the Council’s technical development work.

Italy signs a treaty of friendship with Abyssinia. Mussolini intends this as one stage towards establishing an economic protectorate over the country.

1929

Il Duce relinquishes personal and direct control of the three ministries of army, navy and air force and thereby permitting the ministries to greatly increase the quality of their work. Where before nothing could be done without his immediate presence, which was usually lacking given that he had seven ministerial responsibilities, now a professional momentum began to develop. IOTL Il Duce would reassume control in 1931: ITTL he does not. However he resists to the end the establishment of a genuine tri-service general staff; that would be going too far.

The Ferrari Reforms began with the artillery. New plans are made, dismissed, remade and approved; budgets were given, if grudgingly, and training commenced. When it was time to bring the 'necessary change to Europe', the Italian artillery would be more than capable of holding it's own. Over the next twelve years the Italian artillery regiments would gradually be able to field a useful range of light, medium and heavy pieces; of mortars, howitzers and guns; for mountains, desert and air defence. The Italian artillery liked to site and fight well forward, more so than any other power. It was aggressive, well controlled and willing to take casualties.

It was with a wry smile that Fate decreed the Ferrari would, in addition to being the fountainhead of Italian military reform, be an early proponent of mechanized warfare. While most certainly a general of the old school he recognised that something went wrong at the Isonzo in the Great War and that, if available, sufficiently evaluated alternatives may have resulted in more success. He saw what the tank did on the Western Front and wondered as to its application in Italian military doctrine. It was not for him to develop, but the Italian tank industry secured it's future with his impetus. Swept away were the multitude of designs submitted by rival designs and crafted on a haphazard and artisan basis: Italy would build three designs and they would be constructed along the lines of the Soviet model by semi-skilled labour according to the principles of mass production.

The reoccupation of Cyrenaica commences. To accelerate the process the governorships of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are placed under the direct control of Marshal Cavallero.

AGIP enters into a consortium, the British Oil Development Company (BOD), in an effort to obtain leverage into Iraq and move into an area previously controlled by the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). Legal and negotiation problems ensued, lasting several years.

1930

From this point Mussolini’s speeches became less careful and more extravagant; “Words are beautiful things, but rifles, guns, ships, aeroplanes are still more beautiful. When tomorrow dawns the spectacle of our armed forces will reveal to the world the calm and war-like countenance of Fascist Italy.” and “The Italian people will eventually constitute a single human mass and, more than a mass, will become a shooting star that could be hurled against anyone, anywhere”.

AGIP introduces the rotary drilling process, permitting exploitation of the deep Po Valley reserves, as well as the large natural gas fields near Lodi

June. Marshal Cavallero and his henchman-in-chief General Graziani instigate the policy of forced resettlement of the population of Cyrenaica.

1931

Il Duce continues to rant on about war, as his army steadily grows, declaring "... war alone can carry to the maximum tension all human energies and imprint with the seal of nobility those people who have the courage to confront it: every other test is a mere substitute". He predicts that within ten years the whole of Europe would be fascist, and the Regio Esercito (RE) is instructed to be ready for a surprise attack on France or Yugoslavia.

The reforming of the Army benefits further by the Army Chief of Staff that succeeded Ferrari. General Baistrocchi was an organiser and administrator of considerable skill and manages to navigate Il Duce through the minefield of his own capriciousness, especially with regard to several important, and very short sighted, decisions Il Duce sought to take around the Abyssinian and Spanish conflicts. While he did eventually succeed in having himself dismissed with such an indelicacy, as "You, Duce, will lose the empire you have created" he was able to extend the hand of moderation into most areas of the Army. He even managed to establish a system of accelerated promotion on the basis of merit to supplement the traditional system of seniority: while heavily opposed at the time it did ensure that a few of the senior Italian officers in the coming war were only partially incompetent. He even established the open collar tunic into the army and gave his name to the new military jacket. Unfortunately following Baistrocchi there were no great reformers serving as Army Chief of Staff; Il Duce had had enough of their kind.

Under his counterpart General Valle the Regio Aeronautica (RA) finally commences it's reorganisation. Hitherto RA investment had largely been into matters of style over substance such as formation flying and propaganda flights. His is a slower reform than that of Baistrocchi, but at least it moves in the right direction. Primary reforms involve the rejection of trimotor airplanes (aside from the S.79 design which is developed as a land based torpedo bomber), biplanes, and air cooled engines. Much of the impetus to modernise is led by General Amadeo Mecozzi. Fighters become significantly better as the RA moves away from the Douhet doctrine, and both maritime reconnaissance craft and torpedo squadrons (using the excellent Fiume torpedo) are established.

In Cyrenaica General Graziani builds a four metre thick belt of wire between Bardia and Jarabub to prevent the resupply of the Senoussi from Egypt.

Mussolini begins financing and sending arms to various opposition groups in Spain.

1932

The official long arm of the RE, the Mannlicher-Carcano 1891 begins rechambering from the 6.5mm to a 7.35mm.

AGIP commences drilling operations in Iraq. IOTL when BOD found favourable conditions in the Mosul region AGIP could not meet it's share capital contributions and had to pull out: ITTL it could, and remained, adding an increase in oil supplies to further gains in technical and human competencies.

Pacification of Libya is now largely complete. Ardito Desio commences preliminary work in the Sirte basin and locates evidence of substantial oil deposits.

In a speech celebrating Fascism’s first decade Il Duce would say, “Today with a quiet conscience I tell you, this vast crowd, that the twentieth century will be the century of Fascism. It will the century of Italian power; it will be the century in which Italy will return for the third time to be the leader of human civilisation, for outside our faith there is no salvation either for individuals or for peoples”.

1933

The Italian fleet has now increased to 550,000 tons, and work commences on refitting two pre-Great War battleships, the Cavour and Cesare.

Italian supplies substantial quantities of arms to various, and often rival, Austrian separatists groups. Later in the year Il Duce sends an ultimatum to the Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss that further support from Italy would be conditional on Austria introducing a fascist regime on the Roman model and eliminating other parties, if necessary, by force.

Il Duce secretly appoints Marshal de Bono to command an Italian Expeditionary Force against Abyssinia.

1934

Il Duce declares that the year would mark a decisive step in the spread of fascism throughout the civilised world. Democracy and liberalism were no longer dying, but dead. So was any question of disarmament. Also declares that Italy's historical destiny now lies in Africa.

The measured moderation of Baistrocchi is in contrast with the enthusiastic extravagance of Marshal Balbo, and it is fair to say that Balbo's contribution was the more visible and immediate of the two great post-Ferrari reformers. Traditionally the RE had a mobilised complement of thirty divisions. Balbo recognised that the constraints of modern war were such that it would be extremely difficult to properly equip thirty modern divisions, and proposed halving that number. This of course did not go down well with many in the army and his plan was violently opposed by a group headed by General Pariani who declared that Italy needed more, not fewer, divisions and proposed to double the number.

Il Duce had little concept of industrial warfare and had a tendency to confuse quality with quantity... and somewhat unsurprisingly, he adored Pariani's plan. Given to such rhetoric as the eight million bayonets and the air force that would blot out the sun, he was most enthusiastic for an army of sixty divisions. Just where Pariani lost control of his run for influence is not certain, but the combined force of Balbo (who still carried considerable weight in the Party), Baistrocchi and the put-to-pasture Ferrari managed to convey to Il Duce the fundamentals of the matter. While still not convinced as to their arguments, which were largely economic and hence of only passing interest, he eventually acquiesced. Italy would enter a general war with a mobilised complement of 22 divisions.

It was possibly the second main contribution of Balbo that swayed Il Duce; he liked the panoply of office, the visibly compelling instruments of war, the new and fantastic. What can be more fantastic than grim parachutists falling from the heavens with their guns blazing; what can be more compelling than grizzled marines charging ashore and directly into the teeth of the enemy, carrying all before them? Both these regimental sized units were to be employed initially on that frustrating island, that brazen British port, Malta. When war came there would be fury falling from the sky and pouring from the sea. Il Duce liked that. There were of course substantial issues around coordination with the RA and Regia Marina (RM) that had to be overcome and to a significant degree this is why the airborne and amphibious forces were still working through their operational details when war began. Mistakes would be made, and needless ones at that, but it would still be Balbo's name that was remembered primarily when future discussions of the combined operations against Malta were made.

Since the early work undertaken by Ferrari, Il Duce had restricted himself to general bombast with regard to military matters, but he was only ever biding his time. In what was recognised at that time as his 'rearmament' speech, where he sought cast aside the shackles of the League of Nations and repudiated all the disarmament treaties he had so quickly signed, he began to fully develop his own unique oracular style and somehow, somewhere, the tone began to subtly change. His "war is to man what maternity is to women" speech charted the commencement of his descent of fantasy, where the liquidity of words finally overcame the solidity of substance, "It is the plough that traces the furrow, but it is the sword which defends it, and both plough and sword are made of tempered steel like the faith in our hearts". Il Duce was building up to something and that something was Abyssinia.

The Abyssinian War was not something that just happened. Since 1929 Italian troops had been bending the frontier to their will and establishing themselves in Abyssinian territory. Nor was this purely an enterprise by Il Duce: in fact he was initially suspicious and had to be sold on the idea, although admittedly the price of sale was not great. Abyssinia was seen by the armed forces as a proving ground, initially for the artillery and the new divisional structure, but later also for the new light tank, not to mention operational issues around poison gas and air-ground cooperation. Abyssinia was also an important step in the militarisation of Italian society and it was with invasion in mind that Il Duce enacted the law that stated that every Italian citizen was a soldier and should be educated militarily from the age of eight. While not specifically useful for the impending war, such a measure would capitalise handsomely on the glorious successes of his armies, helping overcome social resistance to war and associating the military with Italy, and victory.

The murder of Dolfuss catches Mussolini off guard and, unfortunately, he had to break the news to Dolfuss’ wife who was the guest of Il Duce at the time. Italy announces that four divisions (the Ravenna, Cosseria, Superga & Sforzesca) are poised to occupy the Austrian Tyrol. RE planning is adjusted to include operations against Germany.

Croat refugees, who had been living in Italy and whose arms and funds had been provided by the Italian government, murders King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles.

Mussolini signs agreement with two Spanish monarchist groups aimed at destabilising the Spanish government.

The RM laid down the battleships Littorio and Vittorio Veneto, together with an additional 17 submarines.

1935

The Minister for Exchange and Currency Guarnieri advises the SDC that Italy faces bankruptcy. Il Duce imposes import quotas to prevent an excessive drain on currency reserves, which also bites into rearmament. Although Il Duce remained an economic imbecile there builds a gradual groundswell within the military interests of the regime that seeks to ensure the RE’s funding. IOTL there was a 15% decline in funding for the army between the Abyssinian war and the eve of the World War: ITTL there was no such shortfall.

The SDC meets to discuss the progress of eight years of Italian military reform and rearmament. Following five days of sometimes absolutely frivolous discussion, such as choosing between cabbage or beans as the main basis for soldier’s rations, widespread approval is returned as to the nature of the artillery and infantry reforms, though with some substantial qualifications and caution over tank developments.

In May RM forward planning calls for the laying down of four new battleships, three aircraft carriers, four cruisers, twenty frigates, 12 corvettes and 54 submarines (for an additional 360,000 tons. Construction is envisaged as proceeding slowly in order to avoid international complications.

AGIP receives considerable political direction, greatly stretching it's resources that, but for the increasing revenues from the Mosul operations, would have proven too great to surmount. Increased geological and technical expertise is put to use developing the Po basin, exploitation of methane deposits as an alternative fuel source, and exploratory drilling operations in Eritrea, Abyssinia, Somalia and Libya. The creation of AGIP's scientific unit and government financing leads to increased levels of human competency and the importation or development of new exploratory techniques, of which the most notable is the technique of seismic reflection from the United States. A drilling operation is sent to Libya to follow up Desio's work and to apply the new technical developments to reach the deeper Libyan reserves.

February. Two divisions of regular infantry (the Pasubio and Piave) are despatched to Eritrea.

May. Two further divisions of regular infantry (the Bergamo and Sassari) and four ‘divisions’ of Blackshirts despatched to Eritrea.

September. The British Mediterranean Fleet despatched to the Eastern Mediterranean and reinforced by the Home Fleet. Britain is seen as being "fundamentally inclined to oppose" Italy's Mediterranean and African aspirations. One of the responses to this sabre rattling is the establishment of the General Commissariat for War Production, which builds upon much of the earlier work around war economics, and the overall efficiency of military production is maintained.

October. Following a lengthy build up Italy invades Abyssinia and the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions a few days later. The Abyssinian War is intended as being a prestige building effort for the regime. The Blackshirt led offensive under de Bono just runs out of steam; the army under Cavallero and Graziani finishes the conquest. This marks a subtle shift of the balance of power where the army demonstrates it's professional skill and indispensability.

December. Naval Chief of Staff Admiral Cavagnari proposes the immediate renovation of the old battleships Duilio and Doria, construction of two more Littorio class ships, one aircraft carrier and more submarines. Construction is delayed until the League of Nations sanctions lift.

1936

January. Il Duce informs Hitler that the Abyssinian sanctions had created a definite breach between Italy and France and hence, although he was not ready to permit Anschluss, he would recognise that Austria is a satellite of Germany and no longer of Italy.

May. The Abyssinian War is declared won, the ‘greatest colonial war known to history’ and that the population of Abyssinia had turned against their government and joyfully welcomed Italian rule.

July. Franco's rebellion catches Il Duce by surprise and against the advice of the RE Italy intervenes.

July 4. League of Nations sanctions on Italy lifted.

September. RA commences operations in Spain.

December. Abyssinia is declared completely pacified, although opposition was growing and had even spread to Eritrea. Italian rule progressively becomes harsher. The Italian Expeditionary Force arrives in Spain to conduct ground operations; gain it is seen as a Fascist war and largely untrained militias (together with substantial numbers of the unemployed from the south) are despatched, with a smaller regular army contingent of two divisions (the Cuneo and Livorno).

1937

Advance planning for an invasion of Egypt commences, aiming firstly at a seizure of the Mersa Matruh railhead and adjacent airfields and thence an advance to the Suez. Significant obstacles were encountered in liaison with the RM concerning just how the formidable forces of the Royal Navy were to be overcome.

March. Italy signs a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia, temporarily ending Italy's long-standing support for Croatian separatism.

March. The Battle of Guadalajara results in an embarrassing Italian defeat. Crucially for the upcoming war, European military experts associate the Italian army with the Blackshirt rabbles in Abyssinia and Spain.

August. Italian submarines begin campaign against Soviet resupply shipping, leading to confrontation with Britain.

November. Italy withdraws from the League of Nations and the takes part in the establishment of the Axis; Il Duce boasts that "Italy is at the end of the most formidable politico-military combination that has ever existed’

December. The hardline policies of Graziani in Abyssinia are finally recognised as having failed and he was brought home, being replaced by the more moderate Duke of Aosta. The damage had however been done and the new viceroy can do little better.

Encouraging developments lead AGIP to consider natural gas as a substitute not for gasoline but for the imported coal fed industries of northern Italy. A positive result from the Sirte fields in Libya leads to an increase in operations and work begins to determine how best to develop and exploit the wider reserves. Investment in plant and construction of facilities begins apace but large-scale exploitation is not achieved before the commencement of general hostilities in 1939.

1938

From the Abyssinian War onwards Il Duce had increasingly taken on the role of Supreme Commander: in a March speech he publicly claimed the role. Naval planning for a North African conflict confirmed as operations to support the landward drive, the reduction of Malta and operations around Suez. Il Duce says that war with Britain is inevitable. Economically things are still tight. The costs of the Abyssinian war, the Spanish campaign, the costs associated with the colonies and military rearmament is draining the budget. Leading up to war there are still issues around senior and junior leadership, and supply... but the military is undoubtedly more proficient.

As a compensation for letting Hitler into Austria, Italy decides to invade Albania and finally extend full control over the Adriatic.

February. RA bombs Barcelona against wishes of Franco.

June. RE instructed to prepare invasion plans for Albania.

November 5. Italian foreign policy sets out to create 'an insurmountable abyss between Italy and France'

1939

Il Duce informs the Grand Council of Fascism that war with France is unavoidable. The RE for the moment puts aside the Suez plan and begins to focus on French contingencies.

Rumania seeks Italian protection against the Soviets, Germans and Hungarians.

Jan. With general war seemingly inevitable Mussolini decides to establish a formal military alliance with Germany. In the belief that the Anglo-French alliance holds no threat, the RE is told to exclude Britain from their war hypotheses, while the public was simultaneously told that war against France was inevitable and victory certain.

March 21. Il Duce explains to the Grand Council of Fascists of the need to adopt a policy of uncompromising loyalty to the Axis.

29/30 March. Madrid & Valencia falls, ending Italian involvement in Spain. Large amounts of equipment are left behind, much of which is secretly sold by Spain to Yugoslavia.

April. Advance talks for joint German/Italian operations commence. German planning for the invasion of Poland also commences.

April 7. Italian forces land at Durazzo and Valona in Albania.

May 22. Following the signing of the Pact of Steel, Il Duce begins to take renewed interest in Yugoslavia and Greece. Yugoslavia is seen as the primary conquest, with Greece a secondary one, or even client state. Mussolini has in place invasion plans for Greece and destabilisation plans for Yugoslavia. He feels it important to be ready to assert Italian claims to predominance in the Danube/Balkans while Germany was preoccupied with Poland.

May 30. The 'Cavallero Memorandum' is despatched to Berlin explaining that Mussolini recognises that war is inevitable and that in the first moment of hostility the Italian aim is to seize the Balkans as far as the Danube and to put Greece, Rumania and Turkey hors de combat.

May 31. Il Duce informs Ciano that he has no intention to ease relations with France.

June. Ciano signs an agreement with the Croat leader Vladko Macek that provides for a rising against Belgrade in 4-5 months, Italian military intervention and a Croat puppet state. Italy had now ‘acquired new continental objectives of a European territorial value’.

June 22. Orders for invasion of Poland signed and concealed mobilisation commences.

July. The British plan in the event of Italy joining Germany in a war is for the RN to sweep the Eastern Mediterranean of Italian submarines, attack Libyan bases, and launch carrier strikes on Taranto. The French are to bombard the Italian coast from Palermo to Genoa while also invading Libya from Tunisia. However the French war party cannot overcome the Italophiles within cabinet, nor the French army's desire to reduce risk in light of German military might.

July. Mussolini assures Hitler that should he decide to fight, then Italy would be behind him 100% and mobilise at a moments notice.

August 11/12. In Salzburg Hitler (which TTL Mussolini attends) refuses to reconsider the planned Polish invasion that Italy has by now caught wind of and urges Italy to take the opportunity and attack Yugoslavia. IOTL Il Duce pulled back because the RE was not ready - not so ITTL. Hitler explains that the best thing for the Axis would be to liquidate the neutral states of Europe one after the other; just as Austria, Czechoslovakia and Albania had already been invaded; each partner should cover the other in turn as they took their pick. Yugoslavia is mentioned in this context.

August 15. Il Duce meets with Marshal Cavallero and says war is imminent. He proposes a landing in Croatia and Salonika. While Cavallero pointed out the vulnerability of Libya, Il Duce held that gains from Yugoslavia and Greece would more than compensate for the loss of Libya.

August 25. IOTL Il Duce orders a mobilisation decree to be prepared: ITTL it is a full mobilisation order

September 1. Germany attacks Poland

Croesus

[Croesus]

Upon receipt of the full mobilisation order of August 25 the Army Chief of Staff General Graziani [IOTL this position was filled by General Pariani; ITTL Pariani’s career does not survive his defeat at the hands of the Reformers in 1934] had four operational plans on his desk. Each had been initiated, discarded, updated and discarded again as the mercurial foreign policy of Il Duce waxed and waned. It was a curious aspect to the RE’s preparation for war that the constant upheaval of planning had in fact resulted in four fairly well conceived strategies; the hiatus between the rejection and resumption of planning permitted the strategies to be updated to current conditions while remaining true to their essential features.

The plans for the invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece had the longest maturation period, having been laid down in the early 1920’s. The plans for a war on two fronts with France and the invasion of Egypt were more recent and were laid down from 1931 and 1935 respectively. Of the four the French conflict was considered the most difficult given the challenges involved in forcing the French defences in Savoy and the large military concentration in French North Africa. The invasion of Egypt was regarded more favourably in the RE than the RM as the latter had significant concerns around how the Royal Navy would be dealt with. The invasions of Yugoslavia and Greece were inter- linked, giving a certain degree of flexibility and commonalities in the case of hostilities.

The RE could conduct either an African or a European war, but not both. Il Duce had signalled that a European campaign was the preferred option in the mid 1920’s, had then moved on in favour of an African campaign in the mid 1930’s and recently returned to giving priority to the European. This inconstancy had led the RE to conceive the Libyan forces-in-place as either an advance or a rear-guard; while Fascist ideology held Libya as a first colony, there were more Italians in New York than in all the Italian colonies combined, and RE planning took this into account. Complicating matters somewhat was the recent investment of AGIP into the Sirte oilfields but as yet the infrastructure there was not considerable and AGIP advised that present advances in the exploitation and commercial use of liquid natural gas in Italy was more advanced, and as promising, than the Sirte developments.

Libya was of course caught between two fires: the French in Tunisia and the British in Egypt. Of the two the former had the more substantial army and the latter the more substantial navy. RE planning in Libya followed three basic directions: an attack on Tunis, an attack on Mersa Matruh or a defensive action facing the French (the British military investment in Egypt was not considered substantial to warrant significant concern). In each of the two offensive options a portion of the RE would by necessity have to guard the other flank and no reliance was placed on the capacity of the RM to obtain naval supremacy, although it was thought that the RA would be able to control the skies. The defensive option had a smaller force occupying hardened positions around Halfaya Pass and the bulk of the Libyan force along two lines placed forward to the Tunisian border.

Malta was considered a priority target irrespective of there being an African or European focus to Italian wartime strategy. It would have to be eliminated to ensure either the effective reinforcement or evacuation of the front. To this end the Landing Troops and Parachutists had been training since their inception. Based in Sicily both units found themselves regarded with jealousy when it came to funding and personnel assignment (which was the principal reason why both arms were initially dominated by Libyan personnel), and substantial inter-service obstacles were met, as both units had RE personnel and organisation yet had to work very closely with the RA & RM. There was no great confidence in their ability to force the British from the island and all three services had contingency plans in place should the initial assault be defeated. As it was considered that a war upon either France or Britain would bring the other, the attack on Malta would proceed as a first priority in the event of hostilities against only one.

The Greek action suffered from widespread confusion as to war-aims and ranged from a reoccupation of Corfu to an annexation of Epirus/Tsamouria to a full-scale invasion of the whole country. In the large scale operation landings in Salonika were to complement an eastwards push from Albania. The Salonika landing was considerably fraught with danger and was seen both as a diversionary and sacrificial measure, with the main emphasis placed on the advance from Albania. Two forms of plan existed for the Albanian advance: a large scale operation involving eleven divisions and a lesser version involving nine, although the substance was the same. Five/four divisions were to attack into Epirus, three/two were to hold the Yugoslav border, two were to hold the Koritsa region and one was to reoccupy Corfu. Options around the intervention of both Bulgaria and Turkey had also to be considered.

The Yugoslav invasion was somewhat more complicated. Political efforts were to be made to destabilise the Croat elements in the Royal Yugoslav Army and support given to Macek's establishment of a Croatian puppet state. Five invasion points were identified with four divisions advancing out of the Fiume & Zara beachheads, four divisions advancing out of Albania, four divisions pushing through Slovenia and two guarding the Greek boarder. The numbers of divisions deployed also varied with the Slovenian or Dalmatian fronts enjoying predominance in turn, although no less than ten divisions were considered; and some versions asked for eighteen. There was substantial complication around the involvement of foreign armies with Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and even Greece considered.

The RE Order of Battle on 25 September 1939 reflected the divergence of strategic options and confusion around foreign policy. Four corps with four infantry divisions were disposed along the French border; two corps with two mountain infantry and one alpine division were based in Albania; four corps with two mountain infantry, two alpine, one regular infantry and one armoured division were arrayed along the Yugoslavian border; four corps with three autotransportable infantry, two mountain infantry, one alpine, one regular and one armoured division were held in reserve in Italy; two corps of two Libyan infantry, one regular infantry, one autotransportable infantry and one armoured division held Libya, in addition to three Fortress garrisons; and four Sectors with 25 native infantry brigades held Italian East Africa.

Details of specific dispositions are as follows;

FIRST ARMY CO: Gen. P.Pintor [French border]
Army Reserves
Army Art.Reg (mot)
4 A.A. Reg (mot.)
1 Ber.Reg
6 Cav.Reg Cavalleggeri di Monferrato

III Corps CO: Gen. A. Aymonino
3 & 112 M.G.Btls.
Corps Art.Reg
2 & 24 Border-Guard Sectors + 16 & 58 Border-Guard Art.Regs
3 Inf.Div Ravenna

XIII Corps CO: Gen. G.Gambara
15 & 111 M.G.Btls.
Corps Art.Reg
1 & 5 Border-Guard Sectors + 11 & 24 Border-Guard Art.Reg
5 Inf.Div Cosseria


FOURTH ARMY: CO: Gen. V. Ambrosio [French border]
Army Reserves:
Army Art.Reg (mot)
1 AA.Reg (mot)
4 Ber.Reg
1 Cav.Reg Nizza Cavalleria

I Corps: CO: Gen. C.Vecchiarelli
1 & 113 M.G.Btl.
Corps Art.Reg
8 & 9 Border-Guard Sectors + 19 & 23 Border-Guard Art.Reg
1 Inf.Div Superga

IV Corps: CO: Gen. C.Mercalli
4 & 104 M.G.Btl.
Corps-Art.Reg
7 & 49 Border-Guard Sector + 8 & 92 Border-Guard Art.Reg
2 Inf.Div Sforzesca


SECOND ARMY CO: Gen. V.Ambrosio [Albania]
Army Reserves
Army Art.Reg
2 Cav.Regs Piemonte Reale & 3 Cav.Reg Genova Cavalleria

X Corps CO: Gen. C. Rossi
108 & 115 MG.Btls
2 x Corps Art.Regs
2 Ber.Reg
14 Inf.Div (Mtn) Bergamo

V Corps: CO: Gen. R.Balocco
Corps-Art.Reg
25 & 37 Border-Guard Sectors + 10 & 62 Border-Guard Art.Reg
11 Inf.Div (Mtn) Sassari
2 Alp.Div Tridentina


THIRD ARMY CO: Gen A. Guzzoni [Yugoslav border]
Army Reserves:
10, 56 & 93 Border-Guard Sector + 12, 88 & 51 Border-Guard Art.Reg
9 Inf.Div Piave

VII Corps CO: Gen M. Arisio
2 x Corps Art.Reg (mot)
3 Ber.Reg, 5 Ber.Reg & 6 Ber.Reg
1 Arm.Div Centauro

Alpine Corps: CO: Gen. L.Negri
102, 103 & 110 M.G.Btl.
Corps Art.Reg
10 Border-Guard Sector + 12 Border-Guard Art.Reg
1 Alp.Div Taurinense


SECOND ARMY: CO: Gen. V.Ambrosio [Yugoslav border]
Army Reserves:
Army Art.Reg
2 Cav.Reg Piemonte Reale & 3 Cav.Reg Genova Cavalleria

X Corps CO: Gen M. Roux
108 & 115 MG.Btl
2 x Corps Art.Reg
2 Ber.Reg
14 Inf.Div (Mtn) Bergamo

V Corps CO: Gen. R.Balocco
Corps-Art.Reg
25 & 37 Border-Guard Sectors + 10 & 62 Border-Guard Art.Reg
11 Inf.Div (Mtn) Sassari
2 Alp.Div Tridentina


SEVENTH ARMY CO: Gen. C.Geloso [Italy]
Army Reserves:
Army Art.Reg
4 Cav.Reg Lancieri di Aosta & 5 Cav.Reg Lancieri di Milano

VI Corps CO: Gen. S. Visconti Prasca
33 & 58 MG.Btl
Corps Art.Reg
22 Border-Guard Sector + 13 Border-Guard Art.Reg
13 Inf.Div (Mtn) Isonzo

XI Corps: CO: Gen. M. Vercellino
Corps-Art.Reg
21 & 23 Border-Guard Sectors + 9 & 17 Border-Guard Art.Reg
12 Inf.Div (Mtn) Re
3 Alp.Div Julia.


SIXTH ARMY: CO: Gen. M.Berti [Italy]
Army Reserves:
Army-Art.Regt. (mot)
2 AA Reg (mot)

IX Corps CO: Gen. A Bergonzoli
6 & 120 MG Btl (mot)
2 x Corps -Art.Reg (mot)
4 Inf.Div (Auto) Livorno & 10 Inf.Div (Auto) Brenner

II Corps CO: Gen. F. Cola
Corps Art.Reg (mot)
6 Inf.Div (Auto) Cuneo
3 Arm.Div Littorio


FIFTH ARMY: CO: Gen. I.Gariboldi [Libya]
Army Reserves:
Army-Art.Reg (mot)
3 AA Reg (mot)

VIII Corps CO: Gen. L. Dalmazzo
20 & 105 MG Btl (mot)
2 x Corps -Art.Reg (mot)
8 Inf.Div Pasubio
15 Inf.Div (Lib) Sibelle & 16 Inf.Div (Lib) Pescatori

XII Corps CO: Gen. E Patessi Manella
Corps Art.Reg (mot)
7 Inf.Div (Auto) Lupi di Toscana
2 Arm.Div Ariete

Fortress Tripoli
30 Coastal Art.Reg.
33, 34 & 35 Border-Guard Sectors + 33, 34, & 35 Border-Guard Art.Regts.

Fortress Benghazi
30 Border-Guard Sector + 30 Border-Guard Art.Reg.

Fortress Tobruk:
31 & 32 Border-Guard Sectors + 31 & 32 Border-Guard Art.Reg.


EAST AFRICAN COMMAND CO: HRH Amedeo di Savoia – duca d’Aosta

Northern Sector CO: Gen. L.Frusci
3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 16, 19, 21, 22 & 41 Colonial Bde.

Eastern Sector CO: Gen. G.Nasi
2, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15 & 17 Colonial Bde.

Southern Sector CO: Gen. P.Gazzera
1, 9,10, 18, 23 & 25 Colonial Bde.

Giuba Sector: CO: Gen. C.de Simone
20 Colonial Bde.

Croesus

[Croesus]

An error in the OOB: there are two Second Armies. Second Army is correctly in Albania: the Second Army on the Yugoslav border is now Eighth Army and commanded by Gen. R. Balocco.

I also neglected to note as to the deployment of the Blackshirt [Camicie Nere, or CCNN] divisions. ITTL the RE is stronger and more able to resist CCNN penetration of their combat formations. Given that Il Duce was the de facto CCNN Commander-in-Chief, and that Abyssinia had been envisaged as a Fascist campaign, rather than a regular army one, I've placed the three CCNN divisions in the AOI.

The RE would support this as the CCNN units very quickly become someone elses problem and, in case of general hostilities, the AOI is a difficult territory to defend. The MSVN [political arm of the Camicie Nere] would also support it as the AOI becomes a Fascist fiefdom. From an alt-his pov this makes for some future fun as the AOI campaign can run concurrently but divergently to the main thread.

Croesus

[Croesus]

Following Il Duce's mobilisation order of 25 August Marshal Cavallero attended a meeting in the Palazzo Venezia to learn of the intended direction of the war effort. He arrived to find Il Duce, Ciano and a gaggle of fawning sychophants excitedly discussing victory parades and triumphal arches. He was informed that Italy would invade Yugoslavia at the first opportunity; that Greece was to be guarded against but not attacked; that Savoy was to be invaded; that Malta was to be reduced; and that an advance into Tunisia commenced. Cavallero wondered to himself if Il Duce had been paying attention during their recent meetings.

He reminded Il Duce that, following the Balbo reforms, Italy only fielded sixteen infantry divisions. It was proposed that the Army should forthwith detach a regiment from each division and form new divisions; and that the three Blackshirt [Camicie Nere, or CCNN] Divisions would be released to Army control. Cavallero informed Il Duce that detaching regiments from divisions at this stage was not even remotely a possibility under the circumstances, but that he would gratefully accept the generous offer of such crack troops as the CCNN. He did note however that it would take time for the CCNN divisions presently deployed in the AOI to be transferred to Italy, and that the British might have reservations about such a move through the Suez Canal.

Il Duce considered this and declared that, in fact, the CCNN had a mission of the utmost importance to play in the invasions of Kenya and Egypt and, while he would certainly wish that he could use them to stiffen the RE, unfortunately it could not be done. He conferred with his advisors and then commanded Cavallero to hold in Libya and Savoy, but instead to attack Greece as well as Yugoslavia. After all they were right next to each other and in Albania Italy held a strong bulwark from which it could launch an all-conquering offensive that would carry Italian arms all the way to the Danube.

Cavallero was then asked how long would full mobilisation take. He explained that in Libya all Fifth Army units except the Libyan Sibelle and Pescatori were already under arms; that in Albania the Second Army was also fully mobilised; and that on the French and Yugoslav borders the First and Third Armies were already in position. This left the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Armies requiring mobilisation, which he expected would take about a month to complete. This meant that the Yugoslav and Greek invasions would commence around the middle or end of September.

Il Duce thought on this for a moment. He enquired as to launching an attack on Malta. Cavallero informed him that the Parachutists and Infantry Landing Force were ready for deployment but enquired as to the intention to declare war on Britain... or was the attack to be an undeclared act of aggression? Ciano intervened and reminded Il Duce that the plan was to mask the Italian intention to invade behind the cloud of 'non-belligerency' and invading Malta would defeat that purpose. Cavallero asked what was this thing, 'non-belligerency; surely a nation is either a belligerent or a neutral? He was informed that a power of the magnitude of Italy in these times could never be neutral, as Italy was at the nexus of European geo-politics; because Italy could not be neutral, but was not at war, it was therefore a 'non-belligerent'.

The smiles all round informed Cavallero at the pride with which the concept of non-belligerency was regarded; never mind the fact that it had no basis in international law. At any rate it appeared that Cavallero was to oversee the mobilisation, under the pretext of ensuring Italian sovereignty remains safe from sudden aggressors (and could he please make some effort to conceal the scale?), with a view to launching an invasion into the Balkans while Ciano held off the Anglo-French with the nebulous status of 'non-belligerency'.

Cavallero informed Il Duce that he would do all that was asked, but noted that a concealed mobilisation would take a little longer and set Sep 30 as the first available date for the twin invasions. He also offered to share with Il Duce a recent RE planning document that held a twin invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece as impossible without certainty over the intervention of two of Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria.

Il Duce did not see why Cavallero was insisting on creating doubts in his mind and dismissed such talk as unnecessary and defeatist. Ciano intervened and noted that the three powers in question could not be approached because then the invasions would not be surprises. Cavallero noted that tensions had been rising between Italy and both countries over the last few months and surely an invasion would come as no surprise. Il Duce employed a few choice sarcasms to ensure that Cavallero was appraised of his ignorance as to the subtleties of foreign policy and sent the Marshall on his way.

A concealed mobilisation? Cavallero doubted as to the efficacy of this given the present state of tensions. He particularly doubted the ability of the RA to prepare for hostilities. However, that was a minor concern relative to the headache of invading both Yugoslavia and Greece. He suspected that the latter was in no doubt as to the likelihood of coming to blows with Italy and that while Gen. Metaxas was proficiently walking a line of neutrality he would be ensuring his own mobilisation schedule close at hand, not to mention the issue of opening up facilities to the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy who were almost certain to offer assistance.

He was somewhat more confident about the Yugoslav operation as the the Italian destabilisation of the Royal Yugoslav Army and sponsorship of an independet Croatian state was well advanced; not to mention the likelihood of further Hungarian action aimed at redressing the losses it suffered by the Treaty of Trianon. He wondered as to how much the Germans knew of the Il Duce's plans as his recent meetings with Gen. Keitel had only just begun to work through operational issues of joint action and was some time away from completion.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The bulk of any Anglo-French land operations against Italy in the event of a general conflict would be undertaken by the French colonial forces in North Africa; the Franco-Italian border was not favourable for the offensive and the British held few forces in Egypt. The French fleet would also play a significant role. What, therefore, were the French preparations?

France was hit by the Depression later than other western powers and only began recovering in 1939: the differential for industrial production over the period 1929-38 for Britain was +20%, for Germany +16% but for France was actually –24%. It was only between Oct 1938 and June 1929 that industrial production returned to 1928 levels. France was most assuredly not strong.

The resolution to avoid a repetition of the Great War tragedy (where 25% of all people under 30 died) was one of the main determinants of French diplomacy. Unfortunately for the French, the years 1935-40 would be thin in terms of military conscripts due to the slump in birth rates during the Great War. Having had two wars in living memory, Germany was seen as the fundamental adversary and this naturally dominated French policy.

The population disparity between Germany (60 million) and France (40 million) was insuperable and gave France little realistic alternative than to adopt a defensive posture. The French dilemma was thus to give into German demands and risk humiliation and second power status; or to resist and risk either a Pyrrhic victory or annihilation. Some choice.

During the 1930's France forged a group of alliances in central and eastern Europe, gathering together Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia. However this policy of linked alliances clashed with her increasingly defensive war plans. As a result, these pacts, aside from the Polish, were not military alliances. They had no teeth and this would prove decisive as first Czechoslovakia, then Poland and, ITTL, Yugoslavia were attacked by the Axis.

The Little Entente was a French sponsored pact consisting of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia and based on three bilateral agreements aimed at containing Hungary. France itself only had bilaterals with each of the parties, rather than relating to the Little Entente as a group. While France did have a military alliance with Poland, full staff talks didn't commence until May 1939, and without which a military alliance is shorn of much of it's strength. France's treaties with the Little Entente pledged consultation and assistance in the face of a common threat, but even in 1938 there no formal staff talks between France and Czechoslovakia, and never any between France and Yugoslavia/Romania.

With the Rome Agreements of Jan 7 1935 France sought to use Italy as a counterweight against Germany. Italy exploited this Agreement, and the subsequent Stresa Front, to further it's own policies in Abyssinia and to maintain it's policy of equidistance between Germany and the western powers.

After Munich the aims of French policy were unchanged; firstly the preservation and consolidation of the Entente, secondly the defence of the Mediterranean and the Empire; and thirdly the search for an understanding with Berlin and Rome as a prelude to a wider European detente. French attitudes to Italy vacillated over the years and the inherent weaknesses within the Third Republic ensured that this vacillation was never conclusively resolved. There would always be a pro-Italy faction within the Cabinet and, OTL as well as TTL, they were never overcome until Italy initiated hostilities.

Oct 12 1938. French Army Chief of Staff Gamelin examined French strategy. Faced with Axis solidarity and de facto German predominance in central and eastern Europe, he felt France should maintain a close partnership with Britain and defend the Mediterranean theatre. If Hitler reopened colonial claims they must be refused. Gamelin did not advocate a general withdrawl of French policy in the east. further German pressure there had to be resisted, otherwise the French position in western Europe would be undermined.

For Gamelin the way to renewed influence was through the Mediterranean. The first objective was a favourable settlement of the Spanish question. Once secure in the west, France would then consolidate her position in the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. Relations with Turkey might be improved and the maintanence of the Balkan entetne was essential.

Oct 25 1938. Air Chief of Staff Vuillemin responds to Gamelins analysis, who had expressed confidence of France's ability to stand on the defensive in the early stages of a conflict until allied help was available. Vuillemin stated that although a defensive stance against the Axis might be possible for the army, it would be disastrous for the air force. There was nothing to oppose the estimated 5,000 Axis aircraft; by 1 April 1939 France would have less than 500 modern fighters.

He felt that France must decide on a policy that the state of the military forces imposed. While Gamelin had only hinted at the need to secure Italian neutrality, Vuilleman insisted that this must be the first priority of policy. The Air Chief suggested that this might be obtained by the observation of strict neutrality towards Republican Spain and a radical break with the Soviets. Germany, seeing the defection of Italy and aware that France, Britain and Poland are closely united, would then be less tempted to expand in the east.

12 Nov 1938. French economic mission despatched to Romanian, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to study the possibilities of French investment and trade to counter German influence. They reported to the Govt with a range of recommendatiosn on 19 Dec and another committee met on 30 Jan to discuss further measures. However by Feb 1939 nothing had been done to follow up this work and this would be all the help Yugoslavia received from France, it's supposed guarantor.

February 1939. France by now is planning for an Italian offensive in the Mediterranean. It is predicted that an attack would be made in late March or early April. However the British government's reading of Italian intentions is more optimistic and it was believed that Il Duce was worth placating because of the moderating influence he supposedly had on Hitler. Time and again Britain would soften French resolve at this juncture, until the French themselves began to relax. Britain felt that Italy "had further to go now than she had in 1914 before she would be induced to throw in her lot with us". This was a persuasive argument.

7 April. The Italian invasion of Albania nevertheless introduces a new policy of French and British guarantees in eastern and southeastern Europe. France begins to receive numerous reports of Italian operations against Corfu, Egypt and Gibralter; however the British felt that Italy had shot it's bolt and would not attack elsewhere. Somewhat belatedly, France and Britain commence full staff talks. France estimates that, against the 120 Franco-British divisions, the Axis disposed of 240; that Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia could bring in 110 and Greece and Turkey 50. While there is a sense of superiority with regard to the Italian army (based on the observations in Abyssinia and Spain), there were concerns about relying on the 160 poorly equipped central/southeastern European divisions.

9 April. Greece reports an imminent Italian attack on Corfu. Britain asks France if she would join in promising help to Greece. Concurrently, the Permanent Committee of National Defence confirms the 1937 strategy of, in case of general war, that France would attack Italy first. The fleet would be mobilised and transferred to the Mediterranean and the air force placed on alert and concentrated against Italy. Such were the plans for war.

10 April. Britain decides to concentrate fleet around Malta to reassure France. [At this point the Regia Marina is positively crapping itself]

June. French sensitivities towards Italy now subside, with Paris coming to the British view that Italy had 'shot it's bolt' in Albania and would not take the initiative in a general war as part of the Axis. From here until the German invasion of Poland, Italy disapprears somewhat as a concern to Paris and, encouraged by Britain, commences general negotitations with Italy on all matters, excepting Corsica, Nice and Savoy.

September 3. France and Britain declares war on Germany following the invasion of Poland.

This is the period of Italian 'non-belligerency', where Il Duce and Ciano play their greatest double game of all. Il Duce has committed to general war, yet Ciano assures the British in absolute point blank terms that Italy will not attack Britain or France. That she was planning and mobilising to attack Yugoslavia and Greece was not mentioned. During that long, stressful month spent in Rome Il Duce watched in amazement as the Western Powers did nothing... France even forbade it's troops to fire on their German counterparts.

As the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece approached, Il Duce began to sense a turning point, a critical moment, an opportunity to be seized. Manifest destiny was upon him and, on Sep 25, five days before the invasion, he made another of those few decisions of his that actually made sense: he cancelled the Greek operation. He would attack only Yugoslavia, he would drive towards the Danube, he would capitalise on the initiative afforded him by French timidity and would claim by right of conquest his historical heritage.

Cavellero was not impressed... but glad nonetheless.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The Italian passage into WWII was not smooth, nor consistent, nor part of a wider Axis unity. Much of what follows is OTL, with TTL changes marked: it's remarkable how little needs to be changed when dealing with such a mercurial figure as Il Duce.

1 Jan 1939. Il Duce seeks to transform the anti-Comintern Pact into a formal alliance.

3 Jan. Ciano despatches a letter proposing a Triple Alliance to Ribbentrop.

6 Jan. Ribbentrop despatches drafts of a Triple Alliance with secret military clauses to Rome.

8 Jan. Following Japanese hesitation to join a triple, Il Duce counter-proposes an Italo-German alliance.

March. Italy proposes combined staff talks.

5-6 April. Italo-German staff talks held between Generals Kietel and Graziani [TTL Army Chief of Staff is Graziani, not Pariani]. German approaches the talks with reserve and no effort is made to have serious discussions concerning operational or strategic matters in the event of a general European war. Graziani notes the general readiness of the RE [in OTL Graziani notes the Italian unreadiness], to the secret bemusement of the German staff mindful as they were of the less-than-ideal performance of the CVF in Spain. No mention of the Albanian invasion is made, even though it launches within a few hours of the conference's completion; similarly no mention is made of the prospective attack on Poland, which had been established in a directive by Hitler two days previously.

16 April. Goering attends ceremony of the presentation of the Albanian crown to the Italian King and makes strong remarks with regard to Poland, reminding Ciano of similar tones leading up to the Austrian and Czechoslovakian crises. Il Duce notes that he is looking forward to being able to settle accounts with France and mounts blackout and anti-aircraft demonstration for Goering.

20 April. Italian ambassador to Berlin Attolico reports impression that German attack on Poland is imminent. Il Duce remains unchanged in his resolve to enter into formal military alliance with Germany. He prepares a memorandum where he recognises that war is destined to break out between the 'rich nations and the poor'. [In OTL he appends this with the observation that Italy is unready for hostilities; not so TTL]. The memorandum forms basis of Cianos instructions for upcoming meeting with Ribbentrop.

6 May. Ciano meets Ribbentrop in Milan. [OTL both men talk long of the unreadiness for war, one truthfully, one not so]. Ribbentrop assures Ciano that Germany will be following a path of conciliation with regard to the solution of the Polish problem. Ribbentrop also promotes the inclusion of the Soviet Union to the Axis and noted that a draft military treaty would be forthcoming soon.

7 May. A joint statement is issued confirming the solidarity between Italy and Germany and in keeping with this to formalise the relationship into a political and military alliance.

13 May. Ciano recieves text of the Italo-German alliance: "I have never read such a pact: it contains some real dynamite". It was in fact virtually the same text that Italy had rejected in October 1938, although two changes were made: the indefinite time period was adjusted to ten years and the Italo-German border considered permanently fixed. Notwithstanding these changes, the text bound Italy inextricably to Germany. Il Duce was by now so committed to entering into alliance that the text was signed forthwith, without further scrutiny from anyone else in the Italian government, nor even the various exports and advisors in the Foreign Ministry.

20 May. Ciano travels to Berlin for formal ratification of the treaty, christened shortly afterward by Il Duce as 'the Pact of Steel'.

27 May. Il Duce gives new British Ambassador an icy reception.

30 May. Il Duce informs Ciano that he has no intention of easing relations with France. Cavellero travels to Berlin to further discuss military matters [OTL he notes the Danubian focus of Italian war policy and the unreadiness of the Italian military; ITTL simply mentions the Danubian focus]. However, no mention is made of the German intention to attack Poland. Italy continues to labour under the impression that an early war will not occur [while ITTL the RE is ready for war, it is not to say that Italy would prefer less rather than more time to prepare], while Germany is taking the exactly opposite approach.

June. Work commences around the practicalities of fomenting a Croat revolt and establishing an independent Croat state in confederation with Italy.

10 July. Following concerns around the increasingly inflammatory position taken by Germany around the Polish issue, and an official British representation to be careful of inciting matters further, Attolico is instructed to meet with Ribbentrop to determine if Berlin was planning to undertake military action; he did not receive any assurance that Germany would not attack and continued to be alarmed at the mood within the German hierarchy. Attolico advised Ciano to press for an interview with Ribbentrop himself and Ciano replied to the effect that while he saw value in such a meeting he would leave the date up to the German government and would not expect an interview before 1 September. Attolico rejoined that Rome is substantially underestimating the German position and that he expected military action to be taken by the end of August.

22 July. Il Duce meets with officials to discuss the Italian response to what was seen as a premature entry into war, and mainly stressing the point that a war of nerves served the purposes of the PoS powers better than risking general war and suggesting a conference to work matters through.

23 July. Italian officials meet with Ribbentrop and explaining the Italian position. Ribbentrop agrees to raise the matter with Hitler, but suggests a conference is not in Germany's interest and expresses confidence that Poland is isolated and well in hand. Italian officials suggest a meeting between Hitler and Il Duce.

31 July. Hitler declines offer to meet with Il Duce.

6 August. Following intelligence reports noting German troop concentrations on the Polish border, Ciano and Il Duce meet to discuss wider situation. Il Duce by now a little uncomfortable at being so tightly bound to Germany in an offensive military alliance. Il Duce prepares memorandum to guide Ciano's negotiations in a proposed meeting with Ribbentrop and arguing that in 1939 the PoS would have no more than an even chance at victory while in three years the odds would be four to one, and again repeating a proposal for a conference. It was further decided that Il Duce would simultaneously meet with Hitler [OTL this did not occur].

11 August. Ciano and Ribbentrop meet in Salzburg. Ribbentrop now shows his hand and declines to entertain the Italian proposals. He notes that matters have developed such that precipitate action must be taken and further declines to confirm any details of the German plans, claiming they are known only to Hitler. Ciano leaves in a furious mood.

12 August. Il Duce meets with Hitler, who is more conciliatory, but as unbending. Hitler notes the comparative strengths of the Western Powers and the PoS; of Germany and Poland; and how he believes the war will remain localised. It is at this point that he suggests that Italy attack Yugoslavia. Il Duce regains his swagger and impetuously agrees; he requests that Hitler postpone his attack on Poland so that Italy can mobilise and invade Yugoslavia in step with Germany's invasion. Hitler agrees, but warns that he cannot postpone for more than a few days (as a result of this the original deadline of 26 August is moved back to 1 September). Il Duce leaves in a triumphant mood and, when confronted with the contradictory tones of Ciano, insists that his is the rightful and correct attitude to take in the face of such a decisive moment of history. While his position would vacillate over the coming days, the war faction within his cabinet was sufficiently strong to ensure that he maintained the attitude developed in the meeting with Hitler.

15 August. Il Duce meets with Marshal Cavallero and says war is imminent. He proposes a landing in Croatia and Salonika. While Cavallero pointed out the vulnerability of Libya, Il Duce held that gains from Yugoslavia and Greece would more than compensate for the loss of Libya.

20 August. Following efforts by Attolico and Ciano to forestall events, Il Duce sticks to his intentions and a formal announcement that Italy will enter the war on Germany's side is despatched to Berlin.

22 August. Il Duce sends personal telegram to Hitler: "As soon as you cross the fronteir, I will be at your side".

23 August. Il Duce authorises Ciano to approach the British government with a compromise plan around the Danzig crisis, so as to forestall general war. This marks the beginning of the Italian diplomatic campaign of 'non-belligerency' to mask it's invasion intentions.

25 August. In a high level conference Il Duce orders a concealed mobilisation with a view to invading Yugoslavia and Greece, with a tentative readiness date of September 30. Hitler writes Il Duce a long personal letter explaining the reasons behind Germany's inscrutable strategy of late and why he has not kept his partner informed. He lays out the German vision of the coming war and hopes that Il Duce can appreciate the background behind the German caution.

31 August. Ciano informs the British government that Italy will not enter into a general war.

1 September. Germany invades Poland.

3 September. France and Great Britain declare war on Germany; Italy declares non-belligerency. The Italian invasion of Yugoslavia is scheduled to occur within the end of the month.

Croesus

[Croesus]

It is so easy to get lost reading Balkan history. What follows is a rough TL that gives the main event sof 1934-9 as they relate to the Balkan states. On the eve of the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia the following broad points can be seen:

1. Italy is hiding behind it's non-belligerency statement. Britain is encouraging the placation of Italy against the better judgement of France, whose strategic plan involves attacking Italy before Germany in the event of general war.

2. Following the German economic penetration of Yugoslavia and its occupation of Czechoslovakia, the Little Entente is no more. Both remaining partners are members of the Balkan Pact, but of this group Greece is working to create distance and Turkey will not be intervening.

3. The Revisionist Powers of Hungary and Bulgaria each seek in their own way to avoid become the plaything of Germany. Bulgaria is more successful in this regard. Both powers have interests in Yugoslavia territory.

4. The Italian invasion of Yugoslavia will occur less than one month after the establishment of limited Croatian self-governance, with Greece bought off to the south, with the Yugoslav army only partly mobilised, the Revisionist Powers still biding their time and the Anglo-French disunified and not interested in angering Italy...


1934.

January. German-Polish pact signed.

February. Barthou becomes French Foreign Minister and embarks on a program of binding the Soviet Union, Poland and the Little Entente to France as a means of containing German revisionism. He places importance on reconciling Yugoslavia and Italy.

9 February. The Balkan Pact (Greece, Turkey, Romania & Yugoslavia) is formed following a series of successful Balkan Conferences and along the lines of the Little Entente, in order to safeguard the status quo against Bulgarian revisionism and to form a bloc that would be able to hold it's own against the great powers. Bulgaria, which views the Balkan Pact as the resumption of the 2nd Balkan War Alliance, is encouraged to join as a signatory power, but declines out of fear of the reaction of the Macedonian revolutionary/independence/terrorist organisation IMRO. Bulgaria henceforth holds aloof from the Balkan Pact and the latter subsequently becomes a forum against Bulgarian claims of revision, rather than as a basis for Balkan collaboration.

12 February. Clashes break out between Austrian government forces and banned national-socialist paramilitaries.

16 March. Austro-Italo-Hungarian protocol is established in Rome.

19 May. Bulgarian army launches a coup, led by Colonels Velcher and Georgiev, with the latter becoming president. The new government heralds a process of warming relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; future relations will be encouraged by a Bulgarian military campaign against the heartland of IMRO. An extension of this action sees Bulgaria look for better relations with the Anglo-French. Velcher considers France as a replacement for Italy as the power on whom Bulgaria can rely for support in international affairs.

Jun. Barthou visits Belgrade for initial talks and invites Yugoslav King Alexander to Marseilles in October as a first step in improving relations between the King and Mussolini.

July. Nazi putsch in Austria is put down.

25 July. Austrian Chancellor Dolfuss assassinated by Austrian Nazi's.

5 October. Encouraged by Barthou, Mussolini speaks well of Yugoslavia in a speech. As he gives the speech, a group of assassins organised by IMRO and the Croatian Ustase assemble in Marseilles. Each organisation receives funding from the Italian state and maintains strong links to the Italian Military Intelligence Service (SIM).

9 October. King Alexander of Yugoslavia killed by Macedonian/Croatian assassins, French Foreign Minister Barthou accidentally killed by French police. At Alexander's funeral Goering gives assurance that 'Germany will never support any activity that aims at the break up of Yugoslavia'. As events transpire Germany pressures Italy to withdraw its support of the Ustase and focus it's energies towards Africa rather than the Balkans.

November. Yugoslavia agrees to permit German access to minerals such as copper, lead, zinc and bauxite. In exchange Germany provides finished industrial products.

1935.

Jan. In Bulgaria Col Velcher is outmanoeuvred and Col Georgiev is replaced.

7 January. French Foreign Minister Laval visits Rome, Franco-Italian relations improve.

1 March. Military uprising launched in Greece but soon collapses.

April. Bulgarian King Boris takes control of state from military government. By this time Italian pressure on Bulgaria to subvert Yugoslavia has eased. Boris' non-revisionism further increases links between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and facilitates further economic penetration of the region by Germany; although the Bulgarian request to Germany for war materials is refused. Bulgaria looks to appeal to France and Britain for assistance to avoid economic vassalage to Germany but is disappointed.

May. Franco-Italian military convention for the defence of Austria signed.

2 May. Franco-Soviet pact is signed.

16 May. Soviet-Czech pact signed.

July. First secret meeting between Yugoslavia’s Prince Paul and Hitler is held.

September. The British Mediterranean Fleet despatched to the Eastern Mediterranean and reinforced by the Home Fleet.

29 September. Hungarian Premier Gombos meets with Hitler. Hungary is encouraged to drop it’s revisionist demands towards Romania and Yugoslavia and concentrate on Czechoslovakia.

October. Relief in the Balkan Pact as Italy invades Abyssinia, indicating safety from Italian designs for the moment, and the Pact takes part in League of Nations sanctions. Following the invasion Yugoslavia offers the use of its naval facilities to Britain in the event of an Anglo-Italian war.

December. Greece, together with Yugoslavia and Turkey, affirm to Britain that they will take action if Italy undertakes military operations in light of League sanctions. Greek confidence in Britain subsequently shaken as Britain's position softens.

1936.

January. Il Duce informs Hitler that the Abyssinian sanctions had created a definite breach between Italy and France and hence, although he is not ready to permit Anschluss, he will recognise that Austria is a satellite of Germany and no longer of Italy.

May. Germany commences sale of low-quality military equipment to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. Shipments balance off the trade deficit with Germany and are accompanied by German advisors and instructors.

4-6 May. The Balkan Pact meets in Belgrade. Greek General Metaxas reduces to a minimum its obligation under the Pact, noting that no action will be taken in case of aggression by Italy, Bulgaria or Hungary.

June. Germany and Greece conclude economic agreement aimed at balancing trading accounts between the two powers.

July. Austro-German agreement signed. Romanian King Carol II removes Foreign Minister Titulescu. Until now Titulescu had succeeded in obtaining a precarious balance between Germany, France and the Soviet Union. By the time of his removal Romania was the least economically dependent country on German influence. King Carol II now began to work towards the establishment of a personal dictatorship. Simultaneous with this the fascist Iron Guard resumes its program of destabilisation.

4 August. Metaxas launches coup and seizes power on eve of general strike.

October. Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg disbands the national paramilitary organisation.

8 October. Second secret meeting between Yugoslavian Prince Paul and Hitler held.

25 October. Axis agreement between Italy and Germany announced. Over the last three years southeastern Europe has become heavily dependent on the German economy, is hemmed in by totalitarian states on three sides and finding it difficult to sustain Anglo-French interest.

November. Rome-Berlin Axis is announced. Germany and Japan sign anti-Comintern pact.

1937

January. Bulgar-Yugoslav pact of Friendship is signed.

February. The Balkan Pact in Athens expresses approval of growing closeness between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

March. Italy signs a treaty of friendship with Yugoslavia.

May. Turkish Premier Inonu warns Metaxas that his pro-Nazi and pro-Fascist leanings are causing alarm amongst his supporters in Turkey. Chamberlain becomes British PM.

September. Mussolini visits Germany.

November. In the Romanian elections the Iron Guard secure 16.5% of the vote, becoming Romania's third largest party. Italy leaves League of Nations and joins anti-Comintern pact.

1938

January. Following the failure of the Romanian government, civil disorder grows as rival mobs of Iron Guard increase agitation against the state.

28 Jan. Plot to remove General Metaxas fails. Further unrest and arrests in May and July.

February. Balkan Pact in Istanbul recognises Italian suzerainty over Abyssinia; Romania and Yugoslavia have already recognised this.

12 February. Romanian King Carol II intervenes in civil disorder and establishes authoritarian regime. The entire leadership of the Iron Guard is arrested and the principal members executed. Schuschnigg visits Berlin.

9 March. Schuschnigg announces Austrian plebiscite.

11 March. Schuschnigg forced by Berlin to resign.

12 March. Germany occupies Austria.

16 April. Anglo-Italian agreement negotiated.

27 April. Greco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed.

20 May. A partial Czechoslovak mobilisation follows border tension with Germany.

July. Balkan Pact Naval staffs hold talks.

31 July. Bulgaria and the Balkan Pact sign a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression, recognising the right of Bulgaria to rearm and abrogate the limitations of armaments clause in the Treaty of Neuilly. Bulgaria is not required to guarantee existing frontiers but undertakes not to modify them by force of action and to submit disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement. The clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne that provides for the demilitarisation of the frontiers between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey in eastern Thrace are allowed to lapse.

7 September. Czech Minister Benes offers to meet Sudeten Germans’ demands.

13 September. Rioting in Sudetenland.

20 September. Czechs refuse French compromise-for-peace proposal.

21 September. The Anglo-French issue an ultimatum to Benes.

26 September. Britain promises aid with Russia if France defends Czechs.

27 September. Royal Navy mobilises.

28 September. Hitler accepts Mussolini’s proposal of Four-Power talks.

29 September. Four-Power Agreement signed.

30 September. Polish ultimatum delivered to Benes.

October 1938. Ciano receives and refuses text of proposed Italo-German alliance

5 October. Benes resigns.

November. Balkan Pact military staffs hold talks.

2 November. Vienna award gives southern Slovakia and part of Ruthenia to Hungary.

16 November. Anglo-Italian agreement is ratified.

6 December. France and Germany issue declaration of friendship.


1939.

January. Germany and Italy encourages Yugoslavia to secure portage access in Salonika in face of Greek resistance to arms being shipped to Yugoslavia from that location. Yugoslav Premier Stojadinovic agrees but is relieved of his position two weeks later by Prince Paul. Bulgaria rejects joining the Balkan Pact unless here territorial claims are satisfied.

1 Jan. Il Duce seeks to transform the anti-Comintern Pact into a formal alliance.

3 Jan. Ciano despatches a letter proposing a Triple Alliance to Ribbentrop

6 January. Chamberlain visits Rome. Ribbentrop despatches drafts of a Triple Alliance with secret military clauses to Rome.

8 January. Following Japanese hesitation to join a triple, Il Duce counter-proposes an Italo-German alliance.

13 January. Hungary joins the anti-Comintern pact.

March. Italy proposes combined Italo-German staff talks.

15 March. Germany occupies Prague and remainder of Bohemia-Moravia. Hungary occupies remainder of Carpatho-Ukraine.

19 March. Britain rejects Soviet plan for Five-Power talks on Romania.

23 March. Germano-Romanian signs an economic agreement.

31 March. Anglo-French issues a guarantee of Poland.

5-6 April. Italo-German staff talks held between Generals Kietel and Graziani. German approaches the talks with reserve and no effort is made to have serious discussions concerning operational or strategic matters in the event of a general European war. Graziani notes the general readiness of the RE to the secret bemusement of the German staff mindful as they were of the less-than-ideal performance of the CVF in Spain. No mention of the Albanian invasion is made, even though it launches within a few hours of the conference's completion; similarly no mention is made of the prospective attack on Poland, which had been established in a directive by Hitler two days previously.

7 April. Italy invades Albania.

10 April. Italy assures Greece that her territorial integrity will be absolutely respected.

13 April. British guarantees Greece, which becomes more confident of its position, especially with regards to its experiences during the Great War. Greece is however by now tied to Germany economically, making its relations with the Axis powers delicate.

14 April. Anglo-French negotiations with the Soviet Union recommence.

16 April. Goering attends ceremony of the presentation of the Albanian crown to the Italian King and makes strong remarks with regard to Poland, reminding Ciano of similar tones leading up to the Austrian and Czechoslovakian crises. Il Duce notes that he is looking forward to being able to settle accounts with France and mounts blackout and anti-aircraft demonstration for Goering.

20 April. Italian ambassador to Berlin Attolico reports impression that German attack on Poland is imminent. Il Duce remains unchanged in his resolve to enter into formal military alliance with Germany. He prepares a memorandum where he recognises that war is destined to break out between the 'rich nations and the poor'. The memorandum forms basis of Ciano’s instructions for upcoming meeting with Ribbentrop.

28 April. Hitler denounces Anglo-German naval agreement and Germano-Polish pact.

6 May. Ciano meets Ribbentrop in Milan. Ribbentrop assures Ciano that Germany will be following a path of conciliation with regard to the solution of the Polish problem. Ribbentrop also promotes the inclusion of the Soviet Union to the Axis and noted that a draft military treaty would be forthcoming soon.

7 May. A joint statement is issued confirming the solidarity between Italy and Germany and in keeping with this to formalise the relationship into a political and military alliance.

8 May. Britain refuses Soviet proposal for a Three-Power alliance

12 May. Anglo-Turkish pact is announced.

13 May. Ciano receives text of the Italo-German alliance: "I have never read such a pact: it contains some real dynamite". It was in fact virtually the same text that Italy had rejected last October, although two changes were made: the indefinite time period was adjusted to ten years and the Italo-German border considered permanently fixed. Notwithstanding these changes, the text bound Italy inextricably to Germany. Il Duce was by now so committed to entering into alliance that the text was signed forthwith, without further scrutiny from anyone else in the Italian government, nor even the various exports and advisors in the Foreign Ministry.

20 May. Ciano travels to Berlin for formal ratification of the treaty, christened shortly afterward by Il Duce as 'the Pact of Steel'.

22 May. Pact of Steel signed.

30 May. Il Duce informs Ciano that he has no intention of easing relations with France. Cavallero travels to Berlin to further discuss military matters. However, no mention is made of the German intention to attack Poland. Italy continues to labour under the impression that an early war will not occur, while Germany is taking the exactly opposite approach. During discussions around PoS practicalities Mussolini proposes that Germany and Italy are to occupy the whole of the Balkans and the Danube basin. Hitler opposes the plan. Germano-Soviet negotiations commence.

June. Work commences around the practicalities of fomenting a Croat revolt and establishing an independent Croat state in confederation with Italy.

10 July. Following concerns around the increasingly inflammatory position taken by Germany around the Polish issue, and an official British representation to be careful of inciting matters further, Attolico is instructed to meet with Ribbentrop to determine if Berlin was planning to undertake military action; he did not receive any assurance that Germany would not attack and continued to be alarmed at the mood within the German hierarchy. Attolico advised Ciano to press for an interview with Ribbentrop himself and Ciano replied to the effect that while he saw value in such a meeting he would leave the date up to the German government and would not expect an interview before 1 September. Attolico rejoined that Rome is substantially underestimating the German position and that he expected military action to be taken by the end of August.

22 July. Il Duce meets with officials to discuss the Italian response to what was seen as a premature entry into war, and mainly stressing the point that a war of nerves served the purposes of the PoS powers better than risking general war and suggesting a conference to work matters through.

23 July. Italian officials meet with Ribbentrop and explaining the Italian position. Ribbentrop agrees to raise the matter with Hitler, but suggests a conference is not in Germany's interest and expresses confidence that Poland is isolated and well in hand. Italian officials suggest a meeting between Hitler and Il Duce.

31 July. Hitler declines offer to meet with Il Duce.

August 1939. Greece commences concealed mobilisation. The Balkan Pact becomes nervous about German intervention in Poland, fearing it will bring Italy into the war.

4 August. Polish-Danzig customs crisis commences.

6 August. Following intelligence reports noting German troop concentrations on the Polish border, Ciano and Il Duce meet to discuss wider situation. Il Duce by now is a little uncomfortable at being so tightly bound to Germany in an offensive military alliance. Il Duce prepares memorandum to guide Ciano's negotiations in a proposed meeting with Ribbentrop and arguing that in 1939 the PoS would have no more than an even chance at victory while in three years the odds would be four to one, and again repeating a proposal for a conference. It was further decided that Il Duce would simultaneously meet with Hitler.

9 August. Mutual Germano-Polish warnings over Danzig occur.

11 August. Ciano visits Berlin. Ciano and Ribbentrop meet in Salzburg. Ribbentrop now shows his hand and declines to entertain the Italian proposals. He notes that matters have developed such that precipitate action must be taken and further declines to confirm any details of the German plans, claiming only Hitler knows them. Ciano leaves in a furious mood.

12 August. Hitler reverses previous attitude towards Yugoslavia, urging the Italian invasion. Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks commence. Il Duce meets with Hitler, who is more conciliatory, but as unbending. Hitler notes the comparative strengths of the Western Powers and the Pact of Steel; of Germany and Poland; and how he believes the war will remain localised. It is at this point that he suggests that Italy attack Yugoslavia. Il Duce regains his swagger and impetuously agrees; he requests that Hitler postpone his attack on Poland so that Italy can mobilise and invade Yugoslavia in step with Germany's invasion. Hitler agrees, but warns that he cannot postpone for more than a few days (as a result of this the original deadline of 26 August is moved back to 1 September). Il Duce leaves in a triumphant mood and, when confronted with the contradictory tones of Ciano, insists that his is the rightful and correct attitude to take in the face of such a decisive moment of history. While his position would vacillate over the coming days, the war faction within his cabinet was sufficiently strong to ensure that he maintained the attitude developed in the meeting with Hitler.

15 August. Il Duce meets with Marshal Cavallero and says war is imminent. He proposes a landing in Croatia and Salonika. While Cavallero pointed out the vulnerability of Libya, Il Duce held that gains from Yugoslavia and Greece would more than compensate for the loss of Libya.

16 August. Polish-Danzig customs talks commence.

20 August. Following efforts by Attolico and Ciano to forestall events, Il Duce sticks to his intentions and a formal announcement that Italy will enter the war on Germany's side is despatched to Berlin.

21 August. Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks are suspended.

22 August. Il Duce sends personal telegram to Hitler: "As soon as you cross the frontier, I will be at your side".

23 August. Germano-Soviet pact is announced. Il Duce authorises Ciano to approach the British government with a compromise plan around the Danzig crisis, so as to forestall general war. This marks the beginning of the Italian diplomatic campaign of 'non-belligerency' to mask its invasion intentions.

24 August. Polish-Danzig talks broken off.

25 August. Anglo-Polish agreement signed. Il Duce orders a concealed mobilisation with a view to invading Yugoslavia and Greece, with a tentative readiness date of September 30. Hitler writes Il Duce a long personal letter explaining the reasons behind Germany's inscrutable strategy of late and why he has not kept his partner informed. He lays out the German vision of the coming war and hopes that Il Duce can appreciate the background behind the German caution.

26 August. Yugoslav premier Cvetkovic signs agreement with Croat leader Macek, establishing Croatia as a territorial unit and some degree of self-government, with the latter serving as Vice Premier.

31 August. Ciano informs the British government that Italy will not enter into a general war.

1-3 September. Germany invades Poland: the Anglo-French declare war. Following Italy's declaration of non-belligerency, Italy proposes to Greece a withdrawal of military force from Albania. Italy also proposes a treaty of non-aggression, to which Greece agrees; northern Epirus is the price of Greek peace. The Anglo-French commences economic warfare measures aimed at disrupting German attempts to obtain Romanian oil supplies. Germany threatens invasion on grounds that Romania is violating its neutrality if it doesn't resist Anglo-French efforts (not until OTL March 1940 does Romania cave into German pressure). Hungary declares non-belligerency; Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece declare neutrality.

3 September. Yugoslavia commences partial mobilisation; Britain works to ensure that Italy is not provoked to abandon it’s status of non-belligerence by cautioning against Yugoslav preparations and moves to create closer links with Bulgaria.

11 September. Il Duce: "Greece does not lie in our path, and we want nothing from her. I have full confidence in Metaxas, who has restored order to his country."

20 September. Il Duce: "War with Greece is off. Greece is a bare bone and is not worth the loss of a single Sardinian Grenadier."

25 September. Il Duce cancels Greek invasion.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The first intimation that Marshal Cavallero had as to the Italian intention to enter the war came on August 15 following Il Duce’s visit to Berchtesgarden. He was informed that Germany would be attacking Poland before the month is out and that Italy has a free hand to attack Yugoslavia. Cavallero pointed out that since October 1934 Yugoslavia had clearly become part of the German sphere and doubted that Hitler would so willingly give up five years of preparation.

Il Duce responded by frankly assessing the situation as he saw it; that Germany needs a distraction from it’s endeavour in Poland, that the Anglo-French are by no means a unified coalition and that unless Italy does something now it will forever find itself living in the German shadow. The time for war had come: he reminded the Marshal that not for nothing had Il Duce suspended his better judgement when the likes of Ferrari, Baistrocchi and Balbo came calling with their impossible plans. He expects the Italian military to take its place in the annals of history, and for all the right reasons. He expects victory parades and long lines of prisoners-of-war; and it is the Marshal’s task to deliver this.

When Cavallero enquired as to the Italian war aims, Il Duce gave an exasperated sigh and explained to him that he, Il Duce, started the wars and it was not his task to look after the details. Upon recognising the look of incredulity on his Marshal’s face he suggested that Cavallero consult his planners and be available to provide a summary in a weeks time. Until that time Il Duce advised the Marshal to count his soldiers and collect his guns and look after all those things he was paid to look after.

Marshal Cavallero knew quite well the state of the Italian military. The Regio Esercito was small; the Regio Aeronautica was fascist and the Regia Marina timid; hardly the stuff with which to confront the Anglo-French in the event of general war. The RM was positively cowed by the problems posed by the British Mediterranean Fleet and its French counterpart. RM Chief of Staff Admiral Cavagnari was a battleship admiral of the old school and positively miserly about deploying his precious capital assets. Cavallero was resigned to the fact that the RM would be fighting its own war for most of the time and he had to take that into account when examining the problems associated with supplying and supporting the Fifth and Sixth Armies in Libya.

RA Chief of Staff General Valle was made of sterner stuff, but at times too stern, and certainly given to too much bombast than his actual military strength justified. The RA was still transforming itself away from the Douhet doctrine of high level strategic bombing. The two arms of the RA that Cavallero was mainly interested in were not fully capable; the ground attack capability was tied to the limitations of older machines (although they had over the last year improved their record following their experience in Spain) and the torpedo strike capability had encountered significant difficulties in obtaining modern craft, having only obsolete air-cooled engined trimotors (although they at least had an excellent torpedo). On the other hand air superiority looked competent and the RA had also taken over development of radar from the RM.

RE Chief of Staff Graziani was not confident about Italian chances in North Africa, nor about holding back any French push through the Alps; and as for projecting force, the less said the better. Cavallero took a more measured view. Certainly Libya looked weak and he doubted being able to hold on to it unless it formed the focus of Italian efforts; which wasn’t in itself unreasonable, as Italy had looked increasingly towards Tunisia and Egypt since 1934. Malta was a complicating problem of some magnitude, especially since it was the home of the British Mediterranean Fleet, and here Cavallero could sympathise with Cavagnaris unease. However the Italian artillery was strong, the newer anti-aircraft guns were becoming increasingly available and the tanks seemed promising. It seemed to him that as long as economy of force was maintained, the conflict was short and a little bit of luck was had, Italy might do well.

The next stage in the preparations for war came when Marshal Cavallero attended a meeting in the Palazzo Venezia on 25 August with a view to setting war aims, commencing definitive planning and organising mobilisation. Cavallero's idea for economy of force was clearly not shared by the gathered fascisti: attacks into Savoy and Tunisia, assault on Malta and invasion of Yugoslavia were to be conducted simultaneously. The Marshal managed to focus attention sufficiently to have the French attacks cancelled but these gains were lost when Greece was to be invaded in tandem with Yugoslavia and while no specific mention of Malta was made, Cavallero had a suspicion that the original idea of assaulting the island was still being entertained. At any rate he was expected to be ready for an invasion tentatively dated for 30 September.

Returning to his planning, it became clear to the Marshal that there was no feasibility at all for attacking Yugoslavia and Greece. It would have to be one or the other but the final decision for which would rest with Il Duce and so he had to have two invasion plans prepared. Planning documents for invading each of the two countries dated back to the mid-twenties and had gone through several evolutions. The essential form of a Greek invasion called for landings in Salonika to complement an eastwards push from Albania. The Salonika landing was considerably fraught with danger in light of the presence of the Royal Navy, and the main emphasis was placed on the advance from Albania. Two forms of plan existed for the Albanian advance: a large scale operation involving eleven divisions and a lesser version involving nine, although the substance was the same. Five/four divisions were to attack into Epirus, three/two were to hold the Yugoslav border, two were to hold the Koritsa region and one was to reoccupy Corfu. Options around the intervention of both Bulgaria and Turkey had also been considered.

The Yugoslav invasion was somewhat more complicated. Political efforts were to be made to destabilise the Croat elements in the Royal Yugoslav Army and support given to Macek's establishment of a Croatian puppet state. Five invasion points were identified with divisions advancing out of the Fiume & Zara beachheads, Albania and Slovenia. The numbers of divisions deployed also varied with the Slovenian or Dalmatian fronts enjoying predominance in turn, although no less than ten divisions were considered and some versions asked for eighteen. There was substantial complication around the involvement of foreign armies with Germany, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece considered likely to become involved at some point.

Having obtained a degree of certainty over Libya, Cavallero immediately sought to discover what the minimum force was required to put up a stiff defence in the event of a French push from Tunisia. He had no intention of fighting a stand-and-die battle in the colony, regardless of political or economic sensitivities. Of course, it might be forced upon him but he at least took heart from Il Duce's mention of placing more strategic value on Yugoslavia than Libya. Libya could not be considered without also pondering the problem of Malta. Cavallero could not see how he could either sustain a defence of Libya, evacuate the colony or even reinforce in the unlikely event of victory for as long as the British Mediterranean Fleet was able to maintain the island.

Complicating things somewhat was the Italian smokescreen of non-belligerency: he could not simply just attack it for as long as there was a sense in Rome that Britain could be mollified. In the cancellation of the French attacks he could see the logic behind the Italian positioning around non-belligerency and the concept of a 'parallel war'. By no doubt manufacturing some local issue Il Duce hoped to invade Yugoslavia while remaining aloof from the wider conflict. He was hoping that the appeasement party in Britain would continue to keep France from following up on its war strategy of 'Italy first'. This meant that Malta could not be attacked pre-emptively, but rather had to be attacked once it became clear that Italy and Britain would be coming to blows. The other alternative of course was to neutralise the island from the air and the Douhet factions within RA were confident of their ability to do so.

It was only the next day, on 26 August, that the surprising news of the Yugoslav Premier Cvetkovic announcing the formation of the semi-autonomous Croatian Banovina Hrvatska. In a single piece of diplomacy Italy had lost its main justification for intervening into Yugoslavia and bringing about the Kingdoms fall by the establishment of a Croat puppet state. Cavallero's planning was now in tatters and he took the development as an indication that an invasion of Greece was now the more likely of the two events. Initial enquiries to Ciano and Il Duce reinforced this consideration as clearly they had not taken such an eventuality into account. Simultaneous with this news came a report from SIM that the Greek army had in fact already been conducting its own concealed mobilisation and may have up to a fortnight's lead on the Italian mobilisation. As there was a fair degree of reliance being placed on catching the Greeks off guard planning changes had to be made and the first major departure from previous thinking was the cancellation of the Salonika landing.

Events now began to move very quickly. Ciano gave his guarantee to Chamberlain on 31 August that Italy would not enter the war against France or Britain, and the desired result was had over the coming weeks where the British intervened with both the French and Yugoslavs in an effort to keep Italy out of the war. This desire to keep a lid on a European general war seemed to be very sincere and Cavallero greatly valued having a blind eye turned his way at such a critical stage of his mobilisation plans. On 1 September Germany invaded Poland, and in the intervening two days the member of the Balkan Pact declared neutrality, the Hungarians and Italians declared non-belligerency and the Anglo-French declared war. On 3 September Yugoslavia began mobilising but was pressured by the British to avoid full mobilisation, and to also desist efforts to further the Bulgar-Yugoslav detente. Italy also offers Greece a treaty of non-aggression and, following several days of negotiation and to the surprise of many on the Italian side of the table, the Greeks agree; their price being the return of northern Epiros from Albania. This treaty was not immediately announced but word soon reached Cavallero who by now was at his wits end with the implications of the shifting political tide for his war plans.

Seeking direction from Il Duce on 10 September Cavallero was surprised to learn that both invasions were still considered to be live issues. In a decision that illustrates well the cold-blooded tenor of Italian foreign policy at the time Cavallero learnt that efforts were underway to organise the fascist Ustase leader Ante Pavelic as a counter-force for the more moderate regime of Macek, and to attack the infant Croatian state before it had a chance to properly secure its position. It was considered likely that the Serbian interests in Yugoslavia would hesitate a little in the event of a sudden Italian invasion, especially in light that it was Serbia that would have to deal with any Hungarian or Bulgarian incursions. The Greek action was also still on because, rather in spite, of the newly signed treaty which was seen as an excellent means to prompt Metaxas to drop his guard. When the gathered fascisti learnt from Cavallero that there was no way a twin invasion could occur there was an extended period of silence followed by a clamorous uproar as the pro-Yugoslav and pro-Greek interests each began to harangue Il Duce about the relative merits of each invasion option. Cavallero was dismissed at this point and was told to continue planning for both eventualities.

An unexpected benefit to the Italian interests was received at this point when it was learnt that the British Mediterranean Fleet was due to steam out through the Straits of Gibralter to link up with the French fleet. It seemed that the Admiralty was confronting a wide range of planning challenges itself and vacating the Mediterranean was seen as being an extension of the British efforts to keep Italy calm and out of the war. This meant that Malta was largely undefended in terms of the British surface fleet, which itself meant that the RM could venture forth from it's bases with confidence as to obtaining local superiority. Subsequently the Libyan Airborne Regiment was placed on alert and the transport and air superiority planes began to be assembled. The Libyan Landing Force which had already been despatched to prepare for landings along the Dalmatian coast was hurriedly instructed to make port and await further instructions.

On 20 September Cavallero was contacted by the Palazzo Venezia and informed that Il Duce was now increasingly in favour of the Yugoslav invasion over the Greek and that Cavallero should commence final planning to that effect. Five days later the Greek operation was definitively cancelled. This suited the Cavallero's deployment schedule as the Second Army in Albania had had it's reinforcements held back until more certainty was had, not to mention as part of the general desire to lull the Greeks into a false sense of security. By this time the Fifth and Sixth Armies in Libya had been stripped of no less than four divisions with one withdrawn to Sicily, and three to the invasion force; a single division was arrayed against the British while the remaining three faced the French. First and Fourth Armies on the Savoy front had retained their strength of four divisions with numerous supporting units and were by now well prepared in defensive positions.

That gave the invasion force a total of 10 full divisions with attached units that, taken together, formed another three. While it was a squeeze and less than ideal, it was all that could be had. Cavallero took heart from what seemed to be a self-interested Greece, the vacating of the Mediterranean by the British Navy, the smokescreens of non-belligerency and parallel war, the partial state of Yugoslav mobilisation and the revisionist interests of Hungary, and finally the impression he had gained over the last year that, based on the efforts in Abyssinia and Spain, foreign military interests considered the Italian army a paper tiger.

Croesus

[Croesus]

Following the creation of the autonomous Croatian Banovina under Vice-Premier Macek the Serbo-Croat schism within the Jugoslovenska Vojska became pronounced. Never an easy relationship, professional jealousies came to the fore and an Italian fund of 100,000 Swiss francs had been disbursed prior to the establishment of the Croatian state as Rome sought to advance it's agenda of destabilising the Kingdom. Subsequently the cooperation between the Croatian dominated 1st Army Group and the Serb dominated 2nd and 3rd Army Groups was not well established and did not perform well under the twin pressures of external war and internal rivalry.

Matters were complicated by the British government advising against full mobilisation that had commenced on 3 September but soon after scaled back, resulting in only 11 divisions being effectively under arms at the time of the Italian invasion. Furthermore those divisions able to take the field were only up to about 80% of their establishment strength and the allocation of war material (which itself was of poor quality and consisted of Great War era weapons, intermingled with recently supplied second-rate German arms and supplemented by a miscellany of pieces from other European producers) both lagged behind the call up of men and was biased towards the Serb dominated units.

The Croatian 1st Army Group consisted of the 4th and 7th Armies, the former disposed in the west of the Banovina and the latter in the east. The 4th Army (Nedeljkovic) was relatively well advanced in it's mobilisation schedule and could field two divisions, the 27th Savska (Maric) and the 40th Slavonska (Raketic), although each was only at 70% of establisment and under-strength in heavy weapons. The Slavonska had been concentrated on the capital Zagreb to ensure security of the new regime which meant that only Savska was in place to contest any Italian movement over the border.

The 7th Army (Trifunovic) fielded only a single division, the 38th Dravska (Stanojlovic), although it was fairly well reinforced with both Alpine and Machine Gun units and up to 90% of its strength. The Serbian 3rd Army Group consisted of the 3rd Army and guarded the Albanian border. The 3rd Army (Brasic) also fielded two divisions, the 13th Herzegovacka (Petrovic) and the 31st Kosovska (Milenkovic), with each division around 80% of strength and two of the better equipped Yugoslav divisions. The Kosovska was centered on the region from which it took its name while the Herzegovacka was based on Montenegro.

The overall weaknesses in heavy weapons within the JV were substantial. The artillery was on the whole obsolete and entirely horse-drawn; AT and AA pieces were scarce and held centrally in Belgrade, which inevitably meant that the Croatian divisions were particularly deficient; and automatic weapons were not plentiful and greatly monopolised by the Serbian divisions. The 1st Armoured Battalion consisted of 48 old French FT-17's and M-28's, fielded only a single operational company and was also held centrally; a full platoon of FT-17's from an Independent Company stationed in Zagreb formed the only armoured complement available to 1st Army Group when the Italians invaded. Available air support was spread throughout the Kingdom and Zagreb could field a single fighter and single bomber regiment, although the quality of machines was poor and heterogenous.

Facing these five understrength divisions were 10 full-strength Italian divisions and associated units that combined for a total of three divisions. The broad strategic idea is to advance along narrow corridors on Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade under cover of air superiority. Belgrade was seen as the more significant obstacle, with the other two capitals targeted first and of the two Zagreb would be given operational priority. Surprise was given a high priority in view of the capacity of the defending units to fall back along their lines of communication and, by blowing roads and culverts, slow down the Italian advance.

The Albanian forces were to make contact with and draw in the Serbian 3rd Army Group such that any attempts to reinforce the 1st Army Group would either be constrained, or lead to a breakthrough by the Italian units. The Libyan Landing Force was initially scheduled to sieze Split but had since been diverted in light of possibilities opened up around the assault and capture of Malta. The main strength was to be launched from Fiume directly at Zagreb and the coastal defence units along the Dalmatian coast were to be largely ignored, beyond being caught up in Regia Marina suppressing actions against the Yugoslav naval bases and the supporting actions for the short coastal advance of Sixth Army. The Fiume operations were conceived as being a first phase that forces the roads and flanking high points and thence pushes up to the first major obstacle at Karlovac and the Kupa bridges, and a second phase either exploiting to Zagreb and Sava, or beyond.

On the Albanian front, Second Army (Ambrosio) fielded two alpine divisions (the 2nd Tridentina and 3rd Julia), two mountain infantry divisions (11th Sassari, a veteran Abyssinian division, and 14th Bergamo), four artillery regiments, two cavalry regiments, one bersaglieri regiment, four border-guard units and two machine gun battalions. V Corps (Frusci) was tasked with watching the Greek border and was stripped down to the Sassari and the border-guard units, while it fell to the reinforced X Corps (Rossi) to force their way forward (and through) the defending units of 3rd Army Group.

Their task was considered to be quite onerous given the poor state of the local roads, the likelihood of inclement weather and the difficulties posed by taking on the well-regarded Serbian infantry in terrain ideally suited to defensive warfare. In Trieste was the Third Army (Guzzoni) tasked with the capture of Ljubljana and consisting of a single mountain infantry division (13th Isonzo), a single alpine division (1st Taurinense), three regiments of artillery, four border guard units and three machine gun battalions. It was not certain if Slovenia would be defended in any signficant way and if so Third Army was to cross the Sava higher up from Zagreb and turn around behind the city.

In Fiume were the units of Eighth Army (Balocco) tasked with forcing open passage into the Croatian hinterland, and comprising two infantry divisions (8th Pasubio and 9th Piave, both veteran Abyssinian divisions), one mountain infantry division (12th Re), one armoured division (1st Centauro), six artillery regiments, one bersaglieri regiment, one AA regiment, four border-guard units and four machine gun battalions. XV Corps (Roux) was tasked with the hard fighting and deployed all three infantry divisions and three of the machine gun battalions, while VII Corps (Arisio) consisted of the Centauro and the bersaglieri.

Behind the Eighth were the breakthrough units of Sixth Army (Berti) and concentrated the bulk of the Italian motorised units with three autotransportable infantry divisions (4th Livorno, 6th Cuneo, both of which are veteran Spanish divisions, and 10th Brenner), one armoured division (3rd Littorio), four motorised artillery regiments, two motorised machine gun battalions, and one motorised AA regiment. While the Eighth was to fight it's way along the Fiume-Karlovac road, the Sixth was to advance a short way down the coast, supported by the guns of the RM, to Senj before taking it's road to Karlovac.

The Regia Aeronautica had three main roles in the invasion plans; local air superiority, the strategic bombing of Zagreb and the tactical bombing in support of each of the three fronts. There remained considerable controversy about the deployment of the heavy bombers as it was seen, somewhat justifiably, that the puppet government of Pavelic would not appreciate inheriting a bombed out city, notwithstanding the professional concern of the RA airmen about avoiding large scale bombing of civilian populations. Consequently the bombers were only permitted to fly missions when cleared directly from Rome.

The establishment of local air superiority was considered a fairly easy task and it was considered likely that by the end of the second week of operations the skies would be cleared of JV aircraft. The tactical bombing missions aroused considerable concern within the RE as no real work had been done in the area of combined operations and the soldiers recognised that any errors made while learning on the job would be borne largely by them. However it was considered an important opportunity to try out the techniques as demonstrated by the Germans in Poland and the RA were very keen to get involved.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The Italian invasion ran behind schedule from the beginning. The transport and logistic system was hard pressed to move such a large amount of men and materiel under conditions of semi-secrecy. There was significant confusion as the Italian forces concentrated and few divisions commenced the campaign with their full complement of equipment, many without even their full establishment of men. It fell to the men of the Pasubio to open the invasion on the ground by pushing directly up the road to Karlovac; there was little attempt to hide or mask the advance. The Piave would follow behind with the Re was held in reserve while the Centauro was not intended to be committed to this stage of the battle.

The Italian build up had not gone unnoticed by the Yugoslavs. The first reports of the RE concentrating around Fiume were received by the third week of September and by the fourth its presence was unmistakeable. While there was at yet no conception of the size of the RE presence there was a distinct sense of something being amiss. Complaints to London were politely received but ultimately dismissed and the advice to not provoke Mussolini was reissued. This left the JV with the difficult task of preparing to defend without giving cause for accusations of aggression, a challenge that Poland had itself recently faced, and lost.

The JV plan was simply to dig in behind the Kupa at Karlovac and buy as much time as possible in the event of an Italian advance. The 27th Savska had upgraded the existing fixed defences somewhat but were still woefully short of artillery and heavy infantry weapons. As mobilising units continued to rally these were formed into a loose battle group ‘Hacovar’ which was tasked with throwing out advance pickets down the Zara, Senj and Fiume roads and thence holding up any Italian advance. These units would typically be reinforced by small groups of engineers who would place explosives along the roads before retiring to the nearby ridgelines where the few available machineguns were sited. It was one of the Hacovar companies that the advance guard of the Pasubio encountered on the second day of the invasion, October 4th.

The Italian operations had commenced on the 3rd when the light cruisers Bari and Taranto of the Ionian and Lower Adriatic Department, and the heavy cruiser Pola of the Upper Adriatic Department bombarded the Yugoslav naval bases at Sibenik, Split and Kotor while the 2nd and 15th Motor Torpedo Boat Squadrons provided additional screening for the capital ships. These naval actions were largely successful in neutralising the small Yugoslav navy, although the Pola hit a mine after steaming away from the burning facility at Sibenik and was immobilised. An attack by surviving Yugoslav torpedo boats came to nothing and with that action the naval component of the Italian invasion ended.

The Regio Aeronautica opened their account by bombing the Zagreb, Nova Topola, Bosanski Alexandrovac and Banja Luka airfields. The 4th Bomber Division Drago, flying BR.20’s out of Novara, bombed the first two targets while the 6th Bomber Division Falco flying Z.1008’s out of Padova hit the second two. Fighter sweeps by the 2nd Fighter Division flying MA.200’s out of Torino escorted the attacking bombers. The RA had a very easy time of it. They departed for their missions before even the RM began its bombardment and flew careful flight paths to help conceal their approach. They were on target before the Yugoslavs could react and those pilots who struggled into the air with their hopelessly outclassed IK-2’s were soon despatched. By the end of the first day the Yugoslav air force in Croatia was largely destroyed.

As the advance guard of the Pasubio moved up the Karlovac road they could hear the echoes of the Yugoslav detonations reverberating down the valleys towards them. Their pace, already somewhat cautious, slowed even further as they turned their first corner to be met by the plunging fire of the Hacovar rearguard units. The Pasubio shrank back before commencing the first of many such actions; traversing down to the stream below before scaling the heights while under the rifle fire of the Hacovar only to find the Yugoslavs already gone onto their next firing position. Eventually substantial forces were thrown out on the flanks as the Italians struggled through the terrain in a vain attempt to catch their persecutors. Meanwhile back on the road engineers were brought forward to span the yawning gaps and as they toiled the entire momentum of the Pasubio and Piave slowly wound down.

Croesus

[Croesus]

While the British were able to conveniently ignore the Yugoslav warnings about the Italian military build up in Trieste and Fiume, they were not able to ignore Il Duce’s summons of their ambassador to the Palazzo Venezia on the evening of 3 October. They arrived to find Mussolini in a good mood; the initial reports from the RM and RA were on his desk and the Pasubio had yet to encounter difficulties on the road to Karlovac. He also knew that the British Mediterranean Fleet was presently in the Atlantic as Britain sought to find the best way to cover its widespread interests and that the French had begun to move divisions away from the Franco-Italian border to reinforce the Maginot Line and Belgian border positions.

Upon the arrival of the ambassadors he drew himself up to his full height and commenced a lengthy diatribe against Yugoslavia in general and Croatia in particular. He was incensed that Yugoslavia, already a virtual German vassal state, could conceive of creating a Croatian state without thinking to consult Italy who clearly had significant interests in the region. He regarded the Macek government as illegal and saw a much darker motivation than mere self-direction for the Croats. He declared that the Macek government did not even represent the Croatian people; how could he when Pavelic still sheltered in Italy and, even though the government was now supposedly Croatian, would not return for fear of imprisonment or execution.

He intimated strongly that Italy had had enough of German economic influence in the Balkans, Italy’s backyard, and that this move by the pro-German Yugoslav regime was just too much. He realised that there was significant pressure on Romania to formally enter the German orbit on account of the Romanian oil, and that the Anglo-French were understandably concerned about this. He reiterated that Italy had no thought whatsoever in fuelling the fire of war by entering on the German side and, while he would also refuse to join the Anglo-French in fighting Germany, would work towards halting the inexorable tide of German economic pressure into the Balkans and Danube basin.

He recognised that the Anglo-French guarantee of Greece signalled an important piece of policy for the western powers and noted also that, given the similarity to the guarantee given to Poland, that meeting the Greek guarantee would be significantly easier with Italian cooperation. Subsequently he announced the existence of the recently concluded Italo-Greek Treaty of Non Aggression and the generous statesmanship exhibited by Italy in solving the problem of northern Epirus in the Greek favour: it is the least he could do for peace. He could thus with considerable confidence assure London that the Balkans at least would remain a bulwark against Germany and that Italy had already commenced the next stage of ensuring that Romania too would be safe from German depredation. The provocative Yugoslav creation of its proxy Croatian state would not be tolerated as Italy saw it for what it really was; and as a result Italian forces are already encountering joyful welcome as liberators from the illegal Macek regime.

Daladier was not impressed when he received the news of the Italian invasion and less of Il Duce’s justification. He felt that the British were being played for fools. However his annoyance was tempered by other considerations. Primarily he took heart from the opinion of Gamelin that the Italian army was a ramshackle affair fit only to overrun Abyssinian tribesman. Noting the debacle that was the battle of Guadalajara it was the considered opinion of the GQG that when confronted with what was widely regarded as some of the best infantry in Europe the Italians would quickly bog down. This would mean that Italy would not be able to assist Germany in the event of an attack on France. He could see additional political advantage accruing in the likely event of Chamberlain continuing his policy of appeasing Mussolini: if France went along with British policy they would clearly be demonstrating good faith as an ally and be thus positioned to make further requests of London.

Chamberlain saw the Italian invasion as a serious blow to his foreign policy but, like Daladier, saw a positive in that at least this would keep the Italian busy. He did not see any need to intervene on the Yugoslav side and would pressure Daladier to agree, using the latter’s own motto of the importance of unity to ensure France would stay out of what was portrayed as a localised, and parallel, conflict. However he could foresee that the unexpected development would be used as fuel by his parliamentary enemies and certainly agreed with the Admiralty advice to return a substantial portion of the Mediterranean Fleet as well as accelerate plans to move the homeport of the fleet from Malta to Alexandria.

Soon after the first Italian bombers flew towards their targets the Italian ambassador to Budapest conveyed an official letter from Il Duce calling for Hungary to act in accordance with its interests as a revisionist Versailles power and take possession of the territory so shamefully taken from it by the Treaty of Trianon. Italy was finally acting in exasperation to Yugoslav provocation by occupying Croatia and urged Hungary to take part in reconquering its Slavonian territory. Similarly the ambassador to Sofia was urged to take part in this historic reorientation of the region by returning to Greater Bulgaria its lost territory of Vardar Macedonia. Here was a great opportunity to reclaim what was lost and to regain their place in history.

The situation was clearly attractive to the Hungarian Premier Teleki and would be a natural development of its recent gains, through the Vienna Awards, of southern Slovakia, Ruthenia and northern Transylvania. With the recent shift to the right of domestic politics and the clear need to increase the strength of the Hungarian state in view of the fundamental change in the balance of power the Italian proposal was given immediate consideration. The view from Sofia was less straightforward. The recent warming of Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations had proceeded apace and the Bulgarian Prime Minister Kyoseivanov had sought to establish the alliance as a means of sidestepping the Balkan Entente, isolating Romania and as a means to returning Bulgaria as the pre-eminent local power. However he could hardly ignore the sea-change that had occurred and there was probably more to lose by supporting the Yugoslavs than by betraying them.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The original plan had the main effort of the Eighth (Balocco) and Sixth (Berti) Armies in the centre jumping off two days before the Second Army (Ambrosio) on the Albanian front and Third Army (Guzzoni) on the Slovenian front. The idea was that doing so would encourage the JV to commit its reserves to the centre and so permit Ambrosio and Guzzoni to make good gains on the flanks. In practice what happened was that the undefended Slovenian front was reinforced by another of the soon-to-be ubiquitous scratch JV units, in this case a formation of artillerymen without guns, an alpine unit and a machinegun detachment, the Battle Group Krstic which was able to get astride the Ljubljana road between Postojna and Vrhnika. The presence of the machine gun unit would prove telling in the days to come as Krstic was able to establish mutually supporting positions on adjacent highpoints and greatly slow the advance of Guzzoni’s vanguard, the 13th Mtn Inf Isonzo.

Ambrosio had even greater cause to rue the delay. His plan had been to take the ridgeline between Plav and Andrijevica and isolate the former so as to support a push on Pec with the objective of seizing the road junction at Rozaje. For this operation he committed the 2nd Alpine Tridentina and 14th Mtn Inf Bergamo which would ordinarily have been enough except that, just as Plav was being occupied by the Tridentina and both sides of the River Drin taken, the Bergamo was hit in its left flank by the advance guard of the JV Herzegovacka, stopping it completely in it’s tracks and forcing the Bergamo to disjointedly deploy along its line of approach. Subsequently by the end of the 5th both Ambrosio and Guzzoni were halted and having to shake out along the lines of advance in the case of the former or having to fight a meeting engagement in the case of the latter.

By this time Berti had managed to struggle clear of Balocco’s supply line and commenced his own advance down the Dalmatian coast towards the Senj road head. Held up briefly by a brave but doomed contingent of Yugoslav naval personnel at Novi Vinodolski, Senj was reached on the morning of the 6th. Following a period of readjustment of units Berti was aghast to learn from his reconnaissance units that the Senj-Karlovac road was entirely unsuited to passage by the great majority of his subordinate units. The entire Sixth Army was thus held up in Senj as Berti consulted with both Graziani and Cavallero as to what the next step should be: a return to Fiume and thence to follow up on Balocco, or a push onto Zara and to follow it’s road to Karlovac. Here was exposed the slovenly nature of Italian communications and delay mounted upon delay as the various commanders prevaricated, leaving Berti stranded in Senj for five full days before finally the decision was taken to advance on Split.

When, on the 10th Berti commenced his sluggish advance on Zara, Balocco had finally managed to make full use of his numbers and the better of JV Hacovar, sending the battle group falling back to positions on the high ground behind Vrbovsko where they were joined by a detachment of infantry. Fixed positions were hurriedly prepared as Hacovar sought to make as strong a stand as could be had. Unfortunately for Hacovar by this time both the Piave and Pasubio had adjusted to the conditions and, in conjunction with the increasingly effective Italian artillery, the Yugoslav positions were fixed, pounded and flanked such that by the 11th Hacovar was trapped and forced to surrender what was left of his command. This defeat meant that Balocco had a clear run out of the highlands and towards the lower ground at Karlovac.

In the meantime a pitched battle had been raging between the Bergamo and Herzegovacka along the entire stretch of the Drin between Plav and Andrijevica. Ambrosio had sought to use the Tridentina to turn the flank of the Herzegovacka but had instead run headlong into the JV Kosovska: clearly the Yugoslavs were not reinforcing their centre but seemed to even fancy their chances at dealing the Italians a bloody nose. In Ambrosio’s favour was the Italian superiority in artillery and, following early concerns of the Bergamo’s’ ability to hold its position let alone engage the Herzegovacka on its own terms, the crisis passed and by the 10th the Bergamo had itself fixed the Herzegovacka in place and Ambrosio had committed his Bersaglieri to turn the JV western flank. The Tridentina had on its own initiative managed to find a gap in the Kosovska’s line of advance and was turning in on the Yugoslav division, splitting it’s disposition and setting up for the destruction of the JV regiment caught between it and the Bergamo. This permitted Ambrosio to continue to hold the 3rd Alpine Julia in reserve for maintaining the intended push onto Rozaje.

Guzzoni had been completely held up by JV Krstic just out of Postojna and was in all sorts of trouble. Loath to commit his only other division, the 1st Alpine Taurinense, he had sought to use his comparative advantage in machine gun battalions by using the tactics of the Krstic against. However this played directly into the hands of the Yugoslav commanders and every day saw fresh arrivals in Ljubljana, further increasing Guzzoni’s problems. By the 11th the Third Army had only reached the halfway point between Postojna and Vrhnika, although the last two days had seen the first appearance of the RA in its ground attack capability. On the whole the combat missions flown by the BA 65 pilots were absolutely unconvincing as to the military effectiveness although it could be seen how they could work and this realisation on the part of both RE and RA would bear dividends later on in the campaign, and particularly for the Third Army as the problems and possibilities of air-ground coordination began to get sorted out.

Croesus

[Croesus]

Things went rapidly from bad to worse for the Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetkovic. His career as Prime Minister started well enough as he negotiated the fine print of a federal structure for Yugoslavia and seemingly created a positive solution to the long running issue between Serb and Croat in the Cvetkovic-Macek Agreement of 26 August that created the semi-independent Banovina of Croatia.

The divergent politics of his predecessor Stodjanovic and the regent Prince Paul was no longer an issue and the neutralist position of Stodjanovic could be replaced by the role of Yugoslavia as a quasi-German satellite: certainly this was seen as an effective means of keeping Italy and Hungary at bay. When war came on 1 September he could clear point to the paucity of his resources and the complexity of his situation when defending Yugoslav neutrality to the German ambassador and, indeed, there was never an issue in that regard. There was also some doubt in both his and the regent's minds as to the capacity of Germany to win the war and it seemed best to be prudent about any hasty involvement and certainly important to retain ties with the Anglo-French.

The first sign that events were taking a turn for the worse was when the British government strongly advised against Yugoslavia completing the mobilisation that it commenced on 3 September, as well as cooling the impetus to establish closer ties with Bulgaria. The former was discouraged in view of the strong Anglo-French desire to keep Italy out of the war and Cvetkovic could understand that, although he was not comfortable with it and did not place much faith in either the existing French guarantee or the unwillingness of the British to provide one themselves. The latter was discouraged as part of a darker, more slippery British diplomatic agenda tied up somehow with the recent treaty with Turkey and the guarantee of Greece and the whole thing left Cvetkovic feeling uneasy.

However it would not be prudent to annoy the British at this point and so he let the matter go. He recieved the first reports of Italian military build up in Fiume and Trieste on 22 September and definitive evidence of the presence of front-line divisions plus supporting units was obtained by 27 September. Taking his concerns to the British ambassador and thence to London he was informed that there was no indication of widespread Italian mobilisation and that the concentration of force was probably just a politically motivated reaction to the earlier Yugoslav partial mobilisation. At any rate it would not be wise to place Yugoslavia in a position where Rome could accuse Belgrade of aggression or provocation, and it would therefore be wise to not fuel the flames any further.

Once the first Italian attacks had developed Cvetkovic immediately convened a war council and was briefed on events by the JV Chief of Staff Simovic. The naval bases and airfields had quickly been neutralised, not so much because of any devastating attack by the Italians but rather because the military assets therein were not at all substantial. However Simovic was not too worried about such events. He had been advised through military channels in London, Paris and Berlin that the Italian army was no great threat; that they had been given a reverse at the Battle of Guadalajara by a rabble and only conquered Abyssinia with overwhelming numbers and technology. When confronted with the widely recognised excellent Serbian infantry, fighting on their own soil and for their own sovereingty he was confident that the Italians would be held and defeated.

He therefore proposed a plan that used the existing regular divisions in Croatia to hold the main Italian advance; to use the divisions facing Albania to attack the Italian positions vigorously in an effort to both relieve Belgrade of any threat and to force the Italians to reinforce this front; to maintain only a covering force facing Hungary and to direct the passage of reserves at the Italians before the Hungarians entered the battle. He further demonstrated how Poland had failed to give itself the best chance at defending itself by seeking to cover all points and not making good use of natural obstacles. So, instead of being forced to fight a defensive war, Yugoslavia would in fact rapidly reinforce the units in Croatia and Kosovo/Montenegro and give the Italians such a bloody nose that the Hungarians would think twice about attacking and send a strong signal to the Greeks that they have more to gain by holding to the Balkan Pact than by keeping to their non-aggression agreement with Italy.

This was important as early indications from the Balkan Pact powers were not encouraging. Turkey would do nothing at all; Greece claimed that it was busy reoccupying it's lost province of northern Epiros in the event of Italian treachery and, while in the medium term it would be able to assist in an attack on Albania in the short term it had to make sure it's gains held; and Romania was still in turmoil following the Axis assisted assassination of the pro Anglo-French Romanian Prime Minister Calinescu. the week long ministry of Argesanu and the present government of Argetoianu who, amongst other things, was promoting a Romanian-Soviet rapprochement. In short no assistance would be forthcoming to Yugoslavia from the Pact, leaving only Bulgaria as a potential source of aid.

Bulgaria by this time was the most effective of the Balkan royal dictatorships and the Italian invasion raised some uncomfortable issues for the King, Boris III. On the one hand he was, as were all Bulgarians, in regaining their losses of the Treaty of Neuilly, namely Greek and Yugoslavian Macedonia. On the other hand he was wary of pressures within the government to forge closer ties with Germany and complicating matters further was the benefits accruing from the recent warming of relations with Yugoslavia. In the end Boris promised that Bulgaria would not attack Yugoslavia, but by the same token would not intervene until Hungary did.

Finally the protestations to Berlin were met with a stony sympathy: while Ribbentrop understood the perils faced by Yugoslavia, he did remind Cvetkovic that Yugoslavia had declared it's neutrality which made it difficult for Germany to interfere given it was at war with the western powers; furthermore he noted that the creation of the Croatian Banovina was a politically clumsy action that would of course incite indignation in Rome, although he did promise to write a letter to Ciano suggesting that Italy and Yugoslavia negotiate over the issue.

Croesus

[Croesus]

Following the German invasion of Poland the Anglo-French surprised themselves and each other by quickly getting in step. Surprising because the Anglo-French relationship could not by any stretch of the imagination be called friendly. The mesentente cordiale was amply demonstrated by both sides in the interwar years; Haig "I have no intention of taking part in any triumphant ride with Foch, or with any pack of foreigners, through the streets of London"; Lord Curzon [on Poincare] "I can't bear that horrid little man. I can't bear him! I can't bear him!" and later, smiling through the window of his carriage at Poincare "... and you sir can go to hell".

Phipps "Veracity is not, I regret to say, the strongest point of the average politician, but there is a rather better chance of extracting the truth from him when he is not in the precence of another French politician"; Bullitt, the US ambassador to Paris and a confidante of Daladier "He [Daladier] fully expected to be betrayed by the British and added that this was the customary fate of allies of the British. Daladier went on to say that he considered Neville Chamberlain a dessicated stick; the King a moron; and the Queen an excessively ambitious woman who would be ready to sacrifice every other country in the world in order that she might remain Queen of England. He added that he considered Eden a young idiot and did not know a single Englishman for whose intellectual equipment and character he had respect. He felt that England had become so feeble and senile".

However they felt about each other, each power commenced hostilities with some semblance of a warlike spirit. The French launched a limited offensive against the Saar on 5 September, the British announce the presence of the BEF on 11 September and together they establish the Supreme War Council (SWC) on 12 September; which incidentally is also the time when the French cancelled further operations against the Saar. Diplomats and bureaucrats on both sides became very busy as negotiations commenced for an Anglo-French Purchasing Committee, an Anglo-French Coordinating Committee and an Anglo-French financial agreement.

In the midst of all these busy and professional scurrying about came the first signal that this war was going to be a little different to the previous; the first SWC meeting ended with not a single decision of any importance having been made. Matters picked up somewhat during the second meeting on 22 September where Daladier proposed the opening of a Balkan front by sending Allied troops presently stationed in the Levant to either Salonika or Istanbul to pre-empt any German advance into south-eastern Europe, as well as to encourage the Balkan Pact powers into the Allied camp. Chamberlain with some difficulty persuaded Daladier that Italy would find such an event decidedly aggressive and would subsequently remove any chance that the Allies had of weaning Mussolini away from Hitler.

The next scheduled meeting was for 17 November but the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia was considered sufficiently important to warrant an interim meeting of staff with a view to briefing their respective governments on their diplomatic and military options. The French generalissimo Gamelin noted that he had already ordered the movement of the first class divisions from the Army of the Alps in order to reinforce the Maginot and Belgian border positions, and that he had no intention of countermanding the order. Already there were strong signs of a build up of German forces in the Saar region and he anticipated that recent artillery exchanges in the region presaged some form of action there. He was perfectly confident that the French defenses would hold in light of any attack by Italy and, given that he had been given no indication of a likely Italian departure from its policy of non-belligerency, had made no provision for attacking Italy in this theatre.

He advised that the existing French plans for an offensive war against Italy consisted in the first instance of naval interdiction of the Italian Tyrrhenian Sea coast, particularly Genoa, and in the second with an advance into Libya from Tunisia; however at the moment the naval assets were mostly out in the Atlantic and the North African divisions were in no state to undertake an offensive at short notice. The British CIGS Ironside explained that the British arrangements in the event of a war with Italy were focused on controlling the Eastern Mediterranean, holding Malta, interdicting Sicily and contributing to the conquest of Libya. On the whole this was to be a navy affair; unfortunately most of the Mediterranean Fleet was at present also in the Atlantic while the Admiralty sorted out its priorities. Furthermore the British presence in Egypt was not substantial and in the process of being brought up to scratch, all of which essentially meant that there was little British could or would do if Italy became an enemy power.

The advice that reached Daladier and Chamberlain therefore encouraged a continuation of the British policy of treating Mussolini with kid gloves; while Daladier made another attempt to promote a Balkan front, he soon gave up as, given the evident collapse of the Balkan Pact, the Turkish Treaty and the Italo-Greek non-aggression pact, he realised that Allied intervention here would not prove to be a positive commitment and a potentially wasteful and divisive move. The two leaders discussed whether to issue a joint statement to Italy but quickly came to grief over the wording; Daladier favoured a strongly toned communique condemning the recklessness of the Italian action, while Chamberlain promoted a more moderate statement warning of unforeseen consequences.

As both countries were now bound by the requirements of the SWC the eventual statement was entirely bland, did not go so far as to condemn the Italian action and essentially gave Italy a free hand in determining its Danubian policy, as long as neither Greece nor Romania were directly affected. In any other situation the invasion of Yugoslavia would have aroused significant indignation in France and Britain; but the former was menaced on it's northern border and had far greater worries, and the latter was for the moment still digesting the implications of yet another continental war. Both governments were in some way pleased that Mussolini had committed yet another error of judgement and, as long as any Yugoslav victory did not bring the German army into the region, were quite content to have Italy busy with it's own problems and left Italy to its parallel war.

Croesus

[Croesus]

Following the destruction of the Yugoslav air force, or rather what passed for an air force, in the first few days of the invasion, the reserve divisions despatched to Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo by Simovic were forced to move by night in order to avoid detection by the wide ranging Italian reconnaissance aircraft. This slowed them down quite considerably; particularly as the increasingly confident Regia Aeronautica were beginning to interdict the roads leading from Belgrade and Osijek/Novi Sad, as well as the Sava bridges. This is why it took so long for the reserve divisions to reach their respective areas of operation.

Of the eleven mobilised divisions on the first day of invasion two were already in Croatia and two in Montenegro/Kosovo. The remaining seven belonged to the 2nd Army Group, which was responsible for defending the entire line of the Drava-Danube. A scant three divisions were retained facing Hungary and Romania (the 3rd Dunavska, the 7th Potiska and the 49th Sremska) and of the remainder the 3rd Cavalry Division and 30th Osjecka were despatched to Croatia, the 17th Vrbaska to Slovenia and the 10th Bosanska to Kosovo. Each of these four divisions were at nearly full strength and as well equipped as any of the JV divisions, so representing a significant up scaling of JV commitment to the battlefronts. An additional gain to the JV at this time was the scraping together of the 12th Jadranska of the Coastal Army which had gathered a number of surviving units from the Regia Marina bombardments plus various garrison and battle group units, and had formed up at Sibenik.

The first of the reinforcing JV divisions to arrive was the 10th Bosanska, force-marching from Belgrade and it arrived in the crucial town of Rozaje just as Ambrosio (Second Army) committed the 3rd Alpine Julia to attack Pec and thus seeking to isolate and destroy the JV Kosovska as it was being split by the 2nd Alpine Tridentina. While the Julia was taking the trouble to bring up its extended supply train its forward units moving up the road to Rozaje were contacted and then thrown back by substantial detachments of the Bosanska moving down from Rozaje. Whereas the Julia was taking its leisure in organising it’s push northwards the Bosanska was simply arriving in the area ad hoc and before the Italians realised it they were encountering JV forces in the outskirts of Pec. Confused house-to-house fighting began to spread along the northern line of the town and several company sized of the Bosanska managed to seize sections of the town before the Julia could seal it off.

While Ambrosio’s push onto Rozaje was rudely interrupted, the fate of the Kosovska was not altered. It had been decisively split by the Tridentina, the Italians had managed to fix the majority of the division in place and had commenced both an artillery bombardment and bomber missions flown by the BR.20’s of the Drago in an effort to completely destroy the Yugoslavs. The survivors managed to fall back in fairly good order, but split into two groups one heading towards Rozaje and the other towards Pec. As it became clear that the Kosovska had encountered significant trouble the Herzegovacka sought to disengage from its slugging match with the Bergamo and was fairly successful in doing so, retiring under cover of darkness to Andrijevica where it proceeded to dig in and prepare for the next stage in the campaign. By the end of the period therefore Ambrosio had managed to destroy a large part of the Kosovska, but the JV had established a strong position in Andrijevica and there was a confused and bloody fight raging for Pec.

In the centre Berti (Sixth Army) had finally sorted out its new deployment and started out on the Zara-Karlovac road. This road had earlier been covered by a small Yugoslav battle group comprised entirely of infantry, JV Svajger, but after a week of no activity along the road and, following the destruction of JV Hacovar at Vrbovsko, Svajger had retired northward to be in a position to threaten the flank of Balocco (Eighth Army) at the Petrova Gora. This meant that Berti had a clear run northwards, although he was not to know this and following conversations with Balocco took extra care to ensure he put troops on the high ground of his flanks as his valuable motorised and armoured detachments moved slowly up the road.

It was in this situation that the hitherto unsuspected 12th Jadranska first made contact with Sixth Army as it moved up from Sibenik, taking the rearguard 6th Cuneo in the flank as it moved slowly up to Obrovac. This was entirely unexpected and led to heated arguments between the RA and RE as the latter somewhat naturally demanded to know how a JV division could find its way into the rear area of the invasion force ten days after the first shots were fired. It was the incident that eventually prompted a greater efficiency in RA reconnaissance that would bear fruit later on in the campaign. But for the moment the Cuneo was extremely discomfited to find that the Jadranska was not just in Obrovac but was able to bring fire on both exits. Deploying under very difficult circumstances the Cuneo soon found themselves in more urban warfare, which would be one of the hallmarks of the campaign and bring considerable loss to the RE units. However Berti felt that the Cuneo were up to the task and, not wanting to suffer further delay, detached an artillery and machine gun unit to support the Cuneo and proceeded up the undefended road and, under the thickening presence of the RA Berti was able to get up to Slunj without being seen by JV Svajger.

On the other road to Karlovac Balocco (Eighth Army) had sought to press on as quickly as possible after despatching JV Hacovar at Vrbovsko. This he did by bringing the 9th Piave up to replace the somewhat worn 8th Pasubio and sending the 12th Mtn Inf Re across to Ogulin where it would turn northwards and dominate the Senj-Karlovac road from the other side of the valley from the Petrova Gora. This movement was observed by JV Svajger and the Yugoslavs moved in stages over successive nights to infiltrate the Re positions south of Ogulin while maintaining observation from its original positions.

The Piave meanwhile pushed directly on towards Karlovac. Upon debouching from the mountains they immediately were contacted by the screening forces of the JV 3rd Cavalry and their momentum was sufficiently held up to force their deployment. The Pasubio came up on their left flank and worked around to cut the road to Metlika, and thus Ljubljana. Balocco now began preparations for a set piece battle aimed at forcing the Kupa, for the purpose of which his attached engineer units had brought up bridging and assault crossing equipment. He was not to know it at this time but he was in fact facing three full JV divisions, two infantry arrayed on the far bank in depth and one cavalry screening Karlovac and maintaining a counterattack force on the Vojnic road. Things were about to get very messy.

Guzzoni (Third Army) finally reached Vrhnika on Oct 15 having finally gotten the better of JV Krstic, mainly through increasingly successful air support missions flown by the BA.65’s. It was clear to both army and air force commanders that the sort of combined force cooperation the Germans exhibited in Poland could be replicated in the Yugoslav operations. While the fundamental handicap of no air-ground radio communications could not be surmounted at such short notice, RA observers began to move forward with Isonzo as they slowly rolled the Yugoslavs back.

Armed with an appreciation of conditions on the ground the RA operations began to yield promising results and, happily for the hard-pressed Isonzo, Krstic had no answer. Guzzoni was now a scant 10 miles or so from his target Ljubljana and he had as yet managed to retain the 1st Alpine Taurinense as his reserve. Unfortunately for his hopes of a push past the Slovenian capital and the crossing of the Sava upstream of Zagreb it became clear from his own patrols and reports from the RA that a regular JV division had taken up positions in front of Ljubljana and were clearly preparing for a stand up fight. Realising that here was his first stern test he commenced planning a set piece battle and for the moment the Third Army operational area calmed down.

Croesus

[Croesus]

After nearly two weeks continually engaged against the JV 13th Inf Herzegovacka the RE 14th Mtn Inf Bergamo was in no fit state to pursue the Yugoslavs to Andrijevica. The Bergamo had been pinned in its positions fighting an often desperate battle against a committed foe that would use the terrain to best advantage, emerging from draws and re-entrants to harrass and overrun Italian positions, maintaining heavy pressure on vulnerable sections of the lengthy Bergamo line and interdicting the Italian supply lines. Consequently Ambrosio (2nd Army) ordered the ragged division off its ridge and to take the place of the fresh and Abyssinian veteran 11th Mtn Inf Sassari who had been kicking its heels in frustration on the Greek front; the Greeks had so far been busy consolidating their hold on northern Epirus and had avoided any activity along their line with the Italian troops.

It took three full days for the two divisions to pass through each other and the Sassari advanced through the old Bergamo positions right up to the outlying defensive positions of the JV Herzegovacka in Andrijevica, who had made solid use of the time afforded them by the Italians and converted the village into as strong a fortress as was possible. They had been reinforced with some more infantry as well as a battalion of pack artillery, the latter a most welcome addition and the former largely replacing their losses to the Bergamo.

The RE 2nd Alp Tridentina, having defeated and driven from the field the JV 31st Inf Kosovska, was thrown out in a long outpost line to cover the movements of the Bergamo and Sassari, and, aside from calling in harrassing artillery fire and conducting patrolling operations took no part in the heavy fighting that was occurring in Pec. The exhausted and depleted regiment of the Kosovska that had retreated to Pec entered the battle there from entirely an unexpected direction and the RE 3rd Alp Julia, already heavily engaged with the reinforcing JV 10th Inf Bosanska, found its positions untenable and were thrown out of Pec, retaining only a few advanced positions on the outskirts. Ambrosio couldn't accept such a situation given the pressure this put on the Tridentina line and in view of the threat the Bosanska and Kosovska posed to the retiring Bergamo.

He subsequently moved up one of the MG Btl and the 2nd Reg Bersaglieri to make a night assault on Pec while sending the Piemonte Reale Cav Reg to infiltrate the left flank and rear of the JV forces. With the MG Btl firing on fixed lines marked out by the forward units of the Julia, the Bersaglieri charged straight into the fight and some furious hand to hand fighting regained the lost Italian positions. The Julia were able to reinforce the Bersaglieri after dawn once it became clear where their counterattack had taken them, and just in time to help beat off a Bosanska counterattack. In their first action the Bersaglieri had lost a full quarter of their strength but had sent a clear message to the other Bersaglieri regiments about how they should comport themselves when their time came.

The Spanish veteran RE 6th Auto Inf Cuneo, having been surprised in Obrovac by the JV 12th Inf Jadranska, had assimilated the artillery regiment and MG battalion left to them as Berti (6th Army) advanced on Karlovac, and had chosen to withdraw completely from the town. Recognising that they would not profit from getting drawn into costly urban warfare where their mobility could not be used to effect they chose instead to encircle the town, cut the Jadranska off from the lines to Sibenik, and proceed to pound the town into dust.

The scratch units of the Jadranska which had only rallied to their staff and cadre units three days ago put up a staunch resistance but simply lacked the cohesion to conduct an effective and organised resistance. By the 18th the division broke up and sought to exfiltrate through the Italian cordon; some succeded, but most were captured and afforded the RE with its first propaganda opportunity and the Cuneo with its first battle honour of the campaign.

During the reduction of Obrovac Berti had painstakingly advanced the Sixth Army up the Zara-Karlovac road with such tardiness that the watching units of JV Svajger had returned to the main body of the unit. Without recourse to aerial reconnaissance, Belgrade was therefore blind to the threat posed by Sixth Army as it moved inexorably through the uplands and towards the flat ground beyond. Crucially for the Yugoslav defence this meant that there was only a single regiment of the 3rd Cavalry between the entirely mechanised Sixth Army and the strategic bridges at Glina and Sisak.

For the moment there was no threat as Berti made his pedantic progress past Slunj but the chances for disaster grew with each day. Part of the problem for the Yugoslavs was that the front was lengthening northwards along the line of the Sava. This was because the 8th Inf Pasubio, as it turned north to cut the road to Metlika -Novo Mesto - Ljubljana, encountered no resistance and was even able to get detachments across the Sava. This had the effect of drawing the JV 40th Inf Slavonska from its position in Zagreb as well as the screening cavalry of the 3rd Cavalry. The commitment of the Slavonska had the flow on effect of the sole remaining reserve JV division, the 38th Dravska, had to relocate westwards from its covering position in Nasice, further uncovering the Yugoslav flank.

Another development that caused the Yugoslavs to look westward was the engagement of the RE 12th Mtn Inf Re by JV Svajger at Ogulin. The Italians suddenly found their supply lines cut and outposts being cut off as Svajger made excellent use of the terrain and night conditions to counter the overwhelming Italian advantage in numbers and heavy weapons. The Re responded well and made changes to their dispositions to ensure the flank of the remainder of Eighth Army (Balocco) was covered but was effectively removed from operations during the period as they struggled to tie down and eliminate the stubborn Yugoslavs.

The main positions of the Eighth Army were however not bothered by this conflict and the RE 9th Inf Piave, together with most of the artillery and machine gun units, commenced the slow matter of brushing off the remaining JV cavaly screen, working up to the line of the Krupa and preparing for a set piece with the JV 27th Inf Savska and 30th inf Ojecka, who had by now established a solid line of resistance and weren't moved to counter the movements of the Pasubio upstream. They had even managed to gather some AA pieces and, initially at least, were able to mitigate the effects of RA aerial reconnaissance. Balocco despatched the 6th Reg Bersaglieri to reinforce the Pasubio and ensure the JV cavalry did not pierce the Eighth line and also brought up the 1st Arm Div Centauro to exploit north to Ljubljana as it was recognised that the assault crossing of the Krupa would be largely an infantry affair, and there was more than a hint of good gains to be had by turning the JV flank.

The movements of the Pasubio and Centauro towards Ljubljana obviously changed the situation faced by Guzzoni (Third Army). He kept the 13th Mtn Inf Isonzo in place in front of the JV 17th Inf Vrbaska but did not commence any substantial operations beyond patrolling and artillery harrassment. He was under orders to prevent large scale fighting in the city as Rome had plans for some sort of semi-autonomous Slovenian puppet state and also didn't want to turn the town into a more significant defensive position than it already was. He had heard of the fighting in Pec and Obrovac and, noting the paucity of his resources, did not want to place his future operations in jeopardy. He did however despatch the 1st Alpine Taurinense on a long passage around the right flank of the Vrbaska in an effort to force the JV to retire or, if not, to be able to cut the Yugoslavs off and coordinate operations with the Pasubio and Centauro.

Croesus

[Croesus]

A map of the battleground:

http://encarta.msn.com/map_701511901/Croatia.html

Ambrosio (2nd Army) had managed to fill his line out such that he could contemplate the reduction of Andrijevica. The impetus to do so was pronounced as the RE 3rd Alp Julia was only making slow progress against the ragged remnants of a regiment of the JV 31st Inf Kosovska and the reinforcing JV 10th Inf Bosanska in the blasted ruin of Pec. Even though the Piemonte Reale Cav Reg had managed to cut the road to Rozaje the Yugoslav forces trapped in Pec simply would not give in. In the end Ambrosio had to move up much of his artillery and reduce the Yugoslavs into blood and dust.

On the afternoon of the 23rd Pec was finally in Italian hands, ten days after the Bosanska first clashed with the Julia and such was the ruin that the village was not able to be used as a supply base for several days yet. It was in Pec that the Italian forces, much to their grudging respect, first encountered the extreme stubbornness of the Yugoslav infantry. Of the Bosanska much of their number remained behind buried in the rubble or lying in bits in the street; approximately a regiment of Yugoslavs of both shattered divisions retreated on Rozaje where they were taken gratefully and admiringly in by the regiment of the Kosovska that had originally retired to the strategic town.

While Pec was being reduced the eager 11th Mtn Inf Sassari and 2nd Alp Tridentina prepared for operations against the JV 13th Inf Herzegovacka in Andrijevica. Following the experience in Pec, the idea was for the Sassari to turn the flank of the JV units by advancing to cut the road to Matesevo while the Tridentina kept the Herzegovacka pinned. This worked surprisingly well and the Sassari were astride the road in short order. Leaving behind a regimental sized blocking force the remainder of the division struck north towards Ivangrad with the idea of completely isolating Andrijevica.

However their intentions were plain to the Yugoslavs who had no intention of losing another precious division and the Herzegovacka were drawn back to Ivangrad. There were clashes between the two divisions near Trepca but the Herzegovacka were able to hold the road open and the remainder of the division passed through safely. This action brought to an end the initial, and quite successful phase of Yugoslav operations; 2nd Army had only managed to move some 20 miles northwards in some 18 days of fighting, although the loss of the Bosanska was painful and could not be easily replaced.

The crucial area of the campaign was, as originally envisaged in the centre and, again as originally envisaged, the crucial units were that of 6th Army (Berti). His striking force consisted of two autotransportable infantry divisions (the veteran Spanish 4th Livorno and 10th Brenner), one armoured division (3rd Littorio), three motorised artillery regiments, one motorised machine gun battalions, and one motorised AA regiment. This was a massive preponderance of force when compared to the single regiment of JV 3rd Cavalry which was operating between Vojnic and Tusilovic. Berti had finally realised that the passage of his forces did not seem to be observed let alone opposed. Abruptly recognising that in spite of all his tribulations the breakthrough might actually have fallen to him, he commenced a hurried planning session.

The key target in terms of cutting the Zagreb-Belgrade line of communication was Sisak, which first required the seizure of Glina that was approximately fifty miles of road distance from his positions outside Slunj. A sudden tension filled the 6th Army as it was recognised from rank to file that they were on the verge of a significant event. The plan that emerged was fairly simple: the Livorno would advance up to Karlovac-Vojnic crossroads, stop and hold that position; the Littorio and Brenner would thence turn eastwards and seek to drive through Vojnic to Vrginmost and thence to Glina, where the Littorio would pause while the Brenner pushed ontowards Marinbrod and Petrinja; finally the Cuneo would come up from Obrovac and relieve the Livorno who would then push on to reinforce the Littorio and Brenner in a final push to Sisak.

When the Livorno began rolling towards the crossroads they drove straight through the JV cavalry screen without pausing to stop. The Yugoslavs were in the process of closing up behind the Livorno when they caught sight of the interminable lines of the Littorio and Brenner following up behind. They immediately withdrew in the direction of Vojnic and, having relayed the unpleasant news to Belgrade began to frantically fortify the village against the expected Italian attack. Their efforts were in vain however as the Littorio came barrelling down the road and following some light skirmishing broke clean through the thin Yugoslav line.

The road to Vrginmost was open and the Littorio reached it on the morning of the second day of their attack, cutting the rail and road link to Karlovac, which could now only be resupplied directly from Zagreb. Leaving behind a regiment of the Brenner the Italians pushed on to Glina which was reached in good order, although the town had been abandoned and some effort at dislocating the lines of communication had been made. By the end of the second day the Brenner were moving up on Marinbrod and the Cuneo had relieved the Livorno. The JV defensive structure was in complete disarray; RA interdiction along the line of advance and the general breakdown in communications had blinded the JV command in Belgrade and there was disbelief when it became known that Glina had fallen. Providentially the JV 38th Inf Dravska was en route to Zagreb and was able to be detrained at Novska, leaving one regiment behind while the remainder marched on Potok. Still, this was remarkably thin and there was little confidence in the ability of the division to hold the armoured Italian units for long.

6th Army's breakthrough caused a significant shift in emphasis by the JV command. The Karlovac position was still considered to be a strong one and defensible, but the JV 17th Inf Vrbaska was not seen as being in a strategic position in Ljubljana and was subsequently ordered to retire down the Zagreb road and take up blocking positions in Dobruska Vas so as to prevent a general outflanking movement by the 8th Inf Pasubio and 1st Arm Centauro who were moving up the road to Novo Mesto. The JV 40th Inf Slavonska was halted in its move west and split in two, one regiment staying in place and two regiments entraining to join the Dravska at Potok.

Finally the forces defending against 2nd Army in Montenegro were ordered to commence retrograde actions and hold up the pursuing Italian forces as much as possible. Belgrade briefly entertained the idea of sending another division southwards but increasing reports of Hungarian military concentrations put paid to any thought of further reinforcement to the Italians. It was from this point that the hitherto unified Serbo-Croat front in the face of the Italian invasion began to crack; secret planning commenced around the likely scenarios that would result if the Serb forces pulled back to defend Belgrade, leaving the Croatian forces to fend for themselves. While not an official plan at this stage, sufficient detail would begin to leak out through unofficial channels, greatly constraining the efforts to defend Zagreb.

The withdrawal of the Vrbaska from Ljubljana proceeded smoothly as the 3rd Army (Guzzoni) was not fully in contact with the Yugoslavs, with the 1st Alp Taurinense maneuvering around the JV right flank and the 13th Mtn Inf Isonzo simply holding in place and the intercepting Pasubio and Centauro from 8th Army (Balocco) were to slow to cut the Ljubljana-Zagreb road. By the time it became clear that the Vrbaska had slipped away all Guzzoni could do was bring his two divisions up to the Slovenian capital and commence a short period of reorganisation while accepting the keys of the city and establishing various aspects of Italian military government.

With the fall of Ljubljana Mussolini had his first success and he was quick to make political capital of it, particularly with the Hungarians and Bulgarians, suggesting that the longer they held off the more likely it would be that not just Croatia but Serbia would be under Italian jurisdiction. The message did not fall on deaf ears in Budapest and Sofia and each approved plans for intervention; the Hungarian preparations were further advanced than the Bulgarian, but the Bulgarians were not faced by any significant Yugoslav forces. The fall of Ljubljana therefore signalled the full resumption of revisionism in southern Europe and presaged a new period of political developments in the region, which hitherto had been dominated by the interplay of Soviet-German tensions balanced off by the defensive alignment of the clearly toothless Balkan Entente.

In front of Karlovac Balocco had been working on his approaches on the main Croatian defense line on the far bank of the Kupa and this work continued. the 12th Mtn Inf Re had finally chased and dispersed JV Svajger and could rejoin the main positions being developed by the substantially reinforced 9th Inf Piave and engineer and artillery units. The developments in the the 3rd and 6th Army fronts had prompted Rome to command Balocco to hang back on his preparations as it was felt that retaining military force was more important than seeking a premature attack on well defended positions if it transpired that the general strategy of retreats observed in Albania and Slovenia were to be repeated in Karlovac.

When it became clear that Ljubljana had been vacated Balocco recalled the Pasubio to rejoin the main positions, thus giving him a strong offensive grouping of three divisions allowing him to develop the battle at Karlovac in whatever form was appropriate. His force was further bolstered by the presence of the Cuneo near Vojnic, though it was not certain if that division would remain in place or reinforce the exploiting 6th Army.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The Hungarian government of moderate conservatives led by Count Pal Teleki did not welcome the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia. The unifying aspect of Hungarian politics was a consensus around the revision of the Treaty of Trianon and the reclamation of Slovakia and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, Transylvania from Romania, Croatia-Slavonia from Yugoslavia and the Burgenland from Austria. The difference was in how such revision would be obtained and the difference was substantial. The moderate conservatives whom, aside from the tenure of Gombos of 1932-36, had maintained that avoiding close ties and commitments in European politics would give Hungary a ‘free hand’ in attaining its revisionist goals.

The radical right, with its power base in the military and fascist organisations, believed it important to ally closely other radical right-wing powers and obtain revision directly, and by force if necessary. The views of the Regent, Admiral Horthy, combined attitudes of both parties: inherently conservative, he was also given to some sympathy with the radicals. On the whole he had consistently come down on the side of the moderate conservatives whenever the radicals had pressured him to take direct action, but as the decade of the 1930’s passed and the successes of first Italy and then Germany became apparent, his mediating influence came under increasing pressure.

The attack on Yugoslavia meant an effective end to Hungarian efforts to foster a Third Europe, whereby Rome, Belgrade, Bucharest and Budapest would combine to prevent increased German influence in the area. Even before Italy’s signature of the Anti-Comintern pact in November 1937, Italy had signalled favourably to Polish-Hungarian efforts to coordinate their foreign policy. Official contact was made when Rome invited the Polish Foreign Minister Beck in March 1938 to discuss matters around the strategic issues around German economic and political penetration of the Danube basin. Upon realisation of the Anschluss Germany obtained a common frontier with Hungary, Yugoslavia and Italy and its influence was substantially facilitated.

During the Czech crisis and subsequent Munich agreement, Poland and Hungary, supported by Italy, sought to obtain a common border, which was seen as an important step leading towards the consolidation of the Third Europe. Prior to this Hungary had not only refused the German invitation to participate in a military invasion of Czechoslovakia, but it had concluded the Bled Agreement with the Little Entente powers where the two sides renounced force in its territorial dealing with each other and Hungary was permitted to rearm. However the Polish-Hungarian efforts were rebuffed as it was clearly recognised in Berlin that this would entail an anti-German bloc. Taking the Bled Agreement, the Polish-Hungarian efforts to coordinate policy and the gains Hungary made from the Munich settlement and subsequent Vienna Award, it certainly seemed that the free hand policy of the moderate conservatives was successful.

However the invasion of Poland changed this. Taken with the German protectorate in northern Slovakia, the Polish invasion saw considerable popular and official sympathy shown for Warsaw. Hungary remained neutral during the conflict, refused the German request for transit rights and harboured fleeing Polish troops. While a serious blow, the idea of a Third Europe remained, though in a modified form and now as a neutral bloc of countries under Italian leadership. The Yugoslav invasion changed this and signalled the ultimate failure of the free hand approach: first Vienna, then Prague, then Warsaw and now Belgrade had fallen to the encroaches of radical right wing governments and Regent Horthy could no longer mollify the indignant military who pointed to the iciness of German relations, the collapse the Polish diplomacy and the imminent occupation of Croatia as a clear and patent failure of government policy.

With misgivings Horthy felt constrained to ask for Teleki’s resignation and subsequently swore in Laszlo Bardossy as Prime Minister. The change in regime was a clear signal to Berlin that the period of Hungarian equivocation was over; what it didn’t communicate was a slowly growing realisation that closer Italo-Hungarian ties might as easily satisfy Hungary’s revisionist agenda as well as serve to deflect, if not block, further German penetration of the Danube basin. The establishment of an Italianate policy took time to develop but gradually developed into a principle of the Bardossy regime; taken with the Italo-Greek non-aggression treaty, it seemed to Budapest that there was a genuine alternative to outright identification of Hungary as a German satellite. This was important as it was a long-held view of Horthy, the last Admiral of the Austro-Hungarian crown after all, that Britains fleet would eventually prove decisive in any European conflict and it would hardly be beneficial for Hungary to pay for revision with its sovereignty.

It was against this background of a seemingly fundamental shift of the temper of Hungarian government from the moderate-conservative right to the military-radical right that saw the Hungarian Army intervene in the Yugoslav conflict when the 3rd Army under General Novak struck over the border from Pecs. The prime strategic goal of the 3rd Army was the occupation of the Serbian Backa, from Subotica in the north down to the principal centre of Novi Sad. 3rd Army was principally an infantry force comprising of eight infantry, two cavalry and two motorised divisions in four corps and it was envisaged that as the advance extended divisions would drop off the route of advance to hold key positions and ensure the land was conclusively. The Hungarians were to proceed with caution and maintain close communications with Budapest but their intention and technique was unmistakable: forced revision.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The entry of Hungary into the Italo-Yugoslav war produced an abrupt collapse of the united Serbo-Croat front, which saw the emphasis pass from the military to the diplomatic and led to a perceptible cessation of hostilities by all parties. The passage of the Hungarian 3rd Army (Novak) to Novi Sad was rapid and, aside from two small actions fought near Subotica and Srbobran, uncontested. Novak was greatly assisted by the general southward passage of JV units in accordance with the strategic plan as laid out by the Yugoslav Chief of Staff Simovic. Preceded by his motorised and screened by his cavalry divisions, the Hungarian infantry simply marched directly to their target areas, drew up outside and commenced encircling operations.

The rapid success of the Hungarians brought about the resignation of Simovic and the formal notification to the Hungarian minister in Sofia that Bulgaria was to seek border revision ‘lest Serbia and Croatia fall entirely into Italian hands’ led to the resignation of Prime Minister Cvetkovic. The subsequent crisis of government left Prince Paul in a hopeless position and, following a failed attempt to enrol Ribbentrops’ aid against the Italo-Hungarian attacks, authorised the despatch of letters to Rome and Budapest requesting an armistice with a view to obtaining a peace settlement.

News of this quickly circulated through Belgrade within two days of the proposal a group of nationalist Serbian army officers overthrew the Prince in a bloodless coup. This only served to paralyse the functioning of government in Serbia and contributed significantly to the events that followed. For the moment however Belgrade and its approaches began to be hurriedly fortified and all available divisions ordered to move back immediately to assist in the city’s defence. Given the questionable nature of the new military government, not to mention the problem of having to disengage from their respective fronts, not all commanders gave the order to retire.

In Zagreb the government of Macek looked on with dismay as the catastrophe unfolded; first the Italians broke into the centre while pushing in the Croatian right wing, then the Hungarian and Bulgarian intervention and lastly the collapse of government in Belgrade. Macek had no alternative but to sue for peace, which he did immediately and directly to Rome, offering a full surrender and trusting to the support he hoped he could count on within Rome, on account of the lengthy contact he had had with the fascist regime over the last ten years.

He also gambled that, if given a choice, the Italian government would find it easier to deal with Macek and his clearly popular government than with the alternative, the extreme Pavelic and his group of Ustase terrorists. He also took care to enlist the support and good offices of Athens in his approach, further considering that the Metaxas government would help pave the way for a more generous treatment. As the diplomatic channels were being opened, so were the military being closed, with all artillery fire being stopped, all movement to the front prevented and strict instructions issued that all Croatian soldiers should remain in place and under no circumstances provoke the Italians.

For Cavallero the news of the Serbian collapse and Croatian surrender came at an opportune moment. He had on his desk a growing series of reports concerning the supply situation and they did not make for pleasant reading. Essentially the Regio Esercito had run out of steam. It had become apparent within the first week of hostilities that the logistics of the invasion had not been well provided for and now, three weeks later, increasing rates of exposure related injuries, lengthening delays in ammunition and petrol resupply and deepening problems of food and medical supply had led him to the conclusion that there was at most another weeks worth of fighting in his army before it simply stopped.

He had in fact in his hand a report from Berti (6th Army), whose force it was that had produced the breakthrough and who was meant to be exploiting deep into Yugoslavia, that he had only two days fuel remaining. Given this litany of woe, Cavallero gratefully sent out the stop order to all units and commanders and, while there were many within the Comando Supremo that Italy had been robbed of a victory, he knew only too well that it had been spared a humiliation.

While the governments of Rome, Budapest and Sofia grappled with the immediate problems of carving up the Yugoslav corpse, initial findings by foreign military attaches on the performance of the Italian armed forces were mixed. They fell into two camps and both camps were represented in all the capitals interested in determining the impact Italy would have in the ‘German war’. The first group, and substantially the larger, dismissed the results obtained by the Italians. It was noted that the British had curtailed the Yugoslav mobilisation and hence prevented Belgrade from defending itself against what was demonstrably a surprise attack, and the fact that Italy had cleared its way with Greece and allowed itself therefore to concentrate its scanty resources against the depleted Yugoslavs was seen as doubly important.

The difficulties the Italians had when confronting the Serbian infantry in pitched battle at Andrijevica and Pec, rather than pounding makeshift units at Obrovac and Vrbovsko, was held up as proof that the Italians were still a second-rate army. Finally the obvious supply problems that had developed in the latter stages of the campaign did not escape attention. The second camp pointed out issues such as the demonstration of air-ground cooperation in the drive to Ljubljana, the use of mobile troops in searching out flanking opportunities and the point that the Italians actually won the opening stages of the Andrijevica and Pec battle.

However their words of caution were insufficient. Rather than confront their prejudices against the capacity of the Italian army to wage war, foreign military staffs noted that the Italians were still a long way behind their larger neighbours and, while they obtained a meritorious result in Croatia, victory came to them due to a political collapse rather than a military breakthrough.

Croesus

[Croesus]

When Italy invaded Yugoslavia two broad justifications were used by Rome to give some degree of respectability to what otherwise was an act of pure aggression. The first was the annexation of the Dalmatian coast, which was portrayed as both a natural extension of the prior annexations of Fiume and Zara, and the recent absorption of ‘Greater Albania’ into the Italian Empire. The establishment of Italian hegemony in the Adriatic was a long standing aim of Italian diplomacy and not a surprise to foreign capitals. The second was the position that the semi-autonomous regime established by the Peasant Party under Vladko Macek without consideration for Italian sensitivities was an affront to Rome and, further to this, not entirely representative of Croatian nationalist politics; that the interests of the Croatian right went unrecognised as the leader of the Ustase movement, Ante Pavelic, remained in exile in Italy.

So it was the Italian army was ostensibly intervening to provide a more representative form of independent Croatian government and, in keeping with this, the several hundred members of the Ustase took part in the invasion as a paramilitary unit attached to Balocco’s Eighth Army. Although it took no part in the set piece fighting the Ustase became increasingly active in ‘insurgency operations’ conducted behind the advancing Italian front. It became quite clear early on that Pavelic was fulfilling a unique political agenda totally removed from the broader Italian interests; namely the deliberate massacre of Serbian minorities in the countryside. During the last week of hostilities matters were brought abruptly to a head when a company of the 3rd Bersaglieri Regiment happened upon an Ustase action near Barilovic while moving up to the front. Abruptly confronted with the seamier side of Yugoslav politics the no nonsense Bersaglieri confronted the Ustase unit and chased them from the village.

The Bersaglieri intervention into ‘domestic Croatian politics’ brought a stern protest from Pavelic to Balocco; the latter however issued a stern denunciation of what he saw as terroristic and criminal behaviour. Pavelic declared that he would go straight to Rome with his concerns and Balocco declared that he would welcome such a move; given the attention it would bring to the Ustase activities. Unperturbed Pavelic immediately left the front and travelled to Rome to demand a cessation of Italian involvement in the affairs of the government-in-waiting. Upon his arrival he found however that the mood had changed somewhat since his departure of a month before. Mussolini declined to see him, instead despatching a distant and distracted Ciano to conduct a short interview. Increasingly uncomfortable, Pavelic laid down his complaints. He was however interrupted in mid-flight as Ciano informed Pavelic in no uncertain terms that the Ustase activities were creating significant problems for the Italian army and that at no time did Rome consider the massacre of minorities an activity to which it would lend its support. He informed Pavelic that Mussolini was extremely angry at what he saw a betrayal of Italian good will and that as a result Pavelic should consider himself under arrest and his unit of ‘bandits and cutthroats’ disbanded and impressed into the Italian military penal system. And so ended the inglorious career of Ante Pavelic.

The turning point had come soon after the Barilovic confrontation with the Bersaglieri. Following the abandonment of the Zagreb regime to its own fate by the JV following the Hungarian intervention and the subsequent collapse of the Belgrade government, the Croat Premier Macek had requested an armistice and terms through the good offices of the Greek government. Negotiations had proceeded apace as Italy did not wish for the war to continue as it became clear that the Macek government was popular, the Italian army about to run out of steam and the fundamental sense of betrayal and general dissatisfaction with the Belgrade regime combined to make Rome keen to consolidate its sudden, and surprising, gains. The Ustase incident came at a time when the Italian negotiators were trying to find ways of distancing Rome from Pavelic and was immediately seized upon. The Macek government was then reinstated, though with some significant Italian appointments to promote the achievement of Rome’s objective of ‘increased representation’. While there were a number of freedoms and autonomous rights accorded to Zagreb there was no doubt that the new state, the Nezavisna Crzava Hrvatska, was a puppet state and that there was a fundamental expectation on the part of Rome that Zagreb would take a full part in the wider political and economic interests of Italy.

Dalmatia was annexed, which finally delivered up full Italian control of the Adriatic, not to mention various vessels and facilities of the Yugoslav navy. While direct control was seen as of great benefit, the wider implications of Italy being the destination for Croatia’s exports was quickly appreciated. In agricultural production significant gains were made. Yugoslavia was Europe’s third largest producer of corn and of that, three-fifths is concentrated in Croatia; furthermore the Croatian wheat crop is of particularly high quality. Widespread areas of livestock, timber and vine and olive cultivation are now taken into the Italian economic system. Important manufacturing centres in the forestry, foodstuffs and textile industries have also been taken up. It is however the mineral gains that most interest the Italian industrialists. Significant output of brown coal from Slovenia and Bosnia will make a welcome addition to the energy tight Italian economy, while the output of the rich Bosnian and Croatian iron gives a substantial boost to Italian heavy industry. These two aside, it is probably the large quantities of quality copper that will have the most immediate impact on the Italian economy, with no fewer than seven of the thirteen deposits now within the Italian sphere. Other important metals include chrome, manganese, lead, zinc, pyrites, antimony, bauxite, gypsym, petroleum, silver and Portland cement. Where prior to the invasion half of Croatia’s exports were going to Germany, now most of it is going directly into Italy. In this sense alone the Italian invasion has proven to be a great success.

Croesus

[Croesus]

The purpose of the Danubian-Balkan countries in the post-Versailles world was to act as a frontier between the Great Powers; primarily between Germany and Russia whose twin pressures from west and east dominated the international relations of the region, but also including the influence of Italy, France and Britain. It was an implication of this purpose that they would in some way coalesce and come together to obtain a degree of self-interested collective security such that they could more readily resist interference by the Great Powers.

On the eve of general hostilities each of these countries, with the qualified exception of Hungary, had developed some form of dictatorial rule, involving domination by monarchist and/or military interests. Two attempts at collective security had been made, the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania and the Balkan Entente between Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and Turkey. Each was directed primarily against one of the two revisionist powers, Hungary and Bulgaria, and each was fatally weakened by member powers making exceptions in the governance arrangements such that they were effectively unable to intervene when the status quo was challenged.

The challenge came in 1936 with the opening of the German economic offensive into the region. By this time Italy had become a revisionist power and Britain retreated from direct activity in regional politics, leaving France to construct a series of political structures that, it was hoped, would prevent German expansion eastward while also maintaining the cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union. This was not to be for, as was clear to Berlin, there were no economic, or even military, provisions in the French diplomatic arrangements. Germany provided a way for the Danubian-Balkan states to trade their way out of the Depression by offering a market for their agricultural surpluses. The German economic offensive was structured thus that internal price levels were driven up making it increasingly difficult for the countries to obtain alternative markets and thus to escape the noose that was closing about their necks. By the time limited French and British economic treaties were in place the damage had been done; the region was firmly in the German economic hinterland.

As war approached the German situation strengthened the hand of the three revisionist countries, while the Anglo-French inactivity and weakness progressively harmed that of the remaining Danubian-Balkan countries. As the horse-trading commenced it became clear that these countries would have a significant part to play and, again, the Anglo-French were at a disadvantage. Where the Axis powers were content with Danubian-Balkan neutrality, the Anglo-French were pressing them to make a commitment to stem the eastward flow of Axis influence. The one was easier to provide than the other given the unique nature of the political environment and so it was that when war did come each of the powers held to individual neutrality, if they weren’t already tied by non-belligerence to one of the two warring sides.

The announcement of the German-Soviet pact in August was the first act in a bewildering succession of crises and surprises that fundamentally changed the nature of the carefully constructed Danubian-Balkan political system. The country most immediately affected was Romania. Its fundamental policy was to balance off the interests between Germany and the Anglo-French while keeping the Soviet Union at arms length. Upon learning of the pact the concern became that Germany and Russia had come to an arrangement over the division of Poland and Romania; as events in September unfolded it became clear that in the former this was true, which could only spell trouble for Romania.

Despite recent border tensions, Bucharest felt fairly confident that Hungary would not intervene in Transylvania, as it was not in Budapest’s interest to see Soviet influence increase in the region, given the treatment the Hungarians had afforded the regime of Bela Kun and the significant absence of communist activity in that country. Bulgaria was a different matter as of late it had been noted that relations between Sofia and Moscow were growing warmer and Bulgaria was clear and unapologetic over its ambitions in the Dobrudja.

The Romanian response was to seek to draw Bulgaria into the Balkan Entente by discussing measures with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister in September that would see each of the Balkan Entente powers ceding territory to Bulgaria in return for Bulgaria avoiding ‘adverse movements which might compromise the work of appeasement’. But the main point was that the proposal would not be made until the Turkish Foreign Minister returned from impending talks with his counterpart Molotov in October.

Following the meeting with the Yugoslavs, the Romanian Foreign Minister raised the idea of a Balkan Entente with Rome, but adding the important distinction that such a bloc would naturally follow the lead of Italy in keeping things as they were in the region. This suggestion came parallel to conversations occurring between Mussolini and Ciano where, following the August commitment to war and the resulting decision to fight ‘in parallel’ with Germany, the consideration was given to keeping the Danubian-Balkan region out of the conflict entirely, as a means of preserving limited Italian influence as well as ensuring no collision of interest with the Anglo-French. The idea did not last long in Rome as it was seen that there was more to be gained from war than from leading a bloc of neutrals but, as with much of Italian diplomacy, no real effort was made to discourage the Romanians from promoting the plan.

Following the Soviet role in the partition of Poland, and simultaneous with the Romanian proposal, there occurred several diplomatic and media items that mentioned directly the idea of Italian regional leadership. Partially in response to this, Ciano briefly revived the idea and sought the opinion of Berlin, which, at this stage, wasn’t grappling with the unforeseen consequences of an Italian dominated Croatia. The message was that Germany had nothing against the idea of Italian regional leadership per se, but that it would if such a leadership took on ‘a political character’.

Things came to a head during a meeting with Hitler on 1 October, on the eve of the Italian invasion, where Ciano was informed that Germany approved of an Italian-led bloc of neutrals to ward off Allied influence but that it was the German view that the Italian sphere of influence in the region extended only so far as those countries in direct contact with the Adriatic and Mediterranean. This was a fundamental difference of opinion and, following on from the exasperation of the Ciano-Ribbentrop conversations of August and the announcement of the German-Soviet pact of that month had a marked impact on the view that Rome subsequently took of Berlin; needless to say also that, for the moment, the idea was completely killed off.

However, Rome neglected to inform the Romanians of this development and in spite of the fact that the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia, tacitly supported by Greece, took the Yugoslav influence in the Romanian scheme out of contention, Bucharest retained interest in the plan and, just as the Italian army was drawing up outside of Karlovac, the Turkish Foreign Minister returned with his news. And it wasn’t good. The position of the Soviet Union, who had been seeking to force Turkey into a revised relationship such that Soviet naval power could be extended past the Straits, was that Moscow not only had no interest in the Balkan Entente consolidating its position, but that in fact Molotov had openly taken up the cause of full Bulgarian revisionism. This effectively confirmed that Moscow saw its interests in Bessarabia and Bukovina as unsatisfied and that it would at some point seek to rectify matters.

Further to this it emerged that Istanbul, of its own accord, had approached Bulgaria directly with the Romanian plan. Perhaps unsurprisingly Sofia saw little gain to join the Entente given that its hopes for revision had never been higher; and further to this the Bulgarians made pointed reference to the recent conclusion of the Tripartite Agreement with France and England. The Romanians made a further attempt to revive the idea of turning to Italy to prevent German or Soviet domination by calling upon Rome to accept leadership of an anti-Bolshevik bloc, citing the cautious warming of relations with Istanbul and the encouraging signs of a Hungarian-Romanian border accord. This last effort proved as unsuccessful as the earlier however and with its demise, together with internal problems with the Iron Guard, the Romanian efforts to resist German control was given up leading to a growing and marked pro-German influence within the Romanian government.

With the departure of the Romanian diplomatic initiatives and the destruction of the Yugoslav state, the politics of the region entered into a new phase. Italy proceeded to establish puppet states in Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro while continuing to administer Albania as part of the Italian Empire. Greece ensured its hold on northern Epirus would not be uncontested and, confident of its Turkish and Italian agreements, continued with its avowed neutrality in the wider European war while at the same time furthering its disengagement from the Balkan Entente.

Bulgaria, having taken its slice of Yugoslavia by occupying Vardar Macedonia recognised in the wider developments that its position had abruptly become intensely strategic and began to mobilise its forces in anticipation of either furthering its revisionist agenda at the expense of Romania, or defending itself against Greek and/or Turkish operations. Hungary proceeded to consolidate its gains while building on its suddenly remarkable position; with a resurgence of its relationship with Italy and an understanding with Romania, it began to turn its attention to the smaller matter of Slovakia and the greater matter of its place in the German sphere. Turkey found itself under increasing diplomatic pressure from the Anglo-French in light of the Italian successes and, given a marked cooling of relations with Moscow, found itself unable to prevent the gradual dissolution of the Balkan Entente.

By the end of October tensions in the Danubian-Balkan region were high. Greece and Bulgaria watched each other suspiciously; Turkey was proving unable to avoid the attentions of the Anglo-French at the expense of its Russian relationship; Romania was in the throes of internal upheaval and fundamental failure of its foreign policy; Hungary was becoming increasingly confident of securing its full revisionist aims; and Italy, buffered by a string of client states, was fulfilling its long held policy of a ‘horizontal axis’ by encroaching steadily on the German economic hinterland.

Croesus

[Croesus]

This period was one of three surprises and subsequent rapid change in foreign policy for all the capitals of the great powers. The first great surprise was the Soviet-German pact signed on 24 August. Its announcement removed the fundamental premise upon which the foreign policies of most of the states along the Baltic-Black Sea line was based and took away the option of a second front for the Anglo-French, leaving them to face Germany alone. The second surprise was the abrupt stiffening of Anglo-French resolve leading to their declaration of war on 3 September; where before they had acquiesced over the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia, now they abandoned their policies of appeasement and conciliation and opted for war. The third surprise was the behaviour of Italy where it did not declare war in favour of Germany but instead opened a campaign against Yugoslavia, which it won in three and a half weeks, to the surprise of all the military observers in Europe.

The passage of events that culminated in the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the end of October was not, when considered in sum, a pleasant one from Hitler’s perspective. He had without a doubt lost control of the situation. The value of the Soviet-German pact in his eyes was as a means to present Poland with an irresistible fait accompli such that his territorial demands would be meekly accepted. At no point did he consider that his action would lead to general war and, even if it did, he at least concluded that the Soviet complicity in the absorption of Poland would lead to the Anglo-French having to also declare war on the Soviet Union, or backing down entirely. That the Soviets managed to avoid the declaration baffled him. Once war was declared it became clear that Stalin had different uses for the pact and that, rather than guaranteeing the surrender of Poland, the agreement had removed the German balance of power deterrent for the Baltic, Danubian and Black Sea states. The only advantage accruing to Germany in the end was an opportunity to open accounts with the French with no fear of a Soviet offensive. In short, the Soviet-German pact was a complete diplomatic and political failure.

The Anglo-French declarations of war were, as things transpired, of little consequence insofar as the Polish campaign was concerned. The rapidity of the German campaign and the sluggish and meek Anglo-French response meant that the shooting was over in the east before it could take hold in the west. This at least was good news. What was not so good was the Italian failure to fulfil the obligation of the Pact of Steel. Hitler had seen this agreement principally as a means of keeping Italy out of the clutches of the Anglo-French whom he knew would be considering concessions aimed at drawing Italy away from the German orbit. Its secondary function was as a means, in case of war with the western powers, to ensure that Italy declared in Germany’s favour and subsequently, in light of its geographical position, took the brunt of the Anglo-French response.

Once he realised the depth of Italian frustration at being kept in the dark as to his plans regarding Poland, and their annoying, but correct, perception that a German attack on Poland would lead to general war, Hitler had, regretfully as things turned out, offered the prize of Yugoslavia to further induce Rome to enter the war. The problem was that Italy declared non-belligerency and attacked Yugoslavia as a ‘parallel war’ once the Polish campaign was over. Things would not have been so bad if Italy had attacked in step with Germany as Hitler felt the Anglo-French would not be able to comfortably differentiate between the two invasions; but once Poland had fallen and the weight of the Wehrmacht had been transferred west, the Anglo-French had considerable incentive to give Mussolini more leeway.

Matters worsened when, in spite of the virtually unanimous assessments within OKH, Italy overcame Yugoslavia in less than a month. Granted it was the intervention of Hungary, and to a lesser extent Bulgaria, that proved the difference; but that in itself was somewhat worrying and hardly conducive to German interests in the region. Italy and Hungary now effectively had a common border, and Italy had further buttressed its position by establishing a line of dependent states extending from Slovenia to Albania. The economic wealth of Yugoslavia was now passing through Italy and Hungary and their presence, particularly that of Italy, served to provide the other regional states with the alternative markets that they had to date been fruitlessly seeking from the Anglo-French.

Worse still, Mussolini now had a bona fide military success that, when considered relative to his military strength, actually outweighed Germany’s conquest of Poland, which had been accomplished with the intervention of the Soviet Union. No political or military talks were scheduled to take place so it was not known the changes the Italian victory would have on the bilateral dealings, but initial reports from the German ambassador pointedly noted that there was a swagger and confidence within the Italian government circles and, even more worrying, the British and French ambassadors had become increasingly active. Clearly something had to be done and, unfortunately, it was recognised that both Ribbentrops and Hitlers own behaviour in August had seriously damaged the relationship with Ciano, who was clearly an influential figure within senior Fascist circles.

Finally Hitler had to confront the possibility of Anglo-French intervention in Norway and the concomitant threat to his Swedish iron imports. Taken together with the combined threats to the Baltic, Danube and Black Sea states, the disadvantageous situation with the Soviet Union’s exploitation of the terms of the Soviet-German pact and the failure of Italy to enter the war, attract Anglo-French attention or even get bogged down in Yugoslavia, the German position in the second month of the war was not a positive one.

[Croesus]

Britain fell into war with Germany in a very poor state indeed. London's policy of deterrance and appeasement had failed and Britain had ended up giving a unilateral guarantee to an eastern European nation with which it had no meaningful ties and to which it could give no real assistance; in April it had been decided by the Anglo-French chiefs of staff that in the event of a German attack on Poland, there would be no real intervention on their part in the west. Britain's war policy rested on the fundamental premise that Germany should be made to fight a long war as that would permit Britain to make the best use of its strategic weapons of Empire and blockade to offset its short-term military weakness and dependence on continental allies.

However the economic strength of Britain was not great; in the absence of recourse to war loans from the US Britain was forced, in large part due to significant pressure from the US Treasury, to finance its war preparations from its rapidly diminishing gold reserve. This meant that, when considering the desired wartime establishment of 55 divisions and monthly aircraft production of 2,550 that Britain would be unable to sustain military operations after two years of conflict. This brought into doubt the wisdom of the 'long-war' strategy and prompted some to suggest a war with Germany at the soonest opportunity would be best as it was understood that Germany would finance her war through conquest, an option clearly not open to Britain.

There were further weaknesses in the British plan for economic warfare; the roles played by the Soviet Union and Italy. Both of these countries were at the very least benevolently neutral towards Germany and, taken with the size and strength of Berlin's economic hinterland in the Danube-Balkan region, greatly decreased the effectiveness of blockade. In fact there was growing evidence from the early weeks of the establishment of the blockade that Britain was suffering more than Germany. Britains' Soviet policy was in tatters: Moscow was suspicious of what it viewed as British attempts to drag it, and other smaller states, into war with Germany, the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks had in turn collapsed and been trumped by the Soviet-German pact and belated attempts to use trade talks as a means of reviving relations were not going well.

Considerable amounts of raw and war material were now entering Germany through its eastern border and there was nothing that London could do about it, even where there was an increasing perception that Germany was not going to be living up to its side of the bargain. There was somewhat better news from Rome, where Italy had chosen to declare non-belligerency and at least stay out of the war; while at first there were some, particularly within the Admiralty, that was hoping that Italy would declare war as it was seen as a better military option than attacking Germany, the subsequent performance of the Italian army in Yugoslavia gave pause for thought. While some satisfaction was taken from the fact that Croatian and Bosnian raw materials were now being diverted to Italy, it remained that Mussolini openly considered his non-belligerency as a means of helping Germany beat the British blockade and, so, prevent a repetition of the Great War blockade.

Paris declared war knowing that it fell to France to do the bulk of the fighting on land, while also recognising that it did not have the strength to hold back Germany, let alone launch a successful offensive into Germany itself. It was estimated that the entire French war reserve would be depleted once the full complement of 100 divisions had been mobilised, leaving absolutely nothing for a continuation of operations in the event of setback or breakthrough. Following the systematic dismantling of its eastern diplomatic system of interlinked alliances, France had few options but to work to force Britain to abandon its distance and bring about a full alliance. In spite of Britain and France having similar foreign goals and an increasing sense of being yoked to the same horse, Anglo-French staff talks had been late, intermittent and tardy.

Once these issues were taken together, it became clear that French strategy had to focus on finding means of threatening Germany by direct action against its economic linkages with supporting or neutral powers. In this French and British strategy united and gradually began to coalesce into two cases: a northern Front targeting Swedish iron, and a Mediteranean/Balkan front targeting Romanian oil. The former was difficult in that it involved the probable violation of the neutrality of Norway, Finland and Sweden while also exciting Soviet suspicion at a time when the Anglo-French were anxious to avoid giving cause to a further warming of Soviet-German relations. The latter was, if not easy at least less challenging. In spite of often ridiculous provocation from Rome there remained within Paris a desire to bring about a Franco-Italian rapprochement. Taken with the interlinkage of treaties between Italy, Britain and France with Greece, the Anglo-French treaty with Turkey and the collapse of the Balkan Entente it seemed that the opportunities for improving relations with Rome were good.

As the Anglo-French staff talks grew into the Supreme War Council and planning for military intervention of varying degrees into the Balkans matured during the early months of the war (where, uncomfortably but predictably, no assistance was given to the Poles against the Germans and the Soviet absorption of the remainder of Poland was optimistically explained away as defensive) a joint Anglo-French deputation travelled to Rome to attempt to negotiate a non-aggression pact with Italy on the lines of the Soviet-German one. Headed by the Italophile French ambassador Andre Francois-Poncet and Sir Robert Vansittart, until recently the Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the two diplomats proceeded with the combined weight of their respective Foreign Ministers Bonnet and Halifax behind them.

The aim of the Anglo-French was simply to ensure that Italy felt confident enough to retain more of its Croatian gains for its own uses and to replace the German trade linkage with an Anglo-French one, such that Italy could regain its traditional role of equidistance and, by extension, prevent it from providing any signficant support for Germany. Francois-Poncet and Vansittart negotiated primarily with counterpart professional diplomats but also on occaision with the known Germanophobe Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano. It became quite clear during the early rounds of negotiation that the Italian price for sitting the war out would be substantial and that the price would either be borne by France itself and by the Danubian-Balkan neutrals. Helpfully the Italians withdrew claims on Nice and Savoy, though would not be budged from their position on Tunis, which they say, and with some justification, as being more Italian than French.

In the Danube-Balkans Rome wanted recognition of the region as an Italian 'spazio vitale', and subsequent support for Italian economic and political aims in the region. The Italians stopped short of saying they wanted Anglo-French support against Germany, as they knew that would certainly be readily accepted, and also were hesitant about identifying the Soviet Union as a potential threat to the regional interests. The negotiations were hard and intense and went through several stages but progress was being made when the third great 'totalitarian shock' occurred that would so fundamentally change the balance of power in Europe: the Soviet invasion of Finland.

[Croesus]

Simply put, Stalin achieved more against the Anglo-French in the first months of the war than did Germany, and technically wasn’t even a combatant. Chamberlain and Daladier were both skating on thin ice following their failure to intervene following the German invasion of Poland and the blind eye turned towards the Italian invasion of Yugoslavia stretched the remaining reserves of public and parliamentary goodwill as far as they could go. The Soviet invasion of Finland was the last straw for a concerned and strained electorate, especially once it became clear that the Finns were putting up both a stiff and successful fight. The vigour of their desire to fight for freedom contrasted with that of the Anglo-French governments and, predictably, both fell within weeks.

Daladier was simply bundled out of office in a cloud of shame, but it was Chamberlains resignation while at the head of a very strong majority that really changed the political landscape. With his departure, and death within the year, the last of the inter-war politicians on both sides of the Channel whom favoured appeasement and deterrence faded inexorably into the background. In one stroke the Soviets had changed the temper of the war and that temper was best exemplified by the increasingly familiar bulldog-and-cockerel spirit of Churchill and Reynaud. Nowhere was this regime felt more intensely than in the tripartite negotiations in Rome.

Vansittart and Francois-Poncet had proceeded with a vigour and purpose both fitting for the times and uncharacteristic of the governments from which they proceeded. Because any lasting Franco-Italian deal rested on French willingness to entertain Italian revisionism, and because the entire point of the exercise was to lure Italy away from Germany, it fell to Francois-Poncet to put before Ciano a proposal that could not easily be dismissed for fear of justifiable accusations of bad faith and the implication thereof that Italy would then face the full force of Anglo-French militarism.

Subsequently Francois-Poncet proceeded along three lines: that the Italian hegemony over both shores of the Adriatic would be recognised; that Italy would be givens seats on the Suez Board; and that Italy would regain its traditional rights with regards to Tunisia. Vansittart fully backed up his French colleague on this bargaining line and both maintained a unanimous and unmistakeable line: that if Italy held to Germany it would gain less than it otherwise would and would concomitantly suffer more.

The directness of the Anglo-French bargaining position discomfited Ciano and Mussolini. Both were acutely aware that Berlin was following matters closely and that the Italian line, that because it was not at war it could diplome and negotiate with whom it saw fit, was quite thin. Faced with the opportunity to realise its Danubian ambitions after a decade of having to play second fiddle to Berlin, it was imperative that Hitler was not encouraged to act pre-emptively and intervene directly or, potentially worse, to draw closer to Moscow and bring the Red Army into play.

The Anglo-French wanted an Italian guarantee that Rome would not materially or morally assist Germany in the upcoming war. It helped that, by declaring non-belligerency Italy had already voided the key article on the Pact of Steel, but there still remained substantial delicacy around how Italy could avoid providing help to its Axis partner. The collapse of the Anglo-French governments therefore came at a most opportune time and it was with relief that Ciano suggested that talks be suspended until the credentials and writ of the Anglo-French negotiators be confirmed. The buck had been passed to Churchill and Reynaud: how would they act?

[Croesus]

In spite of the relative success of the Ferrari-Baistrocchi-Balbo reforms and the seemingly easy victory over the Yugoslavs in October, Italy was not prepared for general war. 1943 was the year generally accepted as being when the state of the Italian economy, its industrial capacity and its energy budget would be strong enough to sustain a major war. Until then the army and navy acted as an anchor to the foreign policy ambitions of Mussolini and, although this influence was countered somewhat by the airforce, it could not be ignored.

Somewhat paradoxically given the native belligerence of the Italian leader, there emerged following the Yugoslav victory an increasing desire to preserve the offensive capacity of the army in light of the need to garrison Libya, East Africa, Albania and Croatia while providing sufficient cadre for a progressive increase in the number of divisions. Once Mussolini began to see the value of maintaining the army the impetus to take sides in the conflict was greatly constrained and this military caution informed Italian foreign policy making at all levels.

In light of this caution Italian diplomacy returned to its agenda of promoting a negotiated peace, as it had consistently done since Munich, where Mussolini's intercession had seemingly been decisive. Italy had sought to establish a conference to settle the Danzig crisis and had in part sought to use the Salzburg Conference of August to look for ways to prevent Germany from starting what Italy saw as a general war, rather than the localised conflict that Hitler envisaged.

Of course, as matters had transpired, Mussolini had received a sudden rush of blood to the head and had dramatically declared in favour of Germany as the latter offered up Yugoslavia as an inducement to enter hostilities. Notwithstanding this however, there remained sufficient disagreement between the partners that no joint communique was issued and the Conference broke up with no sense of unanimity. Following the conference Berlin did issue a statement that Italy had undertaken to fall into step with Germany and this tactless piece of politics served to encourage Mussolini towards his concept of a parallel war, which would be so damaging to German interests in the months to come.

In its policy towards Berlin, Rome emphasised that Italy valued its ideological solidarity with Germany and did not wish to be seen as anything other than an ally; but stressed that Italy was not prepared to confront the western powers directly. Mussolini saw the Italian role as preventing the conflict from spreading and acting such that the British blockade strategy would not be able to repeat its success of the Great War, as foodstuffs and materials would continue to flow between the two countries.

When Italy inherited the wealth of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia it continued to portray itself as the economic guardian of German interests although now there was a subtly different tone to its proclamation and the realisation that Rome had obtained such a strong position over German assets led to a number of reappraisals in Berlin which would slowly become apparent as the war progressed. One of the main points borne in mind by Berlin at this time was the sense that, for as long as France and/or Britain would have to satisfy Italian revisionist demands from their own possessions or interests, then Italy would be naturally inclined towards Germany; maintaining that relationship therefore became a significant part of German diplomacy.

Overall the Italian attitude to the war, like most governments, was that it would follow the pattern of the Great War and be a static war of position. This observation was the origin of the Italian position of passively acting to break the British blockade; while it did not consider that Germany would be able to break through in the west, neither did it consider that Germany would be brought to its knees which therefore supported the Italian role as peacemaker. The Italian military did not consider that either Germany nor the Anglo-French had the power to destroy each other, and Rome was simply not interested in any form of total war.

Its interests were a Mediterranean free from British control, a territorial arrangement with France and the establishment of a sphere of influence in Italy's 'horizontal axis' in the Danube-Balkans. These would not be achieved by total war, with or without Italian participation; the current conflict had resulted because of a European failure to conclusively bring about a territorial revision of Versailles Europe and a rearrangement of colonial interests. This diplomatic programme envisaged a return to a Stresa type of containment rather than a Munich type of appeasement as Italy would take up what it saw as its natural role as mediator between the west and the centre-east. The invasion of Yugoslavia fitted the Italian conception of a limited war that worked towards a natural equilibrium without contributing to an out-of-control conflagration.

However Italy was not motivated at all to abandon its role in the Rome-Berlin Axis. Mussolini felt fundamentally exposed in the Mediterranean to the threat of the Royal Navy and while the recent non-aggression treaty with Greece was encouraging, there was no guarantee that it would hold and the events surrounding the Abyssinian and Spanish campaigns served to constantly remind Rome of its vulnerability in its own immediate naval sphere.

The Anglo-Franco-Italian negotiations that had immediately preceded the fall of the Chamberlain-Daladier governments had to a large extent avoided this issue directly as Franco-Italian problems formed the initial area of negotiation, but they always loomed in the back of the minds of the Italian negotiators and the British were clearly uncomfortable when indirect mention of the Royal Navy came up. So Rome needed its presence in the Axis as much as it needed to keep sending signals about its desire for a long-term negotiated peace, and the tension between these two divergent strands provided significant difficulties in setting Italian policy as events developed.

This need to maintain the Axis was the primary motivation for Italy to follow its policy of non-belligerency over the alternative, 'American', form of disinterested neutrality. It was seen that such a form of non-activity would benefit the Anglo-French and reduce the value of the Axis card during what was envisaged to be lengthy negotiations leading to a stable peace. If Italy was neutral it could not help Germany avoid the effects of the blockade and, while it had not wanted Germany to start the war, it did not care to see Germany defeated as this would render the Italian position as mediator void and lead to a resumption of Anglo-French domination of the Mediterranean. The opposite side of this coin was of course the desire to avoid a German domination of the continent as the same result would occur.

There was also a strong desire to avoid a long running war as the chance of unforeseen events sending the conflict into a dangerous and uncontrollable direction increased; a Soviet penetration of the Danube-Balkan region under the auspices of the Soviet-German pact was of particular concern. In fact Hitler had made mention of 'traditional Russian interests' since the Salzburg Conference and following the unforeseen disruption of German interests in Yugoslavia had gone further by implying that continued Italian disturbance in the region would not be welcome, where the furtherance of Russian interests were not similarly portrayed as being discouraging to Berlin.

Concurrent to developments in the Axis relationship and the Anglo-Franco-Italian negotiations was the Royal Navy blockade of German coal exports to Italy. While there had been promising developments in the use of native natural gas and the exploitation of Libyan oil was as yet uninterrupted, it remained that Italian energy needs were reliant on the receipt of German brown coal (even though there was some easing following the capture of the ex-Yugoslavian seams). The energy blockade proved to be politically damaging for Mussolini and he sought to constantly keep it in the fore-front of negotiations both with Berlin, who had undertaken the overland delivery of coal but the transport of which was increasingly doubtful in light of increasing preparations for war and the Anglo-French.

Indeed it was during a negotiation round with the British that London had offered to stop the blockade in return for Italian arms, a proposal which was flatly declined at the time and was strongly advised against by Berlin. This question of coal quickly became a flashpoint of diplomacy as the Anglo-French were effectively exploiting it as a means of pushing Italy into a de-facto alliance while the threat of German intervention to prevent such an occurrence was made plain. Further pressure was placed on Rome when Washington suggested again that Italy adopt 'American' neutrality, and so have the blockade lifted. In response Italy secretly offered to withdraw fully from its Pact of Steel obligations, which it had already indirectly half-achieved, but this was rejected by the British and here the essential difference between Anglo-French motivations were exposed.

Britain did not see a strong Italy as being in its interests as this would threaten London's interests in the region, given its control of the Gibraltar and Suez exits. While London wanted to split the Axis, its model of what Italy would look like was a Mediterranean Portugal, neutered and incapable of significant threat. Paris on the other hand sought means of extending the line of containment eastwards, as it had done for the last decade, and while it did not welcome a strong Italian navy, it had greater and more direct concerns with Germany.

That Italy quietly continued the sale of arms to France and the construction of defensive positions in the northern alps demonstrated a lingering desire on the part of Rome to make common cause with Paris; yet London took a bargaining line that was much stiffer and while the results of negotiations were pleasing when interrupted by the change in governments, it did not disguise the fact that the Anglo-French were far from unanimous in their approach. That this division of interest failed to capitalise fully on known and suspected differences between Rome and Berlin led to a strong sense of demoralisation on part of the principal negotiators Vansittart and Francois-Poncet, as they could see how close they were able to bring Ciano, and yet found within their own ranks a lack of purpose and good faith.

[Croesus]

During an adjournment of the recent Anglo-Franco-Italian talks, one of the negotiators, a Fascist, had remarked offhandedly, if a little exasperatedly, to Francois-Poncet that all Italy was looking for was a small victory. He was referring to the relative intransigence of the British bargaining strategy, which was basically looking for unilateral concessions on the part of Italy before offering up trilateral proposals.

What the negotiator was illustrating however was the subtle change of direction that internal Italian politics had taken following the victory over the Yugoslavs. Mussolini's regime balanced the interests of the Fascist party, the Church, the Monarchy, the military, the landowners and the industrialists; by defeating Yugoslavia ('Vittoria Iugoslavia')the prestige of the military, and by direct extension, the King had been greatly boosted, and by securing significant economic assets the political power of the industrialists increased.

This in turn led to changes within the Fascist party as functionaries attempted to muscle into the administration of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, an effort which was somewhat paradoxically resisted by Mussolini and his inner circle. This resistance formed around the large and well established apparatus of the State bureaucracies, and increasingly efforts by Party officials to grow their influence were thwarted by these professional agencies.

The small victory that was being looked for was not for the benefit of Italy; it was for the benefit of a fracturing Fascist party trying to emulate its National Socialist counterpart as it confronted a grim fate of gradual marginalisation. It would be the activity of some of those marginalised Fascists who had established ties with Nationalist Socialist officials and structures that would in the months to come to be so problematic.

The enemy of the Fascist Party was its leader. Mussolini had overcome the more vigorous, and extreme, elements within the Party and now the Ducismo was the principal governing agent. The Party was conceived as being an organ that linked the people to the State and even prior to the Vittoria Iugoslavia the emasculation of the Party had been subtle and inexorable. Rather than a dominant organism within the ruling structure, the Party was only one of several and its power was declining.

The Vittoria Iugoslavia , which greatly increased the strength of the rival military and business groups, became the final nail in the coffin of the Party and from 1940 onwards its influence in Italian politics declined to eventually being negligible. The small victory needed by the Fascist negotiator had been pre-empted by the great victory provided by the Ducismo and this event was profound in its implications for future Italian foreign policy and Romes relations with the warring powers.

The Vittoria Iugoslavia promoted a growth of support for Mussolini, an increased respect for the military and a general feeling of pride in Italian traditional institutions. 'The Illyrians Are Conquered' was a common slogan found on walls in October and there was a feeling that Il Duce had delivered on the promise that his ascension to power had suggested. The extravagance, corruption and extremism associated with Fascism was portrayed as a necessary but temporary evil required to carry Italy through times of weakness and chaos. Now that the Italian eagle was unfolding its wings once more the more ridiculous trappings of Fascist ideology gradually became the target of satire.

This is not to say that Il Duce permitted the entire erosion of the Fascist ideology, as he still had use for it. It was one of the factors that permitted him to maintain the balance that underpinned his regime. He had no use for an all-powerful Fascist Party, but neither did he want a shrivelled and wasted Party; he needed the Party to retain some degree of potence. By permitting it a fief in Abyssinia he managed to quarantine its forces somewhat while he continued establishing his personal rule.

The Vittoria Iugoslavia strengthened the influence of the military in the handling of foreign policy, but this influence was by no means united. As might be expected two broad groups emerged; those in favour of entering the war on the German side and those in favour of the Anglo-French. While representation within these groups were mixed, on the whole the Regio Aeronautica, with its greater proportion of Fascist officers, was pro-German while the Regia Esercito and Regia Marina were pro-Western.

The RM in particular were strongly opposed to any course of action that would result in a direct confrontation with the Royal Navy under the current conditions as it was seen, with some justification, that with Germany's small naval threat and Japans' distance that the British would be able to concentrate the full weight of their capital ships on Italy, and with easily foreseeable and dire consequences.

The RE was primarily interested in maintaining its prestige by retaining control over Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and enjoyed the increased attention the Vittoria Iugoslavia had brought. Already there were strong representations for meaningful staff talks with the Hungarians and Greeks and few officers remembered the initial German-Italian staff talks with any fondness.

The Chief of Staff Cavallero also found that there was subtle encouragement for him to improve the nature of his relationship with Il Duce and his ties to the Royal Family gradually strengthened. So it was that while the rest of Europe became distracted by the heroic resistance of the Finns, Italian politics was undergoing a fundamental transformation... and one which did not escape the notice of Berlin.

[Croesus]

Following the Vittoria Iugoslavia there commenced a series of military reviews examining the relative performance of the armed forces in the campaign. Given that the role of the Regia Marina was both short and conclusive no recommendations were made as to potential changes or improvements; it was however recognised that with the Adriatic firmly in Italian hands the RM might be able to improve its concentration of force in future campaign. Most of the attention was invested into examining the roles of the Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica.

The RA did not lose a single machine to JV fire with the only fatalities attributed to lapses in navigation and difficulties encountered in local flying conditions. It was noted that the RA went essentially untested and as a result the reviewing panels could not determine relative performance. However a number of parallels were drawn with the apparent lessons of the Polish campaign. Both attacks used surprise and targeted enemy airfields with the result that strategic victory in the air was obtained in the opening round of hostilities and it was felt that no significant lessons were available to be taken by the German campaign. Two differences did emerge however; the bombing of urban centres and tactical bombing.

In the Yugoslav campaign the RA were expressly forbidden to undertake operations against civilian centers. There had been some resistance to this as it was seen as preventing the effective dislocation of supply and reinforcement, not to mention lost opportunities to damage morale. However the directive remained firm: there would be no bombing of civilian population and any attacks on infrastructure would be restricted to roads, tunnels and bridges. As the campaign developed thought had to be given to avoiding the destruction along the line of advance, but the rapid collapse of resistance meant that bombing operations were soon suspended.

The second area of difference was in the area of tactical bombing and here it was seen that definite gains could be had from examining the German results. It was noted that the Germans had in the Stuka an excellent weapons platform and that the lack of ground-air radio in the Italian forces had seriously prevented any significant gains from being obtained by the RA as it sought to support the advance of the Third Army as it advanced on Ljubljana. Given the potentially tension around Italo-German relations it was not seen as being likely that the RA would be able to take delivery of Stukas and so efforts were put in place to modernise the Breda BA.65 close to the level of the Stuka.

The Breda was the lighter of the two aircraft and, with a comparable HP engine, was faster; however it was recognised that a longer loiter time over the target was a positive aspect. The Stuka had an edge in range and ceiling, while the bombloads were comparable. Initial improvements revolved around improving the bombload of the Breda, providing increased armor protection, better defensive armament and an improved engine. The question of effective ground-air radio communications proved a little more challenging at first as there was required a level of cooperation between the RE and RA that was not usual, but the project received the support of some senior officers who had been involved in supporting the Third Army and eventually results began to show in this area.

The material performance of the RE received general approval. There were some doubts around the upchambered Mannlicher-Carcano 1891 but given the view that any further changes would necessitate the adoption of an entirely new weapon, for which there was no budget, the rifle was retained and development work focused on cartridge performance. The upgraded artillery had proved to be very effective and its value was well attested by all involved in the campaign. There was considerable relief that the triangular division had been retained and the heavy fighting had by the Second Army confirmed the wisdom of rejecting the two-regimental structure. The majority of concerns centered around the quality of senior and non-commissioned officer leadership.

Once the fighting had died down, likely individuals were combed out of the ranks and sent back to Italy for training in an effort to improve what had been a disappointing area of performance. Similarly all of the Army commanders except Ambrosio were promoted out of the line formations and other officers brought up. The performance of the two tank types committed to the campaign were difficult to assess given the lack of battle, but their crews were on the whole content with their machines and given the general paucity of industrial plant it was decided to continue with their development without major change. Finally it was recommended that four additional divisions be raised and that recruitment could be extended to Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Albania in an effort to supplant the somewhat stretched Italian stocks.

In the final analysis it was recognised that the military had not been sorely tested, but also that some important lessons were learnt and that on the whole the armed forces were moving in the right direction.

[Croesus]

Following the suspension of the Anglo-Franco-Italian talks in November, the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop travelled to Milan to discuss a number of issues with his Italian counterpart. Upon his arrival he was annoyed to find Ciano had been 'held up' and would be unable to join Ribbentrop until the next day. When the two Foreign Ministers did meet the tone was officious, professional but somewhat cold.

Ciano remembered how Ribbentrop had handled their last meeting in August, when he dismissed Italian concerns over the Polish invasion, and treated the whole matter as a fait accompli that Italy would simply have to accept. For his part Ribbentrop was well aware that the Italian conquest of Yugoslavia had changed the relationship somewhat, but was not going to entertain any ideas of bending German policy to accommodate what was widely seen as a simple piece of luck.

The first item discussed was the status of the Alto Adige and the arrangements for the resettlement of the German minority. The German side of the matter was actually being handled by Reichsfuhrer-SS Himmler, who had confirmed on 30 May that the South Tyrol had been given up as volksdeutsche territory and that efforts would be made to clear territory elsewhere for the resettlement of the 'valuable Germanic tribe' such that it retained its identity and did not splinter.

An initial meeting had been held at the Gestapo headquarters in Berlin and here the small Italian delegation heard of the three-stage plan that would see the German minority completely evacuated from the region. The meeting broke up with some difference between the two groups, with the Italians apparently not quite confronting the sweeping changes Himmler was planning. On the Italian side efforts were made to immediately remove those elements of South Tyrolese society whom they saw as primarily responsible for the unrest in the region, the unrest that had prompted increasingly heavy handed police actions.

That such repression was occurring at the hands of an ally before, during and after the Polish campaign, which had been initiated supposedly because of Polish repression of similar minorities, had caused some embarrassment in Berlin and the anti-German Prefect of Bolzano Mastromattei had taken the opportunity to bring to a head differences between the Italian and German ideas of solving the Alto Adige 'problem'. It was at this point that Himmler began dealing directly with the Italian Chief of Police Bocchini in an effort to smooth matters and expedite the resettlement process.

However tension in the province remained, and Ciano became involved by delivering a list of grievances to the German Ambassador von Mackensen. Relations deteriorated and, even following direct intervention by Himmler and Bocchini, distrust over the issue grew to the point that interference on the part of the Italian regional authorities grew to a considerable degree as efforts were made to derail the recently initiated plebiscite process.

In their meeting Ribbentrop came straight to the point and noted that unless Italian incitement in the region be ceased that Hitler might have cause to reconsider his views of the status of the region. Ciano replied that the area was geographically Italian and, as mountains and rivers could not be moved, it must be the dissenting elements of the population that must go.

Ribbentrop responded with the observation that this is exactly what Himmler is attempting to achieve but the resistance to the process is coming from the Italians. Ciano noted that there was considerable difference of opinion over just what constituted the German population and went on to say that German bargaining had become quite tiresome on the issue, with ridiculous issues being debated such as whether or not relocating Germans be permitted to take their locks and latches with them. The situation was not resolved as the two men glared at each other.

Ribbentrop then congratulated Italy on its Yugoslav conquests and noting that matters had developed as Hitler had originally suggested; that the two Axis powers move in complementary directions and taking out the independent Danubian-Balkan states one by one. Ciano agreed that matters had gone well but enquired as to the expectations of the Soviet Union in regard to the region. Ribbentrop replied that Moscow had historic interests in Bessarabia and Bukovina and that its interests are recognised and supported in Berlin and suggested that Rome accept this.

Ciano noted that if Stalin decided to pursue its interests by force that the region would quickly destabilise and that it would be an easy matter for the Soviets to intervene such that they take up the entirety of the Romanian oil supply, which accounted for much of Italian domestic consumption. Given such a threat to its interests surely Berlin would appreciate the importance of Rome acting such as to prevent such a situation developing. Ribbentrop returned with a firm line that Berlin would not support any action that would see Rome give any cause for Moscow to fear that its interests would not be upheld. Ciano ridiculed this by saying that the region is in the Italian backyard now that the eastern shore of the Adriatic was Italian, and went to the greater issue of just how did Berlin expect Rome to react?

Ribbentrop replied by stating that, in fact, the region is firmly in the German economic hinterland and Hitler would look very poorly on any Italian 'adventurism' in the area; and that such a position is final and not for negotiation. Ciano laughed, saying that it was further to Berlin from Bucharest than Rome and that this was perhaps an issue to the two heads of state needed to think more deeply on given such a divergence of interest was of significant consequence for Italo-German relations.

Ribbentrop coldly noted that Italy had already broken the requirements of the Pact of Steel by not going to war in Germany's favour, but Ciano dismissed this with a wave of his hand and said that was old hat. Ribbentrop changed the subject somewhat by confirming the establishment of an independent Slovakia as a German protectorate and announcing that negotiations were proceeding in Budapest as to securing a positive outcome for Hungarian interest in Transylvania. Ciano countered by noting that the independent states of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia were not labouring under an Italian protectorate, and also that Italy was working to establish a viable Serbian state. This last took Ribbentrop by surprise and he queried the wisdom of such a move. Ciano noted that such a step was a matter for Italian foreign policy and, besides, a stable Serbia could only help keep the region calm.

The conference broke up following a short discussion as to matters of trade and supply. Ciano asked when full delivery of the promised German coal would begin to arrive and noted that the British blockade was begining to bite and, naturally, it would be important for Italy to be able to compensate itself from the resources of the recently 'liberated territories' of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Ribbentrop replied that the coal was being held up by a shortage of locomotives, but that a resumption of deliveries from the 'liberated territories' would provide ample opportunity for a return trip laden with the coal Italy needs. Ciano smiled and assured his colleague that they were in perfect agreement and that no doubt traffic would resume, when other matters were taken care of.

[Croesus]

The Churchill and Reynaud governments came into power on the crest of a wave of discontent over the failure of the Chamberlain and Daladier policies of deterrance and appeasement. The implication that both new leaders faced was that they had to take action to forestall questions about their willingness to fight. Given this imperative to action an emergency session of the Supreme War Council was held in early December where a review of the Council strategy was made. In spite of the change in political leadership, the general strategy of the SWC remained largely unchanged as it was the product of established policy and thinking on the problem of achieving the military defeat of Germany.

Both countries considered that their best option for winning the conflict was to make the war a long one as it was felt that economic warfare would ultimately bring Germany to its knees, much as it did in the Great War. This strategy also took into account a degree of unreadiness on the part of the British to take part in land warfare on the continent and an unwillingness on the part of the French to bring the war onto French soil. The result of this general approach was to evaluate options of attacking Germany by interupting its vital economic flows, namely Swedish iron ore, Finnish nickel and Romanian oil, or by targeting those regimes contributing to Germany's ability to mitigate the impact of the Anglo-French economic warfare, namely the Soviet Union and Italy.

In the case of Italy, the previous administrations had sought to placate Rome whereever possible in an effort to give Mussolini options to avoid becoming further entwined in Hitlers political web. The change of governments and suspension of the Anglo-Franco-Italian talks at a time when some progress was being made had resulted in an immediate difference of opinion: London favoured increasing the pressure on Rome, while Paris favoured the establishment of direct talks and a programme of concessions.

The first stages of the debate were won by Reynaud and in fact he went further by authorising a secret delegation to approach Ciano with a view to buidling bilateral links, as it was recognised that if any real chance at bringing Italy into the Anglo-French camp, or at least out of the German one, would rely in the first instance on Italo-French relations. This meant for the moment that options involving attacks on Germany via Italy were off the agenda, and this also excluded military landings at Salonika, hitherto a favoured French tactic.

The enlargement of the Italian sphere into the republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, as well as the annexation of Albania and the protectorate over Serbia meant that any action against Romanian oil supply would have to be handled very carefully. Already intelligence reports were noting an increase in Italo-Romanian contacts and a concomitant increase in continuing Romanian resistance against Berlins insistance that the entirety of the Romanian oil supply be given over to Germany. It was felt that any Anglo-French activity in the matter would potentially force the hand of the Romanians, undermine the Italian position and spur the Germans and Hungarians to invade. Consequently attacks on the Romanian oil were taken off as an option.

This left two alternatives: extending the war into Scandinavia by disrupting the iron and nickel supplies or attacking the Soviet Union by interdicting the Caucasus oil fields. There was some discomfort as both plans involved the violation to various degrees of the rights of neutral countries, but each was seen as fulfilling the essential conditions of attacking Germany indirectly. As talks developed the role of the Soviet Union began to be increasingly debated. The two governments were still smarting over the profound diplomatic defeat at the hands of Molotov where the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks collapsed immediately before the conclusion of the Germano-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.

Consequent to this event, Moscow was seen as an implicit partner in German aggression. The Soviets supplied the German war effort which directly helped Berlin mitigate the effects of the blockade, had taken part in the partition of Poland and denounced the conflict as an 'imperialist war' and encouraged the international proletariat not to support it. Furthermore the Soviet regime was seen as being more odious than that of Hitlers and long-standing distrust of Stalin's motives ensured a lasting sense of suspicion pervaded both London and Paris.

These feelings were brought to the fore by the Soviet invasion of Finland, which triggered the collapse of the Chamberlain-Daladier governments, and outrage was particularly strong in France. As senior partner in the alliance, as it was the French Army that would be doing the bulk of the fighting, the desire to help the brave Finns was considerable in French public opinion and, given the war-platform of his government, Reynaud was committed to recognising and acting accordingly.

An Anglo-French expeditionary force, or some form of direct intervention, was seen as helping to establish the new governments, and attack Germany indirectly by undermining its Soviet ally, drawing Finland away from any association with Germany and interupting the iron ore supply line. The alternative, a bombing offensive on the Soviet oilfields and, it was hoped, the despatch of a naval flotilla into the Black Sea was seen as being of secondary value as it would not involve French arms and did not help the Finns.

Subsequent to further lengthy debate where the British CIGS argued vigorously against the commencement of land operations in Scandinavia and the Admiralty against large scale operations in the Baltic, the plans to involve the Anglo-French militarily in Scandinavia went through many changes, but the political will did not. The first stand against Hitler would take place in Norway and Finland.

[Croesus]

The surprising omission by the Anglo-French to declare war on the Soviet Union following Moscow's part in the partition of Poland forced Hitler to abandon his 'Moscow First' strategy and substitute that of 'Paris First'. Preparations for what was expected to be a long drawn out war on the Western Front commenced from early October. In this era of mass production warfare, and in light of the substantial French defensive system, it was clear that France would have to be ground down. This would require considerable levels of coordination by the respective military and economic planners. While Hitler was certain that he would ultimately prevail, as much on the basis of being able to mitigate the blockade through the Soviet and Italian agreements as through any sense of military superiority, it was by no means considered that France would fall as quickly as Poland had.

Indeed the industrial program was not intended to reach maximum output until the autumn of 1941. Upon notification of the intention to attack France the production budgets were prioritised against expected levels of requirements, which meant that for instance the construction of tanks received only 5% of the steel supply and less than that which was allotted to the manufacture of trench warfare items such as barbed wire and obstacles. Parallel to this industrial preparation were the mobilisation plans that anticipated a lengthy period of positional warfare and for which a mass of third-class divisions were raised, a quarter of whose soldiers were over 40 and half of who had received only a few weeks training.

There was some concern that such a lengthy preparation would play into the hands of the Anglo-French strategists who were known to be following a long-war strategy, but there was sufficient evidence to suggest that the Soviet and Italian agreements, together with the extent of the German economic hinterlands and the relative brittleness of the liberal democratic governments would result in a better German situation than London or Paris anticipated. Hitler still retained some hope that Britain could be encouraged towards a separate peace, but he was prepared to fight a long war if such a situation did not eventuate.

Indeed the whole purpose of the Four Year Plan had been to set up a unified economic system that would provide the necessary industrial base upon which large scale armaments output could be established. As the resources of Austria and Czechoslovakia were taken directly into the Reich their output was coordinated with the Four Year Plan, and it was into this system that the resources of the Danubian-Balkan region were fed. While the disruption brought about by the Italian absorption of a large proportion of the Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian production was annoying, it was not decisive as Germany still retained enough of an economic war chest to purchase the supplies from Italy, who was short of hard currency and did not have the industrial capacity to utilise all of the diverted resources.

Unfortunately the outbreak of general hostilities following the Poland invasion occurred when the war economy, or Wehrwirtschaft, was in a transitional phase. Consequently Hitler ordered full mobilisation and pass the War Economy Decree that required that 'every citizen impose upon themselves the necessary restrictions in living standards'. During November and December Hitler, Goering and military leaders consulted extensively to determine how the war economy should be structured. The subsequent decree gave the guidelines for the coordination of war production; 'the war requires the greatest efforts in building up armaments. The High Command recommends guidelines, which have as their goal the strongest mobilisation of all economic resources in the service of national defence. Capacity and labour not concerned with goods essential for war or subsistence was to be freed insofar as it can be put to work for strengthening armaments'.

All planning was to be undertaken under the assumption that the war would last from between five and seven years. Output of all classes of weapons were planned to increase by 200-300 % between 1939 and 1941; the initial budget of 13,700 tons of high explosive per month was later increased to 53,000 tons per month by the end of 1940; expenditure on infantry munitions was to increase from 590m RM in the present year to 2.2b RM in 1940.

It was recognised that the extreme acceleration of the production programme would soon outstrip the productive capacity of the economy and a lot of work was undertaken from September 1939 to establish a practical framework that would take the economy through the transition phase and into full production. Financing the growth was critical and advisors across the German government agreed on the need to restrict consumer spending and to divert the money into savings and government loans. Following debates over the relative merits of direct and indirect taxation it was decided to raise income tax, company tax and the taxation of luxury goods which increased the total tax burden from 17.7b RM to 32.3b RM by 1941.

The labour policy began with the proclamation that businesses must release surplus and non-essential workers, or face severe penalties. However labour allocation was not efficient at this stage as the labour survey commenced in 1938 was not complete and there were a number of competing agencies working at cross-purposes to each other. Similar problems affected the drive for industrial capacity, which was intended to come from the introduction of multiple shift-working, the investment of new plant and the conversion of existing plant to war work.

Problems soon emerged. The disruption of trade placed significant strain on domestic stocks and led to the imposition of a quota system. Industry, expecting a short war, held its labour back as it contemplated a return to peacetime production. Capacity that was released for wartime production was left idle and waiting for armaments orders. Numbers of skilled workers were left underemployed and significant labour disruptions occurred in unforeseen areas. The imperatives of the Four Year Plan and the military were often at odds and initially Hitler did not intervene. What this meant was that gradually a gap between capacity and output began to emerge, although it would not become a problem for some months yet.

Complicating matters further was Germany’s slim energy margin. Only 35% of its oil needs were met by home production of crude and synthetic oil, while 50% of German oil imports came from the western hemisphere and were suspended upon the declaration of hostilities. This meant that Germany entered the war 25% short of its pre-war consumption level. The Russo-German pact provided for delivery of some oil, but the rest had to be made up by the production of synthetic oil from coal. However the hydrogenation plan was both excessively wasteful in terms of coal, could produce only gasoline and was behind schedule. All this meant that coal, even more so than during the Great War, formed the mainstay of Germany’s energy system. The energy limitation on any large scale land offensive further encouraged Hitler to prepare for an energy extensive war on the Western Front, such that Germany could build its liquid stockpiles and so prepare for a long war.

[Croesus]

In the meeting of the Supreme War Council on 4 Jan 1940 it was decided to adopt a British plan for an AIF of two brigades landing in Narvik in April. The force was to advance up the railroad to the two centres of the North Swedish ore field, Kiruna and Gallivare, and thence to the Baltic port of Lulea. The force is expected to control the line by late March. Also landing are five British Territorial battalions who are assigned to the three Norwegian ports of Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger.

A campaign into southern Sweden was contemplated; passing through Trondheim the Anglo-French would put 100,000 British and 50,000 French soldiers into the long-term campaign. Forty destroyers were assigned to close support duties and the Home Fleet deployed to ensure the safety of the transports. Six and a half thousand aircraft would be engaged, three squadrons of fighters and four squadrons of home based heavy bombers responsible for aviation operations.

The Supreme War Council ordered the invasion of Norway on 8 Feb. Norway and Sweden were informed that their neutrality favoured the Germans and that Britain reserved the right to act in accordance with the rights of the neutrals against the Germans who have now consumed three. Orders went out to the Royal Navy to mine the approaches to the Vestfjord, off Stadland and a false operation off Molde. In all six cruisers and five destroyers were assigned to this operation, supplementing the destroyers engaged in close in fighting with the German ground forces.

On 16 Feb the destroyer Cossack halted the Altmark to rescue British prisoners of war while the German ship was in neutral Norwegian waters. Churchill and Reynaud immediately leapt on the opportunity for intervention, as there had clearly occurred a cynical use of Norwegian neutrality, the occurrence of which they had identified as sufficient cause to despatch the expeditionary force. There was every reason for confidence. The campaign had to date confirmed the opinions of the Supreme War Council that the Red Army had not recovered from its opening disasters and that their subsequent operations would be slow.

This justification of the Anglo-French intervention came when preparations were yet incomplete. Only one infantry brigade and a light anti-aircraft battery were available for despatch to Narvik, although the five Territorial Battalions were ready for Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. Two cruisers took two Battalions each to Bergen and Stavanger, with the fifth expected two days following landfall. French units were also despatched and would, upon arrival bring the Anglo-French force up to 18,000. One fighter squadron and an army cooperation flight were available.

The German decision to intervene into Norway was effectively taken on 16 Dec 1939 once Hitler became convinced of the arguments offered up by Admiral Raeder and Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the Norwegian National Union Party. The Altmark incident also forced his hand. The planning staffs for the invasion had fortunately been assembled three weeks earlier and were able to quickly assess the situation as it developed. The German force of six divisions was aimed at Oslo, Kristiansand, Trondheim, Bergen, Stavanger and Narvik. Paratroopers were to land at Stavanger and Oslo to seize important airfields so that the Luftwaffe could establish itself in the area.

[Croesus]

The arrival of the war in Scandinavia dates back to 2 and 10 Oct when Britain and Germany respectively first began to seriously examine possiblities of initiating a Norwegian campaign. As First Sea Lord Churchill proposed the mining of the Leads so as to disrupt the beneficial use of Norwegian neutral waters by Germany, while Admiral Raeder spoke with Hitler about the gains to be had for the submarine campaign if bases on the Norwegian coast could be obtained.

On 19 Oct the Foreign Office noted an unsubstantiated report of a planned German-Soviet partition of Scandinavia. On 4 Nov the Admiralty orders the reconstruction of the Northern Barrage of antisubmarine mines, which necessarily involves the mining of the Leads. On 30 Nov Russia attacks Finland, which brings down the Chamberlain and Daladier governments.

On 2 Dec Swedens decides against joint Finno-Swedish defence of Aaland and rejects direct assistance for Finland. On 3 Dec Raeder notes that a German occupation of Norway is the only practical means of disrupting Anglo-Norwegian trade and that any British occupation of Norway would have significant effects on German interests in the Baltic. On 12 Dec Raeder briefs Hitler on the unfortunate fact that the German fleet would not be able to cope with substantial surface warfare off the coast of Norway for any reasonable length of time.

On 14 Dec Raeder, Rosenburg and Quisling meet with Hitler, following which Hitler orders a study be made of the factors involving an invasion of Norway. The League of Nations expells the Soviet Union and the first foreign volunteers arrive in Sweden to help the Finnish war effort. On 19 Dec Prime Minister Churchill convinces the War Cabinet of strategic need to mine the Leads, however a decision is deferred until the Supreme War Council (SWC) can properly examine the issues. On 22 Dec Finland requests Anglo-French military assistance.

On 29 Dec a report is made to the War Cabinet warning of an impending German occupation of southern Scandinavia. The following day a German naval conference considers the risk of Britain occupying Norway under cover of a volunteer force, a risk which is considered to be likely for as long as the Soviet-Finnish war continues. On 6 Jan Britain approaches made to Oslo and Stockholm about the entry of Anglo-French naval forces into Norwegian waters are rejected. On 11 Jan Germany refuses transit for all foreign volunteers to Finland.

On 14 Jan the Red Air Force bombs the Swedish coast and on the following day the Swedish government rejects a Soviet allegation that Stockholm is abandoning its neutrality. The German Foreign Ministry also denies that Berlin is acting to broker peace talks between the combatants. On 17 Jan German naval staff commences planning countermeasures in case of a British intervention in Norway, which involves the occupation of southern and parts of central Norway. The following day the Swedish Parliament debates sending assistance to Finland, guided by public opinion which is strongly in favour of intervening.

On 20 Jan a report is presented to the War Cabinet on an apparent German plan to secure the Narvik-Lulea railway. On 26 Jan the Finnish Prime Minister Ryti and Commander in Chief Mannerheim confer to discuss possible peace terms during which Mannerheim urges concessions to bring about a settlement.

The following day Sweden warns Russia that continued action is likely to bring involvement by the Anglo-French. In Germany Kietel orders full planning for a Norwegian invasion timed for mid-March and calling for six divisions to be deployed against Oslo, Kristiansand, Egersund, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. On 29 Jan Stalin decides against the original plan of a full reconquest of Finland and Molotov sends signals via Stockholm of a willingness to negotiate. The Finnish Government appeals for Norwegian help. The following day Stockholm passes on the Russian terms which Finland rejects.

On 1 Feb Finland presents counter-terms for a negotiated peace. In London Britain rejects a French plan for a blockade of Soviet ports. On 4 Feb Russia rejects the Finnish peace proposal. The following day the SWC approves a British plan for military intervention in Norway, timed for mid-March, and aimed at supporting Finland while also securing the Swedish orefields. One brigade is to be sent to Narvik, two battalions each to Bergen and Stavanger and one to Trondheim. On 6 Feb Finland informs Sweden and Russia of the SWC decision in an attempt to regain some degree of political initiative.

On 8 Feb Finlands signs a credit arrangement with Britain. On 10 Feb Berlin recieves a report from Oslo about British preparations to occupy Norwegian ports. On 11 Feb Russia offers second set of peace terms to Finland via Stockholm. On the following day Finnish Foreign Minister holds secret talks in Stockholm requesting Swedish assistance, which is declined. On 13 Feb Britain confirms the supply of 45 84mm guns and 45,000 shells which is half of what was originally requested. On the same day Finland issues an international Note criticising Russia for violating the accepted customs of war.

On 15 Feb the Swedish press reveals the presence of Tanner in Stockholm and the Swedish refusal to help. The following day the Swedish, British and French press criticize the Swedish stand. In Norway the Altmark incident causes both the Anglo-French and Germans to decide to intervene/invade. On 17 Feb orders for the Norwegian campaign are approved by the War Cabinet. In Finland the first group of Danish volunteers arrive.

On 18 Feb the battleship Renown sails from Scapa with four destroyers to rendevous with the cruiser Birmingham, four minelaying destroyers and four escort destroyers for mining operations in the Vestfjord. The minelayer Teviot Bank and four escort destroyers also sails from Scapa for mining operations in Stadland. Diplomatic Notes are issued to Oslo and Stockholm explaining the Anglo-French actions. In Stockholm the Swedish Government meets to discuss the Tanner crisis and the King confirms the original decision not to aid Finland.

On 19 Feb Anglo-French military envoys begin negotiations with Mannerheim on details around intervention. On the same day a unit of Swedish volunteers is attached to the Finnish Army. On 20 Feb the Red Air Force bombs the Swedish village of Pajala and the Swedish government issues a stiff Note of protest. Tanner briefs the Finnish Government on details of the second set of Russian peace plans and is encouraged by the Government to accept them. In Berlin a report is received of conversations between French counterparts talking of Anglo-French operations on Narvik.

On 21 Feb Hitler appoints von Falkenhorst to command Norwegian invasion. In Norway the British minelaying operations are undertaken. The Norwegians issue immediate protest Note and prepare for mine-sweeping operations. Upon recieving news of the British operations von Falkenhorst confers with Hitler and Raeder. Further Swedish debates around fears of being drawn into the general hostilities are interrupted by news of the British intervention.

On 22 Feb Hitler gives order to initiate counter-invasion of Norway. Soviets respond to Swedish protest over Pajala bombing as 'malicious allegations. Sweden defers request by Anglo-French for transit of troops to Finnish front. On 23 Feb Tanner meets new British representative and military envoy. In Copenhagen Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Foreign Ministers announce decision not to permit Anglo-French transit rights.

The following day the Foreign Ministers reaffirm neutrality and urge a negotiated settlement. On 25 Feb Tanner arrives in Stockholm to discuss Russian terms and is urged to accept; he forwards terms to Paris and London. In Finland 12 Blenheim bombers are flown in. In Oslo the British Ambassador reports a concentration of German aircraft and shipping; this is seen as providing sufficient evidence of German preparations for invasion and the third phase of the intervention is authorised, the despatch of ground forces.

On 26 Feb the British forces, not yet fully complemented, board their transports for their respective targets in Norway. In Germany the force charged with occupying Trondheim also leaves port. Tanner conducts talks with Stockholm about defensive alliance against Russia, which Sweden declines. In response to Swedish approach Russia refuses to relax its peace terms. The following day the Red Army launches a massive general offensive. In Helsinki Tanner returns with little hope but to accept the Russian peace terms. A majority of the Government agrees but wants to first consult with Mannerheim.

On 28 Feb, following Mannerheims advice to take whatever terms are on offer, the Government votes to commence negotiations by 17 votes to 3. Further deliberations are interrupted when it is learned that a substantial British force has arrived off Narvik. Later news breaks that a German force has arrived off Trondheim. In Germany the nearly fully equipped main invasion force departs. On 1 Mar the British and German fleets meet off Bergen and the British forces for Stavanger are diverted to Aandalsnes. The German invasion forces arrive at Stavanger, Egersund, Kristiansand and Oslo; the German forces for Bergen are diverted back to Oslo. On 2 Mar the British forces for Trondheim are diverted to Namsos.

[Croesus]

The 1st Battalion Scots Guards, 24th Brigade (Guards), were loaded onto their transport in Scapa upon receiving the notification of the third phase of Plan R4 on 26 Feb and, escorted by the cruisers Aurora and Ellingham, sailed immediately for Narvik. Over the next two days the Brigades' other two battalions, 1st Battalion Irish Guards and 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, loaded onto two transports in Scapa and, escorted by the cruisers Southhampton and Enterprise and the anti-aircraft cruiser Cairo, left for Narvik.

Also on 26 Feb the Hallamshire Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment, 146th Brigade (Territorial), were aboard a transport in the Clyde and, under escort by the cruisers Arethusa and Galatea, departed for Trondheim. On the same day the other two battalions of the 146th Brigade, the 1st/4th Battalion The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment and the 1st/4th Battalion The Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, embarked in Rosyth on the cruisers Sheffield and Glasgow for Bergen. Finally two battalions of the 148th Brigade (Territorial), the 1st/5th Battalion The Royal Leicestershire Regiment and 1st/8th Battalion The Sherwood Foresters, also embarked in Rosyth on the cruisers Devonshire and York bound for Stavanger.

When the Scots Guards arrived off Narvik on 26 Feb they found in the harbour two turn-of-the-century Norwegian coastal defence cruisers Norge and Eidsvold, and the submarine B1, which at the time constituted the main force of the Norwegian Navy. In the town itself was a company of the 13th Regiment, 6th Infantry Division, a company of engineers, a machine gun battery, an antiaircraft gun battery and a mountain gun section and the towns land defences were based on two newly constructed pillboxes.

The British flotilla was led in by the flagship Aurora, the passage of which was spotted by Norwegian watch boats who alerted the two Norwegian cruisers. At this time the Norwegian government had vigorously protested against the fait accompli of the British mining operations, which were being swept by Norwegian destroyers and minelayers. The orders given to the two Norwegian vessels were to resist any British landing so as to uphold Norways rights of sovereignty, but to prevent 'unnecessary escalation'. The British were under orders not to return Norwegian fire, unless it became 'intolerable'.

Upon coming into range the Norge put a shot across the bow of the Aurora and signalled the British to stop. The Aurora slowed, but did not stop, and signalled the Norwegians to desist fire. The Norge put another shot across the Aurora's bow and insisted the British stop, which they did. By signal the two commanding officers arranged a parley. The British explained their mission and the Norwegian explained theirs; the former was to land and prepare to help the Finns while the later was bound to resist any foreign intervention or invasion.

The British noted their preponderance of force, which the Norwegians recognised; for their part the Norwegians noted that it was their responsibility to ensure that the honour of Norway's senior service was upheld, which the British recognised. The parley broke up with both commanders expecting some kind of engagement but neither considering a full-scale fight. However, each recognised the risks associated in trying to keep control of matters and the British commander insisted that fire discipline be maintained and return fire made only on his command; the Norwegian commander issued orders to the effect that each vessel would fire a single broadside salvo of its two 21cm guns and three of its 15cm guns. Further to this the 21cm guns were to fire long and the 15cm to fire short.

The Aurora, followed by the Ellingham and thence the British transport resumed its cautious entry into the harbour whereupon the Norge and Eidsvold commenced their symbolic fire. The exact circumstances of what occurred next is not certain as British and Norwegian sources are contradictory; however the result was that the transport carrying the Scots Guards was hit by a single 21cm shell and immediately began taking on water while the Aurora was bracketed by two 15cm shells, causing significant damage and starting a fire amidships.

All reports note at this point that an eerie stillness settled over the harbour as all eyes were on the British ships; the stillness lasted for some minutes and broken eventually by the Ellingham turning around the burning Aurora and firing all guns at the Eidsvold. The Norwegian ship was hit three times by the Ellinghams main armament of 15.2cm guns, twice by 10.2 cms guns and, after a shudder and internal explosion, rolled over and immediately sank. At this the Norge fired at the Ellingham, scoring one hit by a 15cm shell that put out the British ships after turret. Further fire from the Norge was not forthcoming as the Aurora now joined the battle and put two 15.2cm and four 10.2cm shells into the Norwegian vessel which caught fire and began listing.

Onshore the horrified Norwegian commander immediately notified Oslo as to the dramatic events and frantically sought orders. The immediate reply was to take no further action against the British and to avoid further contact, evacuating the town if need be. However one of the few officers loyal to Quisling, Colonel Sundlo, by happenstance was in command of one of the pillbox posts and immediately ordered the mountain gun battery to fire on the Aurora, now fully ablaze, and for the men under his command to prepare to defend an assault landing.

The battery managed to get off several rounds before the Norwegian commanding officer managed to get control of the situation and arrested Sundlo. However the damage had been done and the Ellingham turned ashore and began bombarding the town and pillbox defences. The wooden buildings were set afire and the Norwegians took significant casualties before managing to retreat beyond fire of the British guns.

Meanwhile the Scots Guards were in serious trouble. Boats were put out and soon filled up as the transport began to settle into the water. The Aurora was ineffective at this time as efforts were being made to control the fire, but some of its boats were able to be put out and further assistance was provided by the Ellingham after its initial fire into the town ceased. By the time the transport slipped beneath the surface about three quarters of the Scots Guards had been taken off the ship or pulled from the water, but all their stores and what little equipment they had sailed with was lost. Casualties on the Aurora were not severe but the cruiser was not considered seaworthy and so drawn up for repairs.

The first stage in Plan R4 had not been particularly encouraging.

[Croesus]

The dramatic events in Narvik were soon transmitted to Oslo and a furious exchange of telegrams with London commenced. While the diplomatic situation was being worked out the order went out to all Norwegian military units that the British were landing in strength in northern, and possibly, central Norway, that they were likely to field overwhelming strength and would probably not be inclined to repeat their behaviour of Narvik.

Therefore all units were instructed to remain at their posts but to not engage British units without direct confirmation from higher command. It was in the aftermath of these distressing and confused events that the battlecruiser Lutzow, heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and four destroyers carrying 1,700 men of 138 Gebirgs-Regiment of 3 Mountain Division sailed into Trondheim.

Unaware of the pathos of their action, when the Germans signalled 'Do Not Fire We Are British' they received an immediate response of 'Do Not Fire Please Enter'. Looking at each other for a moment the German commanders immediately ordered the troop carrying destroyers to proceed directly to their landing points. The main defences at Trondheim were the two forst of Brettingen and Hysnes, with a third having recently been stood down. One of the German destroyers landed between the two forts and rushed the Norwegian positions who had only just recognised the shape of the Lutzow as it sailed towards Trondheim and frantically began to arm their guns and switch on their search lights. Aburptly they became aware that German troops had infiltrated the fortifications and following some desultory small arms fire surrendered.

The three other destroyers had proceeded at full speed down Trondheimfjord and disembarked their troops directly into the town and siezing it without significant resistance. The airfield Vaernes was held by troops of the 11th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division and they put up a stiff fight, beating back several attempts by the Germans. By the end of the day the airfield remained in Norwegian hands but the Germans had prepared an emergency landing strip on the ice for their transports, which began arriving within a few hours, and so secured the town completely. This action ended the first days military activity with attention now passing to the naval situation.

To provide naval protection for the convoys the Home Fleet battleships Rodney and Valiant, the battlecruiser Repulse, the cruisers Penelope and B and ten destroyers formed the main element under the Commander-in-Chief Sir Charles Forbes, with the the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, two cruisers and and eleven destroyers and the 18th Cruiser Squadron, two cruisers, also in the region. Upon receiving news of the sailing of the German fleet the Forbes began searching for the German fleet, which had sailed west into the North Sea and thence disappeared from contact.

In spite of their efforts the first contact was entirely by accident as the destroyer Glowworm, part of the Renown's destroyer screen which had remained in the region following the minelaying operations, had fallen behind while recovering a man overboard. As it followed the Renown it ran directly into the path of the Lutzow and Hipper as they made their way out of Trondheim harbour bound for a rendesvous with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. A short sharp encounter followed where the Glowworm, attempting to ram the Hipper was destroyed by the Lutzow and immediately sank.

Upon notification of the contact Forbes detached the Repulse, Penelope and four large destroyers in an attempt to reinforce the Renown which was closer. However bad weather hampered the search and contact with the Lutzow and Hipper was not recovered. While this was occurring however the Polish submarine Orzel torpedoed and sank the German equipment transport Rio de Janeiro which was part of the expedition against Bergen, and hence part of the flotilla led by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Close after this, during a break in the weather, an RAF Sunderland reported a battlecruiser, two cruisers plus escorts sailing west from Trondheim.

Thinking this was the Lutzow and Hipper Forbes immediately gave chase, seeking to trap the German fleet as a French cruiser and two French destroyers were on their way into the area. The most important result of these actions was that the Admiralty became aware that the German fleet was in the immediate vicinity of their troop transports and, with the memory of the Scots Guards at Narvik, so fresh, orders were immediately transmitted to increase the escorts of the Bergen and Stavanger convoy which was now approaching Bergen.

What was about to occur was the first main battleship action of the war. The Renown and her escorting destroyers, the Repulse, Penelope and escorting destroyers sailed towards the four troop-carrying cruisers Sheffield, Glasgow, Devonshire, York and escorting destroyers and came up on Bergen from three different directions. The German fleet was at this time organised into two groups.

The first was the largest, with the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, light cruisers Koln and Konigsberg and attendant destroyers, while the second was the battlecruiser Lutzow, heavy cruizer Admiral Hipper and attendant destroyers. Also shadowing the main German group were several U-Boat groups. The British force was weakened by the four troop carrying cruisers not able to obtain complete freedom of action while the German troops were also aboard fighting ships, though in this case the destroyers were used with the larger ships retaining their freedom of movement.

[Croesus]

In spite of the naval action off Bergen and subsequent dislocation of German plans, the remaining operations of their counter-invasion went well. The two pillboxes that constituted the airfields defenses were first suppressed by ME-110's and then neutralised by parties of the 120 Fallschirmjager that dropped soon after. The few Norwegian air force planes managed to get airborne but offered no additional resistance and the airfield was soon fully secured and the first planes airlifting in the 69 Infantry Division began to land. The Norwegians did score a success when the Norwegian destroyer Aegir sank the German transport ship Rota as it sailed into Stavanger harbour with the subsequent loss of much of the heavy equipment for the airlifted troops.

Down the coast at Egersund a small party of the 69 Infantry Division landed to secure the cable station and encountered no resistance. At Kristiansand the German invasion force was repulsed twice by the coastal fortifications during which the light cruiser Karlsruhe was damaged before an unfortunate coincedence of German use of captured Norwegian codes and a Norwegian order restating no resistance to be offered to either 'British or French' units resulted in uncertainty on the part of the Norwegian commander. The resulting pause was sufficient for the German landing parties of the 214 Infantry Division to reach their disembarkation areas and secured the town and its important military facilities.

This left the expedition against Oslo. In the original German invasion plan the force, led by the heavy cruiser Blucher was to have attempted to slip past the Oscarsborg fortifications and take the city by surprise. However this plan was forestalled by the British intervention in Narvik and it was felt that any advantage of surprise would by now have been lost. Subsequently the landing parties of 163 Infantry Division were put down on the east shore of the fjord and down from the Oscarsborg and from there they proceeded to advance on the capital while the Oscarsborg was invested by naval and air bombardment.

While the 163 Infantry were working their way up to the town there was some confusion surrounding the capture of the Fornebu airfield. It was meant to have been siezed by Fallschirmjager but fog delayed their departure. The few fighters the Norwegians could put up harrassed German bomber and transport planes overhead, and some of the latter attempted a landing on the airfield in the expectation of it already being in German hands. These planes came under fire and hastily took to the air again. Matters were not resolved until a ME-110 landed on the northern edge of the airfield and discovered that it was not swept by Norwegian fire. Subsequently the airlandings continued and the airport was taken into German hands.

However the naval base at Horten and the fortifications at Oscarsborg remained in Norwegian hands and it was actions from these two installations that gave sufficient time for the Norwegian Royal Family, government and military command to evacuate the city and so prevent a complete German victory. By the end of Mar 4 therefore Norway had been effectively split in two. The British were in place in Narvik and fully able to reinforce their position as no German units were in the vicinity.

Trondheim was in German hands but for the moment cut off by landward route and only able to be resupplied by the airfield. There was a lot of confusion around Bergen following the naval battle and disrupted landings. However all the key points in the south, Stavanger, Kristiansand, Egersund and Oslo were in German hands. The Norwegian government was completely dislocated and for a time all the Norwegian military units were acting on their last known orders. The skies effectively belonged to the Luftwaffe while the seas remained the province of the Anglo-French navies.

[Croesus]

The Battle of Bergen opened before dawn on 1 March when the German battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sailing ENE observed the passage of a British flotilla sailing due E and transporting four battalions of British infantry to landfall in Bergen. The Germans were themselves escorting ten troop-carrying destroyers bound for the same port and immediately the destroyers were ordered to break off and make for Stavanger while the two capital ships engaged what they thought was a cruiser squadron.

Their approach was masked by the periodic snow flurries that swept the sea and so it was that their fire fell on their initial targets, the light escort cruiser Penelope and the transporting heavy cruiser Effingham at the same time that one of the escorting destroyers, the Basilisk, spotted the two battle cruisers. The Scharnhorst engaged the Effingham in the belief that she was the main vessel and sought to press its attack hard.

Full with troops as it was the Effingham managed to manoeuvre such that it avoided the worst of the Scharnhorst‘s fire but still received several strikes that caused some damage and casualties. The Gneisenau had fallen upon the Penelope and, the suddenness of the attack combined with some good gunnery, the British cruiser soon began to lose speed and control.

The Gneisenau did not press home its advantage with the crippled Penelope and instead choosing to coordinate with the Scharnhorst against the Effingham, which by now was fully engaging the Scharnhorst while sailing towards its main escort. This was the battle cruiser Repulse that had turned hard upon realisation of the German presence and was now bearing down on the Gneisenau.

Its opening rounds were not entirely effective, though some effect was had. Its arrival did change the expectations of the German ships however, who broke off their attack on the Effingham, which promptly fled, and turned to face their new adversary.

The second salvo by the Repulse straddled the Gneisenau at the same time as the Gneisenau found its target; while the Repulse knocked out the German fire direction control the German fire damaged the forward turret. It was now the Gneisenau’s turn to bolt but in this instance its flight was covered by the Scharnhorst that had found the Repulses range and now began placing the British vessel under considerable fire.

The Repulse swung around and delivered its own messages to the Scharnhorst which, feeling that it had done enough, also sought to break off. Its passage went unchallenged as the Repulse, now thoroughly battered, was having trouble with its engines and the heavy seas and soon gave up any thought of chasing the German battle cruisers.

Matters onboard the Penelope had not improved but at least the vessel remained seaworthy and it was with relief that the crew managed to bring her home some days later. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had taken a fair amount of damage from the Repulse and were forced to take a circuitous route home; they would soon find themselves back in active service.

For the moment however they were out of the fight and could play no further part in the action, not that the British were to know of this at the time and caution as to the whereabouts of the ugly sisters constrained the Admiralty’s plans for the next phase. The Repulse found itself with rudder trouble from the last fleeting shots of the Scharnhorst and also turned for home. That night the stricken battle cruiser was found by U-51, followed and torpedoed the next morning. She began to take on water, list and finally succumbed in the afternoon following a largely successful rescue of its crew.

All thought of making landfall in Bergen was now given up as the largely escort less British cruisers sought to find safety in the North Sea. The slower Effingham had to deal with battle damage and began to fall behind the rest of the group, which did not slow and pressed ahead. Destroyers fell back to escort the Effingham and, at around the time the Repulse fell beneath the waves the Effingham crossed the path of the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and pocket battleship Lutzow.

Visibility was better and the approach of the German vessels detected, but so was the position of the lone cruiser. The Effingham’s destroyers hurled themselves at the Germans and one rammed the Admiral Hipper, gouging a large gash in its belt. But the result was foreseeable and soon the two capital ships sat out of the Effingham’s range and pounded her such that she too sank.

This was the last action in the battle. The battle cruiser Renown sought to close with the Hipper and Lutzow but could not locate the two German ships that had themselves promptly made for southern Arctic waters. The German destroyers had scattered and made landfall in Stavanger, leaving Bergen in Norwegian hands for the moment. The light cruisers Koln and Konigsberg that had also been in the vicinity did not enter the fight.

All told the Battle had favoured the Germans; while they had not secured Bergen, and this would cause trouble in the battles to come, they had suffered no serious loss while themselves sinking two RN ships. The British loss was significant and the fact that they could not transfer resources to other theatres affected, among other things, Britains naval and diplomatic policy in the Mediterranean.

[Croesus]

From the meeting of the SWC in November it had been decided to open up a land front in Scandinavia that would permit the engagement of Russia, the reinforcement of Finland and the chance to interdict German shipments of Swedish iron ore. This was the primary focus of Anglo-French military planning at the time, but it was not the sole focus. There had emerged a front of secondary interest that increasingly came to absorb the attention of Anglo-French planners: operations against the Russian oil fields and infrastructure in the Caucasus.

On 5 Dec the French Premier Reynaud raises with Churchill the matter of the military, and political, need to interdict the German oil supplies. In a strategic sense he sees significant value coming from action that would ultimately cause Russia from being able to use its status of non-belligerence in support of the German war effort; that is to say, the status of Russia vis a vis the Anglo-French needed to be changed so that the scope of the war could be widened.

Five days later the War Cabinet discussed the merits of Reynaud’s proposal. Churchill is in agreement as to the military and strategic benefits from interdicting the German oil and involving Russia in the war. He notes that Baku can be reached by air and Batum by sea and contends that the likely Soviet response would be limited to counter strikes in Persia and Iraq.

On 11 Dec Anglo-Turkish naval talks commenced, one of the questions being the plans and contingencies Turkey had around naval operations in the Black Sea. Turkey noted that it had several plans, none involving war with Russia. Britain enquired as to what Turkey would do in such a conflict; Turkey responded by asking Britain what help would be forthcoming in such a conflict. The talks broke down in mutual posing of questions.

On 16 Dec Reynaud orders Generalissimo Gamelin and Admiral Darlan to prepare a report on Anglo-French military action in the Caucasus. On 26 Dec an influential British COS subcommittee rules that if war with Russia were the only way to intensify the economic war against Germany, and the economic war the only way to bring about a German defeat, then the disadvantages of open hostilities with Russia should be accepted.

On 2 Jan Gamelin discusses practicalities about a Caucasus campaign with the British COS. Five days later France reopens naval negotiations with Turkey aimed at determining the legality of Turkey opening the Straits to Anglo-French vessels by pointing to a precedent with the Montreux Convention that would see access given under League of Nations auspices. On 12 Jan British CIGS in a letter to Admiral Cunningham notes that there is developing an intention to concentrate an Anglo-French fleet in the Black Sea, aimed at the bombardment of Batum.

The next day French Air Force planners discuss further potential operations by CinC Middle East General Weygand’s forces on the successful conclusion of a first stage operation in the Caucasus. On 14 Jan the British COS accept the French thesis that the German and Russian military threats were related and that consequent Anglo-French commitments against the Russians would serve to constrain both threats.

On 17 Jan, during wider secret negotiations, French officials raise with the Italian ambassador matters pertaining to division of interests in the Caucasus oilfields in the event of Anglo-French occupation. On 20 Jan Gamelin produces his report on the Caucasus operation and suggests that such would deprive Germany of Russian oil and fundamentally weaken the Soviet government.

He recommended air attacks on the Baku and Batum targets, and notes that air interdiction would be easier to accomplish than naval action given Turkish caution. Two days later a Turkish report indicates that in conditions of war with Russia and an Anglo-French bombing policy which airfields would be made available; significantly Turkey retains those in range of the proposed Russian targets.

On 3 Feb Cunningham presses for definitions of contingencies in which Turkey would open the Straits, either as a belligerent or under threat of imminent war danger. The Turkish reply is that the Straits would be open in those circumstances where the three powers (Britain, France and Turkey) would be belligerent together. It was underlined this did not include a German attack on Romania or allowing for an Anglo-French attack on Russia.

On 5 Feb, the same day as the SWC ruled on the Scandinavian operation, the Royal Navy draws up contingency plans for the insertion into the Black Sea of a force of four eight-inch cruisers, two six-inch cruisers and a destroyer flotilla. Two days later Weygand is contacted by RAF Command Cairo of overflights over the southern Russian oilfields and requesting permission to send detachments to Syria for the purpose of selecting and preparing airfields for the reconnaissance flights.

On 8 Feb the Persian Minister of War approaches the British Military Attaché and suggests a joint attack on Russia. The next day Weygand meeds Air Marshall Mitchell en route to Ankara to request suitable landing grounds for Anglo-French aircraft flying out the principal French base at Djezireh. On 10 Feb Gamelin informs Weygand of the Caucasus study and invites further work. On the same day the British Commander Middle East Wavell had been informed to investigate the prospects of possible action against the Caucasus in the event of war with Russia.

Weygand writes an operational order noting the importance of supporting Scandinavian operations with those in the Caucasus. On 12 Feb British CIGS informs his principal subordinates that in event of hostilities with Russia that the bombing of Baku would occur forthwith and that planning for such should involve a date by mid-April, with further French assistance post-May. He notes that there are increased strategic options in view of the mobilization of the Indian Army and the presence of ANZAC troops in Gaza and Egypt.

On 13 Feb Gamelin advises Reynaud of the importance of pressing quickly on the Caucasus operations to fully complement those in Scandinavia. He also writes to Weygand expressing confidence that in the event Turkey will be brought into the war on the Anglo-French side and take an active part in the Caucasus operations. The following day the French Ambassador commences talks with the Turkish government over practicalities involved in Anglo-French bombing of Baku, Grozny and Batum.

On 16 Feb, the day of the Altmark crisis which prompts the Scandinavian campaign, Gamelin writes a review of the conduct of the war so far and in it recommends the ultimate establishment of Anglo-French bases in Asiatic Turkey and obtaining Turkish consent for the entrance of Anglo-French submarines into the Black Sea. Four days later Churchill is informed of the nature and scope of French plans to push Turkey into war with Russia.

On 28 Feb, the day that the British land at Narvik, the SWC orders a full study to be made on prospects of effective results of Caucasus operation. Available forces for the air interdiction include four Blenheim squadrons of RAFME, one Wellesley squadron out of Basra, 24 Farmers and 65 Glenn Martins out of Syria. Airfields identified as necessary against Baku were Tehran and Tabriz in Iran, and Kars in Turkey; against Grozny Kars and Erezum in Turkey and Tabriz; against Batum, Kars, Erezum and Erzincan in Turkey. The closest British base at Habbaniyah was not in Blenheim range while Mosul could reach Batum and Grozny, but not Baku.

Wellesley’s flying out of Habbaniyah or Mosul could reach all targets, but there was only one squadron available. This meant that bombing operations could only ideally proceed from Turkish airfields, or with longer-range bombers; although with the earlier Turkish assignment of airfields to Britain, Blenheims could just reach Baku. However it was seen as important to provide for the employment of five heavy bomber, three medium bomber and two fighter squadrons, and the preparation of these forces would take time. However, the order is given and both RAF and FAA commence work around the marshalling of a suitably large airfleet. On 3 Mar, following the naval defeat off Bergen, the French War Cabinet approves the Caucasus operation.

[Croesus]

For the government in Bucharest the World War had begun with the Anschluss; only recently had it evolved into a shooting war, but before that the principal pattern was discernable. That pattern involved the violation of neutrality and political vassalage in some form, often involving dismemberment.

Austria had been absorbed into Germany; Czechoslovakia split in two, one half a puppet and the other a German protectorate; Albania had been absorbed into Italy; Poland had been divided between Germany and Russia; Yugoslavia had been broken up and the three surviving, if truncated, polities firmly within the Italian sphere of influence; Finland had been attacked by Russia, the campaign of which was clearly one of border revision; Denmark had been occupied and Norway effectively split between the principal warring parties of Britain and Germany.

Three Versailles nations had been overthrown and three Scandinavian neutrals attacked; what hope therefore for Versailles and neutral Romania? The Little Entente was dead and the Balkan Pact toothless. Turkey was preventing any hope of naval assistance from the Western Powers and Berlin had, in no uncertain terms, advised Bucharest that it would be wise to come to whatever arrangement with Moscow could be obtained. Hungary had feasted on its neighbours and its revisionism was open and unashamed, while Bulgaria appeared to all intents and purposes to be biding its time and only constrained by some doubts over the intentions of Greece. It was therefore with a sense of resigned fatalism that Romania grasped at the only straw in reach and on March 2 signed a non-aggression treaty with Italy.

A non-aggression treaty between Romania and Italy was patently absurd and was a clear indication of the return of Italy into international politics as something other than a meek German vassal-ally. The genesis of the treaty was obviously an Italian initiative and by identifying the influences that brought about the treaty it becomes clear what Mussolini and Ciano are thinking.

One of the fundamentals of definitive Italian fascism was anti-Bolshevism and this was one of the consistent elements of Mussolinian foreign policy. The announcement of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact was a major blow to Italian political sensibilities as it showed quite clearly the lack of value that Berlin placed in Italian approval; the pact was signed without Italian advisement and Rome informed of it as fait accompli. This political arrogance did not go down well in Italian circles and placed an unnecessary strain on what was already a difficult relationship.

The Soviet attack on Finland had, as in Britain and France and indeed worldwide, brought about a storm of popular indignation in Italy, and this feeling was not acted against by the government. The police did not interfere when large-scale protests were held outside the Russian embassy, thousands of Italians volunteered to fight for Finland and Finnish arms procurement agents met no obstacles when shopping in Rome. The new Soviet ambassador was kept waiting for his formal introduction to the King until, eventually, he returned to Moscow; in similar vein the Italian ambassador in Moscow returned home in January.

It had become known in Rome that there was contained within the German-Russian pact secret protocols whereby Hitler had bought Stalin off, and that one of those protocols involved Bessarabia. Ordinarily Mussolini would not have welcomed Soviet intrusion into the Danube-Balkan region; but following the conquest of Yugoslavia any increase in Soviet presence was a matter of distinct alarm. That Hitler was prepared to take the part of Stalin over Mussolini was a telling sign that in the eyes of Berlin Rome was a small fish. The continuing difficulties in the relationship between Ribbentrop and Ciano did not help either and the common ground shared between Italy and Hungary over Soviet encroachment served to further give boldness to Italian foreign policy.

But it was in the sphere of Anglo-French relations that the decisive impetus for the signature of the treaty with Romania originated. Following the abortive Anglo-Franco-Italian talks there had developed a secret Franco-Italian dialogue promoted largely by the French and Italian military intelligence agencies. This dialogue had over the three months to March managed to find sufficient common ground as to being to disarm the republican vs fascist differences that had hitherto dominated their formal relationship.

What this meant in terms of the war was that there would always be a voice at the Anglo-French Supreme War Council that spoke well of Italy and advised a soft touch. Given that there were still professional diplomats and soldiers identified with the Chamberlain-Daladier policy of giving Rome a foreign policy cushion the stock of Rome had never been higher.

It was however the events of the last few days that really swung the SWC in favour of moving to a policy that definitely favoured Italian interests. The first, and foremost in British eyes, was the change of the balance of power in the North Sea following the sinking of the Repulse and Effingham. Without a commensurate reduction in German naval strength this meant that the Royal Navy was not able to transfer assets into the Mediterranean, which itself meant that Britain could no longer reasonably or realistically continue its hard-line policy towards Italy.

Taken together with the pro-Italian line taken by Paris, London was now obliged to drop many of its objections against Mussolini in general and the rise in Italian power in particular. Finally, the increasing emphasis placed on Anglo-French operations against the Caucasus meant that more than ever Italian goodwill was not just desirable, but necessary.

So it was that the Italo-Romanian non-aggression pact was signed. Ribbentrop was casually advised of it following the announcement in the world press and the following week Mussolini suggested in a short letter to Hitler that perhaps the two leaders should meet and discuss matters of mutual interest.

[Croesus]

There were many doubts and questions that confronted Hitler as he grappled with the political and military challenges of the first six months of war. While he had some concerns about the direction and conduct of the war, of one thing he was certain and that was his fundamental dictum: that Germany would be a world power or it would be destroyed. His role in Germany's fate was also firm in his mind; he would either lead Germany to victory or preside over its immolation. This dictum would prove of great use as he grappled with the problems that challenged him.

Perhaps the most significant question was that of Germany's relationship with Russia. The signature of the Russo-German non-aggression treaty had backfired somewhat. What had been seen primarily as a means of forcing Poland to accept the German solution to the Danzig question, and secondarily as a necessary piece of Ribbentrops strategy to isolate Britain from continental influence, had resulted in general hostilities and a complicated identification of German interests with Soviet interests. This had led to strained relations with Italy, the Danubian-Balkan states and the Baltic states which was only partially balanced off by a marked deterioration in relations between Russia and the Anglo-French.

That German destiny was to be found in the East was a given in his opinion, but how and when that would be achieved was a matter open to debate. Ideally he would have neutralised the west so as to attack east but that was no longer possible. He now had to accept the course of having to neutralise the east so as to attack west in order to thence attack east. The tradeoff was therefore between an opportunity to focus on France and knock her out of the war and giving Russia room to capitalise on its relatively increased freedom of movement in northwest and southeast Europe. Since the signing of the non-aggression pact senior military figures had expressed disquiet as to the increased opportunities Russia now enjoyed and that over time Germany would inevitably lose ground.

Complicating matters were two seperate developments; the Anglo-French landing in Scandinavia and the Italian conquest of Yugoslavia and non-aggression pact with Romania. There were two threads running through the Scandinavian intervention so far as Hitler could see. The French wanted to help the Finns beat back the Soviets while the British wanted to interdict the Swedish ore traffic to Germany. In a way Hitler would not be unwelcome to either development. An attack on Russia would serve to divert Anglo-French strength while also acting as a surrogate for German influence that had permitted the Soviet attack in the first place. An attack on Sweden, which the British plan directly implied, meant that Germany could step in as the 'white hat' and, given the Finno-Swedish linkage may well be able to establish a greater control over the Baltic which would serve well for the eventual attack on Russia.

The Italian conquest of Yugoslavia had interrupted the economic flows somewhat but not to a decisive extent and in other ways served to bring Italy further into the German economic sphere, thus supporting Ribbentrops diplomacy around a continental bloc. The conquest had served to enrich Hungary and lure Greece away from an overt identification with the Anglo-French, which had occurred with Turkey, and these two developments were seen as being politically positive.

The Italo-Romanian agreement was problematic in that it could well inflame tensions in the region as it was clearly anti-Soviet; the flip side to this was that Italy would act as a German proxy in the region and either hold up the Russian advance, or give the grounds for a German 'white hat' intervention. In light of this it was felt that acceding to Mussolini's invitation would be premature and so a letter was sent respectfully declining the invitation while expressing Berlin's full confidence that Rome had matters in hand. Thus it was that under two fairly broad sets of circumstances Germany could let other powers do its anti-Russian work before giving Germany the chance to push the other powers off their gains and look good in the process.

However this still left the matter of war with France. While there were suggestions that armoured warfare could be decisive strategically it seemed more likely that there would be some return to positional warfare that would keep the French locked in place while the militarised economy matured to the extent that a final push, or secondary front, could be made to overcome the western front.

The announcement of the invasion of the west was announced on 27 Sep upon the fall of Warsaw, the directive ordering it made on 9 Oct and the initial plan for it issued on 19 Oct. This plan was adjusted on 28 Oct in line with the established aims of destroying the larger portion of the Anglo-French armies while siezing the Franco-Belgian coast. Orders for the invasion to commence were issued on 5 Nov partly to capitalise on the shock of the Yugoslav invasion and resulting political instability in London and Paris but was cancelled two days later in light of caution over weather and preparedness.

The plan had been redrawn again on Nov 15 to take into account opportunities for forcing the Meuse but had not fundamentally changed in nature. Further debate developed around the plan but the next stage was the ordering on 28 Dec for an invasion date of 17 Jan. Weather delayed the launch of the operation and while the forced landing of a Luftwaffe plane which resulted in the capture of the operational plans caused some consternation, no changes were made when a fourth version of the plan was issued on 30 Jan.

At this point the planning for the French campaign began to impinged upon planning for the Norwegian but the latter was firmly conceived of as an economy of force measure and efforts made to ensure it did not impinge on the more important French campaign. Over the first weeks of Feb however there emerged a growing sense that there were greater opportunities to be had from the main operation, where the focus and main striking power would be on the left wing.

Things moved quickly following the Altmark incident and ordering of the German invasion of Norway. For the French operation it meant the production of a fifth version of the plan on 24 Feb taking into account the decision to attempt a strategic action at Sedan and the Meuse and a date set for early May. Four days later the simultaneous landing in Scandinavia occurred, which substantially challenged the rationale of an economy-of-force invasion of Norway.

Three options presented themselves: that the Norwegian campaign is reinforced at the expense of the French, or the French campaign is brought forward and no change made to relative strength, or the status quo is maintained with a wait-and-see attitude. The naval action in the North Sea on 1 Mar complicated the decision making as did the Italo-Romanian agreement. The pressure was enormous and Hitler became increasingly stressed which served to promote the views of those who held to the status quo option. However it was recognised that he might make a sudden decision for an early invasion and the relevant senior military figures began making preparations.

[Croesus]

The basis for French defence planning was that the weight of a German attack would come through Belgium and, following the principle that it was preferable to defend France outside of France, the French response would be to advance into Belgium and meed the German advance along the lines of the Rivers Escaut or Dyle, or the Albert Canal. From the middle of November 1939 it had been decided that the practicable courses of action would be the Escaut and Dyle options, E and D respectively.

The choice between the two would be based on how well the Belgian Army, which was not coordinating its actions with the Supreme War Council (SWC)), held up the German advance. It was initially thought following the Polish campaign that the E Plan would be adopted owing to the expected speed with which the German army would penetrate the Belgian defences. However by mid October it was recognised that advances in Belgian fortification and their fielding of an army of twenty two divisions kept the D Plan option viable.

There were some important advantages to the D Plan. The Dyle position gave a shorter and better defensible line and permitted the incorporation of the relatively substantial Belgian Army into the Anglo-French dispositions. Furthermore the North Sea lines of communication were secured, the Germans would be denied valuable air and submarine bases and the French industrial north better protected. If the Dyle could be reached, so much the better and the French First Army and British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were assigned to the task of reaching the position upon the opening of the expected German offensive.

The First Army of twelve divisions would fill out the thirty-seven km front of the Gembloux Gap between the Dyle and Namur; the BEF of nine divisions would cover the line between the twenty km front Wavre and Louvain and the retreating Belgian Army of twenty-two divisions would take the fifty-five km front between Louvain and Antwerp. Under the French conception of colmatage and counterattack, any German penetration of the line would be sealed off by the reserves immediately available to the positional units and then, if the attack was identified as being the main thrust, the strategic reserve would be employed to counterattack the German penetration.

In the D Plan the strategic reserve was comprised of the French Seventh Army and it was massed around Reims where it could react to a German attack through Belgium, Switzerland or between the Rhine and the Moselle. However of late the French Generalissimo Gamelin had been examining the potential of using the Seventh Army in an effort to advance into Holland. There was concern on the part of the British about the possible fate of the Netherlands in the face of invasion as hitherto the Dutch were essentially to be left to their own devices. This plan would see the Seventh Army advance to Breda in an effort to link up with the Dutch and, strategically, protect their vital industrial and population centres. This would bring ten Dutch divisions into the Anglo-French order of battle and deny use of the Dutch airfields to the Germans.

This plan, the Breda variant, soon came under serious criticism from both French and British quarters. The fundamental French view was that the duty of the French Army was to defend France and not save hapless neutrals that would not even look to their own defence; while it was valid to fight the Germans in Belgium, the Netherlands was another story entirely. It was also pointed out that to save ten Dutch divisions seven French ones were to be committed, which was hardly a commensurate return for such a hazardous operation. Other objections were raised that, owing to the need to be moving immediately on news of German operations, the French strategic reserve would be committed before the main German thrust had become apparent. However Gamelin would not be moved and in the face of such doubts the Breda variant was adopted.

His resolution would be shaken firstly upon the news of the twin invasions of Norway and then by the continuing analysis of troop requirements for land-based operations following up on the prospective British bombing operations against Baku and Batum. It was recognised that the British in Narvik would have to be reinforced and that meant stripping troops from the northwestern front. There was already concern that even with the thirty-two battalions originally identified to move up into the Swedish ore fields there would be insufficient strength to hold the Germans and develop the Swedish/Finnish front, let alone recapture southern Norway. The planners involved in the Caucasus operations were calling for a similar sized force to establish a base of operations in Salonika for what would be a long campaign trail northward and this put a further strain on available resources.

The matter was concluded during an extended SWC meeting on 8 Mar following on from a French Cabinet decision on 3 Mar that called for the next stage in planning for the Caucasus operation to commence. The following day came news of further developments in Norway that suggested that combat operations there were about to intensify. Consequently to this Gamelin suspended the Breda variant and confirmed that the Seventh Army were to concentrate centrally for counterattack operations into the Gembloux Gap and await the discovery of the main German thrust, while the remainder of the French strategic reserve to return to its original positions around Chalons-sur-Marne.

This disposition was approved and all that remained now was to make local preparations and await the inevitable German attack, wherever and whenever that would be.

[Croesus]

The main concern of Sweden in the last days of peace was the avoidance of a Great Power war in the Baltic and the signature of the Russo-German pact went a long way to allaying this concern. Prior to this the extended Anglo-Franco-Russian negotiations and the Russian demands on Finland had placed significant pressures on Swedish neutrality and the sense that Berlin and Moscow would be able to put aside their differences such that war would not break out on Sweden's doorstep was a welcome one. Given the Foreign Ministry analysis that this war would follow the general pattern of the Great War there was an optimistic sense that Sweden would be able to stay out of the hostilities altogether.

The early days of the war saw Stockholm reach trade agreements with both London and Berlin that appeared to satisfy all parties, though it was recognised that Berlin was less pleased and the German mining of the sea inside Swedish territorial waters off Falsterbo was an indication of the German attitude. Stockholm might have taken the opportunity to make a stronger protest than it did if it weren't for the near simultaneous Russian invasion of Finland. Sweden was required in some way to support its northern neighbour and as it was impossible to take on both Great Powers, Germany had to be accommodated especially in light of a report by the Swedish Ambassador in Berlin that Sweden was 'regarded among the leaders of the German Reich as a country unfriendly to Germany'.

The Russian invasion placed the Swedish government in a difficult situation. While it was certainly prepared to go to war to defend Sweden against foreign aggression, it was less willing to embroil itself in a proxy war with the Soviet Union, with whom relations had on the whole been constructive. Consequently Helsinki was immediately informed that Finland should expect no military assistance from Sweden, which would restrict itself to diplomatic support and delivery of war materials. The resignation of the pro-Finnish Foreign Minister in early December, and the lack of protest around the act, was a clear indication that Stockholm would refuse to be drawn into support for its northern neighbour.

As a new government formed there were no parties who advised Sweden taking an active part in the war, although there was a difference of opinion as to how Sweden should aid Finland. There was also a strong sense that Sweden should not declare itself neutral in the Finno-Russian war as that would necessarily constrain the options that Stockholm had for assisting Helsinki in the ways it saw feasible, and an equally strong sense that Sweden should remain strictly neutral in terms of the wider war. The new Prime Minister, Hansson, gave a speech on the formation of government that spelled out to all what Sweden stood for in the current environment: independence, neutrality, cooperation with alliance-free neutrals and Nordic collaboration.

The Soviet invasion shattered any hopes Sweden had of remaining outside the war as its action necessarily prompted the other Great Powers to assess their options in the region. The Anglo-French wanted to exploit the invasion in order to disrupt Germany's iron ore supply and to open a second front; for its part Germany held back but sent clear signals that any Anglo-French intervention would be swiftly met by German counter-measures. Swedish foreign policy thenceforward focused on bringing about a negotiated peace between Finland and Russia as soon as possible before any Anglo-French intervention prompted German involvement; not surprisingly this policy ran counter to that of Helsinki, which was interested in both drawing Sweden into the war and working towards Anglo-French intervention.

As the Winter War developed Swedish efforts proved fairly effective in this regard as Stockholms rigidity and Russian advances gradually broke down Helsinkis desire to continue the fight. On the eve of the British landing in Narvik Stockholm was on the verge of brokering a final deal; while Finnish public opinion remained positive of its long term prospects, there were doubts about the Anglo-French ability to intervene and the position of Stockholm was not encouraging.

Thus it was that the British intervention was an absolute disaster for Swedish foreign policy. The German counter-response was rapid and, even though the Soviet armies were penetrating ever deeper into Finland, Helsinki and the Finnish public were emboldened and refused the admittedly harsh Russian peace terms. Initial British diplomacy explaining the intervention in terms of extending aid to Finland, establishing a war front against Russia and Germany and that the British action was in Swedish interests were rejected by Stockholm. The British intervention was seen as potentially leading to the overthrow of Germany which would fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Baltic, which could hardly be in Swedish interest.

There could be no question of permitting British troops passage across Swedish territory to either aid Finland or interdict Lulea (the main source of iron ore to Germany) and when the Swedish Ambassador asked whether the British would consider Swedish sensibilities on the matter or simply order troops across the border no reply was obtained. Stockholm was now faced with the choice of aiding the Anglo-French by permitting passage or by aiding Germany by refusing it; a terrible choice in the circumstances given the long line of fallen neutrals that the war and its extended overture had delivered.

Up till this point Sweden had increasingly been seen as an obstacle by London and Paris, while increasingly positive views of it were held in Berlin. Thus it was that slowly Stockholm had begun to be indentified with a Berlin-Moscow bias, which was certainly not an ideal circumstance for Sweden. Such an identification was seen as encouraging the more aggressive Churchill-Reynaud governments to move into Sweden given a sense of inevitability that Stockhholm would favour Hitler and Stalin and the widely understood strategic importance of Lulea becoming ice free in April: if the Anglo-French were serious about disrupting the bulk of German iron ore then they would necessarily have to be in place there before the Germans could send a naval expedition themselves.

Berlin had made it perfectly clear that as soon as the British crossed the Swedish border, then Germany would intervene militarily, and in strength. Increasingly there was pressure on the Swedish government to walk an increasingly fine line. Even though the Swedish army had mobilised, rearmament hastened and the economy placed on a war footing, the Swedish general staff was kept out of government. Given the crisis the government of national unity ensured that all parties had to abide by the collective decision and as all party leaders were in the government the net result was a general lack of opposition. This meant that the control over policy by the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister was total for as long as they were able to agree, which prior to the twin invasions was fairly assured. However in such a desperate situation this unity was coming under increasing pressure and cracks were beginning to emerge.

Militarily the twin invasions had shown that Stockholm had greatly underestimated the situation and while Norway was being split Sweden had few forces of any signficant size ready to be deployed; Sweden was essentially defenceless. Fortunately the German seizure of Denmark and the immediate focus on Norway meant that Sweden lay outside the sphere of operations and both warring sides were very keen to see Sweden remain neutral. The pressure from Germany was somewhat more severe and subsequently there was offered no assistance to Norway whatsoever; further to this a very strong message was sent to London that any attempt by the Anglo-French to cross the Norwegian border into Sweden would be fullsomely and violently resisted.

A similar message was despatched to Berlin and soon Ambassadors in the three main capitals reported a similarity of opinion; that Sweden was not seen as acting in accordance with the needs of the hour and that opinions of Stockholm were inexorably worsening. As it became clear that the British were in force in Narvik a request was made to Stockholm to permit the overland reinforcement of German positions in Norway from Sweden. On the heels of this came a more strongly worded British diplomatic approach requesting transit access to help the Finns who had now come out and made a formal request for military assistance.

Things had come to a head and it was hard to see how Sweden could stay out of the war.

[Croesus]

The immediate aftermath of the twin invasions of Norway and the naval action off Bergen was that Germany had both air and naval superiority and controlled the two main political centers of Oslo and Trondheim. Bergen remained in Norwegian hands and the British were in Narvik in some strength but neither position could be considered strong. Sweden was showing no signs of accepting the 'we're here to help Finland' line, Denmark had been overrun and Finland was looking to be in some trouble. Both sides now had to review their strategy, particulary with regard to the crucial question of reinforcements.

For the French the area of importance was Narvik and they pressed hard to ensure that the current beachhead be immediately reinforced. They considered it imperative that the oreline be followed to the Swedish border and that if force was necessary then it should be applied to the Swedes who were viewed as being de facto German allies. The British took a somewhat more moderate view of matters and advised against rash actions against the Swedes, instead suggesting that efforts be made to regain Trondheim; however they agreed that the position in Narvik was very important and that it be held in strength.

Following the first engagement in Narvik with the Norwegians only half of the 1st Battalion Scots Guards were fit for action but without their equipment. Two days after arrival, on 2 Mar, two further battalions, the 1st Battalion Irish Guards and 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers, of the 24th Guards Brigade made landfall. The Hallamshire Battalion of the York and Lancaster Regiment, 146th Brigade (Territorial), that had been en route to Trondheim were diverted to Narvik and arrived on 3 Mar. Of the remaining original invasion troops the 1st/5th Battalion The Royal Leicestershire Regiment and 1st/8th Battalion The Sherwood Foresters were diverted following the action fought off Bergen and after some efforts to ensure safety from the marauding German ships arrived in Narvik on 4 Mar. The 1st/4th Battalion The Royal Lincolnshire Regiment had gone down with the Effingham and half the 1st/4th Battalion The Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry had managed to return safely to port.

The forces available for operations in Scandinavia included two battalions of the French Foreign Legion and a Polish Brigade of four Battalions that had not been stood down following the cancellation of the Finland operation originally planned by the French and these troops were essentially ready to sail. Also available for despatch was the 147th Territorial Brigade of three Battalions, the remaining Battalion of the 148th Brigade and a Light Division of Chasseurs Alpin consisting of six Battalions. Efforts began combing out from other Territorial units ten Independent Companies but these would not be initially ready for deployment.

Any remaining units would come from France and included two more Light Divisions Chasseurs Alpin taken from the Army of the Alps and units still forming up for the North-West front, the British 126th and 15th Brigades and two Battalions of Canadians and there would be some delay before these units became ready. So it was that Narvik was held by six Battalions, and a total of 16 Battalions were available over the course of the next week to ten days to reinforce the town, push up to the Swedish border and make the planned landings at Narvik and Aandalsnes.

Complicating matters was the doubt around the disposition of the Norwegian government given that the Anglo-French action had violated Norwegian neutrality, had exchanged the first shots and were in strength on Norwegian soil. Contact with the Norwegian government and high command was dislocated owing to the German advance northward from Oslo and the general confusion of the situation. It was thought that the larger concentrations of the Norwegian Army were in the north but it was not known how these units would view the British arrival.

It was decided for the moment to err on the side of caution and advise British units on the ground that the previous assessment of light and symbolic Norwegian resistance might be incorrect and that there existed a danger of combat arising from any encounter with Norwegian army units. When contact was restored on 5 Mar this view was largely confirmed as the Norwegians were very cold towards the British and rejected out of hand a British suggestion that Norway place its forces under British command in an effort to coordinate activity.

The proposed action against Trondheim took two forms: a direct landing in the city itself and two landings to the north and south of the city at Namsos and Aandalsnes. Initially it was thought feasible to undertake the former but gradually there emerged a more cautious view and it was decided eventually that any operations against the German positions should focus on the latter.

Leading the view that a smaller operation was best was the Royal Navy which, following the damaging of the Aurora and Penelope and sinking of the Repulse and Effingham, was very mindful of concerns how any further deterioration in the stock of capital ships would affect future Mediterranean strategy, notwithstanding the necessity of answering the German victory off Bergen with one of their own. They were already gathering the Home Fleet and bringing the capital ships Renown, Valiant and Warspite together with the carriers Glorious and Furious and did not want to be drawn into costly assaults.

It was planned for the French Chasseurs Alpin to land at Namsos and the British 15th and 147th Brigades to land at Aandalsnes. The siege of Trondheim was expected to last for a month and air support provided by the carrier Ark Royal, as well as one of either the Glorious or Furious depending on how operations against the German fleet eventuated. It was planned to reinforce the French with the Foreign Legion and Polish troops and the British with the Canadians while the remainder of the reinforcing troops to be sent to Narvik.

[Croesus]

Following many hours of reflection, it was in the early hours of 6 Mar that Hitler was able to summarise the vast array of foreign policy detail that had come to dominate his life since the Polish campaign.

He, like most of Europe, knew to a basic degree of the Anglo-French plans to open up some sort of bombing campaign in the Caucasus. He knew this would lead to open hostilities between the western powers and the Soviet Union. He also knew that the Caucasus campaign was conditional on a German invasion in the west: if Germany attacked France, then the Anglo-French would not attack Russia.

He had no sense as to the timing of the Anglo-French operations, nor the attitude of Turkey, nor the planning around the involvement of Romania, and therefore also Italy. The Caucasus operation was however linked with attempts by the Anglo-French to intervene in the Russo-Finnish war, or rather interdict the flow of Swedish iron ore which was clearly the main object as, apart from reasons of public sentiment, what care did London and Paris really have for Helsinki?

He knew that when Lulea became ice free the Anglo-French would become increasingly nervous about their chances of intervening before Germany did. He calculated that the Swedish would fight to prevent the Anglo-French from crossing the border as Stockholm knew quite well that the German reaction would be sudden and violent. He recognised also that the Swedish forces in the north were few and that, because of the neutrality protocols, it would be unlikely that the Norwegian forces in the region would liaise effectively with the Swedish.

Germany had gained from the perception that it was simply matching the Anglo-French by countering their move into Norway, and that any move on Sweden would also work towards rehabilitating in some way the opinion Europe had of Germany. Therefore the crossing of the Swedish border by the Anglo-French was a good thing as it would enable him to intervene with a white hat, to control directly the Swedish iron ore and probably bring Sweden into the war.

However, such an eventuality would become a drain on German preparations for Case Yellow and the despatch of some ten divisions or so would greatly constrain the ability of the German armies to meet and destroy the Anglo-French in the field, let alone cut their forces off from the French interior and reach the sea. Scandinavia did not seem to be a substitute for France in that he did not imagine any situation where the French would so denude their own homeland such that the German forces could inflict the desired decisive defeat.

It was also dangerous for war to escalate in the region as it would necessarily serve to cause Russia to renew its previous policy of absorbing Finland wholly rather than the present one of enforced border revision. An increased Soviet presence in Scandinavia and the Baltic would not be helpful to German interests; it would also serve indirectly to promote Italian influence into the Danube-Balkans as he did not expect Russia to be able to fight on two fronts at this time.

Then again, if the Caucasus operations went ahead as well as the Swedish intervention then there arose the possibility that the Anglo-French would sufficiently weaken their center to balance off any loss of German strength to Sweden such that the original premise of Case Yellow could be realised. As the Caucasus was conditional on Case Yellow, and the Lulea operations conditional on the Swedish intervention, it seemed to him that instead of the original plan of forcing the decision in the west as soon as possible that Germany could pass over to the strategic defensive, claim that Western response to the Polish campaign was all out of proportion (as, in an effort to redeem Poland they violate the neutrality of Norway and Sweden, and force Turkey into the hostilities) and await events.

He sensed a distinct lack of appetite on the part of the French to open an offensive centrally and knew that their planning was conditional on Germany being the aggressor; whats more the French public in particular were becoming fretful at this drole de guerre. What if he could manage affairs such that Germany held in the centre, transferred the weight of responsibility for fighting the western powers to Russia and then attacked under cover of a negotiated peace sponsored by his erstwhile ally and inveterate schemer Mussolini? He would thereby destroy the credibility of Italy and likely bring it into the war on his side, bleed the strength of both the Western Powers and the Soviet Union and still conquer France.

So it came down whether or note he attacks France sooner or later. An intriguing question and one that he would spend further time on as the next few days passed.

[Croesus]

The announcement of the Italo-Romanian non aggression pact provided for joint staff talks between the two countries and these soon commenced in Bucharest. One of the first orders of business from the talks was the request from Romania for Italian help in transforming the structure and organisation of the Romanian Army, which was duly accepted. What was not noted was the fact that Italian officers had been in Romania since the middle of January and that much of the preparatory work had already been completed. In fact within a matter of weeks reformed divisions organised on the Italian model began exercising in Bukovina under Italian supervision.

Parallel to this reorganisation was a rearming process that saw a partial modernisation program established, mainly in terms of tanks, artillery and aircraft. These assets were purchased as part of an arms agreement that saw Romania pay partly in cash and partly in oil concessions and so created further leakage in the British blockade. Training cadres were despatched from the 8th Pasubio and 9th Piave Infantry Divisions, two of the more battle-tested divisions in the Regio Esercito with campaign banners from Abyssinia and Croatia. Attached to these cadres were smaller detachments covering matters of supply, air-ground coordination and communications.

By March the four new divisions, the 19th Messina, 20th Venezia, 21st Friuli and 22nd Granatieri di Sardegna, had been established. While the nominal naming of divisions based on geographical catchments was the official policy in reality this had broken down such that naming conventions were largely meaningless. The four new divisions were hardly first-rate. They were ordinary infantry divisions and had not been issued a full-scale of equipment as the pre-war divisions were still being brought up to capacity, replacements for equipment lost in Yugoslavia were taken in and exports to Romania all placed a strain on internal production schedules.

They were also populated by a wide range of recruits with a collection of reservists, young men enamoured with the glories of the Vittoria Iugoslavia and various Slovenes, Croats, Albanians and Montegrins from the Protected Territories (Territori Protetti), as the former Yugoslav states were now termed. It was not seen as being desireable to have these divisions in place in the Territori Protetti and so they were redistributed between the other commands. This contributed to a large scale re-deployment of Italian divisions as Italy responded to the changing political environment.

The semi-motorised 'Libyan' Infantry Divisions 15th Sibelle and 16th Pescatori were transferred from Fifth Army (Libya) to Second Army (Albania/Montenegro) and the 19th Messina and 20th Venezia replacing them. This greatly reduced the ability of Fifth Army to fight the war of movement that hostilities in Libya/Tunisia/Egypt would require and was indicative of the general reduction in tension in the area.

The 3rd Infantry Division Ravenna and 1st Infantry Division Superga were withdrawn from First Army (Valle D'Aosta) and Fourth Army (Piedmont) respectively to Eighth Army (Croatia), with the Superga 'attached' to the reforming Serbian Republican Army in Belgrade. The Regio Esercito now consisted of ten Infantry Divisions, four Autotransportable Infantry Divisions, two semi-motorised Infantry Divisions, six Mountain Infantry Divisions, three Armoured Divisions and four Alpine Divisions. Of these four were concentrated on the French border, four in Libya and four in Italy. This left 17 divisions, the vast bulk of the Italian armed forces spread between Slovenia in the west to Albania and Montenegro in the east.

There were still problems in supplying these forces although the issues around non-commissioned officers were beginning to subside and the deficiency in light AA guns were being made up. Transport was still difficult with even the Autotransportable Divisions fielding a wide array of civilian and military trucks and the supply of tanks to the three armoured divisions was proceeding at a snails pace. The air-ground radio problem had been solved but the supply of sets was poor and difficulties were being encountered about their effectiveness; however there was an increasing emphasis being placed on this issue and it was hoped that sufficient sets would be available by the end of the year.

Following the Vittoria Iugoslavia staff talks had also been taking place with the Hungarians and there were some promising developments stemming from this, principally around issues of fighting cooperatively against a theoretical invasion from the north, as well as a small section studying issues around pushing operations to the east. Finally lines of communication had been secured from Albania up to the Romanian border and the sight of Italian military engineers became commonplace throughout Albania and Montenegro.

[Croesus]

Following the collapse of the Anglo-Franco-Italian talks in November had quickly been overshadowed by other events. However there remained as a direct consequence of the talks formal contact between representatives of the French and Italian intelligence services, the 2e Bureau and the SIM respectively. There was initially no diplomatic representation in the liaison which had developed largely in response to a chance conversation at a higher level as to the practicalities involved in preventing German and/or Soviet intelligence obtaining details of the talks then in progress.

Once the talks were broken off the negotiation apparatus was dismantled and all concerned went their seperate ways, except the two intelligence attaches. Once it became clear to Reynaud and Mussolini that they had a covert and active link they quickly moved to ensure that it was formally closed off, but informally continued.

It was this conduit that had contributed to the March redeployment of second-rate Italian troops into Libya, which had surprised some observers. Over the five months of its existence the liaison had slowly grown to include political trustys of Reynaud and Mussolini and had contributed towards both the French confidence about despatching forces to Norway, which were taken from the Army of the Alps, and the Italian confidence about despatching forces into Albania/Montenegro and Romania, which were taken from Libya.

The liaison also helped soothe British concerns about the implications of reducing the scale of the Mediterranean fleet as the Admiralty prepared to return to the offensive in the North Sea. Equally important was its use as a means by which France tested Italian attitudes and expectations around the proposed Caucasus operations.

At the time of the March redeployment the liaison first began talking in terms of formal political arrangements. While there was initially a great deal of difference about how such an arrangement should look like and what sort of concessions would be involved, the parties involved were confident that their work over the last five months had set a positive framework.

At any rate it was understood that if the wider sensibilities of the British and Germans could not be safely provided for then at least neither France nor Italy would find themselves in a position whereby they would find themselves escalating irresistably and uncontrollably into direct confrontation with each other. Finally the liaising parties were instructed to be ready to work through any political or military matters that might arise from the visit to Europe by the US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and the as yet unannounced meeting between Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass.

[Croesus]

There were two different threads to the Anglo-French strategy in Scandinavia. The British were concerned about the longer term implications of their having violated the neutrality of Norway in order to protect Norway while the French were interested in means of drawing Germany away from France. As the Anglo-French relationship developed and it became clear that it would be France that would do most of the fighting on land, it became equally clear that in matters of land strategy it would be the French that would do the talking and the British the listening. In some ways this suited the British approach to the war and so it was that the Scandinavian campaign became increasingly a French affair.

Following the British landing and German counter-invasion of 28 Feb, and the Battle of the Bergen Leads on 2 Mar, the next Anglo-French move was an attempt to regain Trondheim by landings in Namsos and Andalsnes. The German strategy in contrast was to avoid escalation and avoid increasing commitment into the theatre. Control of the air and temporary control of the seas permitted the Germans to reinforce the Trondheim garrison and within a matter of weeks the Anglo-French abandoned their beachheads in central Norway and concentrated solely on northern Norway, Narvik and the Swedish border. The Germans sought economy of force measures and made a series of small seaborne hops up the coast without bringing the Anglo-French into battle.

Holding Narvik meant controlling the rail link into Sweden and that meant sending troops to the border; these troops were French chasseurs, with the British units enlarging the Narvik base and pushing south to meet the slow movements of the Germans north. As the French were on the border and the French dominated the strategy, and as they were strongest in their desire to help the Finns and dominate the Swedish ore fields it was entirely unexpected that their forces crossed into Sweden on 8 Mar. The Swedish army was very thin on the ground in the area, with only two battalions in place holding positions in depth. While they maintained patrol contact they did not prevent the continued progress of the French up the rail line.

The remaining Norwegian redoubt of Bergen, which the British had sought to reinforce in vain, fell to the Germans on 18 Mar, and ensured the final extinguishment of Norwegian sovereignty as the two sides now held the entire country. The same day saw a decisive breakthrough by the Soviets in the Karelian isthmus and the Finnish defensive positions fundamentally breached. 18 Mar was the turning point of the Scandinavian campaign.

The French advance into Sweden was slow in the face of uncertain politics, bad weather and awful terrain and it was only on 29 Mar that they reached Kiruna. Following a reorganisation period the French soldiers, undergoing considerable privations clashed with Swedish patrols on 4 Apr, leading to casualties on both sides and a temporary withdrawal by the French troops. Two days later the Germans escalated the conflict by conducting a parachute assault onto the Baltic port of Lulea, thus ensuring the bulk of their iron ore supplies. The protestations from Stockholm to Paris were repeated to Berlin, with similar results, though at least the Germans promised not to push to meet the French following news of the Swedish resistance.

The German action prompted an immediate, if controlled, sabotage of the Swedish hydro-electric power stations that brought the delivery of iron ore to a temporary halt. This was the Swedish response that Berlin had to respect the most, but it was telling that the sabotage wasn't widespread nor decisive in terms of future supply. The Swedish sabotage was followed on by what was a major setback by the Finns and it now became clear that they had lost their Winter War.

The next stage of the conflict occurred on 21 Apr where the French had pushed forward once more and took Gallivare, a strategic seizure. Their forward movement could not be ignored by the Germans who sent a kampfgruppe northwards to contain any further French penetration. The Swedish forces held back entirely, although gathered strength by the week. On 2 May the French and Germans met at the Ostersund and Boden crossroad, but each was sufficiently weary or cautious to prevent a large scale battle from developing. By 9 May German bombing was beginning to make life in Narvik increasingly difficult and the British response was to invest even more heavily into ensuring the long-term viability of the port, which was itself a challenging prospect.

The Finns finally made terms with the Russians on 14 May which signalled the withdrawal of Sweden by the French by 30 May. The Battle of Scandinavia was over but by then the attention of the Anglo-French was on the Battle of the Meuse where the Germans were just being held following the opening of the long anticipated western campaign on 10 May.

[Croesus]

The weight of the German plan was on the less-favored right flank of the Anglo-Franco-Belgian line which, while increasingly anchored by the Maginot Line , did not have sufficient first grade troops to conduct what they thought would provide a successful defense of the Meuse.

The Belgian retreat from 11 May shaped the advance of Blanchards First Army which had begun taking up positions only after Prioux was forced from the field at Hannut and whose subsequent retreat in turn caused the retreat of Blanchard on 16 May.

Giraud's Seventh Army was based on Reims and on 12 may begins moving in two directions, on Montherme against Reinhardt, and on Sedan against Guderian. Concurrent to this advance is the arrival of French Army reserve units, 3 DCR and 3 Mot Div at Sedan on the afternoon 13 May. Their arrival coincided somewhat unfortunately with Guderians assault, as 3 Mot Div drove into a German predicted fire pattern covering the Grossdeutschland assault.

55 Inf Div could not hold the line in the face of the German assault but at least retained their positions in part. 71 Inf Div however loses full coherence and breaks apart, its retreat disrupting the arrival of 3 DCR, most of which ended up near the Marfee Heights, but some manage to find 3 Mot Div that took up makeshift positions in Cheveuges. 3 North African had managed to hold largely in place. By evening confused fighting developed and neither side could claim Sedan but for the moment the German assault is held.

The following day Reinhardt's attack at Montherme had been held fairly well by 42 Inf Div, and the reinforcing 43 Inf Div had proved sufficient to hold the Germans in place. Further north at Dinant Hoth took Givet and widened the German bridgehead. 1 DCR arrived to counterattack and retakes the town. Rommel breaks off and advances down the Phillipeville road. At this time 4 North African Div arrives and makes its presence felt. By nightfall the strategic village of Anhaye is held by Hoth but he is pressed from both north and south.

14 May also saw the failure of the counterattack by 3 DCR at Sedan which did some value at least in disrupting Guderians reinforcement of the bridgehead in time for the arrival of the last of strategic reserve in the area, 3 DCR and 1 North African Div. Another French infantry division marching in on foot, 53 Inf Div, also arrives to assist in the reduction of Hoth at Montheume.

On the whole, after two days fighting, the German offensive was partially successful; it had made serious lodgements in Sedan and Dinant with useful pressure at Montherme, but had failed in obtaining an immediate breakthrough.

[Croesus]

The German invasion prevented the dismissal of General Gamelin at the hands of Reynaud who had determined that, following the Norwegian debacle, France was not well served by the subtle but aging generalissimo. Gamelin was therefore able to return to his command post at Vincennes on the edge of Paris and commence command of what might well prove to be the greatest feat of arms in French history.

His command of events was quite unique; he felt that, if he were in his subordinate General Georges’ (commander of the north-west front) place, he would feel humiliated and threatened to find Gamelin arrive to direct the fighting. Further to this Vincennes was not served by radio, there was no teletype, the military telephone network was as poor as the civilian and telegrams took a hazardous trip by motorcycle and more than a few despatch riders would be found dead in ditches.

In order to maintain whatever contact with Georges that he felt acceptable Gamelin would drive the 35 miles to the formers command post in La Ferte-sous-Joarre, or the 45 miles to Georges residence, a trip that took an hour each way on the cluttered and confused roads. As events unfolded the time elapsed between orders issued by Gamelin or Georges and its receipt at the front would generally take 48 hours.

This in the era of blitzkrieg was hardly encouraging. Complicating matters further was the position of the GQG staff headquarters at Montry, halfway between Vincennes and Ferte with the chief-of-staff General Doumenc splitting his time between Gamelin and his own staff, if the latter weren’t already split between the two other command posts.

In spite of all this Gamelin was feeling confident, if not complacent. He had every confidence that the French Army could handle the German and every confidence in his plan of meeting the German thrust on the Dyle. The earlier decision to abandon the Breda variant in favour of maintaining Giraud and his Seventh Army as strategic reserve was confirmed when the Dutch withdrew into Fortress Holland on the second day of battle and henceforth played little part in the wider conflict.

This sense of relief was tempered somewhat by the baffling behaviour of the Belgians who held up units of the BEF, withdrew too fast in the south and who had managed to lose Eben Emael, supposedly the strongest fortification in the world.

On the plus side Prioux and his Cavalry Corps of 2 and 3 DLM had made a fine showing in the Gembloux Gap and managed to halt the advance of Hoepners’ XVI Corps in spite of the startling lack of Belgian defensive positions that were meant to be in place. The Germans retained the field and hence their tanks, but Prioux had given a sufficiently strong account of himself to give Gamelin cause for continued optimism.

Given that Gamelin conceived of the German main thrust coming through this area this tactical victory was seen as a favourable portent of the battle to come. When news of the German lodgement on the Meuse came he considered it a diversionary move and, while permitting the use of local and Army reserves to commence the colmatage, ordered Giraud’s movement towards Montherme and Sedan to halt.

[Croesus]

At dawn on Friday May 10 General Georges, CinC North-West Front telephoned his subordinate General Bilotte to move the French Army Group One into Belgium in reaction to the German opening moves. Soon after Generalissimo Gamelin telephoned Georges and shared the following momentous conversation;
‘Well, General, is it the Dyle operation’ asked Georges.
‘Since the Belgians are calling on us, do you see what else we can do?’ replied Gamelin.
‘Obviously not’ responded Georges.
And with that the Battles of the Dyle and Meuse commenced.

The French plan was to move headlong into Belgium and take up positions along the line Antwerp-Louvain-Wavre-Namur, along a substantial stretch of the River Dyle. This plan presented many advantages: it would keep Germans distant from airfields that might threaten England and kept the Channel Ports safe, it also kept the Germans away from the industrial centres of France; it shortened the front by 35 miles and potentially added up to 20 Belgian divisions to the Anglo-French total. There were difficulties such as the perils of a meeting engagement with the Germans and the troubles involved in integrating the Belgian forces. But the credits outweighed the debits and the Dyle Plan was the only plan.

The Anglo-French line was organised such as to wheel upon the hinge of Sedan and the disposition of units, taking into account the expectation that the ultimate contest would occur in or around the Gembloux Gap, recognised that the further units would have the farthest to travel. The extreme left flank, the Channel Coast, was covered by the independent XVI Corps (Fagalde), detached from Giraud’s Seventh Army, and consisted of the 9th Motorised Infantry Div (Active), the 21st Infantry Division (Active) and the 4th Infantry Division (A). [Note that Active divisions were the best available, A and North African divisions the next best while B divisions and Fortress divisions the least capable].

Fagalde’s right flank was anchored by the BEF (Gort) that disposed of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 42nd, 44th, 48th & 50th divisions in three corps. The British section extended from around Steenvorde in the west to Orchies in the east and was to take up position along the Dyle Line between Louvain and Wavre. Gort’s right flank was held by Blanchard’s First Army, the most numerous and best equipped of the French forces, consisting of the Cavalry Corps under Prioux (2nd and 3rd DLM, the French analogue of the Panzer Division), de la Laurencies’ III Corps (1st Moroccan Infantry Division, 1st Mot Inf Act and 2nd North African Infantry Division), Aymes’ IV Corp (14th Mot Inf Act & 32nd Inf A) and Altmayers’ V Corps (5th Nth Afr Inf, 12th Mot Inf Act & 101st Fortress Infantry Division). Blanchard’s role was to fill out the area between Wavre and the River Sambre.

Blanchard’s right flank was covered by Corap’s Ninth Army, which had the longest frontage of the French line moving forward. It consisted of a Cavalry Corps (1st and 4th Light Cavalry Divisions) that was pushed into the Ardennes upon commencement of hostilities, Bouffets’ II Corps (5th Mot Inf Act), Martin’s XI Corp (18th and 22nd Inf Div A) and Libaud’s XLI Corps (61st Infantry Division B and 102nd Fort Inf). Corap covered of Namur to just west of Sedan and included the best tank country of the Meuse sector.

Corap’s right flank was fixed by Huntziger’s Second Army, the poorest of the French armies and the one that was the hinge upon which the entire movement was based. It consisted of a Cavalry Corps (2nd and 5th Light Cavalry) that was also ordered into the Ardennes, Grandsard’s X Corps (3rd Nth Afr, 55th Inf B, 71st Inf B) and Doyen’s XVIII Corps (1st Colonial Infantry Division and 41st Inf A). Corap’s right flank was held by Conde’s Third Army, from which extended the Maginot Line.

Giraud's Seventh Army, less Fagalde's Corps, was held at Phillipeville such that it could retain it's strategic reserve role. It consisted of two B Infantry divisions (60th and 68th) held directly and Sciards I Corps (1st DLM and 25th Mot Inf Act). Since the cancellation of the Breda Variant, Girauds role was to provide the counterattack to the colmatage of other Corps in the event of the main German thrust being identified. Further reserves existed around Chalons-Reims, consisting of 1st, 2nd and 3rd DCR and the 1st and 4th Nth Afr Inf.

This then was how the Anglo-French sought to hold the German advance; to advance into Belgium on a hinge at Sedan. The Germans for their part sought to draw the Anglo-French into Belgium and attack the hinge at Sedan.

[Croesus]

The two extreme flank positions, Fagalde in Belgium and Doyen at Montmedy played no part in the momentous events of May 10 – 14. From the left the BEF reached their positions on the evening of May 12 and contacting Reichenau’s 6 Army at both Louvain and Wavre. A small breakthrough near Wavre was contained and repulsed while the 3rd Division (Montgomery) cleared the Louvain rail yards following their infiltration by two divisions of the German XI Corps.

The First Army Cavalry Corps under Prioux reached the Gembloux Gap on the evening of May 10 and held up the advance of 3 and 4 Pz under Hoepner, along the line of Firlemont-Hannut-Huy from May 12 with the culmination of battle on May 13 whereupon he withdrew. Blanchard’s’ main body had reached its positions by the evening of May 12. All was going well so far along the Dyle position.

The Ninth Army Cavalry Corps did not fare so well as they moved into the Ardennes on May 10. While they did not engage the enemy they retreated back behind the Meuse on May 12, in response to the retreat by the Second Army Cavalry Corps that had run straight into 10, 1 and 2 Pz Div on the evening of May 10 and morning of May 11. Both Cavalry Corps were back behind the Meuse by May 12.

Only one division of those moving forward from Corap’s Second Army, 5th Mot Inf Act at Namur, was fully in place by the time the first German units arrived at the Meuse. Of the other two, 18th Inf A had only half of its battalions in place by evening of May 12 with the remainder arriving on May 13, while 22nd Inf A had five battalions in position on the morning of May 13, but without their AT Guns. Corap’s other two divisions were not required to move and already in place, though in the case of the 102nd Fort Inf there was no transport for movement, nor artillery, with the majority of the division made up of static machine gun battalions.

At Sedan, the focal point of both campaigns, the French had in Grandsard’s X Corps the weakest concentration of force. From the morning of May 13 extremely heavy air and artillery fire pounded the positions of 55th Inf B. By the afternoon two German assault crossings had taken crucial positions at the heights of the Bois de la Marfee and Croix Piot. By the evening the German bridgehead was five miles deep and three miles wide and the 55th collapsed. The 71st Inf B had been in reserve 40 miles behind the front and had reached their positions to the right of 55th Inf B on the evening of May 12. They managed to hold up the attack of 10 Pz and denied the Germans the heights of Noyers. However the collapse of the 55th led to their retreat and, in turn, disintegration on the morning of May 14. Two French divisions had been driven from the field.

Upstream further German attacks went in on May 13. The sector of 18th Inf A was breached at Houx by elements of 7 Pz and the high ground taken. A local counterattack was called off and the Germans rapidly began to reinforce their position, command being taken by their dashing General Rommel at the secondary crossing point at Bouvignes. By noon 13 the German pocket was three miles wide and two miles deep. Another counterattack by 18th Inf A was successful on the evening of May 13, but the infantry did not accompany the tanks and gains could not be held. The Germans continued to reinforce and the 18th began to waver.

To the right of the 18th Inf A, 22nd Inf A became engaged by an assault crossing of the German 32 Inf Div at Givet on May 14 and the French began to withdraw. Also engaged in the same general movement was the 102nd Fort Inf which managed to hold in the face of pressure by Reinhardt’s XLI Corps and at the least succeeded in keeping the Germans on the far bank. Where matters were going well on the Dyle, they were not on the Meuse.

It was at this point, this crucial time, that the benefit of not committing to the Breda Variant was felt. Giraud’s Seventh Army was close at hand to the hard pressed 18th Inf A and its I Corps under Sciard was despatched, arriving at the northern end of the German pocket at Dinant by noon of May 13. The Germans, only just bringing their tanks across, were unable to prevent the overrunning of the northern end of the pocket by the tanks of 1st DLM, having only recently beaten off counterattacks launched, albeit shakily, by 5th Mot Inf Div from Namur. On the following morning of May 14, supported by the arrival of 4th Nth Afr, Sciard rolled up the remainder of the German pocket even as their tanks were coming across. The brave General Rommel was taken prisoner, gravely wounded.

Equally in strife, the 22nd Inf A was beginning to fold as German reinforcements sought to follow up on their success at Givet, and had begun to collapse upon the arrival of 1st Nth Afr and 1st DCR. The North African Infantry managed to hold the German pressure and it was the arrival of the ‘infantry tanks’ of the DCR on May 14 that finally and completely sealed off the German bridgehead on the lower Meuse. No counterattacks were forthcoming of course as that was not within the French capacity, but for the moment the threat of a German breakout was relieved.

At Sedan, where two French divisions had been destroyed, coincidence decided the day. Following the loss of Grandsard’s Corps, Huntziger transferred sector responsibility to Flavigny’s XXI Corps on May 14, consisting of the reserve units of 3rd DCR, the 3rd Mot Inf Act and the 43rd Inf Act. Flavigny was unable to launch his planned counterattack as the DCR had arrived out of fuel and it was only at 4.00PM that he was able to marshal his forces. He had doubts, and they were serious, and if he had not had the benefit of a third division it is likely he would not have gone through with the attack. But he did and his units, hitherto unknown to the Germans, commenced their attack half an hour after Guderian commenced the westward wheel that would put the Manstein Plan into action. Guderian had argued with Von Kleist about the vulnerability of the southern flank this would expose to the French and had eventually got his way. At this point the German pocket was 10 miles deep on a front of 15 miles and it was at this point, when the panzers were aiming for the interior that the three French divisions struck the vulnerable German flank and following a burst of heavy if unequal fighting completely dislocated the German movement and Guderian found himself cut off from his lines of supply.

The first attempt at breakthrough had failed. Losses on both sides were severe, more so for the French. But the colmatage was beginning to take hold and two prime exponents of panzer warfare were absent from the chain of command.

[Croesus]

Rome was not, like the rest of the world, looking west from May 10 when Germany and France finally took up direct arms against the other. The unofficial liaison established between the 2e Bureau and SIM had given Mussolini cause for encouragement with respect to fears of Anglo-French intervention in another peripheral front, that is the Mediterranean, as they had done in Norway and planned to do in the Caucasus. His gamble in moving the semi-motorised 'Libyan' Infantry Divisions 15th Sibelle and 16th Pescatori from Fifth Army (Libya) to Second Army (Albania/Montenegro) and the 3rd Infantry Division Ravenna and 1st Infantry Division Superga from First Army (Valle D'Aosta) and Fourth Army (Piedmont) respectively to Eighth Army (Croatia) seems to have paid off as all three of the North African powers found it worthwhile to look over their shoulders and concentrate on other matters.

There were still concerns regarding what Ciano saw as warmongering elements in the Admiralty and their interests in seeing a weaker Italy in the Mediterranean, and these concerns were reinforced by the accession of the ‘naval’ Churchill to Downing Street on the eve of the German attack. However, as the Germans attacked it was considered that he would have other matters to deal with rather than giving thought to placing pressure on Italy. Diplomatic advances with regards to the blockade were rebuffed but it was noted that the blockade, hardly watertight at even its most rigorous, seemed to slacken off over time and it was hoped that the Franco-Italian rapprochement contributed to this.

The visit by US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles had gone well, with the American given substantial cause to believe that Italy stood for peace and would continue to do so; but also sending the signal that the arbiter of peace in Europe was Hitler and that, clearly given the disparity of strength between Germany and Italy, there was not much that Rome could accomplish if Berlin did not want to contribute. And the recent events on the Dyle and Meuse only supported this position. Italy was, like all Europe, a tragic hostage to Anglo-Franco-German fortune, and such a shame it was that innocent Italians were suffering as a result. The meeting with Hitler at the Brenner Pass had also gone well. Hitler had rambled and Mussolini listened and the Fuhrer had left congratulating himself on the results of the harangue, while the Duce had managed to avoid any further commitments, moral or material, to the German war effort. Italy was slowly pulling away from Germany and Hitler, intoxicated with war and focused on the developments in France, was too drunk to notice.

Rome was not, like the rest of the world, looking west; it was looking east. There were two threads to this. The first was as a natural extension to Italian foreign policy. First the Vittoria Iugoslavia and then the treaty and staff talks with Romania, both following on from the resumption of the non-aggression pact with Greece and the new working relationship with Hungary. Italy was looking to expand economically, militarily and politically along its horizontal axis and was making a fairly good fist of things. Eastern and Southern Europe had reacted poorly to announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and in Italy they saw a means of preventing the expansion of Bolshevism into the region. Italy knew this and capitalised upon it.

The second thread was the Anglo-French determination to bomb Baku and Batum, and by extension, bring Turkey into the war on their side. Operations had been scheduled for the beginning of June and naval, air and ground assets were being gathered at the same time as increasing pressure being placed upon Istanbul (of course in the event of Turkish obduracy, the operation would proceed regardless). It was only the commencement of hostilities in France that cast a shadow on the operation, although it was not cancelled, a fact soon appreciated by SIM. The Black Sea was becoming increasingly politicised and it seemed only a matter of time before it was either drawn into the Anglo-Franco-German conflict, or became imperilled by the growing threat of an Italo-Soviet one.

The most significant outcome of the Anglo-French planning for the bombing of the Baku and Batum was in fact the alerting of Moscow to the threat to its interests in the area and the associated provision of more generous peace terms to Finland. The idea in Paris had been to help the Finns and their planning had achieved this; but not by dealing Russia a blow, rather by giving Russia an incentive to make peace. Upon the conclusion of the Finno-Russian war large sections of the Red Army began relocating to the wider Black Sea region, and at the same time as joint Italo-Romanian exercises began to increase in tempo.

[Croesus]

Hopefully we can see a map...

[Croesus]

Soon after the German attack on France an exclusive and high-level conference took place at the remote hotel on Campo Imperatore, Gran Sasso d’Italia. Attending were Guarnieri, of late the Minister for Exchange and Currency and now Mussolini’s personal advisor on economic and fiscal matters, Marshall Cavallero, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and hence de facto representative of the King, Ciano, as Foreign Minister but as importantly Mussolini’s right hand man, and of course the Duce himself.

Notable by their absence were any prominent Fascist dignitaries, as sure a signal as any that the mood in Rome was changing and Mussolini was well on his way to establishing a government by cult of personality. The agenda in the empty hotel guarded by Libyan paratroopers, overseen by SIM agents and maintained by Mussolini’s personal staff, was the prosecution of Italian foreign and military policy over the foreseeable future.

First to speak was Guarnieri. The Italian economy was transitioning to a war footing but it was taking time and the significant challenges it faced were proving in parts too much for its industrial base to withstand without experiencing difficulty and delay. The energy situation was easing; the uninterrupted flow of Libyan oil together with the slow take up of natural gas fired furnaces had gone some way to mitigating the effects of the now shakily enforced British blockade of German brown coal.

The supply of Mosul oil, previously interrupted, looked liable to resume following the subtle changes of British policy as evidenced by encouraging reports by Italian negotiators, and also encouraged by French industrial interests. The industrial base remained small but some contracts had been taken up by Croatian industry and construction and conversion of Italian plant was proceeding, albeit slowly. The foreign exchange situation was improving as exports otherwise taken up by Germany were re-routed through Italian ports and an additional foreign currency source had stemmed from the recent links established with Romania. Italy remained an agricultural economy, but it was changing and at a reasonably manageable rate.

Cavallero followed. The Regio Esercito now could field 22 infantry divisions, three armoured divisions and four alpine divisions. Its artillery was strong and its tank force reasonable. Its morale was good and recruitment rates increasing, supplemented by taking up portions of the ex-Yugoslav army that were not able to find places in the new Slovenian and Croatian armies. In the eight months since the Yugoslav war efforts were being made to further increase the army’s efficiency and cadre, but it was slow going. Certainly there could be no thought of opening a second front, especially if the recent reports of Soviet redeployment from Finland were correct.

In fact there were signs of growing Serbian-Croat tension that might undermine the Italian position, and there was always the issue of the region undergoing further trauma from unresolved Greco-Bulgarian issues. The Regia Aeronautica and Regia Marina were both undergoing refit programs with the former taking into account lessons learned in Yugoslavia as well as some of the lessons from Poland, Norway and, now, Belgium. The RM was still not capable of safely taking on the Royal Navy, though recent political developments had helped matters somewhat, especially the evacuation of the main British base from Malta to Alexandria. The RA for its part was busy establishing new bases or taking over Yugoslav ones and was as yet still only partly modernised.

Ciano concluded. Germany was sorely tested by the Vittoria Iugoslavia and were it not for Hitler’s wandering eye, he was sure Italy would be dealing with some sort of consequence over its ‘presumption’ into an area that Berlin has specifically identified as an economic hinterland. However, busy as Berlin now was in the west, it could be expected that other events would overshadow the Italian conquest and help to make it a fait accompli. The Anglo-French clearly do not want Italian belligerence and there is some strength to the thought that the French in particular would be willing to make a significant investment to secure Italian friendship.

Fortunately the British blockade is preventing matters from having to be confronted sooner than preferred but there is a sense that London will drop, or at least mitigate, the blockade at which time Italy would have to make its position clear. Relations with Russia could go both ways; there could be war if Moscow choses to push into Romania and Italy becomes entangled, or there could entail some sort of division of spoils or uneasy peace as each meets the others. The smaller nations such as Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Hungary have differing relations with Rome, with Hungary being the strongest partner, but in no way is Italy in a particularly vulnerable political situation.

Mussolini listened and liked what he heard. His lengthy pronouncement indicated where he thought things should now go and he hoped the others would see to it that his wishes were enacted. Following further discussion the conference broke up, each of the three main forces within Mussolinian Italy now cognisant of Italian direction and their respective roles.

[Croesus]

At the end of the fourth day of fighting along the Dyle/Meuse the honours had been more or less shared between the two sides. The Germans had attacked along the length of the line from Louvain to Sedan and the Anglo-French had held them. Gort’s BEF had held Louvain to Wavre, Blanchard’s First Army had held the Gembloux Gap, Corap’s Ninth Army had held Namur to Mezieres and Huntziger’s Second Army had contained the initial German bridgehead at Sedan. Gamelin felt that his confidence in the Dyle Plan in particular, and the French Army in general was justified, and once he heard that the Dinant pocket had been closed and the Sedan bridgehead contained, he returned his attention to the Gembloux Gap and Belgium. It was a grave miscalculation.

GQG had come to the erroneous conclusion that the Meuse actions were economy-of-force measures designed to draw the French reserves southwards. After action reports from Ninth Army had wrongly concluded that the Dinant Pocket had been forced, not by Panzer divisions, but by motorised and regular infantry, supported by independent tank battalions (as they themselves would tend to deploy their own tanks). Because of the proximity of Giraud’s Seventh Army the two attacking German Corps of Stauss (II) and Hoth (XV) had only managed to establish elements of the accompanying infantry of 12, 32 and 62 Inf Div, rather than the panzers of 5 and 7 Pz. The few tanks that made it across the Meuse confirmed the French in their view that this was a local attack only. What they did not realise was that over the period of initial fighting, and just afterwards, the remainder of von Kluge’s Fourth Army had drawn up on the far bank and were preparing, with the bulk of the two panzer divisions, a second crossing.

The second attempt was going to utilise the extreme bombing of the French as used in the successful Sedan attack and focusing this time not on the centre where the previous attempts failed, but on the flanks. Hoth would attack with 5 Pz and 62 Inf further down the Meuse and close to Namur, between Yvoir and Bois de Villiers while Stauss would attack near Givet with 7 Pz, 12 Inf and 32 Inf, at the place where 32 Inf got across on the first attempt. Ruoff (V Corps) would be strengthened from Army reserve and attack north of Stauss near Hermeton with 211 and 251 Inf, while Heitz (VIII Corps) would make a demonstration in the centre with 8 and 28 Inf. The remaining two infantry divisions would be held in reserve and ready to reinforce success.

During the first round the 102nd Fortress Division had successfully contained the attacks by 6 and 8 Pz by Reinhardt (XXXI Corps) and GQG had again failed to correctly identify the attacking troops. That the 102nd, a mere Fortress Division, had been able to hold its own indicated that the Germans did not consider the sector important, again being seen as confirming that the real push would be coming further north. While the French were congratulating themselves List was bringing up further elements of his Twelfth Army and preparing for a much larger attack along the length of the Meuse between Revin and Mezieres. This time Reinhardt would combine with Haase (III Corps) giving a strong force of 3 & 23 Inf, 2 Mot Inf and 6 and 8 Pz attacking on both sides of Montherme. Accompanying this main attack would be Beyer’s strong (XVIII Corps) of 5 Inf, 21 Inf, 25 Inf and 1 Geb that would attack on both sides of Revin. The remaining divisions of Twelfth were still arriving but it was hoped that they would be in place in time to reinforce the crossing or exploit any breakthrough.

However the main German attack would be through the Sedan bridgehead in an effort both to enlarge it and to recover contact with the strong elements of 1 and 2 Pz that, along with Guderian himself, had been cut off by the French counterattack at the moment of the westward wheel. This attack would see the strong reserves of Busch’s Sixteenth Army diverted to assist the assault of 10 Pz together with surviving units of 1 and 2 Pz to attack towards Guderian. Together with 13 and 29 Moth Inf, a total of six infantry divisions (6, 15, 26, 33,52 and 71 Inf) would shoulder through the bridgehead seeking to wrest the initiative from the French.

For the second push at the Meuse to work OKW still needed the Anglo-French to see danger between Louvain and Gembloux and for this von Reichenau’s Sixth Army was required to hurl itself once more upon the British at Louvain and the French at Gembloux. To attract as much French armour as possible 4 Pz was transferred from von Schwedler’s IV Corps into von Hoepner’s XVI Corps so that as vigorous a tank attack could be made upon the Gembloux Gap as possible. Prioux’s cavalry Corps of 2 and 3 DLM had been withdrawn but it was hoped they and other French tank reserves could be lured into the fight. Von Reichenau was able to concentrate ten divisions along the Anglo-French line and drove the attacks hard. The very heavy fighting that followed proved persuasive to the French self-deceit.

[Croesus]

At Sedan Flavigny’s XXI Corps, consisting of the 3rd DCR, 3rd Mot Inf Act and the 43rd Inf Act had dislocated Guderian’ westward turning movement and separated strong elements of both tank and infantry of 1 and 2 Pz from the German bridgehead. The only remaining division of Grandsard’s X Corps, 3rd Nth Afr that had been holding the right flank of the corps frontage, was advancing towards Sedan and encountering blocking positions set up by 10 Pz and 29 Mot Inf. The impetus of Flavigny’s counterattack had carried the French into the Bois de la Marfee, the dominating position at Sedan; however the stiff German resistance bolstered by the first units of the second attempt arriving at Sedan piecemeal, served to break up the unity of the French movement. This led to considerable confusion in the area, with neither side really having complete control.

Guderians’ mixed battle group had meanwhile arrived at and was seeking passage across the Bar. It was here that occurred one of the few great moments of the French defensive campaign. As the battle of the first phase had developed, Libaud, commander of the French XLI Corps of Ninth Army, seeking to hold the line from Dinant to Montherme, had deployed the 53rd Inf B to hold the line of the Bar and prevent exactly the sort of movement that Guderian was seeking to obtain. The French infantry had themselves rallied some of the artillery of the now disintegrated 55th Inf B following its destruction at Sedan earlier and had only reached its positions when Guderians advance guard appeared. Astride the road that the Germans were advancing down was a particularly pugnacious regiment and its stand went a long way to reversing the rot that was the greatest threat facing the French army at this point.

The battle for Sedan, or more particularly the Bois de la Marfee and River Bar became now a game of numbers. The French could muster five, and were counting on the arrival of 14th Inf Act which was detraining but could not feasibly reach the area for another day. The Germans also fielded five, but could expect reinforcements of as many more. Admittedly the French had more in the form of reserves moving up to the front in general, but their deployment depended on the whim and will of GQG and their ability to control the battle. This was dependent on their attention not being drawn to the Dyle and given the news of a ferocious battle that was developing for the BEF around Louvain, keeping attention on the Meuse was not proving easy.

This is not to say that the French were entirely oblivious to the threat on the Meuse. On the contrary, when news broke that the 102nd Fortress had been overwhelmed between Revin and Montherme, where it had in fact been blasted out of existence by a shocking display of force that outdid even the bombing of the 55th Inf B at Sedan, it was clear that trouble was afoot in the area. The opinion that the Meuse and not the Dyle should receive the bulk of reinforcements might have been unanimous had not von Kluge been held up again at Dinant and Givet, where the seven French divisions that had won the day on the first German attempt were still in situ and not at all inclined to move.

It was felt that this attack demonstrated the effectiveness of the French defensive system and that Giraud could shift his more mobile units southwards to link up with the 44th Inf Act that was at present moving into the area. Where Sedan was a game of numbers, Montherme was a game of timing, as it had been on the first German attempt at the Meuse. Would the Germans establish their pontoon bridges before the French colmatage developed, or would the French arrive in time for the bursting of the dam.

[Croesus]

The essence of the Manstein Plan was a fast moving thrust severing the lines of communication of the Anglo-French in order to annihilate their armies in the field. The decisive arms in this offensive conception were the panzer divisions, their attendant motorised infantry and the tactical support provided by the Luftwaffe. The bulk of the army was as it was in the Great War, restricted to speed of boot and hoof, and ultimately vulnerable to fatigue and loss of momentum. The point of the Manstein Plan was to provide an opportunity for strategic victory that was otherwise missing; the alternative to blitzkrieg was the war of the continuous front. Hitler had effectively hedged his bets: he would give the panzers every opportunity to deliver a knockout blow, but was equally prepared to sustain another western front. Which of the two would transpire was a matter of fate and luck.

Of the ten German panzer divisions available for the attack, three were deployed away from the intended breakthrough area: 3 and 4 Pz with Reichenau’s Sixth Army and 9 Pz with von Kuechler’s Eighteenth Army. Of the remaining seven, two (5 and 7 Pz) were arrayed against Namur/Dinant/Givet which, while admittedly excellent tank country, was also closer to the expected main direction of the Anglo-French advance and, hence, their reserves. While it was hoped these two would contribute materially to the breakthrough, they were not concentrated in decisive strength. The main thrust would come at Sedan and Montherme, through the Ardennes, and field five panzer divisions (1, 2 & 10 Pz at Sedan, and 6 and 8 Pz at Montherme). It was these divisions that would provide the breakthrough, accompanied by the three motorised infantry divisions (2, 13 & 29 Mot Inf) and preceding the inexorable advance of the infantry divisions as they drove a wedge between the French Second and Ninth Armies.

No plan survives first contact with the enemy. Where the Guderians and Rommels of the Panzer Corps envisaged sweeping all the way to the sea before turning and annihilating a retreating and confused mass of Anglo-French soldiery in the first week of fighting they had to accept a more prosaic result. At Sedan 1 and 2 Pz had been split, the larger group running up against the blocking position of 53rd Inf B at the Bar, the smaller group getting ground down by the remorseless advance of 3rd DCR, 3rd Mot Inf Act and the 43rd Inf Act at the Bois de la Marfee. Also at Sedan 10 Pz had been held up first by 71st Inf B and thence, following that division’s collapse, the arrival of 3rd Nth Afr such that it was not able to influence the developing battle.

At Montherme Reinhardt’s 6 and 8 Pz had on their second attempt overcome the surprisingly stout 103rd Fortress but were yet to get sufficient bridges up to permit their tanks to cross. Here it was still an infantry battle, as it was at Dinant and Givet where Hoth and Stauss were again prevented from getting 5 and 7 Pz across, the latter still feeling the loss of their influential commander Rommel. In fact the entire second movement of the German attack was developing into an infantry action as the bulk of the German force arrived and, while there was still hope for a breakout, it was not seen as being led by the panzer divisions, rather developed by them. At the end of the first week there was no German breakthrough; this was by no stretch of the imagination a French defensive victory, but the there was less anticipation now for the ‘race to the sea’.

[Croesus]

The intersecting, and conflicting, interests of the triad of revisionist powers, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, dominated the Danubian-Balkan region following the dissolution of Versailles Yugoslavia.

Of the three there was a definite unity of purpose exercised between Rome and Budapest, particularly towards ensuring that Serbia remained quiet and that further German economic expansion eastwards was halted. In fact talks had commenced from December 1939 in Novi Sad discussing measures of ensuring that Berlin’s influence was progressively reduced. In February staff talks commenced examining a range of issues ranging from counter-insurgency operations against the growing Serbian discontent at the combined Italo-Hungarian occupation to means of preventing any form of Russo-Bulgarian cooperation against Romania.

The issue of Slovakia had been prominent in Budapest since the taking up of the Yugoslav provinces in October 1939. Planning around the creation of a border incident and organisation of military resources had commenced around the same time as the talks with the Regio Esercito; in fact two Italian staff officers were present in an advisory capacity, and additional Italian regiments brought into Serbia to take up the slack while Hungarian units were discreetly moved up to the Slovakian border. It was felt that it would be an unnecessary risk to create the incident while Germany still had freedom of movement while France remain unengaged, especially in light of the deterioration in relations between Ribbentrop and Ciano and the suspicions of the former about the intentions and motivations of the Hungarians.

So it was that while Rommel was being captured Hungary accuse Slovakian police of mistreating Magyar minorities and proceed to crash across the border, the advance units notably using freshly painted Italian-made tanks. The attack led to the expected crisis in the Slovakian government and the Hlinka Guard took to the streets in Bratislava. Germany could not, and would not, intervene on behalf of the Slovakians and within a short time a deal had been done between Berlin and Budapest that led to the dissolution of the short-lived Slovakian state. Hungary took over large parts of ‘claimed’ territory directly while permitting a continuation of the authoritarian-clerical Tiso regime ruling in Hungarian interests. Germany obtained transit rights to Romania and a renewed pledge of Hungarian loyalty but the sorry tale did not reflect well on Berlin in general, and Ribbentrop in particular.

While Hungary was involved in Slovakia and Italy increasingly concerned with counter-insurgency in Serbia and its staff talks and manoeuvres with Romania, Bulgaria and Greece began to move towards armed conflict. The initial battlefield was not Macedonia, but the Dobrudja. The two shared a new border between their new positions in ex-Yugoslav Epirus and Macedonia, and the relationship was not a pleasant one. But Athens, emboldened by its gains and perhaps misreading the Italian diplomatic and military ploy of the Romanian non-aggression pact, declared that any Bulgarian move into the Dobrudja would be seen as initiating forced revision and that, claiming the likelihood of Bulgaria then turning its attention to the remainder of Macedonia, and as a result would lead to Greek intervention in the Romanian interest.

This of course was met with a thundering denunciation from Sofia and a fresh set of solicitations to Moscow for arms and advice. This clumsy piece of Greek diplomacy was not particularly welcome in Bucharest, but at least they had recourse to Italian support. As the war of words escalated and tempers began to be lost, small clashes began in Epirus/Macedonia and Bulgaria, Greece and Romania began to mobilise forces along their respective borders.

[Croesus]

The Belgian army had commenced its retreat from the Albert Canal on the night of May 11 and only agreed to come under the overall command of the French the following day, at which point the Cavalry divisions of the French Second and Ninth Armies had been driven back to the west bank of the Meuse. The Queen and government of the Netherlands had fled on May 13, around the time when the French were closing in on the Dinant/Givet pocket and the Belgians were withdrawing under fire into the northern sector of the Anglo-French front, and the fighting in Holland began to die down soon after. The Dutch surrendered on May 15 although, for them, the war was over the previous evening.

Things were not going well in the north, but the cost was not being borne by the Anglo-French and so was not so bad as to be disastrous. A German attack across the Meuse had been held up by May 14 and another attack at Louvain-Wavre-Gembloux had been similarly held up by May 15. The Anglo-French were holding and, while the Dutch had surrendered, the Belgians were still in the field and protecting Brussels and Antwerp. This was the news despatched from Paris to London and the newly installed Prime Minister, Churchill, was relieved that his first act of office was not to have to preside over a disaster in France. There was a disaster coming, which he could not know, and it would be in France; but it would not be a disaster for the French.

The task initially given to von Reichenau’s Sixth Army was to cause the Anglo-French to over-commit to the Belgian lowlands such that the breakout from the Ardennes would be made easier. The Sixth Army had fought an inconclusive action with Prioux’ Cavalry Corps in the Gembloux Gap and made two small breakthroughs at Louvain and Wavre but had otherwise been held in place. When the second German attempt to break the Meuse began, von Reichenau’s orders were the same; except this time he had more divisions at his disposal following their exhausting march westwards. Subsequently at the end of May 17, when a full scale battle was raging at Sedan and Reinhardt only just beginning to bring tanks across the Meuse at Montherme, von Reichenau launched a much stiffer attack at the Louvain rail yards, where he had been bested three days prior.

Louvain was defended by the BEF 3rd Division, and Wavre the BEF 2nd Division and in the previous phase of fighting both units had been successful in holding their ground due to the deployment in depth of substantial artillery assets. In this second German attack one of the salient features of the German campaign, a devastating concentration of tactical air power, was brought to bear on the Louvain-Wavre front. It had previously been used at Sedan on May 13, thence at Dinant/Give on May 15 and now at Louvain/Wavre on May 17. Each time the result was the same; dislocation, demoralisation and destruction. The RAF were at least in the air but, following the severe losses attempting to bomb the Belgian bridges, were not as coherent as the Luftwaffe and certainly not able to bring the same level of concentration as their opponents.

With the otherwise excellent artillery unable to properly secure them, the 2nd and 3rd divisions were unable to match the German force of numbers and by the end of May 18 von Reichenau had fought his way across the Dyle in four places and was holding his ground while behind him Montgomery’s 3rd was trapped in Louvain and the 2nd only just managing to extricate itself from Wavre. Von Reichenau had, rather than acting as a simple foil to the main effort, managed to obtain a significant concentration of German forces on the French side of the Dyle-Meuse line and, given the large amount of infantry at his disposal, was very optimistic about his ability to widen the gap. As his success began to develop he pulled from the front the near-exhausted 3 and 4 Pz in an effort to capitalise on his unexpected success.

[Croesus]

Following the German lodgement across the Dyle on the previous day, Lord Gort demonstrated the wisdom of his deployment in depth and moved forward the supporting 4th and 48th divisions, as well as the two divisions in reserve, the 5th and 50th. The 3rd division was still trapped in Louvain and the 2nd being forced back from Wavre, but the 1st still held in place. However the British movement was not swift enough to prevent von Reichenau from reinforcing his bridgeheads and by the end of 18 May had the bulk of four divisions, 7, 11, 18 & 223 Inf, across the river albeit without much of their heavy equipment. The German advance forced the retreat of some of the British artillery units as they became exposed to German observation, which helped cement the German hold on the far bank.

The German move gave considerable cause for alarm for the Belgian King and government and assurances were immediately sought for the defence of Brussels being given the utmost priority. Lord Gort could, or would, not give an unequivocal guarantee and this led to a furious telegram to London demanding that the British government ensure the Belgian position. Churchill assured King Albert that Britain indeed gave a high priority to Belgian sovereignty, as it had in the Great War, and would demonstrate this by the despatch of additional fighter squadrons. These units had been earmarked for home defence but, with the savage losses suffered by the Anglo-French air forces and the havoc wrought by the Luftwaffe on Anglo-French ground positions, it was thought expedient to move some of the valuable fighters into Belgium and northern France.

Heavy fighting continued in Louvain which was now completely sealed off from friendly lines, although night patrols were still able to maintain contact and there an effort to move south down the line of Dyle by Belgian troops attracted much hope. However the 3rd Division was slowly being shelled to pieces and in the early hours of May 19 Montgomery lost control of the rail yards, permitting a large scale German infiltration of the British positions and splitting their line. As the Belgians in the north reached German blocking positions and the counterattacking British divisions impacted upon von Reichenau’s units on the west bank it became clear that Louvain was lost. Faced with the choice of a bitter fight to the death which would undoubtedly destroy much of Louvain and cause major civilian casualties, Montgomery gave the order for his command to make their way to friendly lines as best they can, but to surrender where there was no choice. With his staff he surrendered in the late afternoon of May 19 and with him von Reichenau obtained an invaluable launching point across the British main line and aiming directly at Brussels.

A day earlier the heroic resistance of the French 53rd Inf B at the River Bar was broken and Guderians panzers, now only a large battle group, finally was able to move inland towards Mezieres and there meet up with the panzers of Reinhardt. The town itself had been occupied that same day by two regiments of the French 38th Inf A and while they were unable to prevent Guderians movement, they were equally unmoved by German attempts to dislodge them. For his part Guderian had for the moment lost much of his fire and, with broken communications, was unsure of where to direct his next stroke. On the other side of Mezieres Reinhardt was concentrating his strength for an attack towards Rocroi while also ensuring his hard won bridgehead held. It was at this point that the French 2 DCR and 44th Inf Act arrived in the area in the evening of May 19 and immediately confused fighting erupted. This development was quite unexpected for the French who had not fully comprehended the scale of the German breakthrough following the pulverisation of the 103rd Fortress. Belatedly units from Giraud’s Seventh Army were despatched south from Dinant/Givet, where further if not weaker German attempts to get across had been again held.

As he was moving south the French positions at Sedan were reinforced by the arrival of the 14th Inf A, although by this time the front lines were very fluid and there was no real conception of where the German positions extended. This was due in part to the heavy and sustained fighting that had occurred in the area since May 13, but also because finally the full weight of the German infantry were now arriving and making their presence felt.

[Croesus]

Following the loss of Louvain the character and tone of the Battle of France changed. It was not entirely due to the loss of the Belgian city, nor the surrender of a British general, nor the dissolution of his command. It was as a result of a range of factors that had developed so swiftly since the conflict accelerated on May 10.

Luxembourg had been overrun, the Dutch had surrendered, but the Belgians were still in the fight, albeit nervously. Belgium was the latest neutral to be attacked by a great power and joined the long list of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Finland, Denmark and Norway; yet Belgium was also the only one to have on its soil Anglo-French forces arrayed in depth and strength. Belgium became, as Finland was so recently, a rallying point and continental line in the sand; a role that she had taken up in the Great War and now in this war. The loss of Louvain meant that Brussels would become a bastion, and one defended as staunchly as possible. Louvain combined the violation of Belgian statehood with an insult to British arms and from the date of its loss the British became increasingly belligerent and deliberate in their actions.

Where Louvain was the rallying point for the British, so Sedan was the rallying point for the French. It became clear upon the arrival of the 14th Inf A that the Germans were attacking in hitherto unguessed strength and Sedan, site of an inglorious past, gave opportunity for the sons of the heroes of Verdun to reprise the roles of their fathers. The shameful collapse of the 55th Inf B and 71st Inf B were taken firstly as a result of the shock of the impact of the dashing and impressive German army and then as an example not to be followed; and the doomed performance of the 103rd Fortress and 53rd Inf B became the exemplars of the French war effort.

This being as it was did not change the inevitability of the outcome at Sedan. The town was lost again and this time irrevocably as sheer weight of numbers told and the French defenders were forced back. The 53rd Inf B had been destroyed, 43rd Inf Act spent, 3rd Nth Afr overstretched and 3rd DCR and 3rd Mot Inf largely reduced to isolated pockets of defenders in the face of increasing numbers of fresh German divisions. Sedan was lost but with its loss the French army found its honour.
In the centre the French still held the important ground at Namur/Dinant/Givet, though not without the Germans trying their utmost to breakthrough. As the overall battle developed and the French retained this position, German attention began to turn to the possibilities of a battle of encirclement. Louvain had fallen and Wavre threatened to the north, while to the south Revin/Montherme was the site of a significant German breakthrough – although the important town of Mezieres had not fallen. Given that Hoth and Stauss were nearly exhausted the order to cease offensive operations in the area was welcomed. The German attention would now turn to developing the promise of the bridgeheads at Revin/Montherme.

Such attention was not solely theirs, as the French also came to the realisation that in this area there was a grave threat. Georges acted with an alacrity that belied his utter exhaustion and brought to the aid of the 2nd DCR the rested and replenished 2nd and 3rd DLM of Prioux’ Cavalry Corps, as reinforced by the 1st DLM which was moved south from Dinant. The scene was here set for the largest tank battle of the war to date. Where the clash between 2nd and 3rd DLM and 3 and 4 Pz at Gembloux was essentially a draw and inconclusive in terms of either side forcing a decisive result, the looming battle between four French and three German (the Guderian kampfgruppe of 1 and 2 Pz, plus Reinhardt’s 6 and 8 Pz) was taking on a sense of great anticipation.

Finally the air battle began its second stage. In the first the Luftwaffe swept the sky of its opponents while also obtaining an extremity of tactical force in support of the Wehrmacht. However the recent arrival of reinforcing RAF fighters, a reorganisation of the Armee de l’Air and a change of approach forced largely by the grievous losses suffered by the Anglo-French tactical bombers would see a strong challenge thrown down to German air superiority.

This then was the form the Battle of France would henceforth take. And Mussolini was extremely pleased.

[Croesus]

The invasion of France focused all attention on the line of the Dyle-Meuse. All eyes except those serving in Norway. At the time of the great tank battle at Rocroi the French Chasseurs Alpin were withdrawing from Sweden, with Swedish army units on their trail, and Germans not far behind. Politically the Scandinavian operation was an unmitigated disaster as Sweden had fallen grudgingly into the German sphere in the face of the French incursion. Now that the French were falling back the Germans were very polite, but still did not consider it wise to give up control of Lulea just yet.

Narvik had become by June the most heavily bombed part of Europe, with the Luftwaffe commencing operations from 9 May and by the end of the month there was genuine concern that Narvik would become untenable. It was at this point that von Falkenhorst, hitherto comfortable in restricting German operations in the region to making small hops up the coast while consolidating their control in southern and central Norway, managed to place German troops around the British stronghold and so commencing a siege that would at times compete with the Battle of France for the attention of the world.

Where the siege began as an army operation it quickly became a navy one. The army had to focus increasingly on the implications of the war in France and could not afford to invest heavily in Norway. The navy however was in no such mood. The shock of the loss of the Repulse and Effingham at the Battle of the Bergen Leads hardened the mood of the Royal Navy, while at the same time giving some encouragement to their German counterparts. Their mood was not improved by the loss on 8 June of the aircraft carrier Glorious to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Against the Glorious, Repulse, Effingham and Royal Oak for the British, the Germans had lost only the Graf Spee. That was an impressive result given the disparity of strength between the two navies, and was viewed as a grave insult by the Admiralty. It was this that motivated the Royal Navy to maintain the garrison at Narvik and so leading to the one of the more compelling episodes of the war.

[Croesus]

The battle of Rocroi was the decisive event of the first phase of the German invasion of France and was the largest tank engagement of the war to date. It developed when von Kleist sought to push west and achieve the panzer breakthrough he had sought since the start of the campaign, and where Prioux arrived to counterattack the German push across the Meuse between Revin and Charleville-Mezieres. Its result led to fundamental changes of strategy by both sides.

The Manstein plan called for an armoured thrust to the sea that would trap the Anglo-French armies in Belgium and thus lead to their destruction. This thrust would come from across the Meuse between Namur and Sedan and would see the majority of German armour concentrated for its purpose. In spite of tactical surprise a breakthrough had not been forthcoming and time was running out as the French colmatage was beginning to close down further avenues of substantial exploitation. A bitter weeklong fight at Sedan had seen three panzer divisions held up and their strength blunted, while the tank friendly country between Namur and Givet had resulted only in a humiliating setback accompanied by the loss of a divisional commander. Only in the middle section between Revin and Charleville-Mezieres had resulted in a major breach of the French continuous line, but even then it had taken valuable time to reduce the French defenders and get the tanks across the river. The attack west seemed to have come down to its last chance.

The German plan was straightforward. Reinhardt would push 6 Pz, 8 Pz and 2 Mot Inf of XXXI Corps due west from Revin at Rocroi and thence towards Cambrai via Hirson while Guderians reduced XIX Corps of 1 Pz, 2 Pz and 13 Mot Inf would drive northwest from Charleville-Mezieres and towards St Quentin, again via Hirson. Substantial Luftwaffe support had been organised, to the detriment of von Reichenau at Louvain/Wavre and von Kluge at Dinant/Givet, and all units were briefed to drive as hard and fast as they could. All commanders felt instinctively that here was the last chance for a decisive breakthrough in this phase of the battle. Of the German units many of the tanks were having mechanical problems, none of the battalions were at full strength and commanders and soldiers alike were exhausted.

The French plan was nothing special. The idea was simply to arrive in the area and engage the Germans where found. There was a growing sense that the Meuse was becoming a danger area and it was felt that the British commitment to the Belgians would serve to turn the Louvain/Wavre front into a defensive one, especially as the German tank force was not present there in strength. Prioux had seen his command double with the Cavalry Corps taking in 1e DLM and 2e DCR; however the corps was split. 2e DCR had reached and held Rocroi, its presence as much to do with a lack of fuel as a sense of turning the town into a defensive position, as the 38e Inf A had done at Charleville-Mezieres. 1e DLM was driving south from Givet via Fumay while 2e and 3e DLM were moving east from Hirson via Mon Idee. In spite of their preference to the contrary the Battle of Rocroi would be an encounter battle.

The first shots were fired when Reinhardt approached Rocroi and his reconnaissance units failed to observe the presence of 2e DCR that by that time was well dug in. The defensive capabilities of the DCR, with its strong core of Char B1 and complement of the H39, had been demonstrated at Sedan where the 3e DCR had been ground down with great difficulty, and at Givet where the Germans could find little answer to the arrival of 1e DCR. The advance guard ran straight into heavy French fire and withdrew with losses. Two more attempts at a direct entry were thrown back and Reinhardt was forced to settle down to envelop the town and enlist the assistance of the Luftwaffe to blast the DCR out of the way. This had barely been achieved when 1e DLM arrived from the north in the afternoon and immediately engaged 6 Pz, which had been kept back for the breakthrough. Furious fighting erupted here and very soon both units were sorely handled by the other, the decision only being forced by the commitment of the remainder of 8 Pz. By nightfall 1e DLM had been pushed back with heavy loss and 2e DCR destroyed but, crucially, Reinhardt had been held up.

Guderian had driven hard along his line of advance and without trouble until he arrived at Mon Idee to find a cautious Prioux shepherding 2e and 3e DLM towards the fighting at Rocroi. The French had taken a long pause for refuelling following their making good time and had news from Rocroi that the fight was in hand but that other German tank units were somewhere in the area. At Mon Idee Guderian repeated Reinhardts error and drove straight into the village, though his surprise was matched by that of the French, who had not taken up substantial defensive positions. Guderian recovered first and threw his main weight into the attack but the crucial difference between himself and Prioux was that the latter had met and handled German panzers at the Gembloux Gap and had taken measures to improve his command’s chances in the event of a second go at the panzers. By the end of the day Guderian found himself outmatched and retreated down the road, primarily in an effort to maintain his strength which had been slowly bled since the opening of the campaign. The French tanks were encouraged by their success and Prioux detached the 2e DLM up the road towards Rocroi. However nightfall brought the movement to a halt.

The battle was notable for its sharpness and shortness: the fighting in both Rocroi and Mon Idee had been the heaviest of the war to date and by the end of the day neither side was particularly able to exploit its local success or launch counterattacks to overcome the other. It was also important for the first successes of the Anglo-French change in fighter tactics which, although insufficient for 2e DCR, was important in the success of Prioux at Mon Idee. The battle meant that the Manstein plan had run its course; although the road to Rethel in the south lay open the conventional German tactical thinking was beginning to reassert itself. For the result of the battle of Rocroi that they could in the first instance see was the potential to pinch off the Ninth Army in Namur-Dinant-Givet and fight a traditional battle of encirclement and destruction. This reversion to form was greatly resisted by Manstein but his main support from von Rundstedt had ceased as the latter came to ponder the implications of the changing fortunes of war.

[Croesus]

Both sides took some important lessons from the battle of Rocroi that would result in far reaching implications for tank design, their employment in battle and the relative performance of the armoured forces within each opposing army. Of all the vehicles involved, two had particularly important effects on future development.

Some legendary stories had emerged from the performance of the Char 1 bis fielded by 3e DCR at Sedan and 2e DCR at Rocroi. They had taken huge amounts of punishment and the majority of their battlefield losses had been due to problems with refuelling, or by large amounts of artillery or air support. The French recognised that the Char was an excellent tank for their conception of the role performed by the DCR, but felt that the tank was not well suited to open field warfare where manoeuvre was paramount. In the confines of Rocroi and the Bois de la Marfee the Char had outperformed all other tanks, but when caught in the open had demonstrated weaknesses. The Germans had quickly learnt to respect the Char and were quick off the mark to send captured examples back to Germany. Analysis of the tank led to planning for a German heavy battle tank that, it was hoped, would anticipate future advances by their opponents.

The SOMUA had gained more respect from the Germans than the Char in that it had been identified as the type of tank the Germans would themselves have fielded, if given the choice from the French arsenal. The SOMUA fought well in the attack and defence, in open and close field combat; it was regarded as the best tank fielded by both sides. For the French the challenge was to make the SOMUA cheaper and more reliable and efforts were made to simplify the tanks construction while examining the possibility of replacing the suspension system with that of the Christie design. The Germans recognised that the sloped armour, strong armament and general capabilities made for a very good medium tank and, as with the Char, sought to adapt features of the SOMUA to their own tank designs.

In spite of superiority in these two designs, it was clear to both sides that the German conception of tank deployment in the open field was superior. Rocroi did not lead to a breakthrough because both Reinhardt and Guderian sought to drive through urban areas without sufficient reconnaissance. Prioux made some adjustments to his handling of tanks in the open field and scored some successes against Guderian at Mon Idee, but on the whole the German tactic was superior to the French. Following Rocroi French tactics were slowly adjusted but it would be some time before they felt comfortable challenging the Germans in open country. The French also recognised that their command and control systems were deficient and increased priority was given to providing more tanks with radio communications.

Rocroi gave a strong signal that the conception of the DCR was flawed and while the structure persisted, the organisation of the more German-like DLM received growing emphasis in French military circles. One adjustment saw the faster H39 shifted from the slower, heavier and more defensive DCR to the manoeuvre oriented DLM in exchange for the H35. Both sides recognised the value of effective air support for tank warfare, and both understood that here too the Germans had the advantage.

So it was that following Rocroi the French did not seek open field battle with the Germans until they could improve their organisation and that the Germans did not seek battle unless they could dictate terms such that their deficiencies in tank quality could be sufficiently mitigated so as to give victory. And these lessons were not lost on the Italians either.

[Croesus]

At the commencement of hostilities in October 1939 Italy fielded a total of 25 divisions across five classes (infantry, mobile infantry, mountain infantry, alpine and armoured). Four more divisions were added in March 1940 and six in August 1940 for a total of 35 divisions. Great improvements had been wrought since the March expansion, primarily on the back of increasing oil revenues from Libya and a change in attitude towards Italy by the Anglo-French from May 1940.

The Balkan-Danube region had the largest concentration of the Italian army, not surprising considering the increasingly important role Italy was taking in the region and given the growing tensions between Greece and Bulgaria, and the uncertainty Romania had with regards to Russia. Seventh Army in Albania had been stripped down to only two mountain infantry divisions, indicative of the warming change in Italo-Greek relations. Second Army in Montenegro fielded two alpine and two mountain infantry divisions and was increasingly tied up with operations against Yugoslav Royalist partisans, as well as maintaining a watch on the Bulgarian border. Eighth Army in Serbia had two infantry divisions centred on Belgrade involved in re-training a Serbian Republican division and two alpine and one mountain infantry division on the Romanian-Bulgarian border which were also engaged in anti-partisan warfare. Third Army in Croatia-Slovenia maintained an armoured division and two motorised Libyan divisions around Zagreb that were involved in training the Croatian army, and an alpine and mountain infantry division in Ljubljana which kept a watchful eye on the Austrian border. Three Croatian divisions had also been formed, making the region the centre of Italian power. First Army in Piedmont had been reinforced back up to three infantry divisions and one mountain infantry division as had Fourth Army in Veneto. The Sixth Army in Lazio comprised the strategic reserve of the newly formed parachute division, three mobile infantry divisions and one armoured division.

The equipment of the divisions had greatly improved, although there was a noticeable and widespread decrease in quality items such as uniform and barracks equipment. All the mobile units were approaching their full complement of vehicles and the artillery refit had largely been completed. Additional machine gun battalions had been raised and each army finally received their own anti-aircraft regiment. Most importantly each tank division was at full complement of both the light M15/38 and medium M20/39. The benefits were beginning to be reaped by establishing a low skill base in the manufacturing of the tanks; where the finishing was often poor and the vehicles very plain and without many of the refinements common to the French and German machines, the capacity to build large numbers had paid off. Furthermore standardisation of design and plant allowed a quick retool of the assembly lines designated to produce the heavy M30/40 that had begun to arrive at the armoured divisions in September.

The doctrine and tactics had continued to evolve in light of the lessons learnt first in the Vittoria Iugoslavia and recently in the Guerra Partigiana, as well as some observations of the fighting in Finland and of course most recently in France. The emphasis was on placing artillery well forward, of sufficient time taken in reconnaissance and in making an attack in depth and in coordination with armour and air support. While officers were not encouraged to hurl their men forward regardless it was still held axiomatic that an attack pressed aggressively and with impetus was a decisive attack. Given the nature of the Italian war so far little thought was given to the defence, although interest had been taken in the performance of the French colmatage and the planning problems encountered during the staff liaison with the Romanian army had also helped prevent the Regio Esercito from slipping back into the habits of Grandmaison.

[Croesus]

The Regia Aeronautica had grown significantly in the year since the opening of the Yugoslav invasion. The decisions to discontinue air-cooled engines and rejection of biplane and trimotor designs (with some notable exceptions) were confirmed in their wisdom and the officers that championed these innovations had since risen to high command. However, the RA had also maintained its traditional Fascist orientation but as the general influence of the party waned there emerged a schism within the service that had led to a splintering of command unity. In particular the squadrons based in Libya and to a lesser extent the Territori Protetti were known to be bastions of political fascism and the movement was even undergoing a further political evolution. The links between the RA and Luftwaffe developed in the pre-war years began to subtly develop.

Further fallout from the splintering of command would only become apparent in the future and for the moment there was enough for all to do without concern about questions of a politicised military. Foremost on the agenda was the continued development of the Ba.65. This aircraft was approaching the end of its operational life and construction was winding down in light of this, but the design was sufficiently versatile to permit a series of upgrades. Most important was a liquid-cooled 1,250 HP engine and redesigned cowling and cockpit, the direct result of which was a substantial increase in payload (3,800 kg). These changes brought it up to par with the German Ju 87 and following extensive work in Croatia practising ground-air cooperation the skills of the Italian ground attack pilots began to become quite impressive. The replacement aircraft for the Ba.65 was the Ba.88 Lince that unlike its predecessor enjoyed all the design additions: it was powerful with good speed and climb, it was well armed and could carry a strong payload. One unforeseen implication of its development was its greater speed meant that in some trials the Ba.65 outperformed it, and particularly in the Guerra Partigiana the older slower plane was performed.

The fighter Stormo were well served with the MA.200 Saetta, G.55 Freccia and RE.200 Falco, all of which began to evolve into complementary roles. The Freccia by virtue of its higher operational ceiling specialised towards the interception of enemy main force heavy bombers; the Saetta focused on taking on opposing fighters where its range and duration of flight time was valued; and the Falco developed into an all purpose fighter taking on a variety of roles including that of night fighter. All told the RE fighter pilots were happy with their planes and felt that they had sufficiently modern planes to complement what they viewed as their technically superior flying skills. As the glamour units of the RE it was perhaps expected that they were the most Fascist, a fact not lost in Rome but considering the importance they had, their politics were tolerated.

The RE bomber fleet was still dominated by the BR.20 Cicogna, which, like the BA.65, was approaching the end of its life. It was of sufficiently sturdy design to handle the increased load requirements following on from two engine replacements and a steady increase of its defensive armament such that it was a popular plane to fly. However its production was being scaled down in favour of the more modern and altogether superior Z.1018 Leone, which was as good as anything being flown by any of the major combatant airforces. Its numbers were small and there were still some teething problems, but together with the Cicogna, the RE was well served in this class. The heavy bomber P.108 Bombardiere was having trouble finding its place in the RE or even its optimum variation within its design but at least there was a heavy bomber in place and it was expected that over time its promise would be delivered in the form of an effective aircraft.

[Croesus]

It was quite clear that the Regia Marina was the poor cousin of the Italian military. Without recourse to a substantial budget the RM was limited to six battleships by October 1940; four re-conditioned WWI vessels (the Giulio Cesare, Conte di Cavour, Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio) and two modern vessels (the Vittorio Veneto and Littorio). However the political direction of Rome had changed such that the RM had no one to sail against. Under no circumstances was the RM to make any threatening moves towards France and operations involving the Royal Navy were limited to shadowing those few destroyers still enforcing the blockade. The base of the British fleet had been moved to Alexandria and most of the vessels taken into the Atlantic upon the commencement of hostilities. There was simply no one to fight a battleship engagement with, even if Rome was willing to risk the vessels; additionally it was clear that there would be no budget available to develop an aircraft carrier.

This left the RM little room to develop and there was an initial outflow of officers and men into the Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica as these arms were clearly both receiving budget and enjoying action. This resulted in the nature of the RM changing; it became both a bastion of royalism in the Italian military, as well as throwing off the suffocating weight of tradition that had hitherto bound its growth and, as importantly, becoming a focus for anti-British sentiment within the Italian military. With its capital ships in port or skulking after British blockade ships, the energies of the service began to be concentrated into three specialist areas: torpedo bombers, submersibles and radar.

The first, like the parachute division Folgore, had been stripped from the RA but, unlike the Folgore, the RA was not unhappy to see the back of what they saw as an unnecessary distraction. This was largely because the RA was only too glad to be rid of the SM.79 Sparviero, which embodied all that was old, and wrong, in the pre-war Italian air force. An aircooled trimotor, phasing out the ‘damn hunchback’ was an expedient way of making the bomber stocks look thin and so attract funding for newer planes. The RM took up the SM.79’s eventually and with it found a new lease of life. It was not designed as such, but it made an excellent torpedo bomber and its capacity in this area was demonstrated at the expense of a series of old hulks by the Reparto Sperimentale Aerosiluranti (experimental torpedo bomber group), utilising the excellent torpedo produced by the Whitehead works at Fiume.

The submersibles were a study in two extremes; the conventional submarines were large, unwieldy and lacked sophisticated breathing apparatus making their use potentially fatal to their crews, while the special underwater units could boast both excellent equipment and highly motivated units. Faced with an embargo on capital ships the RM commenced a review of submarine design and began producing a series of useful prototypes that were smaller, faster and employed various designs of snorkel. These vessels were still in development by October 1940 and there were mixed results in their development, but at least there was a sense that there would evolve an effective platform for the magnetically activated torpedo, which held the hopes of many in the service as a cost effective means of countering the Royal Navy’s dominance in the region. In the Decima Flottiglia MAS the RM had a potent weapon and, in the atmosphere of capital ship constraint and surface restriction, this unit that would otherwise have been starved of funding gradually began to grow in both size and capability to the extent that it began making ‘training voyages’ that would see them enter into Malta and even Alexandria. In the Xe MAS the spirit of the RM was unbowed.

Finally there was the development of radar. It was still seen as a toy and yet awaited its time; but it had its hobby adherents, a small group of officers of scientific backgrounds. It wasn’t revolutionising warfare but it was being dallied with and a series of experiments were proving encouraging. Perhaps something would come of it after all.

[Croesus]

It was quite clear that the Regia Marina was the poor cousin of the Italian military. Without recourse to a substantial budget the RM was limited to six battleships by October 1940; four re-conditioned WWI vessels (the Giulio Cesare, Conte di Cavour, Andrea Doria and Caio Duilio) and two modern vessels (the Vittorio Veneto and Littorio). However the political direction of Rome had changed such that the RM had no one to sail against. Under no circumstances was the RM to make any threatening moves towards France and operations involving the Royal Navy were limited to shadowing those few destroyers still enforcing the blockade. The base of the British fleet had been moved to Alexandria and most of the vessels taken into the Atlantic upon the commencement of hostilities. There was simply no one to fight a battleship engagement with, even if Rome was willing to risk the vessels; additionally it was clear that there would be no budget available to develop an aircraft carrier.

This left the RM little room to develop and there was an initial outflow of officers and men into the Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica as these arms were clearly both receiving budget and enjoying action. This resulted in the nature of the RM changing; it became both a bastion of royalism in the Italian military, as well as throwing off the suffocating weight of tradition that had hitherto bound its growth and, as importantly, becoming a focus for anti-British sentiment within the Italian military. With its capital ships in port or skulking after British blockade ships, the energies of the service began to be concentrated into three specialist areas: torpedo bombers, submersibles and radar.

The first, like the parachute division Folgore, had been stripped from the RA but, unlike the Folgore, the RA was not unhappy to see the back of what they saw as an unnecessary distraction. This was largely because the RA was only too glad to be rid of the SM.79 Sparviero, which embodied all that was old, and wrong, in the pre-war Italian air force. An aircooled trimotor, phasing out the ‘damn hunchback’ was an expedient way of making the bomber stocks look thin and so attract funding for newer planes. The RM took up the SM.79’s eventually and with it found a new lease of life. It was not designed as such, but it made an excellent torpedo bomber and its capacity in this area was demonstrated at the expense of a series of old hulks by the Reparto Sperimentale Aerosiluranti (experimental torpedo bomber group), utilising the excellent torpedo produced by the Whitehead works at Fiume.

The submersibles were a study in two extremes; the conventional submarines were large, unwieldy and lacked sophisticated breathing apparatus making their use potentially fatal to their crews, while the special underwater units could boast both excellent equipment and highly motivated units. Faced with an embargo on capital ships the RM commenced a review of submarine design and began producing a series of useful prototypes that were smaller, faster and employed various designs of snorkel. These vessels were still in development by October 1940 and there were mixed results in their development, but at least there was a sense that there would evolve an effective platform for the magnetically activated torpedo, which held the hopes of many in the service as a cost effective means of countering the Royal Navy’s dominance in the region. In the Decima Flottiglia MAS the RM had a potent weapon and, in the atmosphere of capital ship constraint and surface restriction, this unit that would otherwise have been starved of funding gradually began to grow in both size and capability to the extent that it began making ‘training voyages’ that would see them enter into Malta and even Alexandria. In the Xe MAS the spirit of the RM was unbowed.

Finally there was the development of radar. It was still seen as a toy and yet awaited its time; but it had its hobby adherents, a small group of officers of scientific backgrounds. It wasn’t revolutionising warfare but it was being dallied with and a series of experiments were proving encouraging. Perhaps something would come of it after all.

[Croesus]

The fourth week of May 1940 was a time of pause and deliberation for the opposing general staffs. The German advance had been held but not thwarted, the Anglo-French defence had bent but not broken. The Dyle-Meuse line had been breached in three places, Louvain-Wavre, Revin-Charleville and Sedan; but in each case there had been sufficient blocking positions in place to stave off disaster. The fighting had been severe. Losses during the first three weeks counted some of the best divisions of both sides; some destroyed, some as good as. The British had lost the 2nd and 3rd Infantry divisions; the French 3e Mot Inf, 43e Inf Act, 53e Inf B, 55e Inf B, 71e Inf B, 102e Fortress, 3e Nth Afr, 2e DCR and 3e DCR; and the Germans 1 Pz, 2 Pz, 10 Pz, 2 Mot Inf, 13 Mot Inf and 29 Mot Inf. The German losses were less, but were the more decisive units. In its failure, the Manstein Plan had sacrificed its Queen.

Clearly, however, there was more to come. The German advance had three possible axes of advance: on Reims, St Quentin or Brussels. This was an army that was willing to take casualties, and one that recognised static warfare on the model of the Great War was not sustainable. This was an army that would attack again, and hard. Accordingly the first action of OKH upon news of the setback at Rocroi was to pull all panzer divisions back, regroup and prepare for the second attempt at the channel. The forces available were 5, 6, 7 and 8 Pz with a loose KG of motorised infantry available after scavenging vehicles and troops from other areas. Still it was four armoured divisions and this time lessons learnt such as the avoidance of urban areas and French tank formations would be maintained.

The essence of the Manstein Plan was squarely within the German tradition of arms; to cut off a large section of the opposing army and destroy it. In attempting to resume the advance, and keep the strategic initiative, the first thought on the German side was to seek to redeem the plan and trap as much as was possible of the Anglo-French armies. The situation in the last week of May showed three main strategic areas the combination of which might provide the means to do so. In the north was the Brussels redoubt, well and strongly defended by British and Belgian divisions and with vigorous air cover; in the centre was the Namur salient, full of confident French divisions that had so far seen off everything the Germans had thrown at it; and to the south was the Meuse bulge, where the Germans had broken through but not broken out and in which was contained the bulk of the reinforcing German army.

The German plan that emerged from the following two weeks, while the opposing armies settled down into a relatively quiet period following the frenzy of activity of the previous weeks, was a typically bold one. It aimed at separating the Brussels redoubt from the Namur salient by offering up von Reichenau’s Sixth Army’s left flank and then hitting the resulting French advance hard with von Kluge’s Fourth Army, while the reconstituted Panzer Group Kleist would seek to slice in on the left flank of von Kluges turning movement. The aim was to lengthen the Namur salient, fill it with as many French divisions as possible, close it and destroy it.

The Anglo-French plan was nowhere near as insightful. The British wanted to hold Brussels and so maintain the Belgian armies in the field while ensuring there was no disaster at Narvik. The French wanted to hold the Namur salient to prepare for an eventual counterattack while ensuring there was no disaster at Reims. The strategic thinking remained the same as it was at the start of the war: to hold in the west, buy time, attack Germany economically while growing their own resources and divert conflict to the northern and eastern flanks. By the end of the first week of June, while the respective armies drew breath, the two sides remained in the same dispositions as they had in the first week of May: the Anglo-French defending and the Germans attacking.

[Croesus]

From the first week of June Britain and France began to militarily pull apart. London’s strategic priorities began to be dominated by the twin considerations of maintaining Narvik and Brussels. Just as the French had found their honour at Sedan and the Bar, so the British had found theirs in the person of Winston Churchill. Past inglories and imperfections aside, Churchill was a man who had found his time and was in tempo with the mood of the nation. Defending Narvik and Brussels was, on the ground, as much about maintaining troops in strong positions on the field as it was about political sensibilities. But it was the political sensibilities that began to stir the nation and defending Norwegian and Belgian independence against what was increasingly portrayed as Nazi tyranny soon came to embody the whole point of the war the British found themselves mired in.

Besides, the Admiralty simply weren’t going to let the Royal Navy be cowed by a couple of German battle cruisers and motley band of destroyers and U-Boats. The shocks of Scapa Flow, Bergen Leads and the loss of the Glorious was too much to bear, and this Churchill well understood. The senior service would have its day and for the moment that meant maintaining Narvik. The situation had steadily worsened since the rebuff of the French chasseurs at the hands of the Germans at Ostersund until the second week of June where the Luftwaffe operated with impunity and the first German patrols reached the Norwegian border and took control of the rail link leading into Narvik.

The foolish French advance on Gallivare had to a large degree had forced the Swedes’ hands; in spite of controlled sabotage they had little choice but to accept the German securing of Lulea. The inevitable request of a corridor of passage across Sweden to Norway followed soon after and in spite of much debate and several resignations permission was granted. The Soviet ultimatum to the Baltic republics and subsequent occupation, both with the tacit approval of Berlin, indicated to Stockholm the seriousness of the situation and it was felt best to trust in relative geographical isolation and protests of neutrality rather than armed resistance. Passage was provided and soon the chasseurs were skirmishing with German regulars on the Swedish-Norwegian border.

Once Narvik was closed off a series of battles were fought for the approaches that saw, in spite of some excellent defence, German artillery brought up within range of the town and the siege proper commenced on June 24. The British response was not lacking in vigour. It was plain that unless Narvik could receive air cover it would be lost and, while a battle raged on land around a small strip the British were attempting to open up, it was clear that it would be the Fleet Air Arm which would have to provide the air cover so sorely needed. It was the provision of such air cover that saw the loss of the Glorious. Taken with the loss of the Courageous on anti-submarine duty and the awareness that Narvik would fall unless sufficient air cover could be brought to be, the Admiralty recognised it had to protect what it had. The carriers designated to the support of Narvik, Operation Sinew, consisted of the Furious (35 aircraft) and the Ark Royal (60 aircraft). With the Eagle at Alexandria and the Hermes at Dakar, the two carriers were all the Royal Navy could bring to bear.

The Anglo-French had managed to concentrate a fairly large force in Narvik; as other operations in Norway foundered it was natural that the troops thus assigned would find themselves transferred to the increasingly crowded beachhead, and what they had was a miscellany. The British had Guardsmen, Territorials and Canadians; the French Foreign Legionnaires, Chasseurs Alpin and the Polish Brigade. As a general rule the town and its approaches was controlled by the British, while the defence of the railway was the responsibility of the French. Once the Germans closed up to the border they had conceived that the push down the railway line would be fairly straightforward: unfortunately for them they would be encountering some of the toughest and more motivated of the Anglo-French troops. Confronting the Anglo-French were a similar mixed bag of regular and mountain troops, together with Fallschirmjager and a handful of tanks. While the ground forces secured the ring around Narvik, the main battle would be fought by the Luftwaffe both against the town and against the Royal Navy.

The concerns around the defence of Brussels were more straightforward. Following Churchill’s promise to the Belgians once there grew a sense of confidence around the French holding on the Meuse, and the subsequent loss of 3rd Division at Louvain, the British resolve to hold the Germans where they were was considerable. Gort brought up his reserve divisions and leaving only a skeleton force on the Escaut fallback line and, taken with the Belgian divisions on his left flank, gave a very stiff frontage indeed to any German thought of further advance. That the German’s weren’t considering an advance wasn’t an obvious consideration at the time. The British plan was to hold in place, thence concentrate troops for a two pronged push on Louvain and Wavre following the establishment of air superiority by the Royal Air Force. This latter issue was regarded as decisive. The impact of the Luftwaffe so far in contrast to the failures of the Anglo-French airforces could not be ignored and the British sought to capitalise on the transfer of the new fighter squadrons from Britain. On the German’s part, while von Reichenau had switched over to the defensive, it was not at any point considered that the Luftwaffe should equally become passive. On the contrary it was felt that a stiff air battle would serve to encourage further Anglo-French concentration of resources and so contribute to their incentive to place their neck in the noose.

For their part the French were pursuing two main objectives: holding the Namur-Dinant positions with a view to using the salient as a springboard for the eventual, and now much anticipated, counterattack, while concentrating sufficient strength to hold Reims and St Quentin should the Germans develop these areas as their main axis of advance. The demands on manpower of these twin aims was considerable and by the second week of June the dispositions were still not complete. Priority had gone to Reims and St Quentin as Ninth Army at Namur- Dinant had become increasingly confident in its ability to continue to hold its positions; indeed it was, it felt, justifiably proud that to date it had taken everything thrown at it and managed the pressure well. Reinforcements were diverted to the area to help prepare for the counterattack but the timetable for the event was put back to the end of June when problems arose around bringing together the desired concentration of artillery that French offensive doctrine required. So it was that, with both the French and Germans gathering themselves for the exertions ahead, that June was a quiet month along the line of the Meuse. There was plenty of fighting along the Dyle line, but the Meuse was quiet. Unfortunately for the French the time they were taking with their preparations was playing into the hands of their opponents.

[Croesus]

The German plan for Operation Ausbruch involved four elements. Von Reichenau’s Sixth Army had the thankless task of being the bait and had two principal tasks. The first was to prepare substantial defences in Louvain and Wavre such that when the British Army came forward the lodgement on the Dyle could be maintained without having large forces trapped with the river to the backs and the second was to give evidence for a drawing up of force indicating an offensive towards Brussels such that the Gembloux Gap would again open up. These two tasks were fraught with risk but OKH felt that it had a fair estimate of the mettle of the Anglo-French and considered that both opposing armies would take their time to draw up strength in accordance with their Great War offensive doctrines rather than hurl forces into the breach as it opened. Nevertheless some precautions were taken to provide a defence in depth should the unthinkable happen.

The second element had von Kluge’s Fourth Army thin out its right wing such that it could both lengthen its line as well as encourage a sense of momentum in the French. Von Kluge’s main task was to capitalise on the sense of superiority the French had had undoubtedly obtained from their admittedly excellent defence of the Namur-Dinant sector. The emphasis on deception for Fourth Army was considerable as it was felt imperative to give the French sufficient evidence to coax them out of their defensive positions. The choice of the Gembloux Gap as lure was hoped to be decisive in this regard. To help cover the line and prevent an unforeseen breakthrough, units were taken from Sixth Armies left wing and placed in echelon on the right. Aside from these preparations von Kluge was to conduct weakening demonstrations along the Namur-Dinant line and establish blocking positions further back that would enable his retreating wing to obtain the abrupt strength necessary to trap the advancing French.

The third part of Ausbruch saw elements of Lists Twelfth Army advance slowly forward along the axes of advance towards Reims and St Quentin with the idea of masking the disposition of the remainder of the Army, as reinforced by units of Busch’s Sixteenth Army, which was to provide the bulk that would seal off the French as they advance towards the gap between the Fourth and Sixth Armies. The axis of advance for this movement was Phillipeville-Beaumont, and was the movement aimed at enveloping the entire French Ninth Army and, it was supposed, dislocating the reinforcing movement of the French offensive. As the Twelfth had all the marching and fighting to do it was given as many supporting units as possible which included, crucially, a reconstituted Panzer Group Kleist. To the existing units of 5, 6, 7 and 8 Pz were transferred 9 Pz, 1 Cav and the SS Adolf Hitler from von Kuechler’s Eighteenth Army. This was, once the vehicles began to assemble, an extremely impressive force and thought began to rekindle within the Manstein camp that a suitable target for such a force might be Lille rather than Charleroi or, as some hot-heads would have it, Dunkirk.

The final element of the offensive lay with in the air. The cracks were beginning to show and the impact of the British Home fighter squadrons was being appreciated, but for the moment the Luftwaffe remained supremely confident. They knew they had the measure of the Armee de Air, and that neither the French nor British AA defences were up to much. The fighters were the most overtasked, having to draw the RAF in over Louvain, chasing off Anglo-French reconnaissance flights and finally escorting the Stuka’s that were to escort the advance of the Twelfth Army. The medium bombers were to interdict selected targets in the Anglo-French rear while the spotter planes had heavy responsibilities for Fourth and Sixth armies to ensure firstly no breakout and secondly to avoid unnecessary losses for the unhappy soldiers whose task it was to just sit and take the Anglo-French punishment.

The timing of Ausbruch was necessarily predicated on the French taking the bait and there were some who felt that it might take a month of Sunday’s before such a thing occurred. In light of the doubts about the French offensive spirit it was decided that if they had not attacked by July then Ausbruch would commence with a greater emphasis on the offensive role of List’s Twelfth Army. They could not know this but the French estimation of when their artillery preparations would be complete for a counterattack in the Namur-Dinant area was for the last week of June. The stage was set for the biggest set piece battle of the war to date.

[Croesus]

June 1940 was a momentous month for international politics, but the greatest impact was made, not in the west, but in the east where Soviet Russia embarked on a series of political and military moves that would see its borders advance further west and complementing its gains in Poland and Finland. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were next in line in terms of physical occupation, but had felt the weight of Soviet attention since the beginning of the war. Their fate had been decided in the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 1939 where Germany had surrendered its interests in the region. By the end of September 1939 Soviet warships were off the Estonian coast and flying reconnaissance missions over all three states. This was followed by an ultimatum to permit the stationing of Red Army troops and by 10 October Moscows request had been agreed to.

The war with obstinate Finland gave Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a reprieve, but it was inevitable that Moscow would return its attention to them and accordingly, on 15 June Lithuania was invaded, and Estonia and Latvia the day after. Taken with the Swedish permission for Germany to establish a land corridor to sustain the siege of Narvik, not to mention the recent overrunning of Holland and the fate of Belgium hanging in the balance, the Soviet move was not viewed with approval in London or Paris. There was little they could do and certainly Berlin was doing nothing and, inevitably, the three republics were absorbed into the Soviet Union.
Stalin was however not satisfied. Another article in the secret protocols gave the Romanian province of Bessarabia over to Moscow and in accordance with this Moscow delivered a ‘Baltic ultimatum’ to Bucharest on 26 June, demanding the return of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union. The Russian ultimatum was followed by official advice from Berlin to accede to the request.

Berlin’s advice did not however recognise the shift in political fortunes in the Danube-Balkan region since the fall of Yugoslavia. There was a hint of desperation even in the official note; Germany had its hands full in the west and was relying on acquiescence on the part of Romania to prevent trouble in the region, which, in spite of the Italian conquest of Yugoslavia, was still firmly within the German economic hinterland. The problem was that Berlin’s ally of the moment was Russia and could hardly call upon its ally of yesterday, Italy, to keep the peace. Caught between two diplomatic fires Berlin was powerless to bring its influence to bear and this powerlessness did not go unnoticed.

Lost in the events of the first week of June, where Norway, the Baltic Republics and Belgium were suffering great ordeals, was the signature in Zagreb of a treaty aimed at promoting the political and stability of the Danube-Balkan region. It was not a universally popular treaty by any means: Bulgaria abstained as it had done from the Balkan Pact that this Zagreb Treaty replaced, and for the same reasons; Greece abstained in a similar vein to Bulgaria as, at the time of the fall of Yugoslavia, it was actively seeking to leave the Balkan Pact; and Turkey, with the recent drama’s surrounding the Anglo-French plans to bomb the Caucasus and the current change of relations with Moscow was not at all inclined to be drawn into anything that would see its neutrality compromised. This meant that the founding signatory nations consisted only of Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Italy. And it was to its fellow Zagreb Treaty members that Bucharest turned upon receiving the Soviet ultimatum.

The Romanian request for assistance was soon received positively and on 28 June Bucharest declined the Russian ultimatum, whereupon the war entered a wholly new and entirely unpredictable phase. Where the west was astounded, and impressed, by Romanian bravery, as it had with the Finn’s before it, the inner power structures in Italy and Hungary were not. This event had been anticipated since the announcement of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and subsequent partition of Poland. The secret Italo-Hungarian staff planners that had cooperated over Yugoslavia and Slovakia and worked through contingencies in light of possible German and/or Soviet moves into the region were able to supply their governments with existing plans. Following the conference at Campo Imperatore Italy had political and diplomatic contingencies, and the military-conservatives in Budapest also had strong ideas of how to react should there be a threat of a return of communism into their sphere of interest. The Italo-Romanian Non-Aggression Pact and subsequent military exercises had been part of this preparation ‘just in case’.

The stakes for Italy and Hungary were straightforward. Hungary wanted to add Transylvania to its gains from Slovakia and Serbia, and Italy wanted to add the oil fields of Ploesti to its oil interests in Libya and Iraq. This was the motivation for Rome and Budapest to promote the treaty of Zagreb and this was what they would fight for. The Russian ultimatum played into their hands and they happily went along.

On 1 July the Red Army crossed the Romanian frontier in force, advancing on the three main centres of Chisinau, Cernauti and Cetatea Alba. They were met by the Romanian army in prepared positions and overhead the Red Air Force had their first encounters with the Regia Aeronautica. While a Hungarian corps moved eastward into the Carpathians and Transylvania, two corps of the Regio Esercito moved into Romania. The first was charged with maintaining the integrity of the border with Bulgaria and the second, consisting of armoured, autotransportable and mountain infantry divisions, advanced towards Bessarabia. Within days they would engage the Red Army and the character and nature of the war changed completely.