Seleucid Hannibal

[Typo]

After Carthage's defeat fled to various locations before finally settling down as an adviser to the Seleucid King Antiochus III. When war took place between Rome and the Seleucids, Hannibal offered to take personal command of the Seleucid army, possibly to once again invade Italy. A faction at the court made sure this did not happen. Antiochus took personal command and was defeated.

What if Antiochus had given Hannibal command? He probably wouldn't have entered Greece with as few troops as Antiochus had historically. Rome would certainly have taken the Macedonian wars much more seriously. Hannibal's original army was very Hellenistic in it's composition, with the exception that they did not use the phalanx. Would he have done as well or even better as he did in the second Punic war? Or would his career crash down once again in a second Zama? How would a battle between a Seleucid army led by Hannibal and Rome look like?

What would have happened had he won? Rome didn't very much to be beaten and would have tried again to subdue what is now Macedonia and Greece, the fact that Hannibal defeated them again would have strengthened their resolve even further. I can't see Hannibal somehow turning a Seleucid army again Antiochus by the way.

[Equinox]

I could see maybe a somewhat successful war against Rome, but i dont think the Seleucids, Hannibal or not, could have defeated the romans.

Hannibal's original army was mostly made up of mercenaries, and when he was in Italy a good percentage of his army was gallic. his "seleucid army wouldn't be very powerful, and i think by then, Rome was too powerful for any of the nearby empires to attack.

[carlton_bach]

Also bear in mind that no Hellenistic king could afford to have his general become too successful. If Hannibal had managed to beat the Romans to any significant extent, the Seleucid clan would have had to kill him.

I guess another invasion of Italy is right out, though. Rome at this point could easily still catch a bloody nose in Illyria or Greece, but their home defenses are good enough to keep out any traditional attack, seaborne or along the Adriatic coast.

[Faeelin]

I think we're missing other places the Seleucids might apply his talents.

Against Bactria, say.

[Typo]

Rome was the biggest threat of the time though, for Hannibal to be brought east, he probably needs to either win or draw the Romans first.

[Max Sinister]

Now if Hannibal had managed to bring Antiochos in an anti-Roman coalition earlier...

[Typo]

Macedonia supported Hannibal during the Second Punic War and didn't get much done. I doubt the Seleucids could have done anything even if he had.

[Max Sinister]

The Seleucid empire was much bigger. The question of logistics is a different one, of course.

[MerryPrankster]

Perhaps the Seleucids treat Hannibal like Justinians treated Belisarius--once he starts winning, send him somewhere else, then when things fall apart, send him back.

This would be a very interesting scenario.

[antisocrates]

Had Antiochus trusted and employed Hannibal's talents to the full, history might have turned out differently. It would have turned out most definitely if Antiochus had even a modicum of statecraft in his entirely empty head.

No Mediterranean Power at that point could have defeated Rome. However, a competently-led Seleucid kingdom could have denied Asia to Rome and achieve a stalemate, a Hellenistic version of Rome vs. Parthia rivalry, except the Seleucids would've been Rome's near equal instead of Parthian annoying-pest; in fact, it was only Antiochus' sheer incompetence that gave Asia to Rome.

If Hannibal commanded the Seleucid armies, the Seleucids would've never been defeated in battle. Tactical supremacy was assured; Hannibal lost Zama only because Scipio had overwhelming cavalry advantage: not so with the Seleucids. With incomparable Iranian and Cappadocian cavalry - superior in both materiel and in numbers to anything Western Mediterranean had to offer - Hannibal would have had assured cavalry superiority in almost any tactical engagement the two would've been engaged in. Moreover, Seleucid phalanx was no slouch either; at Magnesia, it took tremendous punishment before collapsing and it collapsed only because it lost cavalry cover due to Antiochus' monumental stupidity.

Therefore, war would've been one of attrition, and the Seleucids were in much better condition than Carthage to engage in such affair. Not only did Asia offer more wealth, more importantly, Asia and Asia Minor offered nearly inexhaustible supply of cavalry and light infantry, and Greek mercenaries for the Great King to recruit. Furthermore, the logistics would've been Rome's to worry, rather than the other way around that was the case in the Second Punic War. Rome in Asia would've been essentially Napoleon in Russia, except without Napoleon's tactical supremacy. (In fact, Alexander was also as lucky as the Romans, in that both the Seleucids and the Persians folded like houses of cards, instead of engaging in a scorched-earch policy that would've devastated Alexander and Rome alike.)

Just as importantly, Roman supply lines would not have been assured even before they got to Asia. The control of sea would've been contested vigorously. The Seleucid navy would've been formidable, especially because unlike Carthaginians, Seleucids had Macedonian marines who excelled in boarding action. Although Romans defeated them in the Straits, unlike the Carthaginians, the Seleucids would've not have shied from further naval actions and they had Phoenicia, from whence they could rebuild a navy very quickly to contest the control of the sea.

More importantly, a competent Antiochus would have had keener political instincts and gained greater Greek support for his war. The war should've never been decided in Asia Minor; it should've been fought in Greece, much as Austria and France fought for supremacy in Germany, not Bohemia or Burgundy.

But because Antiochus was such a loser of a king, Rome won its Leipzig instead of losing its Waterloo.

P.S. Macedon didn't do much during the 2nd Punic War for two reasons: 1) Philip was a terrible politician, though a decent general, who bungled his Greek affairs badly and thus was engaged in a war in Greece that prevented him from aiding Hannibal in timely fashion; 2) Macedon of Philip was not Macedon of Alexander, and it certainly held no candle to the vast materiel advantages Seleucids' Asian possessions afforded.

Rome was favored by the gods, for how else would you explain that the two most vigorous Greek kingdoms of the era were led by such dunces? Philip was a decent enough general, yet he lacked all political sense and scope for realistic political appraisal. Antiochus was a mere braggart who had neither political nor military talents to match the boundless bounty bequeathed to him by his betters.

[Typo]

You seem kind of harsh on Antiochus there. I think he was at least one of the more energetic Seleucid rulers. He did restore much of the eastern reaches of the empire to at least nominal rule. I'm not really sure which other Seleucid king would have done better against Rome.

[Archdevil]

You seem kind of harsh on Antiochus there. I think he was at least one of the more energetic Seleucid rulers. He did restore much of the eastern reaches of the empire to at least nominal rule. I'm not really sure which other Seleucid king would have done better against Rome.

Seleucus I most likely. Antiochus IV also seems to have been a capable general. Afterwards, most seem to range between crappy and mediocre in quality, with the added element of Roman meddling if their was a somewhat succesful Seleucid ruler.

It seems Antiochus the Great underestimated the resolve of Rome and missed the lessons of the Second Punic War.

[antisocrates]

It's hard not to be hard on Antiochus, given how badly he bungled his encounter with Rome. Of all the Hellenistic monarchies of the time, only his had the requisite manpower, wealth and materiel to strip inevitability out of the Roman domination of Hellenistic world. It would've taken Alexander the Great himself to save the miserably tiny, weak Macedon of the Antigonids from Rome; while Egypt had the best strategic position, a century of misrule had so sapped its strength that, once again, it would've taken someone of Alexander's vigor to renew the Sick Man of the Antiquity. In contrast, the Seleucids were still strong, wealthy and vibrant in their Syrian and Mesopotamian core, and the Western Iran was reasonably loyal to the dynasty, which ensured that they would have the loyalty of the greatest cavalry force of the time.In short, Antiochus had something the Persians never did in their struggle against Alexander: the loyalty of their subjects and tactical equalizer. Persians didn't engage in a scorched-earth policy advocated by their Greek mercenaries, for the fear that it would cost the throne and the empire. In contrast, Antiochus could, and should have, in the aftermath of Magnesia. The Treaty of Apamea that he signed guarranteed the eventual destruction of his kingdom - it was a Carthaginian peace of the worst kind. Instead of daring Rome to try to go for his throat, he gladly slit his throat for them and condemned his successors to Roman domination.He wasn't a bad ruler per se, but not a good one either. Most importantly, he lacked two qualities most needed in an imperial statesman: patience and perseverance. All throughout his life, he always chose the easy way out, never committing himself to the full, even when it was vitally necessary. Thus, instead of solving the Asia Minor/Pergamum problem once and for all, he chose to promenade up and down the East for elephants, bribes and oaths of fealty even more worthless than his scythed chariots. Henceforth the Pergamenes would play a large part in his ruin. Neither did he pursue the conquest of Egypt seriously, despite the fact that Egypt was wrecked by native revolts after their pyrrhic victory at Raphia - Egypt won, but the natives lost all respect for their Greek masters in consequence. And when Rome won at Magnesia, he again chose the easy way out, surrendering when he could've fought on. So what if his regular army was destroyed? Unlike Macedon and its pathetic manpower potential (the biggest reason why Philip was a fool to try Rome), he still had large enough reserve of men to rebuild his army, and his cavalry was unharmed at Magnesia, so all he needed was time to recruit Greek mercenaries and call up his settler reservists throughout Syria to reform his heavy infantry. Time that he would have. Syria was intensely loyal to the House of Seleucus, and the Romans would've had to besiege strongly held cities to secure supply lines. Actually, it's not even sure if Rome had the means to pursue Antiochus into Syria. Scipio had only 40000 or so men, and the mighty fortress-capital of Antioch barred his way into Syria. If Hannibal felt inadequate to invest Rome after Cannae, could Scipio with his smaller army have done better against a city just as strongly held?

[Typo]

About the Seleucid Empire, did they actually have large amount of native levies? Hellenistic Empires had a strong tendency to use only descendants of Greek/Macedonian for the military. If I remember correctly, when the Ptolemy used native Egyptian levies at Raphia, they not only lost confidence but rebelled after the war. Are we actually fairly certain about how many Greco-Macedon settlers there were in Syria etc?

[antisocrates]

Egypt was a rather special case, in that most of the population was in virtual slavery - a relic from its bygone ages. Moreover, it was very centralized and NO efforts were made to hellenize the natives, except in few select cities in Lower Egypt.In contrast, the Seleucids were feudal, a relic of its Persian heritage, and they actively tried to Hellenize their subjects. It was a mixed bag, but since both Asia Minor and Syria were partly Hellenized even before Alexander, Syria was to large degree Hellenized and Mesopotamia, reasonably so in the cities. This meant that native levies could be trusted, for the Hellenized population were loyal to the dynasty. If you look at Magnesia, only about 20000 out of 70- 80000 were Greco-Macedonian settlers. Really, the Seleucids needed Greek soldiers only for one reason: phalanx. Their cavalry was entirely native levies.As for numbers of Settlers, nobody knows, except that we know the Seleucids never had to train natives as phalanx, because they always had enough on hand, and when they didn't, they could recruit Greek mercenaries from Asia Minor.Egypt, like I said, was an anomaly. Unlike Syria, after a generation or so, Greek immigration stopped for the most part, causing Egypt to literally run out of soldiers, whereas Syria continued to receive migrants.

[Typo]

So did the Seleucid suffer at any point from lack of calvary horses? I understand that later Hellenistic armies had a far lower ratio of calvary:infantry than Alexander, or even Hannibal's Carthaginians. Did the Iranians really provide that potent of a force?

[antisocrates]

It's hard to tell, but that they could field 14000+ cavalry at Magnesia is telling. I forget how many Companion cavalry Alexander had in Persia, but at Magnesia Antiochus had 8000 - 10000 heavy cavalry. Assuming that Antiochus did not denude Iran to get these numbers (highly unlikely, since the Iranian barons would have revolted than to deprive their estates of the military force needed to fight various nomadic threats), I'd say it speaks much of his manpower potential.Let's remember that the whole low ratio only applies to Macedon and Egypt, two countries naturally short in cavalry forces. If Philip and Perseus had decent cavalry force, they could've at least threatened Romans tactically, though they'd still have lost the war. Egypt always imported military materiel, not just horses: pitch, iron, timber, copper, etc., etc.

[Typo]

Would the Seleucids have lasted though? They arn't always going to have windfalls like Hannibal. Eventually they are going to get a week king that's probably going to let Rome dominate Greece and another one might lose Asia.

[Keenir]

Egypt was a rather special case, in that most of the population was in virtual slavery - a relic from its bygone ages.

"bygone ages"? :confused:
"slavery"?

[Archdevil]

"bygone ages"? :confused:
"slavery"?
The basic social system in Egypt stayed the same from the time of the very first Pharaos well into the Roman era. So a large rural population who's only goal was to provide grain for the elite in the cities. Social mobility in Egypt was probably the lowest of all ancient civilizations.

The Persians and later Ptolemies kept the system in place and only replaced the top posistion (Pharao) in Egypt. It's telling that only the last of the Ptolemies (Cleopatra) bothered to learn the native language.

[MerryPrankster]

Would the Seleucids have lasted though? They arn't always going to have windfalls like Hannibal. Eventually they are going to get a week king that's probably going to let Rome dominate Greece and another one might lose Asia.


Other states have had weak kings and they didn't get swallowed up by the neighbors.

[Typo]

Rome was also a pretty special neighbour

[Archdevil]

The Romans never managed to really capture Parthia. They weakened it enough to allow the Sassanid coup, but never extended effective control into Mesopotamia.

It should also be remembered that the east was were the money was. When Pompey campaigned there, IIRC he doubled Rome's annual income. The east also had the most people and certainly the most big cities. Antioch, Alexandria, Seleucia (later Ctesiphon) were the ancient megacities along with later Rome.
When Constantine moved the Roman capital to Byzantion, he did it for a very good reason.

Rome was an empire that had to pay for its troops, certainly after Marius. If there are no Asian provinces to pay the taxes for its army, what then?

[SullaG]

So is there any number of causes that can be traced for the downfall of the Seleucid Empire? Why didn't the Seleucids survive?

[Max Sinister]

Several reasons: Incompetent kings, imperial overstretch (at least in the beginning), and later uprisings and the seceding of the Parthians.

Otherwise, welcome to the forum! You must be our first Maltese member!

[SullaG]

Thanks! :)

[burning down one side]

What Hannibal offered to Antiochus was to take 10,000 of the King's troops and a hundred ships to Carthage, pull in more troops there and invade Italy. He advised Antiochus that this was the only way to defeat Rome. Antiochus meanwhile would have his own army to do with as he wished.

I can't see a second Hannibalic invasion succeeding. The Bruttians, still stinging from the sanctions issued against them by Rome at the end of the Second Punic War may have risen to support Hannibal; after that things get dicey in Italy.

Rome had the manpower to fight Antiochus and Hannibal both. In the end both would be defeated.