PDA

View Full Version : The British fleet enters the Sea of Marmara


1940LaSalle
January 2nd, 2007, 06:38 PM
After World War I, Henry Morgenthau opined that had the British fleet pressed their advantage in March 1915 and entered the Sea of Marmara, coming into full sight of Constantinople, the Turks would have capitulated. In Castles of Steel, Massie quotes sources to the effect that the grand vizier had his baggage and so forth loaded onto two cars, whose chauffeurs were ready to depart on an hour's notice for the interior of Asia Minor. He further mentions that the populace would have welcomed any sort of relief from the German presence.

Suppose the British fleet had entered the Sea of Marmara and trained the guns on Constantinople? Would then the Sultan have been overthrown, and Turkey exited the war, leaving the straits open to Russian commerce? And if so, how does that affect the Great War in terms of possibly prolonging Russia's involvement, and viability with respect to the German army?

Electric Monk
January 2nd, 2007, 08:03 PM
Have you read Rule Britannia! (http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=30473) on this board?

It does an excellent job of using that exact POD.

Darkling
January 2nd, 2007, 08:36 PM
As said Rule Britannia pretty much lays out what would happen in the short term, the Balkans go Allied which causes a Southern front to open up against A-H, the Easterners dominate British policy and the central powers probably don't see out 1916.

Whether A-H collapses and whether the peace treaty is quite as lenient as in Rule Britannia is more open to question.

I think the British are more likely to have taken control of Mesopotamia and the Levant earlier (and more directly) with the French possibly getting a slice.

The British might also get the slice of Saudi Arabia along the gulf as was originally planned (which is good news once the oil is discovered).

Over the long term the British walk out of the war laughing as a net creditor and unchallenged navally, whether they seek to use the flushed sense of victory and unity born out of the war is open to question (i.e. trying to bind the dominions closer to Britain).

The Americans stay in their box content that they can ignore the rest of the planet and don't massively benefit from the flight of capital and people to the US.

Without US troops pouring into Europe Spanish Flu might be kept from ravaging Europe.

Probably a better world all round.

Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy
January 2nd, 2007, 09:50 PM
The British might also get the slice of Saudi Arabia along the gulf as was originally planned (which is good news once the oil is discovered).

I'm pretty sure that area was captured by the Saudis in 1913, so the British would have to take it up with them.

Darkling
January 2nd, 2007, 11:25 PM
I'm pretty sure that area was captured by the Saudis in 1913, so the British would have to take it up with them.

It was indeed taken by the Saudi's in 1913 but that didn't stop Britain and France deciding to portion it out amongst themselves when they were drawing up boundaries for the post war middle east in 1916.

Here is a map for the original zones of control decided upon in 1916. (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/ee/Sykes-Picot-1916.gif)

If the British decide they want it there is little the Saudi's can do to stop them (especially since they need Britsih help to do further conquering) although I'm not sure why they would want it the agreement would seem to indicate they did.

1940LaSalle
January 2nd, 2007, 11:58 PM
Have you read Rule Britannia! (http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=30473) on this board?

It does an excellent job of using that exact POD.

LOL...wasn't aware of that thread; I just encountered Morgenthau's comments last evening in Castles of Steel. Oh, well.

Tyr
January 3rd, 2007, 11:18 AM
It was indeed taken by the Saudi's in 1913 but that didn't stop Britain and France deciding to portion it out amongst themselves when they were drawing up boundaries for the post war middle east in 1916.

Here is a map for the original zones of control decided upon in 1916. (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/ee/Sykes-Picot-1916.gif)

If the British decide they want it there is little the Saudi's can do to stop them (especially since they need Britsih help to do further conquering) although I'm not sure why they would want it the agreement would seem to indicate they did.

To protect/expand Kuwait and the Trucial States.

Darkling
January 3rd, 2007, 11:44 AM
To protect/expand Kuwait and the Trucial States.

That is all I could think of (apart from somebody just deciding to make the Gulf surrounded by British controlled territory because it looked nice on a map) but it isn't like the Saudis are much of a threat.

Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy
January 3rd, 2007, 12:07 PM
That is all I could think of (apart from somebody just deciding to make the Gulf surrounded by British controlled territory because it looked nice on a map) but it isn't like the Saudis are much of a threat.

The Hashemites would beg to differ. The British have been funding the Saudis to fight Turkey, which they didn't do.

Darkling
January 3rd, 2007, 12:42 PM
The Hashemites would beg to differ.

The Hashemites aren't exactly in the same league as Britain, they fell because Britain wasn't interested in propping them up in Hejaz.

We need only look to OTL where the British didn't pick up Hasa, the trucial states and Qatar didn't get over run.

The British actually forced the Saudis out of areas along the border with the Trucial states when oil was discovered in a disputed region, the Saudis weren't really capable of messing with those under Britsih protection and certainly note an area directly under Britain's administration.

The British have been funding the Saudis to fight Turkey, which they didn't do.

Quite true, although if the Ottomans collapse early in 1915 British aid and promises to the Arabs (and also the potential Jewish settlers) will be curtailed.

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 3rd, 2007, 03:12 PM
It's nonsense.

The British didn't have any advantage to press. There is this persistent myth that the Ottomans were nearly out of ammunition when the Entente tried to force the Dardanelles which is pure fantasy - and the strongest defenses had not yet even been reached. The losses if the attack had been pressed would have been enormous, and then what? You have a fleet trapped in the Sea of Marmara with no means of refueling or supplying. And what would they do, shell Istanbul? Can you imagine the reaction that would cause in Russia, Greece, and just about everywhere else? Goodbye Hagia Sophia?

The government would have moved to Anatolia and the entire fleet in the Marmara would be trapped and useless, and attrited away entirely. Subs and mines.

I don't know where Massie gets the idea that the Ottomans would be glad to have their capital occupied to get rid of the Germans. The Germans were around in small numbers as advisors and valued technical experts - it's not like they were ubiquitous or running the government. Only a British author would assume people would prefer to be under British military occupation than be independent. :rolleyes:

Morganthau, BTW, is a pure propagandist. His own diaries show that he was well aware the Ottomans would not have capitulated if the Entente had managed to get past the Dardanelles.

After World War I, Henry Morgenthau opined that had the British fleet pressed their advantage in March 1915 and entered the Sea of Marmara, coming into full sight of Constantinople, the Turks would have capitulated. In Castles of Steel, Massie quotes sources to the effect that the grand vizier had his baggage and so forth loaded onto two cars, whose chauffeurs were ready to depart on an hour's notice for the interior of Asia Minor. He further mentions that the populace would have welcomed any sort of relief from the German presence.

Suppose the British fleet had entered the Sea of Marmara and trained the guns on Constantinople? Would then the Sultan have been overthrown, and Turkey exited the war, leaving the straits open to Russian commerce? And if so, how does that affect the Great War in terms of possibly prolonging Russia's involvement, and viability with respect to the German army?

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 3rd, 2007, 03:39 PM
Why is everyone so convinced that the Ottomans will just collapse at the drop of a dime? When did they EVER collapse? Germany did, Russia did, as did the Hapsburgs, but the Ottomans just didn't. Sure, they lost a lot of territory, but ACTUAL HISTORY shows that occupying the capital could not cause them to collapse, even with several countries invading simultaneously.

The Hashemites aren't exactly in the same league as Britain, they fell because Britain wasn't interested in propping them up in Hejaz.

We need only look to OTL where the British didn't pick up Hasa, the trucial states and Qatar didn't get over run.

The British actually forced the Saudis out of areas along the border with the Trucial states when oil was discovered in a disputed region, the Saudis weren't really capable of messing with those under Britsih protection and certainly note an area directly under Britain's administration.



Quite true, although if the Ottomans collapse early in 1915 British aid and promises to the Arabs (and also the potential Jewish settlers) will be curtailed.

Darkling
January 3rd, 2007, 06:39 PM
Why is everyone so convinced that the Ottomans will just collapse at the drop of a dime? When did they EVER collapse?

I actually don't buy the idea that the Ottomans will collapse once ships show up outside the capital however IIRC the Ottomans ammunition came from it's allies and factories in European territories, if that is true then once the British cut off the two parts of the Empire then they are going to start to run out of things to kill the allies with in Mesopotamia.

Germany did, Russia did, as did the Hapsburgs, but the Ottomans just didn't. Sure, they lost a lot of territory, but ACTUAL HISTORY shows that occupying the capital could not cause them to collapse, even with several countries invading simultaneously.

That just means they sensibly came to the table before they fell apart (although there was certainly some strife internally).

Darkling
January 3rd, 2007, 07:36 PM
It's nonsense.

The British didn't have any advantage to press. There is this persistent myth that the Ottomans were nearly out of ammunition when the Entente tried to force the Dardanelles which is pure fantasy –

What were the levels of ammunition then?

and the strongest defenses had not yet even been reached.
[/quote]

Which were?

The government would have moved to Anatolia and the entire fleet in the Marmara would be trapped and useless, and attrited away entirely. Subs and mines.

Weren't the Ottomans rather strapped for mines, to the point of stealing Russian ones?

Anyway I believe the idea is that once the Allies get in the Sea of Marmara they can prevent the re supply of the mine field and forts by sea (although they eventually achieved this anyway on the resupply front albeit after several vital months) and bombard railways that run close to the shore and thus disrupt supplies getting to the forts and any troops to the South.

The end game of course is silencing the forts so that troops can be moved freely (which is plausible given the Allies give it a good go given they had silenced the outer forts).

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 3rd, 2007, 09:37 PM
I actually don't buy the idea that the Ottomans will collapse once ships show up outside the capital however IIRC the Ottomans ammunition came from it's allies and factories in European territories, if that is true then once the British cut off the two parts of the Empire then they are going to start to run out of things to kill the allies with in Mesopotamia.



That just means they sensibly came to the table before they fell apart (although there was certainly some strife internally).

The Ottomans had nowhere near the level of internal strife of even the victorious powers - and coming to the table did them no good because the Entente just plain lied and tried to carve them up.

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 3rd, 2007, 09:42 PM
Up until the British abandoned their attempt on the Straits, the Ottomans had expended about a sixth of their heavy ammo and much less than that of the much more important 6" howitzer shells.

By "stongest", I mean they had not reached the Narrows where the defenses were thickest and the British the most constrained.

Sending a fleet in DOESN'T cut off the European and Asiatic sides - in order to do that you would have to have troops occupy the entire shores of both sides. There is no way to interdict supplies across these. You could harass the supply lines, but that's about it.

The Outer Forts were ancient and nearly useless - their impact upon the defense of the Straits was minimal. You can probably find a good map of the defenses that will show how formidable these were.


What were the levels of ammunition then?




Which were?



Weren't the Ottomans rather strapped for mines, to the point of stealing Russian ones?

Anyway I believe the idea is that once the Allies get in the Sea of Marmara they can prevent the re supply of the mine field and forts by sea (although they eventually achieved this anyway on the resupply front albeit after several vital months) and bombard railways that run close to the shore and thus disrupt supplies getting to the forts and any troops to the South.

The end game of course is silencing the forts so that troops can be moved freely (which is plausible given the Allies give it a good go given they had silenced the outer forts).[/QUOTE]

Darkling
January 3rd, 2007, 09:50 PM
The Ottomans had nowhere near the level of
internal strife of even the victorious powers

I didn't notice the King getting dethroned nor did I notice factional armies marching around Wessex.

Darkling
January 3rd, 2007, 10:35 PM
Up until the British abandoned their attempt on the Straits, the Ottomans had expended about a sixth of their heavy ammo

So where does the idea come that they were down to a few dozen shells (27 rounds of armour piercing I have seen quoted).

and much less than that of the much more important 6" howitzer shells.

How useful were they against warships?

By which I mean could they be expected to deter Destroyers outfitted for mine sweeping instead of just minesweepers.

Also how many hits did the smaller guns score against the enemy?

Sending a fleet in DOESN'T cut off the European and Asiatic sides - in order to do that you would have to have troops occupy the entire shores of both sides. There is no way to interdict supplies across these. You could harass the supply lines, but that's about it.

The allies getting nine subs in the Sea of Marmara (over the course of nine months) led to the Ottomans abandoning it as a logistical route and cost the Ottomans "two battleships (albeit obsolete) and one destroyer, five gunboats, nine troop transports, seven supply ships, 35 steamers and 188 assorted smaller vessels.".

It would seem that a fleet in the sea would have been enough to block supplies through the Sea and would be able to destroy the rail along the Peninsula thus cutting off logistics beneath the sea.

That leaves only supplies going through the Bosporus, what defences lay there to prevent the British interdicting shipping?

You didn't answer about the Ottoman mine levels.

I also take it the point about the munitions supplies being mainly in Europe is correct?

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 3rd, 2007, 11:00 PM
I didn't notice the King getting dethroned nor did I notice factional armies marching around Wessex.

But the Ottomans didn't have mutinies or strikes.

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 3rd, 2007, 11:07 PM
I don't know. Just fabricated. There were some guns that were running low on ready ammo, but there was never any question of stocks being depleted.

Howitzers were extremely effective against the weak decks of warships of this period and accounted for a huge amount of the hits inflicted.

Calling an ironclad laid down in 1873 a "battleship" is a bit of a stretch - Mesudiye was a guardship, largely disarmed. In any case, the presence of the subs didn't stop supplies from flowing historically. The Marmara is not really that necessary - the Bosphorus IS, but take a look at some photos of it and you'll see how problemmatic it would be to use subs in it.

On the other hand, a couple of German subs would have a field day against the Entente fleet under the same circumstances...

Regarding munitions levels, mines, etc., I'm at work so I don't have a reference library handy at the moment... and unfortunately I loaned our own TomB the book that has the most info on this subject.

So where does the idea come that they were down to a few dozen shells (27 rounds of armour piercing I have seen quoted).



How useful were they against warships?

By which I mean could they be expected to deter Destroyers outfitted for mine sweeping instead of just minesweepers.

Also how many hits did the smaller guns score against the enemy?



The allies getting nine subs in the Sea of Marmara (over the course of nine months) led to the Ottomans abandoning it as a logistical route and cost the Ottomans "two battleships (albeit obsolete) and one destroyer, five gunboats, nine troop transports, seven supply ships, 35 steamers and 188 assorted smaller vessels.".

It would seem that a fleet in the sea would have been enough to block supplies through the Sea and would be able to destroy the rail along the Peninsula thus cutting off logistics beneath the sea.

That leaves only supplies going through the Bosporus, what defences lay there to prevent the British interdicting shipping?

You didn't answer about the Ottoman mine levels.

I also take it the point about the munitions supplies being mainly in Europe is correct?

Darkling
January 3rd, 2007, 11:19 PM
But the Ottomans didn't have mutinies or strikes.

Strikes are a little less worrying that rogue armies wandering around your homeland.

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 3rd, 2007, 11:28 PM
Strikes are a little less worrying that rogue armies wandering around your homeland.

I don't know what you mean by this.

Darkling
January 4th, 2007, 12:14 AM
I don't know. Just fabricated. There were some guns that were running low on ammo, but there was never any question of stocks being depleted.

Howitzers were extremely effective against the weak decks of warships of this period and accounted for a huge amount of the hits inflicted.

And how many ships were forced to withdraw due to these hits and what types of ship?

From what I read of the 6 inchers whilst they were able to pierce decks due to their angle of fire they were only able to do minimal damage (a few guys dead here and there) and they weren't that accurate.

There is also indication that the British when deploying fire power were able to cause the shore guns to be quieted or at leats baldy reduced in rate of fire.

In any case, the presence of the subs didn't stop supplies from flowing historically.

I was led to believe that the Turks did abandon it after a few months of the odd subs being in the area.

The Marmara is not really that necessary

It is to supply troops on the Peninsula especially when we consider that ships in the sea can fire on the shore and close the Bulair road, or too quote Churchill "if a squadron of British ships can be placed in the Sea of Marmora the Turkish army must either be starved or so reduced that our army can overpower them".

- the Bosphorus IS, but take a look at some photos of it and you'll see how problemmatic it would be to use subs in it.

So again what defences exists to stop the British interdicting the area.

If the British show up and the government flees as planned will the British be able to gets the city surrender to them under threat of shelling (I'm not sure the British will refrain from shelling the city since it was the point of the plan)?

On the other hand, a couple of German subs would have a field day against the Entente fleet under the same circumstances...

The first U-boats took two months to show up, by that point the issue would have been decided.

Regarding munitions levels, mines, etc., I'm at work so I don't have a reference library handy at the moment... and unfortunately I loaned our own TomB the book that has the most info on this subject.

Fair enough, I'm just interested in seeing what I heard/read is correct (that is that the major munition works were in the capital and the British actually had the located marked and ready for bombardment as part of the plan going in).

A paper from a naval war college indicates that the Ottomans only had two munition factories and both were on the shores of the capital with range of naval guns (along with ministry of war and the Galata bridges which the paper indicates were valuable military targets).

Darkling
January 4th, 2007, 12:36 AM
I have found the (or at least a) source for the claim that the Turks were low on ammo,

Major Carl Muhlmann, a German officer on the staff of General Von Sanders’ Fifth Army during the Gallipoli campaign,

So where does the evidence for the alternate view come from?

Edit:

Apparenlty a nameless Ottoman war office official held that “modern ammunition for heavy guns was very short, but there was a plentiful
supply of older ammunition”, any other evidence in favour of the idea that the forts had lots of ammo (although I'm unsure what older ammunition entailed).

Darkling
January 4th, 2007, 01:14 AM
The ammunition situation is resolved, the armour piercing ammunition which was the threat to the ships and used in the heavy guns was down to low levels (less than 30, per gun I assume).

The paper I have read makes a very convincing argument that the straits could have been forced with a further naval attack, this stand for following up directly on the 18th because the guns had been dealt a bad blow and were low on ammunition, the only problem here is the reliability of the mine sweepers civilian crews but that should be lessened if followed up at night and/or naval crews were swapped in.

Forcing the straits in early April is even more assured because the mine sweeping force was replaced with naval personnel, more than doubled and had 12 fast naval mine sweepers added to the force (along with the force having more ships added to it that were lost).

The forts would have to be sent back into a confused state and forced to waste their ammunition again (if the same strategy was employed) but that was easily doable.

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 4th, 2007, 01:43 AM
I have found the (or at least a) source for the claim that the Turks were low on ammo,

Major Carl Muhlmann, a German officer on the staff of General Von Sanders’ Fifth Army during the Gallipoli campaign,

So where does the evidence for the alternate view come from?

Edit:

Apparenlty a nameless Ottoman war office official held that “modern ammunition for heavy guns was very short, but there was a plentiful
supply of older ammunition”, any other evidence in favour of the idea that the forts had lots of ammo (although I'm unsure what older ammunition entailed).

The Ottoman General Staff kept ammunition reports which indicate the amount of shells available and expended. The quote from the nameless officer is perhaps referring to a shortage of HE rounds for field guns in the land campaign. Naval shells were plentiful. 2,200 shells were fired March 18, of which only 201 were from heavy guns, leaving over 1,000 modern shells and over 4,000 semi-modern heavy shells, and over 6,000 howitzer shells. The heavy guns at the Narrows didn't even become engaged.

British naval fire was ineffective at silencing Ottoman guns; very few were destroyed, and were rarely silenced for long. The mobile batteries were nearly impossible to deal with.

Take a look at this satellite image:

http://guidemediterranee.com/IMG/jpg/darda.jpg

The Entente only got to the bulbous area at the entrance to the Straits - maybe 1/6th of the way - the heaviest defenses were at the point where they narrow where you can see a word on the map.

MrP
January 4th, 2007, 01:52 AM
I must second Abdul on the naval batteries being bloody hard to deal with. I'll have to check my sources to be sure, but the naval forces were more likely to effect the abandonment of a gun by a near miss or forcing the gun to run out of ammunition, than by actually hitting it or its supplies. There are some interesting articles in Wargames Illustrated on this topic.

Incidentally, howitzers are rather nasty for ships of this period (and every other period ;) ) because they have the potential both to penetrate the thinner upper armour or simply set fire to the ship. I'm sure we're all aware of the dangers of fires on warships in WWI - expecially if the deuced things are near magazines.

Darkling
January 4th, 2007, 02:18 AM
The Ottoman General Staff kept ammunition reports which indicate the amount of shells available and expended. The quote from the nameless officer is perhaps referring to a shortage of HE rounds for field guns in the land campaign. Naval shells were plentiful. 2,200 shells were fired March 18, of which only 201 were from heavy guns, leaving over 1,000 modern shells and over 4,000 semi-modern heavy shells, and over 6,000 howitzer shells. The heavy guns at the Narrows didn't even become engaged.

Well both the War minister staff officer, the German on the scene and the German communications Britain intercepted would seem to cast doubt on that unless modern shells != armour piercing shells.

British naval fire was ineffective at silencing Ottoman guns; very few were destroyed, and were rarely silenced for long. The mobile batteries were nearly impossible to deal with.

Oh I know they weren't destroyed but they were silenced.

The paper puts it thusly

"The bombardment from the French ships continued
until 1345. As the French fired on the shore defenses, the Turkish gunfire became more and
more sporadic, until it completely stopped. Shortly before 1400 the French squadron began to
retire as the third line of ships began to move forward. It was at this time that the Bouvet hit a
mine and sank suddenly. The third line of ships moved up and continued to fire until 1600.
The Turkish guns responded very sporadically at first but soon fell silent again."

The opion of the British man of the scene (who was up front with teh mine layers for most of the campaign and thus new what fire to expect from the guns) was

“I had a most indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten
foe. I thought he was beaten at 2pm, I knew he was beaten at 4pm, and at midnight I knew with still greater certainty that he was absolutely beaten.”

The Entente only got to the bulbous area at the entrance to the Straits - maybe 1/6th of the way - the heaviest defenses were at the point where they narrow where you can see a word on the map.

Yes there is map showing the belts of mines and the positions of both the fixed and mobile defences.

However the guns were silenced and that means the mine sweepers could have done there job even if there were losses (although frankly it seems like the guns couldn't do much to the sweepers at any rate).

I have grave doubts about the ability of the Turk guns to do anything of substance, they didn't sink a single vessel during the campaign and only caused 33 casualties, true the most powerful defences weren't faced but they seem to be rather less than a deadly threat.

Darkling
January 4th, 2007, 02:23 AM
I must second Abdul on the naval batteries being bloody hard to deal with. I'll have to check my sources to be sure, but the naval forces were more likely to effect the abandonment of a gun by a near miss or forcing the gun to run out of ammunition, than by actually hitting it or its supplies. There are some interesting articles in Wargames Illustrated on this topic.

Indeed very few guns were knocked out but they were adversely affected by the ships firing on them to the point where firing was eventually stopped, that is all that is needed for operations to commence.

It doesn't really matter if they manage to get back to full fighting shape in a couple of days because they can't replace the mines so every time they are silenced and mines are removed it takes the fleet closer to shelling those munition factories.

Incidentally, howitzers are rather nasty for ships of this period (and every other period ;) ) because they have the potential both to penetrate the thinner upper armour or simply set fire to the ship. I'm sure we're all aware of the dangers of fires on warships in WWI - expecially if the deuced things are near magazines.

Perhaps so but those didn't seem to be that good, I would suggest it might be those firing them but I'm sure Abdul would assure us the Ottoman soldier was very best on the planet in all areas, must of been the Germans I guess. :D

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 4th, 2007, 03:08 AM
According to the Ottoman sources, which Western historians can never be bothered to consult, they were holding fire against the BBs unless they had clear shots that could do damage and waiting for the British to try minesweeping - on one attempt, 6 trawlers were sent in and the Ottomans sank four, damaged the other two, and severely damaged an accompanying light cruiser. That's not "ineffective". As I said, the British never got close enough to the heavy modern guns that would have caused the BBs problems. Also, I don't know where you got the figure that only 33 sailors were hit by guns; the damage done to Entente ships was far greater than that, and totally defeated minesweeping, which was the purpose of the howitzers; the mines were for the BBs, where they were very effective.

In any case, the Ottomans, who contrary to the opinions of just about everyone around here, were NOT actually drooling idiots, had observed that the Entente lines tended to turn to starboard after "silencing" the guns to make way for the next line, and laid a minefield in a parallel line intended to exploit this fact, and since it worked, sinking three BBs and crippling four, maybe they weren't exactly "beaten" after all. I don't tend to give much credence to single observers of no particular importance who opine that the Ottomans had apparently just give up bothering to try to defend their capital, and maybe give a bit more weight to the admirals in charge who judged that the attempt was hopeless.

I'm not sure why you give more credence to a "nameless staff officer" over the ammunition expenditure reports of the General Staff. As I told you, some guns were running low on ready ammunition; if there were intercepted communications it would be "could you send some shells over here, please".

Well both the War minister staff officer, the German on the scene and the German communications Britain intercepted would seem to cast doubt on that unless modern shells != armour piercing shells.



Oh I know they weren't destroyed but they were silenced.

The paper puts it thusly

"The bombardment from the French ships continued
until 1345. As the French fired on the shore defenses, the Turkish gunfire became more and
more sporadic, until it completely stopped. Shortly before 1400 the French squadron began to
retire as the third line of ships began to move forward. It was at this time that the Bouvet hit a
mine and sank suddenly. The third line of ships moved up and continued to fire until 1600.
The Turkish guns responded very sporadically at first but soon fell silent again."

The opion of the British man of the scene (who was up front with teh mine layers for most of the campaign and thus new what fire to expect from the guns) was

“I had a most indelible impression that we were in the presence of a beaten
foe. I thought he was beaten at 2pm, I knew he was beaten at 4pm, and at midnight I knew with still greater certainty that he was absolutely beaten.”



Yes there is map showing the belts of mines and the positions of both the fixed and mobile defences.

However the guns were silenced and that means the mine sweepers could have done there job even if there were losses (although frankly it seems like the guns couldn't do much to the sweepers at any rate).

I have grave doubts about the ability of the Turk guns to do anything of substance, they didn't sink a single vessel during the campaign and only caused 33 casualties, true the most powerful defences weren't faced but they seem to be rather less than a deadly threat.

Darkling
January 4th, 2007, 03:58 AM
According to the Ottoman sources, which Western historians can never be bothered to consult, they were holding fire against the BBs unless they had clear shots that could do damage

And the British sources report heavy but ineffective fire at times and reducing fire at other times.

If the Ottomans were waiting for their bets shots and still were ineffective it;s doesn't speak well of the ability of the guns.

and waiting for the British to try minesweeping - on one attempt, 6 trawlers were sent in and the Ottomans sank four, damaged the other two, and severely damaged an accompanying light cruiser.

When?

I ask because the things I have read only mention minesweepers going down to mines, this is also backed up by the fact that Churchill said this (at the time to the Admiral in charge)

"I do not understand why minesweepers should be interfered with by
firing which causes no casualties."

Now as First Lord of the Admiralty and being the proud parent of the campaign I expect Churchill would be aware if large numbers of the minesweepers were getting destroyed by the firing, I would also expect the Admiral in charge to be aware of this fact and correct him.

Are you sure these minesweepers weren't struck by mines or merely fled in the face of Ottoman fire?

I also find it unlikely that these sinkings could have occurred and not warrant mention anywhere with one paper going out of it's way to point out that the guns didn't sink anything and a quotation of only 33 killed by the guns which seems too low if 4 mine layers were sunk by the guns in addition to the other killed (and since you are probably alleging that this was just the tip of the iceberg that 33 seems way too low).

As I said, the British never got close enough to the heavy modern guns that would have caused the BBs problems.

And where were the heavy guns located because the forts of the inner defences seemed to have the heavy guns spread between them and the allied ships were in fact hit by heavy shells.


In any case, the Ottomans, who contrary to the opinions of just about everyone around here, were NOT actually drooling idiots, had observed that the Entente lines tended to turn to starboard after "silencing" the guns to make way for the next line, and laid a minefield in a parallel line intended to exploit this fact, and since it worked, sinking three BBs and crippling four, maybe they weren't exactly "beaten" after all.

Yes I was aware and I can also spot an irrelevancy when I see it.

We were discussing the gun ability to fire,you are either trying to evade the issue of just trying to preach about how great the Ottomans were, I have little interest in the latter and the former is just wasting our time.

I don't tend to give much credence to single observers of no particular importance who opine that the Ottomans had apparently just give up bothering to try to defend their capital, and maybe give a bit more weight to the admirals in charge who judged that the attempt was hopeless.

I think the chip on your shoulder is leading you to read into things, he didn't say they have given up defending their capital he judged them to have been thrown into sufficient confusion that the mine sweepers could do their job.

As for the Admirals involved (although I'm glad you think they knew what was going on for the first point about mine sweeping casualties), I very much doubt you are unaware of the fact that De Roebuck was unhappy and cautious throughout (and even then he considered reopening the attack and was mainly stopped by the imagined floating mine threat) so it seems odd you would fail to take it into account, since all of his actions are recorded by western sources it is all as unreliable so why cherry pick?

I'm not sure why you give more credence to a "nameless staff officer" over the ammunition expenditure reports of the General Staff.

You mean why do a give more credence to intercepts, Germans on the scene and an official working at the war ministry.

So the question becomes why the incongruity?

As I told you, some guns were running low on ready ammunition; if there were intercepted communications it would be "could you send some shells over here, please".

No the intercepted communications were German and indicated that both ammunition and moral was low in the area shortly before the attack, of course that is a report by one group of westerners intercepted and recorded by another group of westerners so.....

However if you concede that the ammunition was running low in the forts that would seem to potentially solve the problem, the forts were almost out they just had more available once they had time to restock from wherever it was stocked locally although this wasn't doable under fire.

Please keep the Ottoman cheer leading to a minimum I don't really care one way or the other with regards to them, I'm interested in the scenario.

Abdul Hadi Pasha
January 4th, 2007, 04:19 AM
If "ineffective" means "winning", than I guess the Ottomans were "ineffective". Interesting that anything but "Ottomans are ineffective" is "Ottoman cheering". Whatever.

And the British sources report heavy but ineffective fire at times and reducing fire at other times.

If the Ottomans were waiting for their bets shots and still were ineffective it;s doesn't speak well of the ability of the guns.



When?

I ask because the things I have read only mention minesweepers going down to mines, this is also backed up by the fact that Churchill said this (at the time to the Admiral in charge)

"I do not understand why minesweepers should be interfered with by
firing which causes no casualties."

Now as First Lord of the Admiralty and being the proud parent of the campaign I expect Churchill would be aware if large numbers of the minesweepers were getting destroyed by the firing, I would also expect the Admiral in charge to be aware of this fact and correct him.

Are you sure these minesweepers weren't struck by mines or merely fled in the face of Ottoman fire?

I also find it unlikely that these sinkings could have occurred and not warrant mention anywhere with one paper going out of it's way to point out that the guns didn't sink anything and a quotation of only 33 killed by the guns which seems too low if 4 mine layers were sunk by the guns in addition to the other killed (and since you are probably alleging that this was just the tip of the iceberg that 33 seems way too low).



And where were the heavy guns located because the forts of the inner defences seemed to have the heavy guns spread between them and the allied ships were in fact hit by heavy shells.




Yes I was aware and I can also spot an irrelevancy when I see it.

We were discussing the gun ability to fire,you are either trying to evade the issue of just trying to preach about how great the Ottomans were, I have little interest in the latter and the former is just wasting our time.



I think the chip on your shoulder is leading you to read into things, he didn't say they have given up defending their capital he judged them to have been thrown into sufficient confusion that the mine sweepers could do their job.

As for the Admirals involved (although I'm glad you think they knew what was going on for the first point about mine sweeping casualties), I very much doubt you are unaware of the fact that De Roebuck was unhappy and cautious throughout (and even then he considered reopening the attack and was mainly stopped by the imagined floating mine threat) so it seems odd you would fail to take it into account, since all of his actions are recorded by western sources it is all as unreliable so why cherry pick?



You mean why do a give more credence to intercepts, Germans on the scene and an official working at the war ministry.

So the question becomes why the incongruity?



No the intercepted communications were German and indicated that both ammunition and moral was low in the area shortly before the attack, of course that is a report by one group of westerners intercepted and recorded by another group of westerners so.....

However if you concede that the ammunition was running low in the forts that would seem to potentially solve the problem, the forts were almost out they just had more available once they had time to restock from wherever it was stocked locally although this wasn't doable under fire.

Please keep the Ottoman cheer leading to a minimum I don't really care one way or the other with regards to them, I'm interested in the scenario.

Cockroach
January 4th, 2007, 05:04 AM
and cost the Ottomans "two battleships (albeit obsolete) and one destroyer, five gunboats, nine troop transports, seven supply ships, 35 steamers and 188 assorted smaller vessels.".
Is this correct? Other sources, namely a quote from Commander Stoker of the submarine AE2 indicate that a Cruiser of the Peik-E-Shethek class may have been sunk.
At a range of three to four hundred yards I fired the bow torpedo, ordering 70 yards to avoid a destroyer which was attempting to ram on the port side. As the vessel dived the destroyer passed overhead close, and the torpedo was heard to hit... Through the periscope I judged the position to be immediately under Serina Burnu, and I further observed two destroyers, a gunboat, and several small craft standing close off in the Straits firing heavily and a cluster of small boats which I judged to be picking up survivors of the cruiser.
Sourced from Article on AE2 at Sea Power Center (Australia) (http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/ships/ae2.html)

Darkling
January 4th, 2007, 10:31 AM
Is this correct? Other sources, namely a quote from Commander Stoker of the submarine AE2 indicate that a Cruiser of the Peik-E-Shethek class may have been sunk.

Sourced from Article on AE2 at Sea Power Center (Australia) (http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/history/ships/ae2.html)

Australian war memorial (http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/ae2/index.htm) indicates that the AE2 sunk a gunboat instead.