Leipzig, 1813- The Prize of a Lifetime

[Anaxagoras]

On the night of October 15, 1813, the night before the Battle of Leipzig began, French Colonel Marbot noticed what appeared to be a group of Allied staff officers observing the French line from a nearby hill. Hoping to snatch some easy prisoners, he sent forward some squadrons of cavalry to capture them. Alerted when a French soldier accidently fired his weapon, the Allied "officers" turned and fled, barely escaping capture.

Only later was it discovered that the group of Allied "staff officers" included Czar Alexander I of Russia, King Frederick William III of Prussia and some of the most important generals of the Russian and Prussian armies.

What if Colonel Marbot had captured this bag of prisoners?

[Wendell]

On the night of October 15, 1813, the night before the Battle of Leipzig began, French Colonel Marbot noticed what appeared to be a group of Allied staff officers observing the French line from a nearby hill. Hoping to snatch some easy prisoners, he sent forward some squadrons of cavalry to capture them. Alerted when a French soldier accidently fired his weapon, the Allied "officers" turned and fled, barely escaping capture.

Only later was it discovered that the group of Allied "staff officers" included Czar Alexander I of Russia, King Frederick William III of Prussia and some of the most important generals of the Russian and Prussian armies.

What if Colonel Marbot had captured this bag of prisoners?
Maybe he gets favorable peace talks?

[Max Sinister]

Napoleon might even beat the leaderless and confused (and thus not very well-led) armies. The whole countries could fall into confusion (not to mention the shame for the rulers). Napoleon could continue to rule. Maybe the defeat in Russia makes him a bit wiser, so he doesn't go and start the next war immediately after.

[Anaxagoras]

It seems to me that either Napoleon can now beat the Allied army at Leipzig, which would be largely leaderless and confused. After all, he came close to winning anyway. Indeed, it is even possible that the Russian and Prussian troops would not engage the French when their monarchs are Napoleon's prisoners, leading the Austrians to Napoleon's not-so-tender mercies.

On the other hand, it might have resulted in a peace favorable to Napoleon on the spot.

[Kidblast]

Oh...

This sounds good.

Napoleon would get his peace treaty, and most likely the terms would be quite good for him. He would go and sort out Spain, and most likely stay as ruler of France for a while longer.

[Wendell]

Oh...

This sounds good.

Napoleon would get his peace treaty, and most likely the terms would be quite good for him. He would go and sort out Spain, and most likely stay as ruler of France for a while longer.
His lineage might even last on the throne until the present.

[Redbeard]

Napoleon might even beat the leaderless and confused (and thus not very well-led) armies. The whole countries could fall into confusion (not to mention the shame for the rulers). Napoleon could continue to rule. Maybe the defeat in Russia makes him a bit wiser, so he doesn't go and start the next war immediately after.

If for a moment ignoring the moral issue of loosing a couple of main monarchs I'd claim that loosing especially Alexander would greatly enhance the allied leadership.

The commander of the allied army was Schwarzenberg, aided by a very competent Chief of Staff Radetzky, and both frequently complained about interferrence from the allied monarchs, especially Alexander. The complaint is generally supported by historians and even Blücher later claimed that Schwarzenberg had a very difficult task with three monarchs present.

Schwarzenberg rarely nowadays gets credit for the campaign, but IMHO he and Radetzky did a superb job, and to the degree that successes were lost they can mainly be referred to Alexander's interferrence. For instance it was Alexander who refused to commit Russian troops west of the Elster/Pleisse, and thus prohibitted a blocking position in favourable terrain west of Leipzig. Schwarzenberg instead committed a single Austrian Armycorps here (Guylai IIRC) to do probing attacks. This has later been seen as undecisiveness from Schwarzenberg, but in reality was a brilliant utilisation of a difficult situation - Gyulai's probes effectively drew French forces from other sectors - greatly contributing to the allied victory.

Back to the ATL having Alexander and Wilhelm seriously risks having morale collpase in the Russian and Prussian armies. And although the Austrian Army was the biggest and best of the three, it couldn't alone match the Grande Armee. I guess it would do a fighting withdrawal into the Bohemian mountains like it did after Dresden while Napoleon massacres the Russians and Prussians.

Of the Russian and Prussian officers captured Gneisenau will be a true loss. He was the chief of staff to Blücher and in reality the leader (Blücher was mad as a hatter, but a brilliant symbol for the men). If on the other hand Gneisenau escapes, the allied cause might not be lost.

Regards

Steffen Redbeards

[Oddball]

(Blücher was mad as a hatter, ...

:D :D :D :D :D

That must be the least favourable comment about Blücher I have ever read... :D

[Anaxagoras]

Schwarzenberg rarely nowadays gets credit for the campaign, but IMHO he and Radetzky did a superb job

Schwarzenberg has always been criticized as being far too cautious and slow. But there were several reasons for his adopting of this approach.

1. He was up against Napoleon, for God's sake. I'd be cautious, too.
2. The Austrian army he commanded was huge, but it was also the last army the exhausted nation could have raised. He needed to preserve it at all costs, not only as an assurance against the French, but against the Prussians and Russians.
3. The Austrians did not really want Napoleon overthrown- they just wanted France reduced to the 1792 borders so as to allow Austria to regain its influence in Germany.

[Redbeard]

:D :D :D :D :D

That must be the least favourable comment about Blücher I have ever read... :D

Well just wait. He apparently in a short speech to his troops just before Waterloo claimed that he was pregnant and was going to give birth to an elephant. The father was a French grenadier :eek:

He was taken into protective custody and missed most of the battle, but obviously this never took up any prominet place in the official history - to put it mildly.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[Redbeard]

Schwarzenberg has always been criticized as being far too cautious and slow. But there were several reasons for his adopting of this approach.

1. He was up against Napoleon, for God's sake. I'd be cautious, too.
2. The Austrian army he commanded was huge, but it was also the last army the exhausted nation could have raised. He needed to preserve it at all costs, not only as an assurance against the French, but against the Prussians and Russians.
3. The Austrians did not really want Napoleon overthrown- they just wanted France reduced to the 1792 borders so as to allow Austria to regain its influence in Germany.

Pleased to see that I'm not the only one with some degree of understanding of Schwarzenberg. Concerning 3 it is certainly true that Austria would like a reasonably strong France to balance Russia and Prussia (close to being a Russian vassal), but I'm not sure it had operational consequences in holding back the Austrian armies. After all Schwarzenberg's and Radetzky's original plan for Leipzig meant a good blocking position on the causeway leading westward from Leipzig over the swampy area. Letting the main army take up a position here would most likely have meant the anihilation of the Grande Armee.

The cautious operational concept anyway was the most suitable for the allies, slowly tightening the loop while not letting yourself commit in a battle with Napoleon himself before having all armies in reach of its other. Conducting such an operation by 1813 communications IMHO is very impressive, and it must also be remarked that Napoleon's attention most of the time was towards the Austrians while subordinates were send towards the other allies - and lost.

At the opening of Leipzig Schwarzenberg has been critisised for placing 2nd AC and the Armyreserve in the difficult terrain between Elster and Pleisse. But there is no proof in his orders for the day that a main trust was planned here. The postion was good for reaching a number of likely main battlefields and posed a serious flankthreat to Napoleon against which he had to commit forces needed elsewhere. As a culmination of the autumn campaign Leipzig IMHO was conducted perfectly: cautiously tightening the loop while awaiting to see where N. put his main trust (Wachau), and then committing the main allied force to crush the last French hope for victory.

It surely would have been handy with a anihilating victory, but Alexander had himself prevented that before the battle.

If Schwarzenberg at some time intentionally avoided to push too hard it probably was in the pursuit after the battle, which was performed in a still very cautious manner, but leaving Wrede in trouble at Hanau in late October. They knew very litte of each others operations, but Wrede believed the allied main army was close and that he only faced stragglers - then N. himself and the Imperial Guard shows up - upps!

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[Anaxagoras]

Getting back to the POD, how would Schwartzenberg have responded if, with a sudden trick of fate, the Russian and Prussian armies had realize their monarchs and chief generals were Napoleon's prisoners? If the Russian and Prussian armies had been taken out of the equation, the Austrians would have faced the harrowing prospect of a very pissed off Grande Armee able to focus almost its entire might against them.

[Kidblast]

My guess is the Russians go back home, since

a: They wouldn't be directly affected by Napoleon, and Napoleon wasn't going to try anything any time soon.

B: Much of the impetus of the Russian Invasion of France was Alexander's desire for revenge. If that was gone, I doubt the Russians would stick around.

[Redbeard]

Getting back to the POD, how would Schwartzenberg have responded if, with a sudden trick of fate, the Russian and Prussian armies had realize their monarchs and chief generals were Napoleon's prisoners? If the Russian and Prussian armies had been taken out of the equation, the Austrians would have faced the harrowing prospect of a very pissed off Grande Armee able to focus almost its entire might against them.

The standard operational procedure of the Austrian Army in case of being pressed by Napoleon was to withdraw into the Bohemian mountains, like they did after Leipzig. Before 1809 you would seriously have risked being caught up with and encircled, but by 1813 the French Army had too large a part of young recruits and bad horses.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard