IJNAF/IJAAF '46

[mcdo]

I have seen a few "Luftwaffe '46" threads in here, but I don't remember one for the Empire of Japan. So, the scenario is this: for whatever reason, the atomic bomb won't be ready until late 46 or even early 47. The US has decided a ground invasion is too costly, and are trying a total blockade, possibly combined with invasions into Taiwan and southern Korea. The rest of the war goes the same as before. Japanese cities are still subject to bombing. A small but growing number of ad-hoc aircraft factories are set up in railroad tunnels and caves, deep in the mountains.

So, what kind of aircraft might see use (albeit in tiny numbers) that never did OTL?

Ki-83 heavy fighters?
J7W interceptors?
"Kikka" jet craft?
Some kind of "Ohka", rail-launched and powered by a V1-style ramjet?

[Macragge1]

A couple of lads with kites. If they're lucky.

[mcdo]

A couple of lads with kites. If they're lucky.

How do you figure? They didn't run out of planes in OTL, and that was with purposefully crashing them into ships. Hell, they didn't even completely stop designing new planes--both the J7W and the J9Y were test-flown in August of 1945. Despite the horrible toll of the bombing, if the war goes on, I see no reason to think they won't get at least a couple new types into service.

[John Farson]

How do you figure? They didn't run out of planes in OTL, and that was with purposefully crashing them into ships. Hell, they didn't even completely stop designing new planes--both the J7W and the J9Y were test-flown in August of 1945. Despite the horrible toll of the bombing, if the war goes on, I see no reason to think they won't get at least a couple new types into service.

But how will they fly them? With alcohol? Even without the bombs they weren't gonna last much longer.

[Riain]

They have to bring new planes into service in 1943 before you can even think about 1946.

[Emperor Norton I]

http://cghub.com/forum/showthread.php?t=1552
http://www.aeroscale.co.uk/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=1431

[mcdo]

But how will they fly them? With alcohol? Even without the bombs they weren't gonna last much longer.

Fuel shortages are going to be a big problem, much as they were for Germany in 1945. However, the jet and ramjet powered craft actually could be powered by alcohol mixes. Also, In addition, the Japanese did have a (limited) synthetic fuel program. I think they may be able to power a few flights, anyway. I am not trying to come up with a scenario for a whole, useful Japanese air force to combat the bomber streams. I am just pointing out that they had a lot of aircraft in development--some even having been test-flown--and wondering which may have seen combat if given a few more months.

They have to bring new planes into service in 1943 before you can even think about 1946.

The Ki-61 was introduced in 1943, and the superb Ki-84 was test-flown that year. Those are just the famous ones. The reason the Japanese air forces were still flying Zeros and Hayabusas at the end was because they couldn't produce as many new types as they needed. It was not because they didn't bother to design and introduce more modern craft.

http://cghub.com/forum/showthread.php?t=1552
http://www.aeroscale.co.uk/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=1431

Thank you very much. I had heard of some of these, but I did not know all these details. The pictures are especially interesting.

[Riain]

Their failure to compete in the air from 1943 is what doomed them by 1945. If they were competitive in the air by introducing new aircraft in good numbers by 1943 they may still have enough breathing space to introduce their miriacle 1946 models.

[hairysamarian]

Their failure to compete in the air from 1943 is what doomed them by 1945. If they were competitive in the air by introducing new aircraft in good numbers by 1943 they may still have enough breathing space to introduce their miriacle 1946 models.


Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a blockaded and bombarded Japan somehow finds the industrial wherewithal to produce new aircraft in useful numbers (otherwise what's the point of building them at all?). They had plenty of old ones, we already know that. Further suppose that they manage to make all these new aircraft run on some sort of alcohol mixture, or something else their shattered infrastructure can still make and distribute.

Who then is going to fly these planes on anything other than suicide missions, for which skilled pilots aren't needed? By mid-'44 the Japanese had lost more of their trained pilots than they would be able to replace during the war. By October '44 empty carriers were being used as decoys during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. By the time 45/46 rolls around, it seems far too late for any useful recovery for Japanese air power.

[mcdo]

By the time 45/46 rolls around, it seems far too late for any useful recovery for Japanese air power.

This was never supposed to be about a recovery in Japanese air power. I realize that it is far too late for that. However, in August 1945, at least two new Japanese aircraft types had their test flights, including one jet aircraft. The point of this thread was simply to explore what would happen if those aircraft had time to see combat, in whatever tiny numbers they are available. I am under no illusions about changing the outcome of the war. I just wanted to discuss some little-known and IMHO interesting late war designs.

[MattII]

Unless they were using some kind of home-made fuel (alcohol from Sake or something), not a lot, it was lack of fuel that stuffed the Japanese, not lack of aircraft. The reason the Enola Gay and Bockstar weren't intercepted was because the Japanese didn't think such tiny formations could do enough damage to warrant expending the fuel on them.

[Elfwine]

This was never supposed to be about a recovery in Japanese air power. I realize that it is far too late for that. However, in August 1945, at least two new Japanese aircraft types had their test flights, including one jet aircraft. The point of this thread was simply to explore what would happen if those aircraft had time to see combat, in whatever tiny numbers they are available. I am under no illusions about changing the outcome of the war. I just wanted to discuss some little-known and IMHO interesting late war designs.

I'm tempted to ask: Would anyone notice, beyond "Hey that's a funny plane." observations by a few sharp eyed people?

Japan is so far gone by this point in so many ways that even if the invasion doesn't happen and even if the a-bomb isn't ready, its running off a cliff, Wiley E. Coyote style (which is to say, the instant he looks down, the fact he's in midair kicks in...)

This isn't really an environment where any new designs will have have much chance to be anything other than curiosities.

"Saw a funny Jap plane today. Had no prop."
"Aw, pull the other one."
"No, for reals!"

[hairysamarian]

This was never supposed to be about a recovery in Japanese air power. I realize that it is far too late for that....
Fair enough
...what would happen if those aircraft had time to see combat, in whatever tiny numbers they are available. I am under no illusions about changing the outcome of the war
You've answered your own question. A few prototypes, perhaps? Curiosities that, for lack of fuel, spare parts and pilots, have little discernible impact on the war. Perhaps a jet design that might get studied after the war by the victors, but I think there already was one of those IOTL.

[Color-Copycat]

Their best pilots would be dead by then. Rate of attrition was presumably worse than anything the Luftwaffe went through thanks to the kamikaze attacks.

[hairysamarian]

Their best pilots would be dead by then. Rate of attrition was presumably worse than anything the Luftwaffe went through thanks to the kamikaze attacks.

Kamikaze attacks began after their best pilots were already dead, thanks to the results of engagements such as Midway and Leyte Gulf.

[mcdo]

Their best pilots would be dead by then. Rate of attrition was presumably worse than anything the Luftwaffe went through thanks to the kamikaze attacks.

Kamikaze attacks began after their best pilots were already dead, thanks to the results of engagements such as Midway and Leyte Gulf.

Attrition was really bad, sure, but that doesn't mean they would have no skilled pilots left. We are talking about staffing maybe one flight wing.

Here is a list of aces who survived the war. It is not a complete list.
Incidentally, many of these guys made ace--or at least got kills--late in the war. If you manage to down a P-51D or a P-38J in a Ki-43II, you must be pretty talented, IMHO. If one of these guys did manage to climb into the cockpit of a Kikka, they may do some damage. Will it change the course of the war? Of course not. But if the war goes on another month or two, I don't think it is out of the question to see at least one flight.

Name-->Kills--->Branch of Service--->Notes

Kenichi Abe 10 (five jointly) IJN; survived World War II.

Takahide Aioi 10 IJN; Five of the victories came in the Second Sino-Japan War; survived World War II.

Sadaaki Akamatsu 27 IJN; Eleven of the victories came in the Second Sino-Japan War; survived World War II

Satoru Anabuki 39 IJA; survived World War II

Yoshio Fukui 11 IJN 4 probables, survived World War II.

Watari Handa 13 IJN, survived World War II.

Chitoshi Isozaki 12 IJN survived World War II.

Tetsuzō Iwamoto 80 IJN survived World War II (80 confirmed, +7 probable)

Yoshinao Kodaira 13 IJN survived World War II

Sodamu Komachi 12 IJN still alive

Masaichi Kondō 13 IJN survived World War II.

Akio Matsuba 18 IJN still alive

Mitsugu Mori 9 IJN died 1960

Kenji Okabe 15 IJN Okabe was credited with shooting down eight enemy aircraft on 8 May 1942 during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the IJN's official record for the
number of aircraft destroyed in a single encounter. [1] He is famous for his strong opposition to the kamikaze attacks, rare in IJN at the time. Still alive

Satoru Ono 8 IJN survived the war

Saburo Sakai 64+ IJN died 2000

Masao Sasakibara 12 IJN died 2005

Masaaki Shimakawa 8 IJN died 1997

Kazuno Onada 9 IJN still alive

[hairysamarian]

Attrition was really bad, sure, but that doesn't mean they would have no skilled pilots left. We are talking about staffing maybe one flight wing.


And here I thought I was the picky one. Ok, most of their good pilots were dead. So even if they scrounged through their remaining forces and gathered their remaining trained veterans into one unit, it's hard to imagine, material conditions being what they were, that a single wing could have a significant impact.

I suppose you could imagine some great dogfights during the end days, in a lost cause, but even that is debatable. By the war's end the Allies (meaning mostly the Americans in this theater) had fine pilots too, and great planes, and far more of both than the Japanese. The fights wouldn't approach anything like even odds; the attackers would just be too numerous.

[mcdo]

And here I thought I was the picky one. Ok, most of their good pilots were dead. So even if they scrounged through their remaining forces and gathered their remaining trained veterans into one unit, it's hard to imagine, material conditions being what they were, that a single wing could have a significant impact.

I suppose you could imagine some great dogfights during the end days, in a lost cause, but even that is debatable. By the war's end the Allies (meaning mostly the Americans in this theater) had fine pilots too, and great planes, and far more of both than the Japanese. The fights wouldn't approach anything like even odds; the attackers would just be too numerous.

That is all I ever wanted. I have tried to explain this already, but I must not have been clear. I am NOT trying to change the outcome of the war. I am not even trying to get good dogfights. I am just trying to discuss good--and little-known--late war designs. All I really want to see if a nice flight of three jets (or the cool-looking Shinden) try to intercept a bomber stream. Feel free to have them shot down right away. Is that really so much to ask?

[hairysamarian]

That is all I ever wanted. I have tried to explain this already, but I must not have been clear. I am NOT trying to change the outcome of the war. I am not even trying to get good dogfights. I am just trying to discuss good--and little-known--late war designs. All I really want to see if a nice flight of three jets (or the cool-looking Shinden) try to intercept a bomber stream. Feel free to have them shot down right away. Is that really so much to ask?

[chuckle] If I were the Japanese pilot involved, I might have an objection.

I suppose the reason I keep straying aside into comments like "there would be no impact" is that I can't understand why or how such a force, minimal as it might be, would ever get off the deck. If they couldn't put enough of these in the air to have a presence, why would Japan pour resources into trying to produce them? They were in no position to indulge in speculative research.

"Got a cool prototype here, sir. Fine aircraft"
"Do we have enough fuel?"
"Err, no"
"Pilots? Spare Parts?"
"Err, no."
"How many can we build?"
"Oh, many twenty. If B-san doesn't flatten the remaining factory."

I get that you aren't looking to change the war's result. My trouble is that I don't even see a likely time line where these craft get into the air (except, as noted, for some prototypes).

[CalBear]

The real difficulty for the Japanese was that they had enormous trouble with the construction of really high powered engines. This was mainly a function of supply difficulties, and of production pressures and the attendant shortcuts, but Japanese aircraft engines, especially those used in the 1943 and later designs had simply awful reliability. The further you get into the war, the worse this becomes.

This problem was made even worse by the "mindset" of the Japanese maintenance system. While U.S. practice was to strip every washer off of a plane that had been written off, the Japanese did not follow this practice. This may have had something to do with the horrific losses that scythed through the mechanics ranks, especially of the IJN, but also of the IJAAF. One of the things that U.S. support forces were constantly surprised by was the number of aircraft that the Japanese would have in their "total loss" junkyards that could quickly be brought back into action by taking a part or two (literally) off of the plane right next to the "dead" one, bolting them in place, and hitting the starter. This is all the more surprising when you look at the brilliance that the Japanese showed in making do as the Americans closed in for the kill, but it happened virtually every time the Americans came across Japanese airfields.

While the Japanese did have some exceptional pilots who survived the war, the overwhelming majority did not. This was, in part, due to the Japanese practice (similar to that of the Luftwaffe) of keeping pilots out on the cutting edge for WAY too long, but it was mainly due to the fact that there was a dramatic drop-off in pilot quality throughout the ranks as the war progressed. Pilots who would have never been allowed to climb into a cockpit without an instructor in 1942 were flight leaders in late 1944. With a few brilliant pilots and a gaggle of amateurs flying with them, the cream of the Japanese pilot corps was simply obliterated by the onslaught of meticulously trained and robustly equipped American naval aviators. Even the best pilot has a limited life span when confronted by four or five men who are his near equal, all of whom are flying more survivable aircraft and who are trained to fight as a team. That Sakai and any of his brethren survived the war was miraculous. The chances of them making it into mid 1946 would have be miniscule.

One also needs to keep in mind that a war that stretched into 1946 would also result in the Americans deploying a number of rather spectacular aircraft that were, IOTL, simply tossed aside on the cusp of production. For every J7W, there was a F8B (probably the ultimate expression of the carrier piston powered fighter, with all due respect to the wonderful Sea Fury), for every Ki-87 there was a F8F, for every Ki-83 there was a F7F. Actually there would have been 10 of each U.S. design for every Japanese airframe, backed up by thousands of late model F4U & F6F, as well as the the FH Phantom, the FJ-1, and AAF aircraft like the P-47N, P-51H, & P-80.

The reality is that the "advanced" Japanese designs were actually 1944/ early 1945 aircraft that were delayed due to conditions and by late 1945 or early 1946 would have been available in small numbers to face many times their number of actual 1946 designs flown by both veteran naval pilots and by AAF pilots who had learned their trade over the Reich.

[Elfwine]

The real difficulty for the Japanese was that they had enormous trouble with the construction of really high powered engines. This was mainly a function of supply difficulties, and of production pressures and the attendant shortcuts, but Japanese aircraft engines, especially those used in the 1943 and later designs had simply awful reliability. The further you get into the war, the worse this becomes.

This problem was made even worse by the "mindset" of the Japanese maintenance system. While U.S. practice was to strip every washer off of a plane that had been written off, the Japanese did not follow this practice. This may have had something to do with the horrific losses that scythed through the mechanics ranks, especially of the IJN, but also of the IJAAF. One of the things that U.S. support forces were constantly surprised by was the number of aircraft that the Japanese would have in their "total loss" junkyards that could quickly be brought back into action by taking a part or two (literally) off of the plane right next to the "dead" one, bolting them in place, and hitting the starter. This is all the more surprising when you look at the brilliance that the Japanese showed in making do as the Americans closed in for the kill, but it happened virtually every time the Americans came across Japanese airfields.

While the Japanese did have some exceptional pilots who survived the war, the overwhelming majority did not. This was, in part, due to the Japanese practice (similar to that of the Luftwaffe) of keeping pilots out on the cutting edge for WAY too long, but it was mainly due to the fact that there was a dramatic drop-off in pilot quality throughout the ranks as the war progressed. Pilots who would have never been allowed to climb into a cockpit without an instructor in 1942 were flight leaders in late 1944. With a few brilliant pilots and a gaggle of amateurs flying with them, the cream of the Japanese pilot corps was simply obliterated by the onslaught of meticulously trained and robustly equipped American naval aviators. Even the best pilot has a limited life span when confronted by four or five men who are his near equal, all of whom are flying more survivable aircraft and who are trained to fight as a team. That Sakai and any of his brethren survived the war was miraculous. The chances of them making it into mid 1946 would have be miniscule.


Probably greedy of me to ask for more, but this fascinates me. What is up with that (both the bad mechanical practices and the bad pilot practices)?

Is there a good book or two to consult on this? Or more?

[CalBear]

Probably greedy of me to ask for more, but this fascinates me. What is up with that (both the bad mechanical practices and the bad pilot practices)?

Is there a good book or two to consult on this? Or more?

The bad mechanical practices have long been a puzzle. The Japanese in the post war interrogations mainly shrugged when asked about it (which may have been part of the problem in that the combat commanders, even senior ones, simply had no idea). The situation is mentioned in a number of books, including, IIRC, Fire in the Sky by Eric Bergerud. The best guess among the Americans who saw the situation first hand seems to be that the Japanese mechanics lacked the "shade tree mechanic" mindset that was so common among Americans (and to a degree still is).

IMO it wasn't due to some innate American mechanical gift (Lexus anyone?) but more a function of ever lessening experience among the Japanese mechanical corps. When a carrier was sunk, or an island was about to be lost, the Japanese, like the Americans and British, would hustle the pilots off ASAP, treating them like the jewels they were (this is discussed in some detail in the magnificent Shattered Sword). The ground crews were left behind to fight the fires and try to save the ship or given rifles and provided the opportunity to die for the Emperor. This meant that every ship lost took hundreds of skilled technicians with it, every island cost the Japanese skilled experts who had decades of experience in keeping planes in the air. The Japanese, since they were almost always forced to withdraw after a serious battle from Coral Sea onwards, also had little chance to rescue the thousands of men who wound up in the sea after the loss of major vessels (truthfully, the IJN, perhaps even more than the IJA also had a remarkably indifferent view regarding personnel, treating them with far less concern than any of the other naval combatants). This led to even more serious losses among the enlisted ground crews.

The pilots quality issue is much better known (perhaps because it is so easy to see). At the start of the war the Japanese would look for any excuse to wash out a pilot trainee, simply to brace the rest of the class up. Most of their pilots had vast number of flight hours, partly due to intensive training, mainly due to the fact that there were so few of them. While American pilots had similar flight hours, the U.S. also had a solid reserve of pilots who had left the military and were available to recall to the colors. Many of these were used as training cadre, and the American method of pilot training, including bring back combat vets after a year or less of action, led to a almost assembly line that churned out highly trained pilots in almost mind numbing quantities (the USN, before it cut back as the war wound down, had something like 3+ pilots for every aircraft it owned, with pilots having 400+ flight hours unable to even get a carrier slot, the USAAF was in a similar situation). The Japanese, like the Germans and the Soviets left their pilots out on the bleeding edge for far longer than the Americans; this was partly due to a very different view of training, but in the case of the Japanese it was also due to the difficulties in getting pilots back to Japan from the far flung, increasingly cut off, island bases where they were assigned. As a result the Japanese pilots wound up burning out and breaking down due to constant stress (today we call it PTSD), poor food, and tropical diseases.

While all of these could affect the American pilots, USN ships were cruise ships compared to the Japanese vessels (a famous example is the "critical item" list the Yorktown sent to Pearl after Coral Sea, it included a replacement ice cream machine), and American pilots were pulled of the line after a relatively short tour (even the pilots on Guadalcanal were pulled out after 3-4 months for a rest), and most were back in the States inside of a year of shipping out, never to see combat again (or only after a year or more in the U.S.). Unlike their Japanese counterparts, U.S. pilots on home leave weren't sent back to a country that was gradually being strangled (and by mid 1944, being bombed on an increasingly regular basis). The American pilot's main privation while at home was a lack of gasoline for his private car and too much SPAM and too little steak.

In the end you had an ever dwindling group of exceptionally well trained and experienced Japanese pilots facing a flood of lavishly well equipped, healthy, and highly trained (by combat veterans) pilots led by men who were as experienced as the Japanese, but who had been given a year to recuperate from combat and who lived in better conditions while aboard ship than the Japanese pilot could expect if he was lucky enough to get to the Home Islands for a brief visit.

The American material advantage went WAY beyond higher production of airframes.

[Elfwine]

The bad mechanical practices have long been a puzzle. The Japanese in the post war interrogations mainly shrugged when asked about it (which may have been part of the problem in that the combat commanders, even senior ones, simply had no idea). The situation is mentioned in a number of books, including, IIRC, Fire in the Sky by Eric Bergerud. The best guess among the Americans who saw the situation first hand seems to be that the Japanese mechanics lacked the "shade tree mechanic" mindset that was so common among Americans (and to a degree still is).

Correct me if I'm misreading (since I've never heard the phrase), but the "give me some time and a wrench and it'll be flyable"?


IMO it wasn't due to some innate American mechanical gift (Lexus anyone?) but more a function of ever lessening experience among the Japanese mechanical corps. When a carrier was sunk, or an island was about to be lost, the Japanese, like the Americans and British, would hustle the pilots off ASAP, treating them like the jewels they were (this is discussed in some detail in the magnificent Shattered Sword). The ground crews were left behind to fight the fires and try to save the ship or given rifles and provided the opportunity to die for the Emperor. This meant that every ship lost took hundreds of skilled technicians with it, every island cost the Japanese skilled experts who had decades of experience in keeping planes in the air. The Japanese, since they were almost always forced to withdraw after a serious battle from Coral Sea onwards, also had little chance to rescue the thousands of men who wound up in the sea after the loss of major vessels (truthfully, the IJN, perhaps even more than the IJA also had a remarkably indifferent view regarding personnel, treating them with far less concern than any of the other naval combatants). This led to even more serious losses among the enlisted ground crews. Ugh. For a side short on the material aspects, making the most of the people who could hold things together with chewing gum, bailing wire, and chutzpah should have been a requirement, not...this.

That sort of quality is the kind of thing you need to back up a war machine.


The pilots quality issue is much better known (perhaps because it is so easy to see). At the start of the war the Japanese would look for any excuse to wash out a pilot trainee, simply to brace the rest of the class up. Most of their pilots had vast number of flight hours, partly due to intensive training, mainly due to the fact that there were so few of them. While American pilots had similar flight hours, the U.S. also had a solid reserve of pilots who had left the military and were available to recall to the colors. Many of these were used as training cadre, and the American method of pilot training, including bring back combat vets after a year or less of action, led to a almost assembly line that churned out highly trained pilots in almost mind numbing quantities (the USN, before it cut back as the war wound down, had something like 3+ pilots for every aircraft it owned, with pilots having 400+ flight hours unable to even get a carrier slot, the USAAF was in a similar situation). The Japanese, like the Germans and the Soviets left their pilots out on the bleeding edge for far longer than the Americans; this was partly due to a very different view of training, but in the case of the Japanese it was also due to the difficulties in getting pilots back to Japan from the far flung, increasingly cut off, island bases where they were assigned. As a result the Japanese pilots wound up burning out and breaking down due to constant stress (today we call it PTSD), poor food, and tropical diseases. Not a good start. And getting worse from there. :eek:


While all of these could affect the American pilots, USN ships were cruise ships compared to the Japanese vessels (a famous example is the "critical item" list the Yorktown sent to Pearl after Coral Sea, it included a replacement ice cream machine), and American pilots were pulled of the line after a relatively short tour (even the pilots on Guadalcanal were pulled out after 3-4 months for a rest), and most were back in the States inside of a year of shipping out, never to see combat again (or only after a year or more in the U.S.). Unlike their Japanese counterparts, U.S. pilots on home leave weren't sent back to a country that was gradually being strangled (and by mid 1944, being bombed on an increasingly regular basis). The American pilot's main privation while at home was a lack of gasoline for his private car and too much SPAM and too little steak. Seems like this could have been managed better, but...anyone would be screwed there (Japan).

I'm torn between laughing and saluting the idea of an ice cream machine as "critical items". I think it shows a good sense of what you need to keep things running smoothly and not merely going DUTYDUTYDUTY (as in LALALALA) over the rough parts. On the other hand, ice cream. As a critical necessity. Someone has been spoiled. :D


In the end you had an ever dwindling group of exceptionally well trained and experienced Japanese pilots facing a flood of lavishly well equipped, healthy, and highly trained (by combat veterans) pilots led by men who were as experienced as the Japanese, but who had been given a year to recuperate from combat and who lived in better conditions while aboard ship than the Japanese pilot could expect if he was lucky enough to get to the Home Islands for a brief visit.

The American material advantage went WAY beyond higher production of airframes.I can't imagine that not ending as it did. Maybe the very very best Japanese pilots might have a slight edge, but they'd also be on the point of burning out, which negates that and then some, and the newbies getting more and more raw makes them (the vets) have to try doubly hard to make up for it, which makes all the problems worse...

Talk about a way to lose a war, Japan.

[Life In Black]

I can't imagine that not ending as it did. Maybe the very very best Japanese pilots might have a slight edge, but they'd also be on the point of burning out, which negates that and then some, and the newbies getting more and more raw makes them (the vets) have to try doubly hard to make up for it, which makes all the problems worse...

Talk about a way to lose a war, Japan.

That burnout continued postwar as well. Look at the tragic story of one of the IJN's best aces: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tetsuz%C5%8D_Iwamoto

[mcdo]

Many of these were used as training cadre, and the American method of pilot training, including bring back combat vets after a year or less of action, led to a almost assembly line that churned out highly trained pilots The Japanese, like the Germans and the Soviets left their pilots out on the bleeding edge for far longer than the Americans; this was partly due to a very different view of training, but in the case of the Japanese it was also due to the difficulties in getting pilots back to Japan from the far flung, increasingly cut off, island bases where they were assigned.

I recently purchased a new Osprey book, Ki-44 "Shoki" Aces of WWII. It talks about how, when the bombing raids over Japan began in earnest, they pulled the remaining Shoki units out of China to use as anti-bomber interceptors in Japan. Surprisingly, they actually tried to use the best (or at least highest-ranking) Shoki pilots as trainers, as they realized they would soon need a lot more interceptor pilots. However, even when they finally *tried* to give long-serving pilots a break from front-line service (to serve as flight instructors), it didn't work out. The training center airfields, like everything else in Japan, were under constant air attack. The "training" ended up amounting to allowing the student pilots to watch the experts actually fighting, in a desperate attempt to protect the training centers. Not exactly good for unit morale...

That burnout continued postwar as well. Look at the tragic story of one of the IJN's best aces: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tetsuz%C5%8D_Iwamoto

Man, that must be really hard. To try your best to fight for your country, and then lose the war, is hard enough. But this guy had to go from respected war hero to blacklisted from any and all employment. Even today in Japanese culture it is somewhat shameful to not be able to get a job and provide for your family. It must have been even worse then.

I can understand why the Allies would want to root out war criminals, but why a mid-ranking pilot officer? He didn't have the opportunity to commit war crimes himself, and he didn't have the rank to order others to do so.

[Elfwine]

That burnout continued postwar as well. Look at the tragic story of one of the IJN's best aces: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tetsuz%C5%8D_Iwamoto

Damn. I'm not exactly sympathetic in some sense to anyone in the Imperial Japanese military, but...

What a waste of youth.

And what mcdo said. I'm surprised we only hear of physical problems and not a mental breakdown.

[Just Leo]

It was the Japanese mindset of the time that fighter aircraft were considered disposable assets, same as pilots. There were no heroic efforts to salvage damaged aircraft because they were not designed for salvage. The Zero's wings were manufactured integral with the fuselage and could not be removed or replaced. It was also the Japanese mindset that the Zero was equipped with a voice radio, and there were men assigned to make sure the radio worked, and the aircraft worked, but nobody was assigned to make the radio work in the aircraft, so it didn't.

I presume that the reason there is no Japanese Luft 46 ideas is that there was not enough caves and salt mines in Japan to move their factories to. Of course, moving production underground would be admitting defeat.

[hairysamarian]

I presume that the reason there is no Japanese Luft 46 ideas is that there was not enough caves and salt mines in Japan to move their factories to. Of course, moving production underground would be admitting defeat.

It occurs to me that, since Japan is a country wracked by earthquakes, going underground might not be a great option anyways.

[AdA]

Japanese Armed forces being very rigid the bad rear echelon maintenance could be a result of forward maintenance teams sticking to peace time manuals and doing just routine work and sending non flyable aircraft back to rear depots were lack of personel, overwork and by the book, let's finish this total rebuilt that's first on the line instead of just rushing those two zeros with minor damage back to their units procedures would prevent a triage and priority system.

[mcdo]

It occurs to me that, since Japan is a country wracked by earthquakes, going underground might not be a great option anyways.

Well, earthquakes were a problem. The factory producing the replacement for the Zero, the A7M Reppu, was destroyed in an earthquake. Still, they did manage to build quite a lot underground during the war.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsushiro_Underground_Imperial_Headquarters

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20011008b1.html

And, for those that can read Japanese:

Underground factories in Seto area http://ob.aitai.ne.jp/~tera-m/index.htm

Asakawa underground factory http://www.geocities.jp/takaotown/

Hiyoshidai IJN HQ http://www.jca.apc.org/~p-news/hiyoshi.html

Matsumoto GHQ http://homepage3.nifty.com/kibonoie/

[hairysamarian]

Well, earthquakes were a problem. The factory producing the replacement for the Zero, the A7M Reppu, was destroyed in an earthquake. Still, they did manage to build quite a lot underground during the war.

Interesting. I was aware of the bunker for the Imperial Family, but not the factory. I guess if it was a choice between a possibility of quake-induced collapse or a near-certainty of B29-delivered destruction, they would naturally at least try to dig.

[zoomar]

The reality is that the "advanced" Japanese designs were actually 1944/ early 1945 aircraft that were delayed due to conditions and by late 1945 or early 1946 would have been available in small numbers to face many times their number of actual 1946 designs flown by both veteran naval pilots and by AAF pilots who had learned their trade over the Reich.

I agree. It's more like JNAF/JAAF '44.5. At best, even assuming a "bombing holiday" for some miraculous reason, the new Japanese designs with any real chance of seeing combat service in 1946/1947 (Kikka, J71, Ki-97, Ki-83, A7M, etc) would be at best equivalent (not superior) to US planes already entering service in 1945. And that's assuming each and every one of the Japanese planes performed up to their manufacturers' estimates or early test results, which is virtually impossible given declining standards or workmanship. And they'be be woefully outnumbered and poorly flown by raw recruits.