Normandy 1943.

[victoria944]

Allied landing in Normandy 1943.
Compared to 1944 the Nazi forces and defences are squat in Normandy in 1943, theres no Panzer reserve available, the Nazis are commited to Kursk.
The Sicilian landings used more landing craft and shipping than Overlord, ok
what about a port, take Cherbourg its undefended at this time.

[BlairWitch749]

Allied landing in Normandy 1943.
Compared to 1944 the Nazi forces and defences are squat in Normandy in 1943, theres no Panzer reserve available, the Nazis are commited to Kursk.
The Sicilian landings used more landing craft and shipping than Overlord, ok
what about a port, take Cherbourg its undefended at this time.

there where 6 panzer divisions in france when the kursk offensive was going on... assuming this is at the expense of huskey 3 more can be transferred from italy; there are also 25 german infantry divisions in france

dieppe proved direct assaults on ports are a bad idea; and following dieppe cherbourg and other channel ports had been heavily fortified (Cherbourg was already fortified by the french, but the germans installed larger cannons, bunkers, trench lines, interlocking machine gun bunkers etc)

the allied army is also massively smaller, they have less combat experienced divisions, the air force is smaller and doesn't have total superiority vis a vis the LW


the best case scenario for the allies in a july 43 overlord would be penetrating some distance inland to get their supply depots out of artillery range followed by prolonged stalemate until additional american divisions can be brought in to give them enough striking power to break out

worst case, they get pushed into the drink by the germans

middle to worst case, they penetrate a bit, hold for a while, winter comes and they have to withdraw as bad weather makes their supply network untenable

[trekchu]

I am sure there are people who can put this more eloquently and detailed than me. Off the top of my head:

1) Nowhere near enough landing Craft for Europe and the Pacific at the same time.

2) Ongoing ops in North Africa.

3) IIRC FDR felt that US troops needed more training.

4) No Paras to help.

5) Not enough shipping.

6) And zilch in the way of intelligence. Even if the Allies knew of Kursk ahead of time I doubt they could have re-scheduled their plan (which I think by 1943 was already sheduled for late spring 1944) on time.

[informationfan]

normandy 1943 means:
no air superiority... the allied had not air superiority in this year
kursk is important, but with the invasion in the normandy (so no landing in italy, right? cause after september 43 it is no good idea to cross the channel with an invasion...) the germans have enough forces, better trained, way more experienced as the allied counterparts

the germans have much more weapons superior to the allied ones
the allies lack the advantage of much superior asw... they have started the defeat of the subs, not finished it...

the american troops are green, what happend to green yankees playing with experienced germans could be seen in africa late 1942...

multiply this with 20, cause if the germans cancel kursk, they withdraw the 2nd SS-Tank-corps and bring it to the normandy... even if the allies have mega luck and achive a large bridgehead, the second the german troops from the east are here, it is game over...
why? cause you have no chance to stop em with the allied air force... and the helpless allied tankers fighting the most experienced german troops in tank combat will be very onesided... so it could lightly be a second "frisian experience"... extreme high allied losses achiving nothing.

the germans will be very happy with all the stuff they take from the 200.000 prisoners they will make.

also, without kursk the germans do not throw away their tank reserves... but could draw a lot troops after the massacre from the west

also, without italy invaded (after DDD43 (D-Day-Debacle) it will be free from allied soldiers for around a year) the germans have one front less to care about...

no, normandy 43 is self murderer or a BIG german wank...

[paulo]

Massive defeat of WAllies even if they made a successful landing - reasons already posted...
And pushing second (if) try years away.... or as some people say, welcome to nuked Europe - brrrrrr

Maybe making possible the Anglo Nazi War posted by CalBear.....

[cerebus]

Storming ashore in 1943 is pretty much what the US war plan was in Spring 1942. Whatever you say about Churchill he agreed with his experts that this was a "Bad Idea" Anglo-American relations for the next two years pretty much consist of " Can we invade yet?" "No not yet" "Can we invade yet? " "We get there when we get there!". Until the US had enough men and material in England to make British excuses sound like cowardice. Of course even with everything in favour in 1944 it was a damned close run thing.

I blame strategic war games where it is possible to launch an invasion without preperation.

[AdA]

1. Normandy was never a close run thing. The odds in 1944 were so overwheelmingly in favour of the alies that the debate should be, how could the germans keep them locked up in Normandy for so long.
2. The odds in 43 would be far worst, but not impossible, the balance of forces would not be dissimilar to the one in Italy at the start of the allied assault.
3. The offensive against japan could be placed on hold and marines and amphibious assault material be released for use in Europe. That might be the wrong choice on the long run, but would solve a few logistic problems.
4. The offensive could be timed to coincide with Citadel. The Russians knew they were going to be attacked, and more or less when. They could pass that intel to the allies.
5. German forces in Italy would have to stay there, which means a good decepcion plan. That was what the alies did best.
6.The whole logic of the Air offensive against Germany would have to change.
In the long run, the war on the Pacific would still be ended by the manhatam project and the iron wall could be pushed back a couple of countries, if all went well...

[paulo]

In 43, with less experienced US troops, much less landing ships, contested air war over the beaches and no tank with 17 pdr / 76mm gun - can't see the WAllies having a chance.
BTW, in 43 the damage done to the industry / railroads is much less also and the short fuel problems that Germany have in 44 is in the horizon but not yet in action...
Add also, less info on germany troops / positions.

[Derek Jackson]

Note the Manhatten project being a factor in Japan's defeat requires the US to have islands near enough to fly to Japan

[informationfan]

In 43, with less experienced US troops, much less landing ships, contested air war over the beaches and no tank with 17 pdr / 76mm gun - can't see the WAllies having a chance.
BTW, in 43 the damage done to the industry / railroads is much less also and the short fuel problems that Germany have in 44 is in the horizon but not yet in action...
Add also, less info on germany troops / positions.


and the much better quality of german troops... if we see how many troops hitler draw from to the west after d-day, someone could imagine what would happen in 1943... here the russians had been not so dangerous, so a shorter defence line is possible...

the whole plot with kursk, you know that the invasion need the right weather and sea conditions... so you have only a few days in summer...

it isn´t smart to invade to late... bad weather means no supply... not so good, esp. in 1943 with not so much mullberry parts (means one harbor, if this is damaged, the allies really have serious problems... no, they cannot win this scenario... german army in 1943 is maybe 3-4times as strong as in 1944 - unit for unit... also, kursk as a battle wasn´t the german problem, the battle AFTER kursk, from august-october 1943...

i hope nobody want to invade in autum in normandy, right? :eek::D:p

[BlondieBC]

Allied landing in Normandy 1943.
Compared to 1944 the Nazi forces and defences are squat in Normandy in 1943, theres no Panzer reserve available, the Nazis are commited to Kursk.
The Sicilian landings used more landing craft and shipping than Overlord, ok
what about a port, take Cherbourg its undefended at this time.

Amphibious assaults on fortified ports did not work. It was tried in 1942, and the idea was abandoned.

The allied commanders rejected a 1943 invasion of France, and this was the right call for many reasons. It takes months to prepare, train and plan for a major operation like this one. The troops and ships would largely need to be in England by the Winter of 1942/43.

1) This means no Sicily, and Italy remains in the war. Italian divisions are generally second class divisions, but better more second class divisions compared to none.

2) It likely means no invasion of North Africa. These troops would have been diverted to England. The Axis have a much better opportunity to pull troops out of Africa. This may even butterfly into things like Malta falling. North Africa is in a vastly better situation for the Germans.

3) The Luftwaffe was broken in February/March 1944. An early invasion means a massive and decisive air battle over the skies of northern France in 1943. Lack of air supremacy makes the landing much harder.

4) Much of the intelligence work and specialized equipment is not completed in 1943.

5) The US army is going in with totally green troops and leaders. For example, we lost tanks in North Africa because the ammo was training rounds, not live rounds. Imagine similar type mistakes in Northern France.

6) If the the Allies are successful and secure Normandy, the Allies lack the reserves for a decisive breakout. The best realistic case scenario for the Allies is that Normandy is secured, air superiority is slowly established, and the Allies are ready to launch the breakout offensive in April 1942. The worst case is that the Allies are forced to withdraw or surrender. A failed landing in 1943 makes it difficult to try again in 1944.

7) The Axis have a lot more troops from North Africa and Italy that they can transfer to northern France.

Nothing is certain in war, but a 1943 attack on France had huge risks without a lot of upside.

[Snake Featherston]

This would have been a political and military disaster and its only effects would have been to strengthen the Soviet advances in the East in the later part of 1943 when Hitler overreacts and moves a shitload of troops to France to keep that from ever happening again. The result will be to magnify the Soviet victories of 1943 from Kursk onward and that just puts the USSR in an even better position for 1944, as Hitler will overreact to this, it was in his nature as a leader to do that after something like Dieppe, and this would produce the same but more.

[Snake Featherston]

multiply this with 20, cause if the germans cancel kursk, they withdraw the 2nd SS-Tank-corps and bring it to the normandy... even if the allies have mega luck and achive a large bridgehead, the second the german troops from the east are here, it is game over...
why? cause you have no chance to stop em with the allied air force... and the helpless allied tankers fighting the most experienced german troops in tank combat will be very onesided... so it could lightly be a second "frisian experience"... extreme high allied losses achiving nothing.

the germans will be very happy with all the stuff they take from the 200.000 prisoners they will make.

also, without kursk the germans do not throw away their tank reserves... but could draw a lot troops after the massacre from the west

also, without italy invaded (after DDD43 (D-Day-Debacle) it will be free from allied soldiers for around a year) the germans have one front less to care about...

no, normandy 43 is self murderer or a BIG german wank...

If the Germans cancel Kursk that's an admission that not only has the USSR won the initiative but the Germans won't even be making efforts to regain it, which you'd better believe the Soviet Union will be making this into a propaganda triumph because well, it is one. If the Germans are moving their best troops to the West, then all the Soviets have to do is start striking with local superiority of forces at weak points in the German line, and when that line starts crumbling move at other weak points as they did IOTL and then Germany's buggered anyway, as it either sends those troops back East and so loses in the West or starts really withdrawing from the East and ensures local Soviet victories turn into general victories.

and the much better quality of german troops... if we see how many troops hitler draw from to the west after d-day, someone could imagine what would happen in 1943... here the russians had been not so dangerous, so a shorter defence line is possible...

the whole plot with kursk, you know that the invasion need the right weather and sea conditions... so you have only a few days in summer...

it isn´t smart to invade to late... bad weather means no supply... not so good, esp. in 1943 with not so much mullberry parts (means one harbor, if this is damaged, the allies really have serious problems... no, they cannot win this scenario... german army in 1943 is maybe 3-4times as strong as in 1944 - unit for unit... also, kursk as a battle wasn´t the german problem, the battle AFTER kursk, from august-october 1943...

i hope nobody want to invade in autum in normandy, right? :eek::D:p

There's one minor issue with this analysis: if the Germans are weakening their overall lines in the East to shore up the West, the Soviets can find weak spots to start battering through and making good use of their numbers, and with a front that scale there will be the aforementioned weak spots, and it only takes one such weakness to turn a small hole into a Henry-Donelson style clusterfuck with the Germans playing Buckner and Zhukov playing Grant.

The Germans can't maintain a cordon defense in the East, and the Soviets only need to adopt their OTL concept of the staggered offensive to ensure a consistent momentum and the complete collapse of Germany's positions, take far less losses doing so against much weaker German forces, and presto! instant WarPac Empire.

[BlairWitch749]

why would the germans need to pull forces from the east; they have 2300 combat aircraft in france and germany plus 500 in Italy that can be called on (certainly enough to put up a vigorous defense of their field army in France in 1943)... they have 25 infantry divisions in place plus 6 panzer divisions (plus more that can be called on in Italy)

the allies in july 1943 would be more than lucky if they could supply and maintain 20 divisions in France, the forces available in France and Italy would be more than enough to vigorously oppose those forces (especially since nearly all of them would have no combat experience)

[Snake Featherston]

why would the germans need to pull forces from the east; they have 2300 combat aircraft in france and germany plus 500 in Italy that can be called on (certainly enough to put up a vigorous defense of their field army in France in 1943)... they have 25 infantry divisions in place plus 6 panzer divisions (plus more that can be called on in Italy)

the allies in july 1943 would be more than lucky if they could supply and maintain 20 divisions in France, the forces available in France and Italy would be more than enough to vigorously oppose those forces (especially since nearly all of them would have no combat experience)

The reason they'd do that is Hitler really overreacted to things like Operation Husky and Torch IOTL, and this is the same but more so. The Germans won't send any troops from Italy, that defeats the purpose of Hitler's strategy there, and sending troops from the East to prevent disaster in the West might enable Hitler to avoid facing up to the propaganda reality of what he's really doing.

He's going to need to avoid looking politically weak next to the Soviets and Sledgehammer is the perfect pretext for that, and this lets him shift to a defensive policy with plausibility....and then reality sets in.

[Jukra]

Nothing is certain in war, but a 1943 attack on France had huge risks without a lot of upside.

Now, this obviously requires no invasion of Sicily and Italy. Italy stays in war as a net loss to Germany. In the Pacific the Japanese are left to rot.

An Allied landing in 1943 would also lock both German Army and Luftwaffe into a fight they can't win. While a breakthrough in 1943 is probably impossible, a static fight of attrition would play on Allied strenghts. Germans don't have industrial machinery to pound Allied supply depots into smithereens with air power and artillery while their armour is wasted in useless assaults against Allied lines which have advantage of massive airpower superiority and more importantly, massive artillery superiority.

Luftwaffe is broken more quickly and with less Allied casualties as the crucial fights are fought closer to Britain than OTL, making full use of RAF's Fighter Command.

By Spring 1944 the Allied break through the German lines and at the same time Operation Dragoon opens a new front in Southern France.

In hindsight, I think it's completely doable and might well result in earlier Allied victory with less European civilian casualties than OTL. However, like with other Allied landing options used in AH's, it's more risky and Allied leaders did not play wargames, they were making decisions using real people and thus decided to take less risky road of landing in 1944.

[BlondieBC]

Now, this obviously requires no invasion of Sicily and Italy. Italy stays in war as a net loss to Germany. In the Pacific the Japanese are left to rot.

An Allied landing in 1943 would also lock both German Army and Luftwaffe into a fight they can't win. While a breakthrough in 1943 is probably impossible, a static fight of attrition would play on Allied strenghts. Germans don't have industrial machinery to pound Allied supply depots into smithereens with air power and artillery while their armour is wasted in useless assaults against Allied lines which have advantage of massive airpower superiority and more importantly, massive artillery superiority.

Luftwaffe is broken more quickly and with less Allied casualties as the crucial fights are fought closer to Britain than OTL, making full use of RAF's Fighter Command.

By Spring 1944 the Allied break through the German lines and at the same time Operation Dragoon opens a new front in Southern France.

In hindsight, I think it's completely doable and might well result in earlier Allied victory with less European civilian casualties than OTL. However, like with other Allied landing options used in AH's, it's more risky and Allied leaders did not play wargames, they were making decisions using real people and thus decided to take less risky road of landing in 1944.

To invade Normandy in 1943 requires no operation Torch. No Torch = no invasion of southern France. Also, the entire Africa Corp is available for transfer to France, as is most of the Italian Army. While it is possible it speeds up the war a little, it is much more likely to slow down the war.

[paulo]

In 43 the WAllies don't have massive air superiority...... only in 44.
In 43 the US troops are green, more if you remove Torch and Italy invasions.
So, if you try one operation of that magnitude with half (or more) of your forces green untested soldiers under a contested air space - be my guest...
But you don't like the bill.

[AdA]

Note the Manhatten project being a factor in Japan's defeat requires the US to have islands near enough to fly to Japan

No, B29s operated from China.

[AdA]

In 43 the WAllies don't have massive air superiority...... only in 44.
In 43 the US troops are green, more if you remove Torch and Italy invasions.
So, if you try one operation of that magnitude with half (or more) of your forces green untested soldiers under a contested air space - be my guest...
But you don't like the bill.

All the 1943 panther production was sent to Russia. The Italian front got a few tigers in late 43. In 43 the inicial attack would be facing much lighter opposition
The means to secure air superiority were there in 43. They were being used to try to win the war by bombing Germany out of it
Does it take two and a half years to have trained troops? The crack units that faced the allies in normandy 44 were at kursk in 43. The oposition would be of less quality too
How many lives is a free Poland, Hungary, etc worth?
How many lives do you save by gaining a year?

The real risk with a 43 landing in France, Normandy being an option, not a mandatory site, is that you get a winter 43 counter offensive, not necesserely in the ardennes, that can bring about unexpected results.

[tchizek]

No, B29s operated from China.

If there is any way to avoid it the US is not going to move the A-Bombs to China. One of the Major reasons for the Central Pacific campaign in OTL was to provide bases for B29's just in case the A-bomb worked.

Tom.

[AdA]

1st SS was in Russia 12nd SS was forming. 21st PzD was reforming. Lehr was forming, etc. Take away this units and you have just cracked the Normandy defence line...

[BlairWitch749]

1st SS was in Russia 12nd SS was forming. 21st PzD was reforming. Lehr was forming, etc. Take away this units and you have just cracked the Normandy defence line...
24th, 9th ss 10th ss plus several motorized parachute regiments where availbe as well in france

if this is at the expense of huskey and avalanche, that leaves 15th panzergrenadier, hg panzer, 16th panzer, 1st panzer, 3rd panzer grenadier, 1st and 2nd parachute, 26th panzer, 29th panzer available for service as well

plenty to contest dday 43

[wietze]

Just could you imagine Lloyd Fredendall in command of the '43 invasion instead of the landing in north-africa. I think he would manage to make it a disaster that make gallipolli look like a minor mishap.

[paulo]

Lets plan it AdA way....

To have the forces for an invasion of France in 43 is not possible to do Operation Torch - takes time to concentrate troops / equipment.
So, Italy not invaded - and don't know about NAfrica.
Place ?
If not Normandy, Pas de Calais ? - LOL the most strong german defense
South of France ? - more LOL out of range for the majority of WA planes - so LW air superiority
Belgium / Netherlands ? no good place and near the german central bases
Baltic ? ASB
So, Normandy....
Must be (tides, weather) in May or Jun (like 44) - Before Kursk (Jul/Ago 43)- so Kursk is delayed / canceled .

All the incompetent commanders that are kicked in/after Torch (Lloyd Fredendall and others) still in command....
Zero experience in landing forces for the US Army....
Impossible to have air dominance in Jun 43 - takes time to do that...
The railroads / bridges in France are in much better state...
Because no Kursk and no Torch and no Invasion of Italy, much more forces available to put in France for Axis (Italy still at war).....
Much less information about the forces / defenses in France...
Less capability to put / equip /sustain forces on the beach...
No need of Panzer V and VI, Panzer IV G/H and Stug III F/G, all with 75/L43-48 can kill first generation Shermans good enough.

[Perky50]

Somewhere I have a book on this topic, but as I am in the process of relocating I can't locate it at this time. I think it was called 1943 (with a subtitle). It gave a pretty interesting arguement for D-Day a year earlier. It covered all aspects of what was needed as well as what was available that might have made such an option viable.

If I can track it down, I'll let you know the full title and author.

[AdA]

24th, 9th ss 10th ss plus several motorized parachute regiments where availbe as well in france

if this is at the expense of huskey and avalanche, that leaves 15th panzergrenadier, hg panzer, 16th panzer, 1st panzer, 3rd panzer grenadier, 1st and 2nd parachute, 26th panzer, 29th panzer available for service as well

plenty to contest dday 43

Read my first post. German forces in Italy would have to stay there. France 43 follows torch, replaces Italian landings. 24th panzer was reforming. 9thSS was training in Ypres. It was only full PzD in October. 10th was also green, but at least it was in northern France. This are not the crack units that fought in France in 44, and not capable of the same performance...

[trekchu]

Lets plan it AdA way....

To have the forces for an invasion of France in 43 is not possible to do Operation Torch - takes time to concentrate troops / equipment.
So, Italy not invaded - and don't know about NAfrica.
Place ?
If not Normandy, Pas de Calais ? - LOL the most strong german defense
South of France ? - more LOL out of range for the majority of WA planes - so LW air superiority
Belgium / Netherlands ? no good place and near the german central bases
Baltic ? ASB
So, Normandy....
Must be (tides, weather) in May or Jun (like 44) - Before Kursk (Jul/Ago 43)- so Kursk is delayed / canceled .

All the incompetent commanders that are kicked in/after Torch (Lloyd Fredendall and others) still in command....
Zero experience in landing forces for the US Army....
Impossible to have air dominance in Jun 43 - takes time to do that...
The railroads / bridges in France are in much better state...
Because no Kursk and no Torch and no Invasion of Italy, much more forces available to put in France for Axis (Italy still at war).....
Much less information about the forces / defenses in France...
Less capability to put / equip /sustain forces on the beach...
No need of Panzer V and VI, Panzer IV G/H and Stug III F/G, all with 75/L43-48 can kill first generation Shermans good enough.

You forgot the....*dramatic music* other option....

:D

[wietze]

oh noes not the **aaaaaaaaarghhhh* frisian islands :eek:

[Faralis]

No, B29s operated from China.

They moved to the Marianas in late 44 ... and bombing from China with new and quite untested planes was a logistic nightmare ...

They actually stayed in India, then flew to China for fuel and the bombs, bombed Japan, refueled in China and to India again.

[trekchu]

Could it be that we have a new ah.com meme on our hands?

[BlairWitch749]

Read my first post. German forces in Italy would have to stay there. France 43 follows torch, replaces Italian landings. 24th panzer was reforming. 9thSS was training in Ypres. It was only full PzD in October. 10th was also green, but at least it was in northern France. This are not the crack units that fought in France in 44, and not capable of the same performance...
why would they stay there if there are 20 divisions in northern france?

a landing there would draw the higher quality divisions from oberkommando sud

[wietze]

Could it be that we have a new ah.com meme on our hands?

david is persistent enough for it i think lol

[paulo]

The operations in NA ended in May 43....
If you do what your post say (France 43 follows Torch) in what date you do France 43 ???? Jun is impossible - take some time to move the force from NA to UK and re-arm, re-equip, etc.....
Husky (Sicily) is 9-10 July and even that date is too late for France .....

[Jukra]

The operations in NA ended in May 43....
If you do what your post say (France 43 follows Torch) in what date you do France 43 ???? Jun is impossible - take some time to move the force from NA to UK and re-arm, re-equip, etc.....
Husky (Sicily) is 9-10 July and even that date is too late for France .....

And for how long time Afrika Korps would have lasted even without Torch? One bonus is that without Torch Vichy France remains still unoccupied, at least for some time, which means there's possibility of entering Southern France with less resistance than OTL.

[paulo]

And for how long time Afrika Korps would have lasted even without Torch? One bonus is that without Torch Vichy France remains still unoccupied, at least for some time, which means there's possibility of entering Southern France with less resistance than OTL.

Entering SFrance at this time is ASB..... Out of range to almost all aircraft of the allies, in a time that LW is operational.
Rememberthe lessons of Anzio....

[Jukra]

Entering SFrance at this time is ASB..... Out of range to almost all aircraft of the allies, in a time that LW is operational.
Rememberthe lessons of Anzio....

Not by Summer of 1943, sure, but by, say, late 1943 or Spring 1944, certainly a possibility due to increasing Allied naval air power. Remember, a Sledgehammer 1943 creates a true "Europe First" policy which means the new USN carriers can be used first in Med, not in the Pacific. At the same time most of the landing craft used in Sledgehammer are already available for follow up invasions.

[paulo]

Spring 44 maybe, but that defeats the France 43 invasion proposal......

[tres200]

So what is the PoD for a '43 invasion of France?

We could move up events in the Pacific a year, oil embargo in 38/39 and Pearl Harbor in December 1940. US declares war on Germany and Japan. Torch happens August 41 after Germany is deep in Russia. 1942 Attrition war against Luftwaffe, landings on Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica for bases against southern France. June 6 1943 D-Day on a beachhead from Marseilles to Toulon. Possibly a double attack with British and Commonwealth troops in Normandy and Americans in the south.

Just an idea, wanted to throw out there a rough context for a 43 invasion.

[Snake Featherston]

So what is the PoD for a '43 invasion of France?

We could move up events in the Pacific a year, oil embargo in 38/39 and Pearl Harbor in December 1940. US declares war on Germany and Japan. Torch happens August 41 after Germany is deep in Russia. 1942 Attrition war against Luftwaffe, landings on Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica for bases against southern France. June 6 1943 D-Day on a beachhead from Marseilles to Toulon. Possibly a double attack with British and Commonwealth troops in Normandy and Americans in the south.

Just an idea, wanted to throw out there a rough context for a 43 invasion.

The POD might be a Soviet destruction of Army Group Center at Moscow.

[tres200]

The POD might be a Soviet destruction of Army Group Center at Moscow.

In 41 or 42? Red Army couldn't break them in 41 and a victory there in 42 may not change Allied war plans unless it happens at the same time as Stalingrad. Stalingrad didn't move up Normandy any.

[Snake Featherston]

In 41 or 42? Red Army couldn't break them in 41 and a victory there in 42 may not change Allied war plans unless it happens at the same time as Stalingrad. Stalingrad didn't move up Normandy any.

In 1941. The Red Army does not necessarily have to break them, the right combination of Soviet luck and German mistakes can destroy Army Group Center with relatively little direct contribution from the Red Army in bringing that about.

[AdA]

Anglo US conference jan 14 to 18 1943 to set goals for the year. Marshall wanted to land in France in 43, and his operations chief, gen Wedemeyer always claimed it was the choice to make. Admiral King wanted to clear the Med first and general Arnold wanted to bom Germany out of the war. With the Brits all for a Italy first mindset, Alambrooke arguments won the day. If Marshall, who was by no means a risktaking cowboy, had prevailed, the allied effort would have been changed.

[phil5775]

Assuming that an invasion in 1943 was successful, and the Western Allies had driven to Berlin by June of 1944, this leaves the Pacific Theater wide open for early Soviet intervention. US forces were still in New Guinea and the central Pacific, still quite a distance away from the Philippines, Iwo, and Okinawa. The bulk of the Russian forces would still be on their own territory, and Stalin might be a bit perturbed that the US and UK got to Germany before he did. It would have been quite simple for him to let off some steam by turning his forces east, run roughshod through Manchuria and the Kurils, and then finally into the lightly-defended Hokkaido. Quite possibly the shock of having one of the Home Islands invaded could lead to an early Japanese surrender, and the whole country occupied by the Red Army.

[Maur]

Just could you imagine Lloyd Fredendall in command of the '43 invasion instead of the landing in north-africa. I think he would manage to make it a disaster that make gallipolli look like a minor mishap.
Heh. Fortunately, '43 would mean a British General (and not Montgomery) in command. Who was leading COSSAC/SHEAF at the time?

[Maur]

Lets plan it AdA way....

To have the forces for an invasion of France in 43 is not possible to do Operation Torch - takes time to concentrate troops / equipment.
So, Italy not invaded - and don't know about NAfrica.
Place ?
If not Normandy, Pas de Calais ? - LOL the most strong german defense
South of France ? - more LOL out of range for the majority of WA planes - so LW air superiority
Belgium / Netherlands ? no good place and near the german central bases
Baltic ? ASB
So, Normandy....
Must be (tides, weather) in May or Jun (like 44) - Before Kursk (Jul/Ago 43)- so Kursk is delayed / canceled .
Britanny was considered an option IOTL, but obviously Normandy is better.

[Know Nothing]

Eisenhower has to capture Tunis by Christmas 1942. Even though the Allies performed poorly in the early part of the North African Campaign, it is possible.

Keep in mind though, a quickly successful Torch could lead to disaster in France in June 1943, as I believe the following American units would be the only ones blooded in the European Theatre at that point:

-1st and 2nd Armored
-1st, 3rd, 9th and 34th Infantry
-509th Parachute Regiment

[Cryptic]

Eisenhower has to capture Tunis by Christmas 1942. Even though the Allies performed poorly in the early part of the North African Campaign, it is possible.

Keep in mind though, a quickly successful Torch could lead to disaster in France in June 1943, as I believe the following American units would be the only ones blooded in the European Theatre at that point:

-1st and 2nd Armored
-1st, 3rd, 9th and 34th Infantry
-509th Parachute Regiment

By mid 1943, the Japanese had lost strategic offensive capability in the Pacific. In the event of an early D-day being given a mega strategic priority, the U.S. could transfer several experienced Marine and Army Divisions from the the Pacific without risking any Japanese counter offensive. Such a transfer would probably raise the number of veteran U.S. Divisions by three.

[Know Nothing]

I don't know if it's plausible, the US mobilized very slowly. By my count, by July 1943 the US had only deployed 22 Army/Marine divisions outside of the American continent and Hawaii:

-6 are in combat / recovering from combat in the Pacific - the Americal (23rd), 25th, 32nd and 41st Infantry; and the 1st and 2nd Marine
-11 are deployed in Britain, North Africa or Italy in OTL - 82nd Airborne; 1st and 2nd Armored; 1st, 3rd, 5th, 9th, 29th, 34th, 36th and 45th Infantry
-5 divisions in the Pacific (outside Hawaii) could be shifted to Europe in for Normandy '43 - 1st Cavalry; 7th, 37th and 43rd Infantry; 3rd Marine

Several of the other National Guard and older Army units like the 2nd Infantry can probably be rushed to Britain to prepare for the invasion. But this isn't going to go well if Britain and the Commonwealth aren't willing to contribute the majority of units.

Also, the Aussies, Kiwis and MacArthur are going to be furious at losing their offensive striking power. MacArthur may try to resign.

[bsmart111]

To invade Normandy in 1943 requires no operation Torch. No Torch = no invasion of southern France. Also, the entire Africa Corp is available for transfer to France, as is most of the Italian Army. While it is possible it speeds up the war a little, it is much more likely to slow down the war.

Why no Torch? If the plan is to take place in May/June of 1943 that is a direct replacement for Sicily.

Granted I believe it would be a mistake but it wouldn't mean canceling Torch. So there would be some combat experience. Also in '43 the tank superiority of the Germans was not as great as it was later in the war. Panthers and Tigers still had teething problems and most of that production was being sent to teh East front anyway (Remember Citadel was postponed by several weeks to gain more production)

There were plans for a limited invasion of France if it appeared that the Soviet front was collapsing. This would have been a limited assault on the Cherbourg Peninsula and then dig in and build up slowly. It would have been long bloody and ugly.

[bsmart111]

Of course someone here may suggest that they should invade the Frisian Islands instead.:D:eek:
(I will now dive in the bombproof shelter):rolleyes:

[bsmart111]

The POD might be a Soviet destruction of Army Group Center at Moscow.

More likely a major defeat of the Soviet Army in '43 at Kursk in the time frame Operation Citadel was originally planned for. Then the 'Emergency invasion would kick in to relieve pressure on Stalin to prevent a complete collapse

[Snake Featherston]

More likely a major defeat of the Soviet Army in '43 at Kursk in the time frame Operation Citadel was originally planned for. Then the 'Emergency invasion would kick in to relieve pressure on Stalin to prevent a complete collapse

Even in May there were too many Soviets and too few, exhausted Germans for the Citadel plan to have worked, so that's not a possibility. It had its best chance then but best chance and success are not identical concepts. The Soviets winning at Moscow would by 1943 have led to a virtual destruction of the German army's remaining forces in the ensuing and compounding disasters that would have followed and the defects of Allied armies in the West would have mattered rather less in the wake of Allied successes in the East.

[Know Nothing]

If the USSR crushes Germany decisively at Kursk, then the Western Allies are in trouble as an emergency Overlord in '43 during Citadel is hamstrung badly by the lack of forces available at that specific time.

The shipping is out of place as the Americans have 6 of their 11 divisions in theatre committed to Husky. I don't know the UK OOB but they would have to risk their Home Forces in order to get substantial numbers an emergency '43 Overlord against denuded Germans.

That's why I think '43 Overlord isn't viable without a Christmas occupation of Tunis.

[Readman]

Of course someone here may suggest that they should invade the Frisian Islands instead.:D:eek:
(I will now dive in the bombproof shelter):rolleyes:

Ah ha! the Bocagist conspiracy! ;):p Anyway, basically I think in invasion of NW Europe in 1943 would be a Bad Idea. Landing Craft would be fewer, less experienced troops, little to no airborne support/air power or behind the lines sabatoge, sea lanes still not quite clear. Lots and lots of other reasons I think others have pointed out as well.

[Cryptic]

-5 divisions in the Pacific (outside Hawaii) could be shifted to Europe in for Normandy '43 - 1st Cavalry; 7th, 37th and 43rd Infantry; 3rd Marine


So the USA could contribute 11 veteran divisions plus follow on National Guard or established army divisions to D-Day 1943. It is also worth noting that western divisions in general and U.S. divisions in particular are the size of two Soviet divisions. So... the U.S. alone will be contributing 22 veteran Soviet divisions.

If Britain and the Commonwealth (including the hard fighting Indo- Pakistanis) can match the 11 veteran U.S. divisions, then there will a pool of 44 Soviet equivelant veteran divisions alone. Then, lets factor in the Free French and Poles. There are probably 2 additional veteran divisions there (more if the allies occupy Morrocco and Algeria leading the tough French colonial divisions to the allied side).

In the end... that seems to be alot of combat power, especially in the days before large numbers of Panthers, Tigers, The Atlantic Wall, a totally mobilized Germany etc.

[informationfan]

If the Germans cancel Kursk that's an admission that not only has the USSR won the initiative but the Germans won't even be making efforts to regain it, which you'd better believe the Soviet Union will be making this into a propaganda triumph because well, it is one. If the Germans are moving their best troops to the West, then all the Soviets have to do is start striking with local superiority of forces at weak points in the German line, and when that line starts crumbling move at other weak points as they did IOTL and then Germany's buggered anyway, as it either sends those troops back East and so loses in the West or starts really withdrawing from the East and ensures local Soviet victories turn into general victories.



There's one minor issue with this analysis: if the Germans are weakening their overall lines in the East to shore up the West, the Soviets can find weak spots to start battering through and making good use of their numbers, and with a front that scale there will be the aforementioned weak spots, and it only takes one such weakness to turn a small hole into a Henry-Donelson style clusterfuck with the Germans playing Buckner and Zhukov playing Grant.

The Germans can't maintain a cordon defense in the East, and the Soviets only need to adopt their OTL concept of the staggered offensive to ensure a consistent momentum and the complete collapse of Germany's positions, take far less losses doing so against much weaker German forces, and presto! instant WarPac Empire.


Well, i suggest you read what i wrote....

i wrote that with an invasion in normany in 1943 the allies need to invade in summer - or they will run into deepest trouble with heavy weather.

if the allies are not brain dead (like invading the frisian islands and the wadden sea), they knew this.
so the allies have to invade in june 43 or early july 43...
even if the germans do not know the exact time of the invasion, they will not, i repeat not start kursk with the chance of the main strike of the western allies in france

france is the door to germany, so do not think that hitler will not withdraw his attack forces to crush these troops.

the best the allies can do is to fail fast.... if they achive a bridgehead, they make things worse...
a.) without kursk the russians have to attack the germans... this isn´t so good with all the troops here not depleting itself in thick russian defences... so the firepower of the german defence is way higher as it was in mid july...

so we can expect higher russian losses and lesser succsess... so kursk and the 4. battle for charkow will be much bloodier for the russians with lower german losses. the russians may advance, but SLOWLY and it will not be a big victory

b.) with an invasion shortly before kursk the germans have a time gap to move troops to the west... but the troops in the west are enough to stop the allies.
without air superiority (they can´t achive it in summer 1943) the german troops can advance and will not stop because of lacking supply... even in june 44 the aliles would have run into deepest troubles, if the german troops could have move without much airwar by the allies...

so in the east the russians gain at best the same as they gained in july 43, but not more as in agust...

in the west the allies will be crushed - easily and with ultra high losses for the allies... so latest in mid september the germans can throw all the stuff in the east... exactly the time they need a lot troops at the dnjeper... so the russians will reach - again with a high chance - a worse situation here and - with some luck - the germans will get their deep defence fortification at the river...

in the west the allies have lost huge numbers of troops and material (most captured by the germans) and cannot act earlier as spring 44 - in italy...

italy stay in the war, without an invasion it will, so another problem for the allies....

to say it short - it is a really bad idea to try the invasion with a 99%-fail-chance...

[informationfan]

So the USA could contribute 11 veteran divisions plus follow on National Guard or established army divisions to D-Day 1943. It is also worth noting that western divisions in general and U.S. divisions in particular are the size of two Soviet divisions. So... the U.S. alone will be contributing 22 veteran Soviet divisions.

If Britain and the Commonwealth (including the hard fighting Indo- Pakistanis) can match the 11 veteran U.S. divisions, then there will a pool of 44 Soviet equivelant veteran divisions alone. Then, lets factor in the Free French and Poles. There are probably 2 additional veteran divisions there (more if the allies occupy Morrocco and Algeria leading the tough French colonial divisions to the allied side).

In the end... that seems to be alot of combat power, especially in the days before large numbers of Panthers, Tigers, The Atlantic Wall, a totally mobilized Germany etc.


No, not "veteran"... just less green troops...

as others mentioned... you need time to prepare your troops for the invasion, at last 6 months ore more...

so with a invading, planned in late may (you need this time cause the channel has often really bad weather and you need special conditions, so the latest look for an invasion is late may-late june) you can do torch (we know how bad the american troops performed cause they lacked quality and - most important combat experience), but thats it. With torch done you have to withdraw the troops latest in december 42... say you win in december 42 here, withdraw in the next second the semi-combatexperienced troops (1 1/2 month of ass kicking isn´t something i would label "experienced, also look at the numbers, you get only a small part of troops that had actually fought in a war) - but you also save the germans a lot troops and material they had thrown into africa...
so the germans are stronger too.... italy without sicily taken stay in the war. Period. any other scenario is asb.
you can´t invade sicily and do normandy 43... only in an asb-scenaro


so italy and sicily stay axis...

you rise the numbers of divisions and the (little) quality you have will go down... basically you have a lot troops with unexperienced officers, troops that never actually fought a war and you never ever had trained them properly for these operations...

also, you lack the paras...

without sicily and italy invaded the germans have much more planes and pilots...

in france the air superioity of the allies was nil - they could acive local air superiority if the germans didn´t care about (they mostly ignored the attacks in france), but you need to damage the infrastructure of france and the germans will know it

the sub-war isn´t over in late 42 (you made your decision), so more troops at sea could mean 10-20.000 men drowned in the atlantic, sunken by a sub...
your air crews are forced to fly much more missions, so the losses for the allies will rise, cause the americans have basically no time to learn their stuff... will the brits stop the beginning terror bombing? if they try to attack at day they will get slaughtered... at night you can´t hit a railroad (if you have difficulty to hit a city as large as berlin!)...

so rising allied air losses hurt double, first they do less damage and second they are missed in training and experience to give to green pilots...

"famous" american fighter wings will go down to nil, if they try to achive so early air superiority..., so the experience of allied pilots will fall, too...

the germans will suffer, too - but after 3rd charkow they will still plan to beat the russians at kursk... but with the same delay the allies invade earlier... so hitler will move troops (and more important his air fleets) to the west... with enough fuel, intact railroads and smarter generals the allies will get whipped... and no - hitler will move his better troops from every location, becaue with the allies in normandy they cannot invade in sicily or italy... so the germans can move parts of their strengh from here to the invading coast...

latest 2 months later it is done, between 200-300.000 prisioners, 1000s tanks, guns, ammo for half a year, planes and other stuff will be german and the allies cannot comeback for another year or two...

so the germans can move their troops to the east...

well, this is a wet-dream scenario for axis-fanboys...

but the allied hqs aren´t as stupid, so no chance for it

[AdA]

1. 1st and 2nd Polish Corps would probably be used, assuming 2nd corps would be one of the units moved to England after success in Tunisia. Maybe the Brasilian division that fought in Italy could join in, along with some French forces. That gives a few (6 to 8) extra divisions, but the polish ones are worth a lot when it comes to cracking german defences.
2. The allies won the Tunisia air battle, with opposition, and secured total air superiority over Italy in 43. No reason why they couldn't do it over France. Air supremacy along Normandy 44 lines would be nearly impossible, but superiority would suffice.
3. I'll have to look into how far advanced the Atlantic Wall was in mid 43, and how a major bombing effort could have hampered/neutralised it, but defences in 43 might be sufficiently weaker to influence the choice of landing site.
4. Normandy was a great placed to get ashore, but a bad place to move forward from. Losses at landing might be offset by fewer losses in the following battles if another site is chosen.
5. Alexander for overall command? Can we have Alambrooke talk Churchill into bringing the Auk back? Change of US prorities might mean, along with more forces from the pacific, McArthur as overall command. Bradley and Patton could be there, so no lack of talent...

[informationfan]

1. 1st and 2nd Polish Corps would probably be used, assuming 2nd corps would be one of the units moved to England after success in Tunisia. Maybe the Brasilian division that fought in Italy could join in, along with some French forces. That gives a few (6 to 8) extra divisions, but the polish ones are worth a lot when it comes to cracking german defences.
2. The allies won the Tunisia air battle, with opposition, and secured total air superiority over Italy in 43. No reason why they couldn't do it over France. Air supremacy along Normandy 44 lines would be nearly impossible, but superiority would suffice.
3. I'll have to look into how far advanced the Atlantic Wall was in mid 43, and how a major bombing effort could have hampered/neutralised it, but defences in 43 might be sufficiently weaker to influence the choice of landing site.
4. Normandy was a great placed to get ashore, but a bad place to move forward from. Losses at landing might be offset by fewer losses in the following battles if another site is chosen.
5. Alexander for overall command? Can we have Alambrooke talk Churchill into bringing the Auk back? Change of US prorities might mean, along with more forces from the pacific, McArthur as overall command. Bradley and Patton could be there, so no lack of talent...


Well, the allies could achive air superiority, cause the germans lacked nearly anything, also africa isn´t so hot for the germans. they knew they will loose it.

in normandy, they know, it is game over if they don´t do something.
So they will do a lot... they have every advantage, short ranged allied planes, a small bridgehead, so nearly no air strips to use, the germans can use their own EQUAL planes to counter the allied planes and can bomb the allied forces on the beaches...

so not 2 fighters strafing the beach but around 2000-3000 bombers and twinengine fighters attacking the beachhead (the germans will withdraw most of their bomber force from russia, also a lot stuff from germany)

the allies will be not inferior in the air, but they will not have total air superiority, that is REALLY bad... esp. because they need to attack the railways and logistic centres, so the germans can fight the fighters that have only little fuel and bombers without air cover die like flies... so expect very high losses for tactical bombers

if the allies do not try to bomb tactical, the german troops can advance without troubles and overrun the allied troops...

about the forces you mentioned, most are green troops with little to none combat experience, all the german veterans, dead in 1944 are still living and fighting.

so you try to invade in northwestern europe at the peak of german army quality (for tanks!), with troops without adequate training, lacking the knowledge to battle germans... with lesser transport capacity, with no mullberry harbor (so less supply) and with a sub war not decided (sure, high german losses, but still far from one year later)

easily the allies could loose a lot important ships, what if the allies loose 2-3 battleships and a dozen cruisers? Just remember, the germans have guided missles... as the italians learned the hard way...

with these weapons and no air superiority for the allies the losses could be very high.

on the ground - well the poles are tough fighters, but they are no wonderweapons... they lack experience and will be eaten alive with the rest of the green troops. the sherman isn´t impressive and without air support in the way the allies had in 44 the thing is total different, so expect ultra high allied combat losses in their try to enlargen the bridgehead.
latest with the arrival of the 2.SS-Panzerkorps it is game-over... so the question is only, how many men the allies throw in this bridgehead and how many they can save after the total defeat?

under no circumstances is normandy 43 a succsess... not with a normal timeline...

sure, with russia destroying HG central in winter 41, maybe... but with this the russians also could sit at the polish border in early 43 and the invasion will not happen at all?`From a plot "december 42 decision June 43 invasion" you can´t have succsess...

[BlairWitch749]

So the USA could contribute 11 veteran divisions plus follow on National Guard or established army divisions to D-Day 1943. It is also worth noting that western divisions in general and U.S. divisions in particular are the size of two Soviet divisions. So... the U.S. alone will be contributing 22 veteran Soviet divisions.

If Britain and the Commonwealth (including the hard fighting Indo- Pakistanis) can match the 11 veteran U.S. divisions, then there will a pool of 44 Soviet equivelant veteran divisions alone. Then, lets factor in the Free French and Poles. There are probably 2 additional veteran divisions there (more if the allies occupy Morrocco and Algeria leading the tough French colonial divisions to the allied side).

In the end... that seems to be alot of combat power, especially in the days before large numbers of Panthers, Tigers, The Atlantic Wall, a totally mobilized Germany etc.


How are they supplying such a large force? US/UK forces consumed 3x the amount of supplies per day versus their German and 2x the amount of supplies per day versus their Russian counterparts; where the hell are they feeding 22 divisions though with less so much less lift capability than they had in 1944? The ports are fortified, and even if the green infantry can dig the Germans out of a port; said port will not only be wrecked by defending Germans but will also be subject to repeat LW raids from the nearly 3000 aircraft the Germans can deploy from Italy, France, home defense and other sectors that are not the East.

you are talking about supplying forces more than 3x the size of what was tried in Huskey or operation Avalanche; and those forces where only facing minor resistance (to scale) so they could get by with less support... forces in France will be in a head to head battle with at least 3 massed German field armies who have competitive air support; so yea demand on the supply net will be stunning if not probably overwhelming

normandy 1943 is asking for a repeat of Kerch 1942... namely a large numerical force lands into a logistical nightmare against an unbeaten army, gets boxed in and proceeds to have their brains beaten in by air strikes and artillery (and in normandy 43 one can add panzers to the brain beating)

[Maur]

There were plans for a limited invasion of France if it appeared that the Soviet front was collapsing. This would have been a limited assault on the Cherbourg Peninsula and then dig in and build up slowly. It would have been long bloody and ugly.
I don't remember it and i've read about the planning quite extensively. Weird.

[Maur]

So the USA could contribute 11 veteran divisions plus follow on National Guard or established army divisions to D-Day 1943. It is also worth noting that western divisions in general and U.S. divisions in particular are the size of two Soviet divisions.
No, they aren't. Or rather, USSR and Allied divisions aren't really comparable, since they have many differences (logistical and support units being inside divisions in Allied case and outside in Soviet one)

If you look at the actual number or combat troops, and then correct for larger contingent of artillery, engineer, etc units outside divisions in RKKA, it doesn't look that different.

On a sided note, I don't think transfering divisions from Pacific to Europe is worth all that cost in shipping.

[Cryptic]

latest with the arrival of the 2.SS-Panzerkorps it is game-over... so the question is only, how many men the allies throw in this bridgehead and how many they can save after the total defeat?

under no circumstances is normandy 43 a succsess... not with a normal timeline...


Goodness gracious, while the Germans were the most capable nation in the war on a unit by unit basis, they were not ten feet tall. By 1943, alot of the men that produced the early victories had been killed at Crete, Stalingrad, etc. Not every German unit that the allies would face in 1943 France would be first rate and lethal. The Germans in 1943 did not have their 1944 armour strength and second generation tanks were few and far between.

On a macro strategic level, the only reason why the alllies did not land in 1943, or following the 1944 landings, end the war in late autumn 1944 or end the war in the Pacific six months earlier is that that there was a very deep social contract in the USA and UK that did not allow Soviet, German or Imperial Japanese casualty ratios. As a result, the strategic advances were cautious.

Modify that social contract, and the Germans were going to be defeated in France in 1943. That does not mean that such an allied effort would be advisable, or that the victory would come easily, but it would come.

If you look at the actual number or combat troops, and then correct for larger contingent of artillery, engineer, etc units outside divisions in RKKA, it doesn't look that different.

Even accounting for the increased logistics in U.S. divisions, a U.S. division still had more combat troops than their Soviet equivelant. For example, a full strength U.S. infantry company had 198 men.

[Life In Black]

Goodness gracious, while the Germans were the most capable nation in the war on a unit by unit basis, they were not ten feet tall. By 1943, alot of the men that produced the early victories had been killed at Crete, Stalingrad, etc. Not every German unit that the allies would face in 1943 France would be first rate and lethal. The Germans in 1943 did not have their 1944 armour strength and second generation tanks were few and far between.

On a macro strategic level, the only reason why the alllies did not land in 1943, or following the 1944 landings, end the war in late autumn 1944 or end the war in the Pacific six months earlier is that that there was a very deep social contract in the USA and UK that did not allow Soviet, German or Imperial Japanese casualty ratios. As a result, the strategic advances were cautious.

Modify that social contract, and the Germans were going to be defeated in France in 1943. That does not mean that such an allied effort would be advisable, or that the victory would come easily, but it would come.

I disagree. '43 is a time when the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS were greatly expanding its manpower in a desperate need to make up for losses in Africa and the Eastern Front, but most of the personnel still alive were veterans.

[BlairWitch749]

Goodness gracious, while the Germans were the most capable nation in the war on a unit by unit basis, they were not ten feet tall. By 1943, alot of the men that produced the early victories had been killed at Crete, Stalingrad, etc. Not every German unit that the allies would face in 1943 France would be first rate and lethal. The Germans in 1943 did not have their 1944 armour strength and second generation tanks were few and far between.

On a macro strategic level, the only reason why the alllies did not land in 1943, or following the 1944 landings, end the war in late autumn 1944 or end the war in the Pacific six months earlier is that that there was a very deep social contract in the USA and UK that did not allow Soviet, German or Imperial Japanese casualty ratios. As a result, the strategic advances were cautious.

Modify that social contract, and the Germans were going to be defeated in France in 1943. That does not mean that such an allied effort would be advisable, or that the victory would come easily, but it would come.

What part of the allies 1943 conduct gives you this idea

In operation Huskey 7 allied divisions where held up for 30 days with heavy losses by 1 elite and 1 scratch German division (with the allies failing to capture or kill many Germans who successfully evac'ed their visions out from under the nose of the allies)

In operation Avalanche 7 allied divisions where roughly handed by 1 full strength panzer division and 3 below strength infantry divisions to the point where the campaign became a blazing embarassment as allied numerical and firepower superiority was of little use in the face of veteran German troops who knew how to put the terrain and their experience into play on the battle field

So 22 allied divisions with a much more insecure supply line than Huskey or Avalanche are going to defeat 25 German infantry divisions and upwards of 10 mobile divisions supported by 3000 aircraft?

how does that compute :confused:

[Maur]

The ports are fortified, and even if the green infantry can dig the Germans out of a port; said port will not only be wrecked by defending Germans but will also be subject to repeat LW raids from the nearly 3000 aircraft the Germans can deploy from Italy, France, home defense and other sectors that are not the East.

you are talking about supplying forces more than 3x the size of what was tried in Huskey or operation Avalanche; and those forces where only facing minor resistance (to scale) so they could get by with less support... forces in France will be in a head to head battle with at least 3 massed German field armies who have competitive air support; so yea demand on the supply net will be stunning if not probably overwhelming
Ugh, guys, what's up with the "green troops"? Are you aware that in the actual overlord 2/3 of American 1st wave divisions were completely green? And 3/5 if you count paras. I don't think any following up division were battle experienced and they had no trouble performing very well.

I also regret i don't have books at hand, since i vaguely remember German forces in France in 1943 consisted of two thousand old men sitting in few dozens pillboxes called "Atlantic Wall" :p

[BlairWitch749]

Ugh, guys, what's up with the "green troops"? Are you aware that in the actual overlord 2/3 of American 1st wave divisions were completely green? And 3/5 if you count paras. I don't think any following up division were battle experienced and they had no trouble performing very well.

I also regret i don't have books at hand, since i vaguely remember German forces in France in 1943 consisted of two thousand old men sitting in few dozens pillboxes called "Atlantic Wall" :p

green is a wide term

there are a lot of doctrine/fire support issues that where learned in 1943 that made the 1944 troops better (even if they hadn't seen combat yet)... you know like realizing mark clark's order to withold naval gun fire support for operation avalanche (for the extremely dubious idea of achieving surprise which was totally impossible) was a bad idea

imagine if clark get's a hold of dday... shudders

also, the use of forward air laison aircraft for spotting was a lot less effecient in 1943 than it was in 1944; the allied airforce at that point still had numerous incidents of bombing everyone indescriminately and not providing proper umbrellas which allows even small lw forces to get at bridge heads to inflict losses

things like the air raid on bari happened to allied forces of 1943

[krull1m]

While is MAY have been technically possible for the allies to establish a beach head in 1943 why on earth would they want to?

They lacked the necessary build up of forces and material to make a substantial advance inland, so the nazis would have time to respond. Lets not forget that there was a lot going on in 1942/early 43, operations in the pacific, North Africa, all of which required troops and supplies. There is simply no way that the high command would divert those supplies, risking those operations failing because they wanted to rush back into mainland Europe.

And lets not forget that in 1944 the allied high command had had several years of planning & executing operations under their belt, and thas still friction between them all. In 1943 you really dont have that yet, so if you were to cancel Torch and focus on the mainland then you would have a high command that was still quite fragmented, and that would only lead to trouble.

This does actually remind me a lot of the "d-day thread that shall not be named", it gives no advantages to the allies, is weaker than the original plan, and is certain to cost more allied lives even assuming it would work (which I dont think it would). Oh, and both plans require the IQs of the high command to get flushed down the toilet in order for them to accept it.

[Maur]

On a macro strategic level, the only reason why the alllies did not land in 1943, or following the 1944 landings, end the war in late autumn 1944 or end the war in the Pacific six months earlier is that that there was a very deep social contract in the USA and UK that did not allow Soviet, German or Imperial Japanese casualty ratios. As a result, the strategic advances were cautious.

Modify that social contract, and the Germans were going to be defeated in France in 1943. That does not mean that such an allied effort would be advisable, or that the victory would come easily, but it would come.

Having read memoirs of Allied commanders i have to say it had more to do with logistics: lack of shipping, other needs (Pacific that other American commanders argued for, Mediterraen as pet British project), safety of Atlantic sealanes.

Predicted losses did not come into consideration. Probably because they though that actual Overlord would have horrible losses, so they already accepted it.

Reading about operations Roundup and Sledgehammer might be interesting.

Even accounting for the increased logistics in U.S. divisions, a U.S. division still had more combat troops than their Soviet equivelant. For example, a full strength U.S. infantry company had 198 men.
I don't get it. Do you disagree, or not? More (unspecified amount) combat troops or US divisions translate into double number of Soviet divisions? What's the point of bringing up company numbers?

[paulo]

The WAllies can do the landing in mid 43 ? Yes they can. Easily.
They can secure the beaches, provide enough supplies / reinforcements and break the defenses / defeat the attacks the Axis put on place ? That is a VERY different situation.....

[informationfan]

Goodness gracious, while the Germans were the most capable nation in the war on a unit by unit basis, they were not ten feet tall. By 1943, alot of the men that produced the early victories had been killed at Crete, Stalingrad, etc. Not every German unit that the allies would face in 1943 France would be first rate and lethal. The Germans in 1943 did not have their 1944 armour strength and second generation tanks were few and far between.

On a macro strategic level, the only reason why the alllies did not land in 1943, or following the 1944 landings, end the war in late autumn 1944 or end the war in the Pacific six months earlier is that that there was a very deep social contract in the USA and UK that did not allow Soviet, German or Imperial Japanese casualty ratios. As a result, the strategic advances were cautious.

Modify that social contract, and the Germans were going to be defeated in France in 1943. That does not mean that such an allied effort would be advisable, or that the victory would come easily, but it would come.

Even accounting for the increased logistics in U.S. divisions, a U.S. division still had more combat troops than their Soviet equivelant. For example, a full strength U.S. infantry company had 198 men.


Hi,

i never said the germans are 10feet high elite superduperdingsbums,
i just mentioned the fact that the german army in 1943 had some really elite troops... troops with a really experience bonus compared with green troops, lacking nearly anything (be happy that the soldiers hold the gun in the right direction and the officers and nco know who is who)

sure, the germans had also green troops, these wouldn´t be really good. but they had much more combat hardend units, this is the difference.
in 1943 they have a lot more of these units as they had in 1944, esp. BEFORE the hard battles in july-december 1943...

an invasion has to be done in june, so no kursk at all. Do you agree to this?

with the tanks it is like evey other weapon, the man using it is more important as the weapon itself.
so we have average sherman 75mm, a lot light tanks and some tank-destroyers... against markIV special, tigers and mostly markIIIN... also marders and StugIIIL40... in quality of the material we should be more or less even - only if we forget the heavy tanks the germans commited to russia (the 96 Elefants, the 190 panthers) for kursk, with them, you really get a problem.
why? cause these tanks in these numbers WITHOUT allied air superiority means the shit hit the fan... for the green inexperienced allied troops...

so, no - the battle itself (without an asb-changer, like all german aircrafts crash at june 5th, killing all pilots) is very singlesided... still bloody for both sides.

but - the germans loose less troops as they lost at kursk. so in the end they are STRONGER comparing a hard battle with significant losses at normandy (but catching so much equipment and prisoners level this out, also winning means the germans can repair more tanks as they could in the time july-december 1943 in russia, so net losses are lower)

the allies just lack the quality of troops - not the single solider is the problem, but the unit itself as a strong fighting unit...

also, as i said - they will invade and gain a bridgehead, but this will worsen the situation...higher losses, no air superiority and no wrecked infrastructure means the allies loose big way.

for the germans this mean:
italy still a (weak) ally and not enemies area, even sicily being axis area
france will be kept german, if the french try to revolte, they will be destroyed and the partisan movement will never be the same later on
russia will have some advantages, can press the germans to the dnjeper with lesser losses - but latest in september, the germans will throw in their troops from the west, much more as they could in otl, cause with the allies defeated so hard, they can put much more troops from the west to the east.

short:
no air superiority
no destroyed rail infrastructure
higher air losses for the allies
german troops are better supplied, the quality of the german troops is much better
allied troops are worse supplied, the quality of the allied troops is much worse

i think, an absolute no-go for the allied hq...

[Cryptic]

What part of the allies 1943 conduct gives you this idea

In operation Huskey 7 allied divisions where held up for 30 days with heavy losses by 1 elite and 1 scratch German division
That had as much to with the the western allied social contract which called for minimal western casualies as it did with the admittedly high German abilties. Had Patton been allowed to void the social contract like he wanted to and advanced German or Soviet style, then those two German divisions would not have escaped.


By mid 1943, a growing percentate of German air strength was theoretical Kursk and aftermath demonstrates that well). What was not theoretical needed to be spread amongst home defense, western and eastern front


I don't get it. Do you disagree, or not? More (unspecified amount) combat troops or US divisions translate into double number of Soviet divisions? What's the point of bringing up company numbers?
That is because there is no black and white comparison, so complete agreement / disagreement is not possible. Yes, U.S. units had more logistics and admin troops. They also had big core combat units (companies). So... yes, Western divisions still put our more combat power than smaller soviet ones.
short:
german troops are better supplied, the quality of the german troops is much better
allied troops are worse supplied, the quality of the allied troops is much worse

i think, an absolute no-go for the allied hq...
I woudl say better, not "much better" In addition, the eastern front was not going to go away. Shortly after Kursk, the Soviets advanced all the way to Kiev in a blitz advace every bit a capable as the Germans. Many of the better German
units cannot be sent west.

[BlairWitch749]

That had as much to with the the western allied social contract which called for minimal western casualies as it did with the admittedly high German abilties. Had Patton been allowed to void the social contract like he wanted to and advanced German or Soviet style, then those two German divisions would not have escaped.


By mid 1943, a growing percentate of German air strength was theoretical Kurska and aftermath demonstrates that well). What was not theoretical needed to be spread amongst home defense, western and eastern front

That campaign went poorly because the senior leadership made a lot of mistakes on top of a lot of glaring doctrine problems in all three service branches (to say nothing of the dead wood that required elimination in the middle levels of the officer and staff corps)

That senior leadership, with only Torch to their credit, due to the numbers involved (ie they won't be outnumbering the Germans 4 to 1) if they made similar mistakes would find themselves driven into the drink as opposed to just getting punched in the mouth a few times

Are you aware of the heavy losses the 1943 bombing campaign took? Those losses where no inflicted by a theoretical airforce... there where 750 combat aircraft stationed in france, 1600 in germany 500 in italy and 150 in norway that could be called on to contest a 20+ division landing and they would make their presence felt and put up a rigorous defense of the field army

[AdA]

All the damage that could have been done to german forces in France if all the tactical airpower that was being used in Italy and all the heavy bombing that was bein used in Germany were used in France must contribute a lot to weaken german communications, push the luftwaffe back and delay the strengthening of coastal defences.
Comparative quality must not be over influenced by the stellar quality of some elite german formations vs some bellow avarage US ones. Average quality of all German forces vs all allied forces (US, Polish, Canadian, British) must have been much similar in mid 43. And when you compare tank quality, 43 is the best year for the US, who were on Shermans, M7 and M10 and wouldn't be facing the numbers of Tigers They did one year later.

[Maur]

Are you aware of the heavy losses the 1943 bombing campaign took? Those losses where no inflicted by a theoretical airforce... there where 750 combat aircraft stationed in france, 1600 in germany 500 in italy and 150 in norway that could be called on to contest a 20+ division landing and they would make their presence felt and put up a rigorous defense of the field army
Let's be realistic. Germany isn't going to empty Germany proper of air defence, and also not other areas. So we're certainly not looking into 3000 planes, more like under half of it.

Also, can we stop making the cliche tank comparisons? Anti-tank artillery is the main tank killer.

Also, Sicily had more like 4 German divisions not under two, and add hundred or two hundred thousands Italians to it.

[Maur]

That is because there is no black and white comparison, so complete agreement / disagreement is not possible. Yes, U.S. units had more logistics and admin troops. They also had big core combat units (companies). So... yes, Western divisions still put our more combat power than smaller soviet ones.
Yes, of course it's not black and white, that's my point - Soviet and US/UK divisions are simply incomparable, as they are different formations, despite sharing the same name.

[Snake Featherston]

if the allies are not brain dead (like invading the frisian islands and the wadden sea), they knew this.
so the allies have to invade in june 43 or early july 43...
even if the germans do not know the exact time of the invasion, they will not, i repeat not start kursk with the chance of the main strike of the western allies in france


They started it IOTL when the Allies' landings in Italy were a virtual guarantee and in full swing as far as planning them was concerned.


france is the door to germany, so do not think that hitler will not withdraw his attack forces to crush these troops.


Then he forfeits the political and military initiative to the Soviet Union which will be putting all the military power set up for the set-piece battle of OTL to separate, staggered offensives ITTL. 1943 offensives will be rougher than the 1944 ones but the feeling of having and using the initiative and breaking up Army Group South when it's weaker will build a different kind of momentum to OTL, leaving the Soviet Union in a stronger military and political position overall anyway.


the best the allies can do is to fail fast.... if they achive a bridgehead, they make things worse...
a.) without kursk the russians have to attack the germans... this isn´t so good with all the troops here not depleting itself in thick russian defences... so the firepower of the german defence is way higher as it was in mid july...


Not if Hitler's moving his best troops to the West to prevent another invasion even if it fails fast, as here Hitler may well overreact to Husky and the invasion of Italy but moreso.


so we can expect higher russian losses and lesser succsess... so kursk and the 4. battle for charkow will be much bloodier for the russians with lower german losses. the russians may advance, but SLOWLY and it will not be a big victory


We can expect high Soviet losses due to inexperience in summertime offensive operations and in terms of strategic offensives in general, but this is counterbalanced by the Germans obviously forfeiting the initiative beforehand against an enemy whose total manpower pool is larger due to the absence of the casualties of Kursk ITTL.


so in the east the russians gain at best the same as they gained in july 43, but not more as in agust...


Historically the Soviets "only" destroyed German offensive power in July so that's not an insignificant gain in itself.

So the USA could contribute 11 veteran divisions plus follow on National Guard or established army divisions to D-Day 1943. It is also worth noting that western divisions in general and U.S. divisions in particular are the size of two Soviet divisions. So... the U.S. alone will be contributing 22 veteran Soviet divisions.

If Britain and the Commonwealth (including the hard fighting Indo- Pakistanis) can match the 11 veteran U.S. divisions, then there will a pool of 44 Soviet equivelant veteran divisions alone. Then, lets factor in the Free French and Poles. There are probably 2 additional veteran divisions there (more if the allies occupy Morrocco and Algeria leading the tough French colonial divisions to the allied side).

In the end... that seems to be alot of combat power, especially in the days before large numbers of Panthers, Tigers, The Atlantic Wall, a totally mobilized Germany etc.

That reflects a major difference between Soviet and US armies, however. The US Army had the most lavish logistical supply lines of the war and was also thus one of the most mobile armies of the war. It had a more balanced blend of air power and ground forces, where the Soviet army spent most of the war with strong artillery, armor, and infantry arms but rather weak air forces and virtually nothing from the Soviet Navy.

No, they aren't. Or rather, USSR and Allied divisions aren't really comparable, since they have many differences (logistical and support units being inside divisions in Allied case and outside in Soviet one)

If you look at the actual number or combat troops, and then correct for larger contingent of artillery, engineer, etc units outside divisions in RKKA, it doesn't look that different.

On a sided note, I don't think transfering divisions from Pacific to Europe is worth all that cost in shipping.

^This. At least in the later phase of the war, there were bits of it where the Soviet Army for obvious reasons had to scrap a lot of its specialized troops due to expediency and simple losses sustained.

[informationfan]

That had as much to with the the western allied social contract which called for minimal western casualies as it did with the admittedly high German abilties. Had Patton been allowed to void the social contract like he wanted to and advanced German or Soviet style, then those two German divisions would not have escaped.


By mid 1943, a growing percentate of German air strength was theoretical Kursk and aftermath demonstrates that well). What was not theoretical needed to be spread amongst home defense, western and eastern front


That is because there is no black and white comparison, so complete agreement / disagreement is not possible. Yes, U.S. units had more logistics and admin troops. They also had big core combat units (companies). So... yes, Western divisions still put our more combat power than smaller soviet ones.

I woudl say better, not "much better" In addition, the eastern front was not going to go away. Shortly after Kursk, the Soviets advanced all the way to Kiev in a blitz advace every bit a capable as the Germans. Many of the better German
units cannot be sent west.

err, what blitz do you mean?
the blitz was in june44...before it wasn´t this way... they teared themself through the german lines, but got ultra high losses if they battled the germans with giving the germans some place to manovere...

also - please don´t forget that kursk do not happen in this scenario... the allies can´t invade later as june 43... later is just to late. so no kursk-battle... the germans will defend and the russians have to assault... if the germans withdraw 30% of their strike force and move it to france the wallies are doomed. if they keep 70% in russia, any russian operation will be costly, much more as otl.

the planes can move fast, so the wallies face basically most of the german air force, in june 43 a much stronger enemy as in june 44
the supply situation for german troops in summer 43 without the preparation of spring 44 will be MUCH better... also if not any plane flying is allied and try to destroy your supply the troops will actually have enough to fight and eat.

most important, german troops from summer 43 are not the same as they are in summer 44...

these are all improvement for the germans
the allies have
less airplanes
no para troops (at last not the needed numbers)
worse air planes, they have the Thypoon, but not the tempest, the actual spitfire is not so much better as the german FW and Me and the allieds still learn a lot in air war
their troops are less trained and have worse weapons, they have no mullberry harbors and the german navy is still existing and achive sucsesses even if this is declining fast

no - not possible... an invasion in november 43 could work, if the weather wouldn´t be impossible to try it.

[informationfan]

All the damage that could have been done to german forces in France if all the tactical airpower that was being used in Italy and all the heavy bombing that was bein used in Germany were used in France must contribute a lot to weaken german communications, push the luftwaffe back and delay the strengthening of coastal defences.
Comparative quality must not be over influenced by the stellar quality of some elite german formations vs some bellow avarage US ones. Average quality of all German forces vs all allied forces (US, Polish, Canadian, British) must have been much similar in mid 43. And when you compare tank quality, 43 is the best year for the US, who were on Shermans, M7 and M10 and wouldn't be facing the numbers of Tigers They did one year later.


well, you miss the point that the allies do not fight in africa but in normandy... this isn´t a third rated undersupplied battle zone, but it is "the" invasion.
hope you get the point? germany will throw in every weapon it can spare... in may/june 43 they can throw in a lot...

the single sherman maybe not so bad, but its gunner fight against experten... not green boys with a 4 weeks training...

the german air force will do something, your troops will suffer by enemies airforce! so no "we do not care about planes"-happines, but equal terms...
could the allied wear down the germans? yes - but they have not the time to do... german troops crush the bridgehead and game over...

[Know Nothing]

On a sided note, I don't think transfering divisions from Pacific to Europe is worth all that cost in shipping.

I agree, I would only expect only 1 out of the 5 I listed (the 7th Infantry Division) because the opportunity cost of shipping them would be too great and the 7th is the only one still in North America in early 1943. The other divisions would take an exorbitant amount of shipping.

[Cryptic]

Having read memoirs of Allied commanders i have to say it had more to do with logistics: lack of shipping, other needs (Pacific that other American commanders argued for, Mediterraen as pet British project), safety of Atlantic sealanes.


Please consider the social history behind the war effort. The western social contract dictated that every life (at elast western life) was precious and that while the war was to be won, casualties were to be kept to an absolute minimum. There were no expendable units, penal batalions, firing squads to motivate (one solitary exception) etc.

U.S. commanders agonized over whether Tarawa and Pelieu could have been bypassed (yet the casualties there were small by German, Soviet and IJA standards). The IJA at Gudacanal was checked and then the island was leisurely cleared. The same with New Guinea.

Also look at Patton, arguably the most capable western allied commander, was sacked after he violated the social contract. What kept the war from ending six months one year earlier was not the lack of allied ability or recesources, but the western social contract.


Are you aware of the heavy losses the 1943 bombing campaign took? Those losses where no inflicted by a theoretical airforce... there where 750 combat aircraft stationed in france, 1600 in germany 500 in italy and 150 in norway that could be called on to contest a 20+ division landing and they would make their presence felt and put up a rigorous defense of the field army
OK, German home defense aircraft were alot less theoretical. German tactical airforces included alot of stukas, twin engined fighters and light bombers which were obsolete by mid 1943. Meanwhile allied airforces were not only bigger, but better equipped with second generation aircraft.

In operation Avalanche 7 allied divisions where roughly handed by 1 full strength panzer division and 3 below strength infantry divisions to the point where the campaign became a blazing embarassment as allied numerical and firepower superiority was of little use in the face of veteran German troops who knew how to put the terrain and their experience into play on the battle field

I think allied casualties during Avalanche were also low. Once again, the German escape was due to both German skill and the western allied social contract of a victory but with minimal casualties. Had the pursuing allies been operating Soviet style, the pursuit would have been far closer, the allied casualties far greater and hasty airborne drops (with even more casualties) used to catch and destroy the Germans

[merlin]

While the US wanted an invsion in '42, it wasn't going to happen.
But something has to happen in '42 - the American public, the press and Congressman/Senators would all be asking 'what are our boys doing on their butts in England, while they could be fighting in the ???? against the Japanese'.
So Torch happens, it gave advantages to the W.Allies:
1) It brought France back into the war. In North-West Africa, France had troops who could be re-equiped, and re-trained. It also meant that with the rest of France occuppied German troops had a bigger coastline to guard.
2) While the changes in US command structure is often mentioned as a consequence of Kasserine, it also effective the Air Force. It lead to the scrapping of FM 31-35, it was replaced - after AM Sir Arthur Coningham head of the newly formed Northwest African Tactical Air Force - by FM 100-20 - the first section of which was in upper case "Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces, neither is an auxiliary of the other".
From the German perspective - Torch was a shock, that U-boats had such little success, but their main objective was to keep the fighting going on in Africa as long as possible.
But once it was secure - it was percieved as being too late for northern France, and besides landing on Sicilly gave the Allies control of the Med - so save shipping - no need to go around the Cape.
Also, the Axis wouldn't know where the next attack would be - so further spreading their forces.
To go to northern France first, is to invite annilation, whether in '42 or '43. Because the Axis will be able to concentrate superior forces quicker than the Allies can land and resupply them.
However, there is scope for some amendments:
Cancel Dieppe, use the Canadian troops as an additional landing further east, (it's curious that Marshall was adventurous enough to want D-day in '42, but insisted on an Atlantic landing at Morrocco - just in case the Germans came through Spain). So Sicilly can go ahead maybe two months earlier.
But you still have a snag with the Luftwaffe, in OTL the P-51 didn't enter service till very late '43. It meant that between Jan & June 1944 - the five months before D-day - the luftwaffe ws effectively destroyed: 2262 German fighter pilots died during that time.In May alone, no less than 25% of Germany's total fighter force perished. With air supremacy achieved, it gave the Allies the ability to isolate the battlefield by interdiction, and finally (an accordance with FM 10-20) to provide close air support strikes when the landings took place.

[LordIreland]

Couple of points here. Some early posters seemed to think that the WAllies wouldn't know about the impending Operation Citadelle, you guys have heard of Bletchley Park right?

Secondly, Informationfan, you keep quoting this figure of 2500 (approx) german aircraft as if it were some sort of wonder weapon. In actuality the Germans were able to field
1,361 serviceable fighters out of a total of 1,849
444 serviceable dive bombers out of a total of 523
1070 serviceable bombers out of 1,663
305 serviceable twin engined fightrs out of 414
This gives the germans a total of 3110 aircraft across all fronts.
The WAllies will have in excess of 14500, not counting USN or USMC totals. Furthermore, we can delete 2000 (approx) fleet air arm, Bomber Command & Coastal Command aircraft as well as the 3,500 (approx) USAAF Pacific strength for a total of 9,000 aircraft. Now lets assume that one half will not be operational or will be in other theatres (med for example). This would still allow for a frontline aircraft strength of at least 4,000 aircraft.

Furthermore, the Germans will have to come to a battleground of the WAllies choosing rather than having the freedom to attack when and where they want. Strikes me, that regardless of the outcome of the land battle that this might well be the swan song of the Luftwaffe.

All facts and figures were taken from The World War 2 Data book - J.Ellis

[paulo]

Regardless of the fate of the LW, if the land battle is lost, the result is a big defeat for the WAllies......

[Cryptic]

^
A good post that shows true German air strength verse allied air strength in mid 1943. Then factor in that many of the German bombers, dive bombers and heavy fighters were obsolete by mid 1943. True German air effectiveness was limited to the number of German fighters, a certain number of which could not be moved west.

[LordIreland]

Regardless of the fate of the LW, if the land battle is lost, the result is a big defeat for the WAllies......

Agreed, that is a given and conversely if the WAllies win the battle, it is a big defeat for the Germans;)

[Snake Featherston]

I think allied casualties during Avalanche were also low. Once again, the German escape was due to both German skill and the western allied social contract of a victory but with minimal casualties. Had the pursuing allies been operating Soviet style, the pursuit would have been far closer, the allied casualties far greater and hasty airborne drops (with even more casualties) used to catch and destroy the Germans

The democracies were waging a very different kind of war. At least initially the democratic war focused on control of the sea and air, which is why the Battle of the Atlantic and strategic bombing of Germany mattered. The defeats the British had sustained up to Barbarossa meant to enter Europe the democracies had to make successful amphibious attacks, and that's a type of warfare that favors at least initially logistical focus and the more complicated the army, the less dramatic the initial advances in amphibious warfare would be.

The Soviets were waging a primarily land war. The Soviet Union and the Balkans and Central Europe offered plenty of room for sweeping maneuvers ala Barbarossa, Typhoon, Blue, Kutuzov, Rumiantsev, Bagration, and Vistula-Oder. The Soviets had in this sense a need for the kind of army and equipment that were not always compatible with or identical to what the democracies had. Democratic weapons for instance needed to be compatible with amphibious warfare equipment, Soviet weaponry didn't need to worry about that.

[BlairWitch749]

Let's be realistic. Germany isn't going to empty Germany proper of air defence, and also not other areas. So we're certainly not looking into 3000 planes, more like under half of it.

Also, can we stop making the cliche tank comparisons? Anti-tank artillery is the main tank killer.

Also, Sicily had more like 4 German divisions not under two, and add hundred or two hundred thousands Italians to it.

I agree that they wouldn't totally empty their home defense force (especially the night fighters); but half of them along with pretty much everything in Italy could be sent which still puts around 2000 aircraft on station minus whatever for servicablility; that is still 4x what the allies faced in Avalanche or Huskey

Sicily had 2 German divisions HG panzer and 15th panzer grenadier... not to say there where not some other small units there (I don't call the 1st parachute division at that point a division since it had a field strength of only 1300 men which would make it a strong battalion at best) total number of German troops estimated to have fought on Sicily is only 60ish thousand whereas allied strength in the landings was 180k and eventually reached 450k; so at no point was their superiority in men less than 3 to 1 and it reached 7.5 to 1

The Italians except for the Livorno division didn't fight so there isn't much point in counting them in the combat effectiveness column

[Snake Featherston]

Yes, of course it's not black and white, that's my point - Soviet and US/UK divisions are simply incomparable, as they are different formations, despite sharing the same name.

Not to mention formations shaped for very different kinds of warfare. The Allies waged a naval-aerial war with their primary ground operations being amphibious landings that turned into large-scale land campaigns. Their focus was thus a primarily logistical one, and that focus tends to at first limit the amount of flash one can have in one's war. The Allies also fought wars in places like North Africa and Italy where the terrain did not permit gallivanting around the landscape, and they also in France faced the same pattern in the Bocage-Rhineland region.

By contrast both the Wehrmacht and Red Army were used to large-scale conflicts on land and shaped for this purpose. The Red Army was also understrength from the very first day of the war in proportion to what full-strength formations would have looked like, and the enormous losses of 1941 in terms of aircraft and the problematic role the Soviet Navy could play in that war meant that the Red Army was a primarily land, and for a long time primarily infantry and artillery force, with Soviet armor playing a major role more in 1943-5 than it had in 1941-2.

Ironically one thing the US and Soviet armies did have in common was an extremely powerful artillery arm, and Soviet artillery was one of their strengths even in 1941 when everything else was crap as far as their equipment went.

[BlairWitch749]

Please consider the social history behind the war effort. The western social contract dictated that every life (at elast western life) was precious and that while the war was to be won, casualties were to be kept to an absolute minimum. There were no expendable units, penal batalions, firing squads to motivate (one solitary exception) etc.

U.S. commanders agonized over whether Tarawa and Pelieu could have been bypassed (yet the casualties there were small by German, Soviet and IJA standards). The IJA at Gudacanal was checked and then the island was leisurely cleared. The same with New Guinea.

Also look at Patton, arguably the most capable western allied commander, was sacked after he violated the social contract. What kept the war from ending six months one year earlier was not the lack of allied ability or recesources, but the western social contract.


OK, German home defense aircraft were alot less theoretical. German tactical airforces included alot of stukas, twin engined fighters and light bombers which were obsolete by mid 1943. Meanwhile allied airforces were not only bigger, but better equipped with second generation aircraft.

I think allied casualties during Avalanche were also low. Once again, the German escape was due to both German skill and the western allied social contract of a victory but with minimal casualties. Had the pursuing allies been operating Soviet style, the pursuit would have been far closer, the allied casualties far greater and hasty airborne drops (with even more casualties) used to catch and destroy the Germans


The Germans where not using 1940 aircraft either. The ME-109 was well into it's G series and the FW-190 was a very competitive design. The older slower bombers had largely been replaced by JU-88's which where still a 1st class aircraft in 1943; following their final disasterous employment in Africa the Germans generally eschewed using Stuka's against the western allies and left their tactical bombing to JU-88's and other faster/more capable aircraft; I was never suggesting that the LW would gain air superiority in a 1943 dday, just that they would be able to defend the army so that fighter bombers and medium bombers wouldn't get to just parade over them and prevent all daylight operations

Avalanche was just a stupid operation due to poor recon (ie landing where the only full strength panzer division in the whole country was when naval superiority assured they could land anywhere) and Mark Clark being a gigantic idiot. The allies took 12k losses in the initial op (about 4 to 1 in favor of the germans) and they took nearly 50k casualties by the time they stopped for winter at the gustav line (admittedly that number includes a fair number of malaria cases but still the number when you have air, naval, numerical and fire power superiority is still stunning none the less)

[Maur]

Please consider the social history behind the war effort. The western social contract dictated that every life (at elast western life) was precious and that while the war was to be won, casualties were to be kept to an absolute minimum. There were no expendable units, penal batalions, firing squads to motivate (one solitary exception) etc.


U.S. commanders agonized over whether Tarawa and Pelieu could have been bypassed (yet the casualties there were small by German, Soviet and IJA standards). The IJA at Gudacanal was checked and then the island was leisurely cleared. The same with New Guinea.

Also look at Patton, arguably the most capable western allied commander, was sacked after he violated the social contract. What kept the war from ending six months one year earlier was not the lack of allied ability or recesources, but the western social contract.
Well, every Allied life, but yeah. That doesn't change what i said though - that they accepted that defeating Germany and Japan would require large losses. Of course, they wanted to limit them, but had they decided landing in 1943 was good idea, they would've done it.

I'm not sure what are you trying to say. They weren't Clintonesque Somalian involvements, if that's it.

Patton wasn't sacked for needlessly wasting life, if anything, the one example when he did exactly that (sent an unit to liberate POW camp where his relative was and the unit got badly mauled) didn't cost him much. Both times when he was relieved of command was because he made incredibly stupid (and tbh, disgusting) public relation appearances.

I disagree with the Allied losses being lower due to such social contract. It was because the scale of warfare on eastern front was much higher than elsewhere - and on occasions, allied losses were quite high (like in Ardennes)

[Maur]

Not to mention formations shaped for very different kinds of warfare. The Allies waged a naval-aerial war with their primary ground operations being amphibious landings that turned into large-scale land campaigns. Their focus was thus a primarily logistical one, and that focus tends to at first limit the amount of flash one can have in one's war. The Allies also fought wars in places like North Africa and Italy where the terrain did not permit gallivanting around the landscape, and they also in France faced the same pattern in the Bocage-Rhineland region.

By contrast both the Wehrmacht and Red Army were used to large-scale conflicts on land and shaped for this purpose. The Red Army was also understrength from the very first day of the war in proportion to what full-strength formations would have looked like, and the enormous losses of 1941 in terms of aircraft and the problematic role the Soviet Navy could play in that war meant that the Red Army was a primarily land, and for a long time primarily infantry and artillery force, with Soviet armor playing a major role more in 1943-5 than it had in 1941-2.

Ironically one thing the US and Soviet armies did have in common was an extremely powerful artillery arm, and Soviet artillery was one of their strengths even in 1941 when everything else was crap as far as their equipment went.
Hm, yes, but i'd say that Wehrmacht actually used more Allied-style divisions, with non-combat elements being integral part of division. That's more of doctrinal style, and both approaches have positives and negatives (one gives you more tactical and other operational capability, basically)

What's interesting (even though normal) that even understrenghted RKKA divisions retained much of their staying power, losses being absorbed by riflemen and by cannibalizing non-combat elements but the weapon components (hv. mg, mortar, a-t) remaining high. Still, the average was just under 8000 - and the number of riflemen in 15'000 strong American infantry division was over 3000.

[AdA]

well, you miss the point that the allies do not fight in africa but in normandy... this isn´t a third rated undersupplied battle zone, but it is "the" invasion.
hope you get the point? germany will throw in every weapon it can spare... in may/june 43 they can throw in a lot...

the single sherman maybe not so bad, but its gunner fight against experten... not green boys with a 4 weeks training...

the german air force will do something, your troops will suffer by enemies airforce! so no "we do not care about planes"-happines, but equal terms...
could the allied wear down the germans? yes - but they have not the time to do... german troops crush the bridgehead and game over...

A simple look at the list of german units fighting in tunisia and in Italy will show you how first rate they were. II/JG27 III/JG27 and JG77 were not some 2nd rate unit. To put it simply, by summer 43 the Allies could keep a constant pressure on German Airbases in France, and could fly way more fighters than the Germans. The Spitfire IX, and from early summer 43 the P47C, was a match for the Bf109G and the Fw190A3/A4 they would face, and numbers would tell. Even if the luftwaffe came west en masse, something the russians would apreciate imensly, it would be overcome by superior numbers. Remember that once the allied fighters got the range to attack the luftwaffe over Germany, they progrressivly destroyed the German fighter force. The Allies could bomb the German Airfields, the germans could not bomb the allied bases in Britain. It would be a matter of weeks of intensive operations and France would go the way Italy went.
Crushing a bridgehead supported by naval gunfire and airpower is not an easy task. Just see what happened when PzD HG tried that at Anzio...
The high tide mark for the German fighter force was summer 1942, when they had the Bf109F and the Fw190 and the RAF was still flying Spitfire V.
In OTL the tide turned in 43, when JG1 started taking losses and having trouble defending it's airbases. And that was without an allout, deliberated assault. Would not be the 1944 flypast that Normandy was, but it could be done...

[AdA]

When comparing Soviet with westhern Divisons it must be noted that it was soviet doctrine (up to the end of the USSR) to concentrate support elements at higher levels and assign them to units for operations. Therefore, a 1942 Rifle divison would only have basic organic elements (RIfle/AT/Mortars,etc) but would expect to be reinforced by Army level combat support units for operations. US divisons were capable of stand alone operations. (When we studied the streng of WarPAct units in the 80s, we would factor in all probable reinforcements). For example, a soviet Rifle division manning the front lines at Kursk would have been strongly reibforced with AT AA and Artilery units fron its parent Corps, that would in turn be reinforced from Army level, and so on.
This reflects the fact that allied comanders "owned" their units a lot more than their soviet counterparts, who would just led whatever forces they were issued for a given operation...

[informationfan]

A simple look at the list of german units fighting in tunisia and in Italy will show you how first rate they were. II/JG27 III/JG27 and JG77 were not some 2nd rate unit. To put it simply, by summer 43 the Allies could keep a constant pressure on German Airbases in France, and could fly way more fighters than the Germans. The Spitfire IX, and from early summer 43 the P47C, was a match for the Bf109G and the Fw190A3/A4 they would face, and numbers would tell. Even if the luftwaffe came west en masse, something the russians would apreciate imensly, it would be overcome by superior numbers. Remember that once the allied fighters got the range to attack the luftwaffe over Germany, they progrressivly destroyed the German fighter force. The Allies could bomb the German Airfields, the germans could not bomb the allied bases in Britain. It would be a matter of weeks of intensive operations and France would go the way Italy went.
Crushing a bridgehead supported by naval gunfire and airpower is not an easy task. Just see what happened when PzD HG tried that at Anzio...
The high tide mark for the German fighter force was summer 1942, when they had the Bf109F and the Fw190 and the RAF was still flying Spitfire V.
In OTL the tide turned in 43, when JG1 started taking losses and having trouble defending it's airbases. And that was without an allout, deliberated assault. Would not be the 1944 flypast that Normandy was, but it could be done...


hi, i really suggest you stop reading what you want, just read what i wrote.

i never said that the (few) german air groups had been third rated, just that the whole battleground wasn´t really important for the germans, cause they know that they could not supply much forces here.

so - the troops send or at the battleground were experienced, but the zone wasn´t important and - more important - the numbers of german combat forces had been low.

in normandy the allies have to fight the force of german power... and the germans can easily supply this force.

in this plot you need to withdraw the torch-forces very fast - this do only happen if you win fast in dec 1942... this is good (save blood) but also bad, cause the germans loose so much lesser troops and the allies gain lesser combat experience they can learn from.

that is the difference.
don´t think the german air force in sommer 1943 was weak... it wasn´t and nobody in the allied hq thought it would be easy.

[informationfan]

Couple of points here. Some early posters seemed to think that the WAllies wouldn't know about the impending Operation Citadelle, you guys have heard of Bletchley Park right?

Secondly, Informationfan, you keep quoting this figure of 2500 (approx) german aircraft as if it were some sort of wonder weapon. In actuality the Germans were able to field
1,361 serviceable fighters out of a total of 1,849
444 serviceable dive bombers out of a total of 523
1070 serviceable bombers out of 1,663
305 serviceable twin engined fightrs out of 414
This gives the germans a total of 3110 aircraft across all fronts.
The WAllies will have in excess of 14500, not counting USN or USMC totals. Furthermore, we can delete 2000 (approx) fleet air arm, Bomber Command & Coastal Command aircraft as well as the 3,500 (approx) USAAF Pacific strength for a total of 9,000 aircraft. Now lets assume that one half will not be operational or will be in other theatres (med for example). This would still allow for a frontline aircraft strength of at least 4,000 aircraft.

Furthermore, the Germans will have to come to a battleground of the WAllies choosing rather than having the freedom to attack when and where they want. Strikes me, that regardless of the outcome of the land battle that this might well be the swan song of the Luftwaffe.

All facts and figures were taken from The World War 2 Data book - J.Ellis

well, what numbers do you add? all fronts or just homefront and france?

just look at the numbers of planes the germans had for kursk.
with an allied invasion kursk will not happen and the planes will be moved.

you really underestimate the german airforce

about the allied numbers, no - they haven´t these forces combat ready. if they had em they had used em.

and again no - the germans do not have to come to play with wallies terms... the wallies will be slaughtered on the ground and will desperatly need to stop this by their air force.
the germans can use their air force to hurt the wallies at some certain points.

the whole bridgehead isn´t stable, cause the allies have no advantage in numbers, they have poor quality in combat experience, they lack improved ground support by air force - so if they try to attack the german forces you will get high allied losses by friendly bombing...

the germans on the other side have high morale-units, battle hardened from the eastern front... with plenty of supply cause the allies lack the airforce to keep the german airforce at bay AND destroy the infrastructure in the way it is needed (like 1944)

also, allied planes in 1943 weren´t wonderweapons, they had the P47 and the P38, also the Spitfire, mostly V and IX... not too impressive...

france 1943 wasn´t an important battleground in otl, here it is "the" battlezone... beating the wallies means a big advantage, loosing here is "game over".

but loosing isn´t possible, not with a plot in late 1942...

sure, creating a scenario in spring 1936 with the usa increasing its army and airforce much more as they did could change the things... but this is asb.

the question was (and as i read it the plot start in mid/late 1942 and say "invade normandy in 1943) what happen to this invasion.

under these circumstances it is a no-go, a secure defeat.

[AdA]

hi, i really suggest you stop reading what you want, just read what i wrote.

i never said that the (few) german air groups had been third rated, just that the whole battleground wasn´t really important for the germans, cause they know that they could not supply much forces here.

so - the troops send or at the battleground were experienced, but the zone wasn´t important and - more important - the numbers of german combat forces had been low.

in normandy the allies have to fight the force of german power... and the germans can easily supply this force.

in this plot you need to withdraw the torch-forces very fast - this do only happen if you win fast in dec 1942... this is good (save blood) but also bad, cause the germans loose so much lesser troops and the allies gain lesser combat experience they can learn from.

that is the difference.
don´t think the german air force in sommer 1943 was weak... it wasn´t and nobody in the allied hq thought it would be easy.


Simply put, the Luftwaffe lost the iniciative in late 42 and early 43 and was being pushed back everywhere, form North Africa to France , in Russia, etc.
The Luftwaffe gained it's reputation when it had superior aircraft and better trained pilots. By 1943 it no longer had better aircraft and the trainning of allied pilots was better, on average, than the germans. Paper figures look good on (you guessed it) paper, but without bringing JG51/52/54 back from Russia and canceling Kursk there was only a limited number of fighters that could take part in a fight over France. And the allies would have numerical superiority in the crucial Spitfire IX/P47 vs Bf109/Fw190 sortie rates. The allies would do what they did in Italy, maintain a constant pressure on german front line airfields and progressively wear out the defending fighter units. They had the quality and the numbers.
It would not be as easy as 1944, the question is if it would be possible.
Very few things are impossible.
Make a list of Allied forces vs german forces in the Summer 43 and you'll see why the russian felt the Anglo/US forces were doing little to help...

[AdA]

The russians actually had numerical superioruty before the germans attacked and were planning to go on the offensive as soon as the Germans had lost the iniciative. They did it in OTL and never really stoped. If the germans pull a significant number of forces from russia and cancel Citadel the conditions are set for a russian offensive earlier in 43. Given that the russians took larger casualties than the Germans during Citadel, and still managed to push back and maul the german lines in their post Kursk offensive, odds are that given the iniciative they would inflict a massive defeat on the germans.

[paulo]

The russians actually had numerical superioruty before the germans attacked and were planning to go on the offensive as soon as the Germans had lost the iniciative. They did it in OTL and never really stoped. If the germans pull a significant number of forces from russia and cancel Citadel the conditions are set for a russian offensive earlier in 43. Given that the russians took larger casualties than the Germans during Citadel, and still managed to push back and maul the german lines in their post Kursk offensive, odds are that given the iniciative they would inflict a massive defeat on the germans.

Sorry, nope....
In the defensive, the germans inflict way more casualties to the red army and suffer less... at that time they still have full mobility.

[informationfan]

Sorry, nope....
In the defensive, the germans inflict way more casualties to the red army and suffer less... at that time they still have full mobility.


you are right...

the germans "win" kursk in numbers, but the problem was, they lost so many troops in the whole battle, that they had no reserves...

so every time after kursk the russians could make more out of their break through as they could have done without kursk-battle...

for example, if the germans use their Elefants the right way (like they did after kursk) these tankdestroyers are true killers...
the panthers the germans lost had been destroyed at russian mine fields... not by russian troops...
200 panthers in august 43 against russian assault operations make short process... quality of german mobile forces are still WAY better as the russian ones, but - this is important - they lacked them after july 1943...

the russians couldn´t go into assault mode much earlier, they expected the german assault.

with normandy 43 (may/june) the wallies do their best for the germans.

sure, the russians can advance, they will throw back the germans... but these had dig in too for 3 months and they have reserves...

nearly any time the germans had reserves to "strike back" the russian sucked, at last till late 1943... even if they are outnumbering the germans 5:1 or more.

the germans burned their abilities (and the quality of their troops) in the time between july 43-april 44, but it started at kursk. without kursk the russian losses will be still high (even higher, cause to break german defence lines they lost allways a lot troops), but they cannot expand these break throughs like they did after kursk.

in this scenario the germans beat the wallies around mid/late june (invasion mid may 43), so if the russians strike, they advance till the dnjeper, but latest here the germans can throw in all the troops from the west.

this could even lead to a seperate peace, cause if stalin is beaten badly in autum 43 (in this time fray this is quite possible) and the wallies could not come back earlier as in a year he could think about peace with hitler...

[Cryptic]

Well, every Allied life, but yeah. That doesn't change what i said though - that they accepted that defeating Germany and Japan would require large losses. and on occasions, allied losses were quite high (like in Ardennes)

I think you are under estimating the how deep the social contract was in the western allies and how it effected western allied planning in the strategic sense. Yes, the allies wanted to win and winning a war of that scale was going to cost alot of casualties. At the same time, the western allies place alot higher priority on minimal casualties when they made strategic decisions than the totalaterian governments did.

The minimal casualties policy also gave the totalitarian nations military options that the western allies did not have. It also meant that the strategic advances of the western allies (and a certain number of tactical advances) were cautious. For example, the British only agreed to D-Day and not Yugoslavia and / or Norway becasue they saw it was needed to win the war. It also meant that the U.S. advacne across the Pcific was going to deliberate and there were not going to be any hasty and costly counter attacks at Attu and Kiska

[AdA]

Sorry, nope....
In the defensive, the germans inflict way more casualties to the red army and suffer less... at that time they still have full mobility.

Most acounts on Citadel stop when the Germans call an alt to offensive operations. What followed was a series of russian offensives that crushed the german orel salient and started the process that led them across the Dienepr in a series of victories that lasted from Aug43 to Jan44. They did it having taken extensive casualties at Kursk. If you remove units from the German Battle line, even if only Air units, and leave the Russians at their full pre Kursk strengh the odds are even better for the Red Corner.
The Soviet plan was in fact to blunt the germans at Kursk before attacking, and the basis for the german elastic defensive thesis is that. But in fact the Soviets took way more casualties and lost way more material than they expected (and than the Germans). There is nothing in the events from AUG 1943 to May 45 to show that anything but the need to reorganize logistics would slow down the russian much. Swiss Historian COL Eddie Bauer used to say that you follow Allied operations on 1/100 000 maps, but you follow russian advances on 1/1 000 000 maps.

[informationfan]

Most acounts on Citadel stop when the Germans call an alt to offensive operations. What followed was a series of russian offensives that crushed the german orel salient and started the process that led them across the Dienepr in a series of victories that lasted from Aug43 to Jan44. They did it having taken extensive casualties at Kursk. If you remove units from the German Battle line, even if only Air units, and leave the Russians at their full pre Kursk strengh the odds are even better for the Red Corner.
The Soviet plan was in fact to blunt the germans at Kursk before attacking, and the basis for the german elastic defensive thesis is that. But in fact the Soviets took way more casualties and lost way more material than they expected (and than the Germans). There is nothing in the events from AUG 1943 to May 45 to show that anything but the need to reorganize logistics would slow down the russian much. Swiss Historian COL Eddie Bauer used to say that you follow Allied operations on 1/100 000 maps, but you follow russian advances on 1/1 000 000 maps.

well, it would be kind to read all what others write....

i said, that without kursk the germans have reserves...
with german reserves the russians sucked... without they could do what they want cause the nearby forces of the germans never could do more as kill a lot russians but not beat em.

kursk was the neckbreaker for the germans, cause here they had to strike against the most heavily fortified area wasting their reserves, the mobile reserves...

without kursk the germans still destroy 5-7:1 russian tanks, but even more so they can beat the russian assaults, cut em of and destroy em.

the russians allways (even in early 1945) feared the german counterstrikes... so they never took the german panzers with their own tanks but allways with at-guns, they knew what happen to their forces.

i also mentioned that the russians will throw back the germans, slowly, but they will do.

But only as long as the germans crush the wallies. after this, the germans can bring back a lot strong units, even if some are exhausted and are in need to refresh.

basically, if the germans have enough reserves the russian advance is much more costly for the russians as it was, sometimes it will be no succsess at all. the otl battles showed, how narrow certain events had been, so if the germans have a panzerkorps more, things can go down the toilet for the russians...

not enough to "win" the war, that is impossible in 1943, but maybe enough for stalin to make a peace, cause the wallies sucked in normandy and will be out of the game for a year or two? who knows this? nobody... now he - stalin - has to fight the whole german army again, even stronger as otl...

[AdA]

Since this thread as placed great focus in Air ops, let's consider this.
Citadel was the last great party for the German fighter units in the russian front. They were fighting in near ideal conditions, with elite JG facing masses of russian aircraft in a restricted battlearea. The germans inflicted huge losses on the Soviet AF. with the iniciative on the russian side, and the need to cover a vast frontline, the russians would be able to make better use of their air assets.
Also, the Germans made excelent use of their armour. Their Ferdinands scored multiple kills, and their Tigers took a heavy toll of russian Tanks. The Panther proved very unreliable, and would have proven more so in mobile defensive ops were they would have to move from one battle area to the next in russian roads.
And those that advocate elastic defense for the Germans should consider the impact of Hitler on German Generals freedom of action. Hitler's interference and predilection for holding strongpoints often led to the Germans doing quite badly in defensive ops...
Would the Germans have destroyed more russian tanks in defensive ops than they did in the tank battles inside the Kursk salient? Maybe. Enought to stop the russians? They never really did from that Summer on...
So Hitler dictates a linear defense and we all know how that ends...

[AdA]

I do read other people posts. I just don't allways agree with them. The general idea that the germans suffered huge losses during the offensive phase at Kursk is dispeled, among other, by von Meinstein, who claymed in his book lost victories that the germans were inflicting casualties on the russain at a higly favourable rate, and that the attack should have continued as the only way to destroy the russian reserves before they counterattacked. The Germans actually sufered more losses in the defensive battles after Citadel than during it. There is no big diference in kill ratios in the two phases of the battle, wich leads one to believe that the Russians loosing "thousands" of tanks defending Kursk or attacking Orel would have lead to the same end.
My point is, German reserves would have been exauthed fighting the initial soviet offensives in the same way they were at citadel, and unable to break a second wave of russian offensives. That first wave of russian offensives would achieve more or less the same results the russian defensive ops at Kursk did.
And losses at kursk are a hotly debated subject. Both German and Russian.

[informationfan]

Since this thread as placed great focus in Air ops, let's consider this.
Citadel was the last great party for the German fighter units in the russian front. They were fighting in near ideal conditions, with elite JG facing masses of russian aircraft in a restricted battlearea. The germans inflicted huge losses on the Soviet AF. with the iniciative on the russian side, and the need to cover a vast frontline, the russians would be able to make better use of their air assets.
Also, the Germans made excelent use of their armour. Their Ferdinands scored multiple kills, and their Tigers took a heavy toll of russian Tanks. The Panther proved very unreliable, and would have proven more so in mobile defensive ops were they would have to move from one battle area to the next in russian roads.
And those that advocate elastic defense for the Germans should consider the impact of Hitler on German Generals freedom of action. Hitler's interference and predilection for holding strongpoints often led to the Germans doing quite badly in defensive ops...
Would the Germans have destroyed more russian tanks in defensive ops than they did in the tank battles inside the Kursk salient? Maybe. Enought to stop the russians? They never really did from that Summer on...
So Hitler dictates a linear defense and we all know how that ends...


Well, at kursk the germans achieved around 8:1 kill-ratio...

but maybe you forget the important point.
with the wallies invading in normandy hitler will do everything to stop em.
i wrote that the inital landing would be mostly a sucsess, so a bridgehead can be established in the first 2 weeks.

but - this isn´t good for the wallies... cause hitler will cancel kursk and move away forces... at last the 2. SS-panzerkorps... maybe the ferdinands (doubtfull), but for sure some sPAbtl, so the wallies will face all the stuff in the west (and don´t forget some quite good troops from italy) and some really strong units from russia....

the job for the luftwaffe is just to protect the assaulting units (mostly 2.ss-pk and some strong other units), a thing they can do, cause the wallies cannot stop em. not in june 43...

with the allies being defeated in july/august the germans can withdraw a lot more troops from the west to the east, so they are significant stronger
a.) they avoid the losses in the assault against heavily fortified positions
b.) they bring with them more qualified troops - also hitler know that the wallies cannot invade in the next 6-12 months again. This free a lot stuff from the west... stuff the germans can use to bolster their defence in russia...


so i stay with my starting words: an invasion in may/june 43 help the germans a lot, cause it is the wrong move with serious consequences for the russians...

if - here i agree, the chance for a heavy russian defeat in open movement-battle in russia is at best 60:40 for the germans, more a coinflip - the germans beat the russian advance to the dnjeper and cause heavy losses (something similar to the january-march-43-action) i think stalin could rethink his opinions... if hitler offers peace (very doubtfull, but still possible) he could say yes. Or - maybe he offers peace and some officer kills hitler if this one say no... ?a lot soldiers tried to kill hitler... so this isn´t out of scope.

in the end, if all allies stay to the plan they win against germany - i just said that the wallies do the germans a big favour in trying the invasion in 1943...

[Life In Black]

Well, at kursk the germans achieved around 8:1 kill-ratio...

but maybe you forget the important point.
with the wallies invading in normandy hitler will do everything to stop em.
i wrote that the inital landing would be mostly a sucsess, so a bridgehead can be established in the first 2 weeks.

but - this isn´t good for the wallies... cause hitler will cancel kursk and move away forces... at last the 2. SS-panzerkorps... maybe the ferdinands (doubtfull), but for sure some sPAbtl, so the wallies will face all the stuff in the west (and don´t forget some quite good troops from italy) and some really strong units from russia....

the job for the luftwaffe is just to protect the assaulting units (mostly 2.ss-pk and some strong other units), a thing they can do, cause the wallies cannot stop em. not in june 43...

with the allies being defeated in july/august the germans can withdraw a lot more troops from the west to the east, so they are significant stronger
a.) they avoid the losses in the assault against heavily fortified positions
b.) they bring with them more qualified troops - also hitler know that the wallies cannot invade in the next 6-12 months again. This free a lot stuff from the west... stuff the germans can use to bolster their defence in russia...


so i stay with my starting words: an invasion in may/june 43 help the germans a lot, cause it is the wrong move with serious consequences for the russians...

if - here i agree, the chance for a heavy russian defeat in open movement-battle in russia is at best 60:40 for the germans, more a coinflip - the germans beat the russian advance to the dnjeper and cause heavy losses (something similar to the january-march-43-action) i think stalin could rethink his opinions... if hitler offers peace (very doubtfull, but still possible) he could say yes. Or - maybe he offers peace and some officer kills hitler if this one say no... ?a lot soldiers tried to kill hitler... so this isn´t out of scope.

in the end, if all allies stay to the plan they win against germany - i just said that the wallies do the germans a big favour in trying the invasion in 1943...

I believe both the 1st SS Panzer Korps, and the 5th SS Panzer-Grenadier Division "Wiking" could be sent to France as well at this time.

[AdA]

The real risk with a 43 landing in France, Normandy being an option, not a mandatory site, is that you get a winter 43 counter offensive, not necesserely in the ardennes, that can bring about unexpected results.[/QUOTE]

That was one of my starting points....And I'm the guy who doesn't read other people posts (sight...)
One year early on France means the Germans counterattack a year earlier (or more). That, not can we land in France, is the big question.

[Snake Featherston]

Hm, yes, but i'd say that Wehrmacht actually used more Allied-style divisions, with non-combat elements being integral part of division. That's more of doctrinal style, and both approaches have positives and negatives (one gives you more tactical and other operational capability, basically)

What's interesting (even though normal) that even understrenghted RKKA divisions retained much of their staying power, losses being absorbed by riflemen and by cannibalizing non-combat elements but the weapon components (hv. mg, mortar, a-t) remaining high. Still, the average was just under 8000 - and the number of riflemen in 15'000 strong American infantry division was over 3000.

Given the Soviets won the war it's worth noting that the Soviet concept of a mechanized, combined-arms division was arguably superior, as the Soviets also won gigantic victories that left them in Europe for decades where the Nazi empire fell apart in two years despite its own victories.

When comparing Soviet with westhern Divisons it must be noted that it was soviet doctrine (up to the end of the USSR) to concentrate support elements at higher levels and assign them to units for operations. Therefore, a 1942 Rifle divison would only have basic organic elements (RIfle/AT/Mortars,etc) but would expect to be reinforced by Army level combat support units for operations. US divisons were capable of stand alone operations. (When we studied the streng of WarPAct units in the 80s, we would factor in all probable reinforcements). For example, a soviet Rifle division manning the front lines at Kursk would have been strongly reibforced with AT AA and Artilery units fron its parent Corps, that would in turn be reinforced from Army level, and so on.
This reflects the fact that allied comanders "owned" their units a lot more than their soviet counterparts, who would just led whatever forces they were issued for a given operation...

This also reflects the simple scale of Soviet losses at the start of the war and the resulting need to improvise faced by Red Army generals and is a testament to their skill at said improvisation. The Soviets needed to reconstruct their armored formations from scratch and did a very good job of it, but this also meant it wasn't until 1943 and 1944 that they had sufficient quantities of armor for strategic offensives.

The russians actually had numerical superioruty before the germans attacked and were planning to go on the offensive as soon as the Germans had lost the iniciative. They did it in OTL and never really stoped. If the germans pull a significant number of forces from russia and cancel Citadel the conditions are set for a russian offensive earlier in 43. Given that the russians took larger casualties than the Germans during Citadel, and still managed to push back and maul the german lines in their post Kursk offensive, odds are that given the iniciative they would inflict a massive defeat on the germans.

Quite so. The Soviets were actually beginning their first offensive, Kutuzov, when the Germans were still thinking they were succeeding in the south. This indicates that if Manstein had made any more gains he might well have become the next Paulus.

Sorry, nope....
In the defensive, the germans inflict way more casualties to the red army and suffer less... at that time they still have full mobility.

In what timeline? In the historical one Kutuzov started before the Soviets hammered the Axis offensive in the south to a halt, then Rumiantsev reversed all German gains and began the set of operations that cleared Ukraine through the summer and winter of 1943.

you are right...

the germans "win" kursk in numbers, but the problem was, they lost so many troops in the whole battle, that they had no reserves...

so every time after kursk the russians could make more out of their break through as they could have done without kursk-battle...


Also because the Soviets had trucks and the German army remained predominantly trapped in 1918 as far as logistics went. US-issue trucks and jeeps played a huge role in the success of Soviet flexibility and ability to concentrate, without them I think the Germans could very likely have formed a stalemate somewhere around the Vistula at the worst-case scenario for them.


for example, if the germans use their Elefants the right way (like they did after kursk) these tankdestroyers are true killers...


And infantry with sufficient balls (or sufficient fear of the NKVD, same result, different cause) can destroy the elefants with mines. Oopsie....


the panthers the germans lost had been destroyed at russian mine fields... not by russian troops...


Meaning the Russians understood concentrated firepower as opposed to banking on the Triumph of the Will.


200 panthers in august 43 against russian assault operations make short process... quality of german mobile forces are still WAY better as the russian ones, but - this is important - they lacked them after july 1943...


Where in the time that would have been between July-August 1943 and the German withdrawal the Soviets have in all probability made multiple staggered offensives instead of waiting for the Germans to begin their last offensive.


the russians couldn´t go into assault mode much earlier, they expected the german assault.


A German assault that their own intelligence and British aid from Ultra would tell them isn't coming so they can try something different.


with normandy 43 (may/june) the wallies do their best for the germans.

sure, the russians can advance, they will throw back the germans... but these had dig in too for 3 months and they have reserves...


Actually given the Soviets will know the Germans aren't going to attack, the Soviets will begin hammering at German weak spots and seeking to start transforming Deep Operations from pre-war concepts to contemporary reality.


nearly any time the germans had reserves to "strike back" the russian sucked, at last till late 1943... even if they are outnumbering the germans 5:1 or more.


Not so. Not in 1943, the Germans had reserves in Ukraine in that year and the Soviets still were overrunning it, while they broke the siege of Leningrad in a technical sense earlier in the year and Army Group North's problems did not include want of reserves.


the germans burned their abilities (and the quality of their troops) in the time between july 43-april 44, but it started at kursk. without kursk the russian losses will be still high (even higher, cause to break german defence lines they lost allways a lot troops), but they cannot expand these break throughs like they did after kursk.


Actually they'd be at least attempting what they did historically to win the war, local staggered offensives and reinforcing successful bridgeheads and neglecting ones that fail. They'd be much rougher at it than in 1944 but the building momentum of success and the reality that nothing breeds success like success will simply lead to the same result and a much more sophisticated army in 1944 without the mammoth losses in the Kursk Bulge.


in this scenario the germans beat the wallies around mid/late june (invasion mid may 43), so if the russians strike, they advance till the dnjeper, but latest here the germans can throw in all the troops from the west.


Yes, to shore up a line that would already have been cracking by this point, committed in finest Nazi fashion in improvised fashion according to Hitler's desires and finding out that the Soviet subhumans are far better at war-waging than the Germans were.


this could even lead to a seperate peace, cause if stalin is beaten badly in autum 43 (in this time fray this is quite possible) and the wallies could not come back earlier as in a year he could think about peace with hitler...

Actually it's not possible at all, the absence of Kursk means the Soviets can lose all the troops lost in that one battle and still have the ones lost in the historical Ukraine offensives to chew up in subsequent battles. Their manpower crisis was not until the early part of 1945, this is still 1943.

Most acounts on Citadel stop when the Germans call an alt to offensive operations. What followed was a series of russian offensives that crushed the german orel salient and started the process that led them across the Dienepr in a series of victories that lasted from Aug43 to Jan44. They did it having taken extensive casualties at Kursk. If you remove units from the German Battle line, even if only Air units, and leave the Russians at their full pre Kursk strengh the odds are even better for the Red Corner.
The Soviet plan was in fact to blunt the germans at Kursk before attacking, and the basis for the german elastic defensive thesis is that. But in fact the Soviets took way more casualties and lost way more material than they expected (and than the Germans). There is nothing in the events from AUG 1943 to May 45 to show that anything but the need to reorganize logistics would slow down the russian much. Swiss Historian COL Eddie Bauer used to say that you follow Allied operations on 1/100 000 maps, but you follow russian advances on 1/1 000 000 maps.

Bingo. As the Soviets will again be seeking to do what they did so well IOTL and seeking to break through with local, overwhelming superiority aided by their newly-enhanced mobility and declining German mobility. It's not a Kursk in reverse, it's a dress rehearsal of 1943 and the Soviets using this to refine their doctrine and streamline their communications issues.


i said, that without kursk the germans have reserves...
with german reserves the russians sucked... without they could do what they want cause the nearby forces of the germans never could do more as kill a lot russians but not beat em.


So do the Soviets also have reserves.


kursk was the neckbreaker for the germans, cause here they had to strike against the most heavily fortified area wasting their reserves, the mobile reserves...


Where here they've withdrawn all their best troops to the West gambling on Stalin to do something uncharacteristic and just let them leave their weakest troops in the East.


without kursk the germans still destroy 5-7:1 russian tanks, but even more so they can beat the russian assaults, cut em of and destroy em.

the russians allways (even in early 1945) feared the german counterstrikes... so they never took the german panzers with their own tanks but allways with at-guns, they knew what happen to their forces.


Not in 1945, that was because the Soviets were logistically overstretched and they wished to establish a solid line, and the evidence indicated that a drive to Berlin then might have actually led to a defeat as the Germans would have been able to launch one last attempt at a major flank attack that had some hope for success.


i also mentioned that the russians will throw back the germans, slowly, but they will do.

But only as long as the germans crush the wallies. after this, the germans can bring back a lot strong units, even if some are exhausted and are in need to refresh.


By the time the Germans are able to send those troops back the Soviets will have already been hammering and smashing their line for several months, so the commitment won't be anywhere this neat and will only contribute to the further unraveling of the east.


basically, if the germans have enough reserves the russian advance is much more costly for the russians as it was, sometimes it will be no succsess at all. the otl battles showed, how narrow certain events had been, so if the germans have a panzerkorps more, things can go down the toilet for the russians...


This didn't happen in 1945 at Lake Balaton, the only German advantage here is the Russians are inexperienced at strategic offensive operations in 1943, this advantage disappears over months of fighting the German soldiers Hitler can't and doesn't want to use in the West......

I do read other people posts. I just don't allways agree with them. The general idea that the germans suffered huge losses during the offensive phase at Kursk is dispeled, among other, by von Meinstein, who claymed in his book lost victories that the germans were inflicting casualties on the russain at a higly favourable rate, and that the attack should have continued as the only way to destroy the russian reserves before they counterattacked. The Germans actually sufered more losses in the defensive battles after Citadel than during it. There is no big diference in kill ratios in the two phases of the battle, wich leads one to believe that the Russians loosing "thousands" of tanks defending Kursk or attacking Orel would have lead to the same end.
My point is, German reserves would have been exauthed fighting the initial soviet offensives in the same way they were at citadel, and unable to break a second wave of russian offensives. That first wave of russian offensives would achieve more or less the same results the russian defensive ops at Kursk did.
And losses at kursk are a hotly debated subject. Both German and Russian.

Eh, the Soviets did sustain enormous losses, primarily in the south, and there the problem was that the Stavka expected the primary German attack in the north, not the south, and even then those losses more than sufficed to contain the Germans to tactical depths of the Soviet defenses. It was effective death, not Luigi Cadorna war.

[Snake Featherston]

Well, at kursk the germans achieved around 8:1 kill-ratio...


This was due to the circumstances of the battle, and due to it being the one occasion in the war where the best German armor was superior to the best Soviet armor. This factor won't apply if Hitler's sending his best troops to the West, the T-34 with all its original defects will still be superior to the German armor opposed to it, and improved ability to depend upon and use firepower will do serious harm to a Wehrmacht depleted of its best troops and facing a Red Army far improved in mobility and firepower.


so i stay with my starting words: an invasion in may/june 43 help the germans a lot, cause it is the wrong move with serious consequences for the russians...


Indeed, the Russians, knowing no German summer offensive is going to happen are free not to await the major German strategic offensive but to shift to their own and exploit their overall manpower and armor superiority and to try both to keep the initiative and to begin to work out their own problems in offensive operations.


if - here i agree, the chance for a heavy russian defeat in open movement-battle in russia is at best 60:40 for the germans, more a coinflip - the germans beat the russian advance to the dnjeper and cause heavy losses (something similar to the january-march-43-action) i think stalin could rethink his opinions... if hitler offers peace (very doubtfull, but still possible) he could say yes. Or - maybe he offers peace and some officer kills hitler if this one say no... ?a lot soldiers tried to kill hitler... so this isn´t out of scope.

in the end, if all allies stay to the plan they win against germany - i just said that the wallies do the germans a big favour in trying the invasion in 1943...

Stalin's no more going to rethink a peace with Hitler than Hitler was going to with Stalin. The Soviets aren't going to be idle when they know they've a chance to seize, gain, and keep the initiative, possibly for the rest of the war.

[Cryptic]

The real risk with a 43 landing in France, Normandy being an option, not a mandatory site, is that you get a winter 43 counter offensive, not necesserely in the ardennes, that can bring about unexpected results.

One year early on France means the Germans counterattack a year earlier (or more). That, not can we land in France, is the big question.

That is a good point.

I think that even in 1943, the only way for the Germans to win would be to counter attack immediatly and destroy the landings. They did not have that ability.

Later counter attacks, as you mentioned, would be large and lethal. They would lead to tactical German victories. I do not think, however, that the German counter attacks would result in a strategic defeat of the western allies in France. If the western allies modified their social contract of victory with minimal casualties, and were prepared to accept heavier casualties from a 1943 invasion, then their advantages were just too great and their combat skills were growing too rapdily (no copyright on Blitzkreig and other armoured tactics) for the Germans to give a strategic defeat.

[informationfan]

The real risk with a 43 landing in France, Normandy being an option, not a mandatory site, is that you get a winter 43 counter offensive, not necesserely in the ardennes, that can bring about unexpected results.

That was one of my starting points....And I'm the guy who doesn't read other people posts (sight...)
One year early on France means the Germans counterattack a year earlier (or more). That, not can we land in France, is the big question.[/QUOTE]


well, you ignored parts of my post and answerd my post in a way one would think the germans could hold the russians and you explain why this isn´t possible

i also know what you wrote - but you are wrong.

an invasion in june 43 means a big defeat in july 1943 for the wallies... so no winter counter operation... the allies cannot break out of the bridgehead, cause they are crashed in an ugly way... causing a lot prisioners and killed wallies troops, basically most of the troops with combat experienced will now be dead or work for the germans...

the russians still lack the abilities of 1944, so even if they come a little bit nearer to berlin as otl (i doubt they can), it improve the german situation a lot. so it is not a good idea

[informationfan]

well, something generally...

i am surprised how stupid the western allies HQ must have been, they just had to invade in 1943... :rolleyes:

in reallity they knew exactly what was possible. Not "social contract" at all... they just know, they loose big time if they try it in 1943

[Snake Featherston]

the russians still lack the abilities of 1944, so even if they come a little bit nearer to berlin as otl (i doubt they can), it improve the german situation a lot. so it is not a good idea

The Soviets have a lot more manpower than they did IOTL towards the end of the war, and much less overall financial, economic, and military strain from the later battles of the war. Any democratic invasion of Western Europe would be foreseen quite some time before it happened at this phase so the Germans would be moving troops months before the actual invasion, and if they decide to forfeit the initiative to the USSR Stalin will exploit every single second of that he can.

[LordIreland]

well, what numbers do you add? all fronts or just homefront and france?

just look at the numbers of planes the germans had for kursk.
with an allied invasion kursk will not happen and the planes will be moved.

you really underestimate the german airforce

about the allied numbers, no - they haven´t these forces combat ready. if they had em they had used em.

and again no - the germans do not have to come to play with wallies terms... the wallies will be slaughtered on the ground and will desperatly need to stop this by their air force.
the germans can use their air force to hurt the wallies at some certain points.

the whole bridgehead isn´t stable, cause the allies have no advantage in numbers, they have poor quality in combat experience, they lack improved ground support by air force - so if they try to attack the german forces you will get high allied losses by friendly bombing...

the germans on the other side have high morale-units, battle hardened from the eastern front... with plenty of supply cause the allies lack the airforce to keep the german airforce at bay AND destroy the infrastructure in the way it is needed (like 1944)

also, allied planes in 1943 weren´t wonderweapons, they had the P47 and the P38, also the Spitfire, mostly V and IX... not too impressive...

france 1943 wasn´t an important battleground in otl, here it is "the" battlezone... beating the wallies means a big advantage, loosing here is "game over".

but loosing isn´t possible, not with a plot in late 1942...

sure, creating a scenario in spring 1936 with the usa increasing its army and airforce much more as they did could change the things... but this is asb.

the question was (and as i read it the plot start in mid/late 1942 and say "invade normandy in 1943) what happen to this invasion.

under these circumstances it is a no-go, a secure defeat.

You silly bugger. Read what I said. The numbrs are quite explicit, even quoted the source if you wish to go check it yourself.

[informationfan]

You silly bugger. Read what I said. The numbrs are quite explicit, even quoted the source if you wish to go check it yourself.


well, i read it and it wasn´t useful... you should stop insulting people because you cannot live with different opinions... production numbers aren´t the same as combat ready forces... i hoped this is clear to you.

if not you should read a few books more, maybe some that explain these differents... esp. that every plane needs a pilot, a trained pilot and logistics... both the allies had not in the needed range for an air force in england in 1943...

maybe you should read more? or ask yourself if the allied hq was full of idiots or maybe they knew something you have forgotten? i bet they knew more as you knew... :cool:

[Maur]

if not you should read a few books more, maybe some that explain these differents...
Could you suggest some books?

[Maur]

I think you are under estimating the how deep the social contract was in the western allies and how it effected western allied planning in the strategic sense. Yes, the allies wanted to win and winning a war of that scale was going to cost alot of casualties. At the same time, the western allies place alot higher priority on minimal casualties when they made strategic decisions than the totalaterian governments did.

The minimal casualties policy also gave the totalitarian nations military options that the western allies did not have. It also meant that the strategic advances of the western allies (and a certain number of tactical advances) were cautious. For example, the British only agreed to D-Day and not Yugoslavia and / or Norway becasue they saw it was needed to win the war. It also meant that the U.S. advacne across the Pcific was going to deliberate and there were not going to be any hasty and costly counter attacks at Attu and Kiska


Given the Soviets won the war it's worth noting that the Soviet concept of a mechanized, combined-arms division was arguably superior, as the Soviets also won gigantic victories that left them in Europe for decades where the Nazi empire fell apart in two years despite its own victories.
Curiously, these two posts are about the same thing.

I'll start from Snake. Yes, i'd say you're right - operational flexibility (which having assets not permanently tied up with divisions) is better when it comes to winning wars. Tactical capability, having divisions (a smaller formation) being well-rounded units capable of acting independently leads to them being more efficient when they are not reinforced from upper echelon.

See where it's going? The west choose the attitude that makes investing in everyone, which Soviets sacrificed the non-essential rifle divisions in order to be able to concentrate the assets where they were needed.

Which bring us to the west reluctance to accept losses, which i actually disagree with. Yes, i know it was (and certainly is now) the narrative in the west, i simply disagree with it being so distinctive from Soviet (dunno about Japanese), and with it being the reality, instead of just the cultural narrative. Soviets didn't go around throwing away manpower, that's misconception.

Back to the divisions. The one caveat is that it's more relevant to German-Soviet situation, Allies had a situation where they saturated their army with so many support units that they basically had both (although many support units were in reality permanently attached to divisions, so divisions in fact were even stronger than on paper). One could argue that the effect was smaller army, but, well.

[Snake Featherston]

Curiously, these two posts are about the same thing.

I'll start from Snake. Yes, i'd say you're right - operational flexibility (which having assets not permanently tied up with divisions) is better when it comes to winning wars. Tactical capability, having divisions (a smaller formation) being well-rounded units capable of acting independently leads to them being more efficient when they are not reinforced from upper echelon.

See where it's going? The west choose the attitude that makes investing in everyone, which Soviets sacrificed the non-essential rifle divisions in order to be able to concentrate the assets where they were needed.

Which bring us to the west reluctance to accept losses, which i actually disagree with. Yes, i know it was (and certainly is now) the narrative in the west, i simply disagree with it being so distinctive from Soviet (dunno about Japanese), and with it being the reality, instead of just the cultural narrative. Soviets didn't go around throwing away manpower, that's misconception.

Back to the divisions. The one caveat is that it's more relevant to German-Soviet situation, Allies had a situation where they saturated their army with so many support units that they basically had both (although many support units were in reality permanently attached to divisions, so divisions in fact were even stronger than on paper). One could argue that the effect was smaller army, but, well.

The problem is that the Soviets did not want to throw away manpower and their concept of the strategic reserve in practice led to them having no choice but to do precisely this. The losses the USSR took in terms of manpower and what all that meant for the Soviet Union helped contribute to the Soviet collapse. The democracies will not be able to adopt an operational concept very easily given the reality that the string of Nazi victories have booted them out of mainland Europe.

They *can* structure their army thus, but the reality of the war they fight limits their chances to do so. The one occasion this would have made a big difference is in 1940 where adopting an operational concept of war would have stopped the German war in its tracks.

[Know Nothing]

Curiously, these two posts are about the same thing.

I'll start from Snake. Yes, i'd say you're right - operational flexibility (which having assets not permanently tied up with divisions) is better when it comes to winning wars. Tactical capability, having divisions (a smaller formation) being well-rounded units capable of acting independently leads to them being more efficient when they are not reinforced from upper echelon.

See where it's going? The west choose the attitude that makes investing in everyone, which Soviets sacrificed the non-essential rifle divisions in order to be able to concentrate the assets where they were needed.

Which bring us to the west reluctance to accept losses, which i actually disagree with. Yes, i know it was (and certainly is now) the narrative in the west, i simply disagree with it being so distinctive from Soviet (dunno about Japanese), and with it being the reality, instead of just the cultural narrative. Soviets didn't go around throwing away manpower, that's misconception.

Back to the divisions. The one caveat is that it's more relevant to German-Soviet situation, Allies had a situation where they saturated their army with so many support units that they basically had both (although many support units were in reality permanently attached to divisions, so divisions in fact were even stronger than on paper). One could argue that the effect was smaller army, but, well.

The lack of infantry replacements will hurt the US like it hurt in 1944 in OTL. They didn't train enough infantry, and only 91 Army (and 6 Marine) Divisions is cutting it too close.

If the beachhead survives, they may be in trouble during a sustained German offensive.

[Maur]

The lack of infantry replacements will hurt the US like it hurt in 1944 in OTL. They didn't train enough infantry, and only 91 Army (and 6 Marine) Divisions is cutting it too close.

If the beachhead survives, they may be in trouble during a sustained German offensive.
You mean lack of riflemen replacements.

I have more faith in US flexibility when it comes to handling replacements (less so with UK ;p). Surely, they fumbled a bit and had to comb the other services to put more men on the frontline, but the replacement issue was never very pressing and appeared only late in the war.

And anyway, riflemen are needed for offensive capability, divisions that sustained large losses still have almost untouched defensive strength due to remaining at, mg, artillery components.

[Know Nothing]

You mean lack of riflemen replacements.

I have more faith in US flexibility when it comes to handling replacements (less so with UK ;p). Surely, they fumbled a bit and had to comb the other services to put more men on the frontline, but the replacement issue was never very pressing and appeared only late in the war.

And anyway, riflemen are needed for offensive capability, divisions that sustained large losses still have almost untouched defensive strength due to remaining at, mg, artillery components.

Yep I meant rifleman.

[LordIreland]

well, i read it and it wasn´t useful... you should stop insulting people because you cannot live with different opinions... production numbers aren´t the same as combat ready forces... i hoped this is clear to you.

if not you should read a few books more, maybe some that explain these differents... esp. that every plane needs a pilot, a trained pilot and logistics... both the allies had not in the needed range for an air force in england in 1943...

maybe you should read more? or ask yourself if the allied hq was full of idiots or maybe they knew something you have forgotten? i bet they knew more as you knew... :cool:

You are totally correct, i shouldn't have been so dismissive of your opinions, I can only plead being distracted when I posted, so please accept my apologies. I will now answer your post in a more appropriate manner;)

Firstly, let me state quite clearly, I think a land invasion in 43 has a minimal chance of success. So we agree about that in principal. My primary focus was to take issue with your comments about the luftwaffe, which are IMHO a tad overstated!So, i will now answer your points in detail:cool:

well, what numbers do you add? all fronts or just homefront and france?

I believe that I stated quite clearly that Germany had approx 5000 total aircraft, I then gave a very clear breakdown of aircraft numbers available of each type. Total numbers, as I believe you were quoting don't tell the true story, what you will find is that a number of aircraft at any given time will be being repaired or serviced. A logical rule of thumb would be to half the number of serviceable aircraft, although it may be slightly higher in the west due to there being less strain on the LW at this point. So, lets be generous and say 2,000 of the total aircraft in the west are available for combat, leaving approx 1,300 to cover the eastern front and the upcoming Operation Citadel. Check the my OP for exact numbers of serviceable vs total in each category. Incidentally, I didn't bother to include transport aircraft in those figures, if the LW are using transports in the battle they really have lost big time....

.you really underestimate the german airforce, about the allied numbers, no - they haven´t these forces combat ready. if they had em they had used em.

No, I think its safe to say that you really over estimate the LW. Also, the trick with superior numbers is not to throw them all at the enemy at once, but to keep the pressure up, which is what the WAllies did IOTL, with their slow erosion policy. This ofc would change in the postulated scenario, it would then be a game of numbers, which the WAllies will win.

and again no - the germans do not have to come to play with wallies terms..the wallies will be slaughtered on the ground and will desperatly need to stop this by their air force.
the germans can use their air force to hurt the wallies at some certain points.

Uhm, yeah they do. The WAllies will choose where to attack and the Germans will have to come to them, if they don't then the won't be able to stop them. But, let me expand on this point, because you clearly didn't understand it. What I meant here was that this battle will be different to the slow erosion of the LWs strength by a bomber offensive. IOTL, the WAllies had to fly into the teeth of the German defences, this meant that the LW held all the cards so to speak, they could choose when are where to attack. Furthermore, the lack of a long range fighter (until the advent of the mustang) seriously disadvantaged the WAllies. So the process took longer. In this situation the WAllies can employ their full might and the LW will be involved in a fight where it lacks the advantages enjoyed by the defender.

the whole bridgehead isn´t stable, cause the allies have no advantage in numbers, they have poor quality in combat experience, they lack improved ground support by air force - so if they try to attack the german forces you will get high allied losses by friendly bombing...

the germans on the other side have high morale-units, battle hardened from the eastern front... with plenty of supply cause the allies lack the airforce to keep the german airforce at bay AND destroy the infrastructure in the way it is needed (like 1944)

Agreed, the LW Wehrmacht co-operation was very good, but this will be a battle of attrition, both airforces will effectively be hammering each other and since the WAllies have the advantage in numbers they will win!.

also, allied planes in 1943 weren´t wonderweapons, they had the P47 and the P38, also the Spitfire, mostly V and IX... not too impressive...

The WAllie aircraft are a match for the German ones plain and simple, there is no real qualitive difference between the opposing aircraft. As a side note, I didn't claim that they were wonder weapons, merely that the LW was NOT a wonder weapon, you seem to be putting altogether too much faith in them, remember thisis not France 1940;)



but loosing isn´t possible, not with a plot in late 1942...

sure, creating a scenario in spring 1936 with the usa increasing its army and airforce much more as they did could change the things... but this is asb.

the question was (and as i read it the plot start in mid/late 1942 and say "invade normandy in 1943) what happen to this invasion.

under these circumstances it is a no-go, a secure defeat.

Again, no arguements from me here. I was merely discussing the overall effect of the LW, which I think you have way over stated;)

So, there we have it, a cogent rebutal in the true style of AH.com.

Fondest regards.

Lord I

[Sior]

You mean lack of riflemen replacements.

I have more faith in US flexibility when it comes to handling replacements (less so with UK ;p). Surely, they fumbled a bit and had to comb the other services to put more men on the frontline, but the replacement issue was never very pressing and appeared only late in the war.

And anyway, riflemen are needed for offensive capability, divisions that sustained large losses still have almost untouched defensive strength due to remaining at, mg, artillery components.

Bit of a not thought through comment there (dum) Britain had been fighting from 1939 (5 years) America from 1942 (2 years). population of Britain in the 1940's approx 48 million, population of America 139 million. So of course America can find more replacements, they have not lost so may in combat and they have over 3 times the population.

[merlin]

Could you suggest some books?

Try:
- Alanbrooke by David Fraser, or Masters & Commanders (sorry author not known) - for insights to the strategic problems as perceived from on high.

- Strike from the Sky, The History of Battlefield Air attack 1911-1945, by Richard Hallion - for the way Tactical air power changed from Torch to D-Day.

- Armageddon, by Max Hastings, - demonstrates how the German Army even when scrapping the 'bottom of the barrel' was still able to stonewall the Allies.

[Maur]

Bit of a not thought through comment there (dum) Britain had been fighting from 1939 (5 years) America from 1942 (2 years). population of Britain in the 1940's approx 48 million, population of America 139 million. So of course America can find more replacements, they have not lost so may in combat and they have over 3 times the population.
Oh i thought it out. Had UK didn't mismanage it colonies so much it would have much more manpower potential than any WW II combatant, including China.

[LordIreland]

@Sior

Manpower wasn't the issue, it was the ability to equip them that caused problems. Also, no Imperial Power (however benign) will arm masses of the natives.....it would be Imperial Suicide:D

Regards

Lord I

[bsmart111]

I don't remember it and i've read about the planning quite extensively. Weird.

I'm sorry for not replying sooner massive issues at work got in the way.

The plan for a 'save the USSR' invasion of France was Operation Sledgehammer. The plan was initially projected for the fall of '42 but the plans were kept in place and updated at least until Operation Husky made a real threat to the European continent by the Western allies.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sledgehammer
is the Wikipedia page on it I know there are extensive writings on it in teh U.S. Army Green book series but I don't have them directly at hand

Edit - I just found an online section of the Green Books that covers this
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-WD-Ops/USA-WD-Ops-9.html
Scroll down to page 156 (this chapter begins on 143) and youll find the basis for Sledgehammer. This is in 'The Command Post' series of Green books not the ETO series since it was a plan developed by the War Plans Division in Washington. Hope this helps

The plans were not the best but were seen as a measure that may have to be taken to relieve pressure on the Soviets if it appeared that front may be collapsing. I believe the time it was most seriously considered was Fall/Winter of 42-43 when the Germans were at Stalingrad, the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. If any one of those three would have ended in a German breakthrough it might have become a reality.

I think it would initially have been an 'Anzio on a larger scale' (Although Anzio wasn't supposed to be a surrounded beachhead it just ended up that way) with a French front well wihin tactical air range of England

[phx1138]

no landing in italy
That frees enormous quantities of shipping otherwise wasted supplying weaps, ammo, & food to armies in Italy, not to mention food & fuel to Italian civilians...:rolleyes: Instead, the Germans will have to supply food & fuel, as well as keep the Italians pacified.:eek: (Like Germany doesn't have enough problems with fuel supplies...:rolleyes:)
the germans have enough forces, better trained, way more experienced as the allied counterparts
Many now tied up in Italy. Meanwhile, combat experienced troops who would otherwise be in Italy, like I Canadian Corps (frex), would instead be in Normandy.
the germans have much more weapons superior to the allied ones
Speer's "production miracle" hasn't happened yet...
the allies lack the advantage of much superior asw... they have started the defeat of the subs, not finished it...
By June '43, the U-boat threat was under control. With the drastically reduced demand for shipping thanks to no Italian campaign, losses in the Atlantic would not be unacceptable.
the american troops are green
:confused::confused: So what have they been doing in North Africa & Sicily? Macrame?:rolleyes:
if the germans cancel kursk, they withdraw the 2nd SS-Tank-corps and bring it to the normandy...
Not a chance. In the first place, the Germans have got to hold the Sovs. In the second, they've got to deliver the troops, & even with reduced air, I simply don't believe the Allies couldn't make that next to impossible.
cause you have no chance to stop em with the allied air force
Why? The formations come to France by train...
also, without italy invaded (after DDD43 (D-Day-Debacle) it will be free from allied soldiers for around a year) the germans have one front less to care about...
Why do you conclude Italy won't fall & end up occupied by Germans?

Sounds to me you're giving the Germans way too much credit.
In the long run, the war on the Pacific would still be ended by the manhatam project
Well, no. The Bomb did less IMO than the Sov declaration of war. Which, if Germany is defeated sooner, means Japan could get terms. When Inouye's government falls at the fall of Saipan, around the same time Germany surrenders, FDR could cut Japan a deal. Not being dead & all, & not having Byrnes as SecState (& stalling til the Bomb was used, evidently to intimidate the Sovs).

This also means, IMO, no wars in Korea nor Vietnam.:cool::cool:

[Easterling]

I can't believe such an obviously dumb ideea is still being discussed after 7 pages:eek:

the Germans will have to supply food & fuel, as well as keep the Italians pacified.:eek: (Like Germany doesn't have enough problems with fuel supplies...:rolleyes:)
Given that in this scenario there is still a fully functioning Italian state, it will probably cost the Germans less than propping up the Salo republic of OTL

Many now tied up in Italy. Yes, because in OTL the Germans had no troops tied up in Italy fighting to stop the allied advance.:rolleyes:

Speer's "production miracle" hasn't happened yet......neither has the allied strategic bombing offensive.
And before you discuss production capabilities you should remember that the Third Reich of 1943 had a stronger army compared to the Third Reich of 1944, while the Allies in 1943 were still building up and would be more powerfull in 1944.

By June '43, the U-boat threat was under control. With the drastically reduced demand for shipping thanks to no Italian campaign, losses in the Atlantic would not be unacceptable. Under control does not mean eradicated (as it was in 1944). And from your scenario I understand that those shipping demands would still exist, only directed to a different area (which may be in fact more vulnerable to U-Boats.

:confused::confused: So what have they been doing in North Africa & Sicily? Macrame?:rolleyes: If you want to land in Normandy in 1943 you have to cancel Sicily, and even with the experince in North Africa US troops are still relatively green.

Not a chance. In the first place, the Germans have got to hold the Sovs. In the second, they've got to deliver the troops, & even with reduced air, I simply don't believe the Allies couldn't make that next to impossible.- It takes less troops to hold the line then to attack against prepared defenses.
- The allies who do not even have long range fighters at this point and are still taking serious losses when bombing the continent are going to completely neutralize the German transportation system... how?:confused:


Why do you conclude Italy won't fall & end up occupied by Germans?Why would Italy fall when it is not attacked. I find it more likely that Italy would stay in the fight and maybe even send troops to France.


Well, no. The Bomb did less IMO than the Sov declaration of war. Which, if Germany is defeated sooner, means Japan could get terms. When Inouye's government falls at the fall of Saipan, around the same time Germany surrenders, FDR could cut Japan a deal. Not being dead & all, & not having Byrnes as SecState (& stalling til the Bomb was used, evidently to intimidate the Sovs).

This also means, IMO, no wars in Korea nor Vietnam.:cool::cool:The unconditional surrender policy was allreasy in force in 1943, and there is no way Roosevelt would cut a deal with Japan, the original axis agressor.
And if somehow the war really does end earlier than OTL, this might mean that the Soviets are in a better shape on VE day, and with no A-Bomb in sight yet, they might get...ideeas:cool::D
Certainly it would not make the Cold War any better.

[phx1138]

Given that in this scenario there is still a fully functioning Italian state, it will probably cost the Germans less than propping up the Salo republic of OTL
Yes, because in OTL the Germans had no troops tied up in Italy fighting to stop the allied advance.:rolleyes:
And you think a hostile Italy, which the Germans have to occupy & pacify, feed, clothe, & provide fuel for is a picnic?
...neither has the allied strategic bombing offensive.
What?:confused::confused: I suppose you think Bomber Command hadn't been attacking Germany since 1940.:confused::confused:
And before you discuss production capabilities
Before you do, you should remember the U.S. alone outproduced all the Axis powers combined. In 1938. By 1943, the U.S. alone almost outproduced every other power in the war combined.
the Third Reich of 1943 had a stronger army compared to the Third Reich of 1944, while the Allies in 1943 were still building up and would be more powerfull in 1944.
I never said it would be a cakewalk. Nor do I recall anybody else saying it, either.
Under control does not mean eradicated (as it was in 1944). And from your scenario I understand that those shipping demands would still exist, only directed to a different area (which may be in fact more vulnerable to U-Boats.)
No. You misunderstand. By mid-'43, Dönitz was abandoning the Atlantic because his boats couldn't survive under the CVE/VLR umbrella with radar & Hedgehog & all the rest of it. What it means is, the buildup for Neptune can happen because the Italian campaign doesn't. You don't need every U-boat sunk, contrary to what you appear to believe. (Even in '45, there were quite a few still in service...:rolleyes: And the Germans were working toward even better boats, so "eradicated in 1944" does not stand scrutiny.)
If you want to land in Normandy in 1943 you have to cancel Sicily
Why?:confused::confused::confused: There were LCs & troops enough for both. (They weren't going off simultaneously, after all.:rolleyes:) It probably means some PTO op has to be delayed or cancelled, which will piss off MacArthur.:rolleyes: (I count that a good thing.:p)

Ideally, of course, you'd have Alexander &/or Eisenhower show a trifle more sense & just bottle up the DAK in Tunisia, rather than insist on reducing them, & save 6mo.:rolleyes:
- It takes less troops to hold the line then to attack against prepared defenses.
You appear to believe the "prepared defenses" were on the same scale. For most of the Normandy coast, there weren't any til Rommel got started--in '44.
The allies who do not even have long range fighters at this point and are still taking serious losses when bombing the continent are going to completely neutralize the German transportation system... how?:confused:
One: they don't have to "completely neutralize the German transportation system", just the parts of it moving troops & equipment into Normandy. They called that the "French railway desert", & that can be done with Spitfires, Hurricanes, Typhoons, P-47s, & A-36s, all in service in '43.

Two: where is it set in stone the attacks have to be in daylight? Bomber Command was working quite nicely without fighter escort at night.

Three, & most telling in your ignorance: attacks by bombers (without escorts, at night) on railyards, canals, & rivers could have done more than "completely neutralize the German transportation system" into France. They could have shut down the German war economy.

Except you think the Allied strategic bomber offensive hadn't even started in '43....:rolleyes:
Why would Italy fall when it is not attacked.
Oh, I don't know. How about the OTL experience of it actually happening when Sicily fell to the Allies?:rolleyes: It wasn't the invasion of the mainland that did it. Or did you not know this?:rolleyes:
The unconditional surrender policy was allreasy in force in 1943, and there is no way Roosevelt would cut a deal with Japan
Get a clue. All the Axis powers got conditional surrenders OTL. The only condition the Japanese demanded was "retain the Emperor". Guess what: the U.S. agreed. "Unconditional"? Not so much.
the original axis agressor
What does that make Germany?:rolleyes:
And if somehow the war really does end earlier than OTL, this might mean that the Soviets are in a better shape on VE day
Within their own borders, instead, yes. Better for Eastern Europe, I'd say. Korea, too. Also, without so much destruction in Japan & Germany, the world is better off. And without their power completely broken, Germany & Japan can continue to be bulwarks against Sov expansion. Plus, without August Storm (with Japan's surrender sooner), Mao loses the Chinese Civil War... (Much less Sov aid left behind in Manchuria...)
with no A-Bomb in sight yet, they might get...ideeas:cool::D
Certainly it would not make the Cold War any better.
This is the only point I actually agree with you on. Without the Bomb actually being used, the Sovs could do something stupid, not believing the U.S. would actually use it on a city.

[Shaby]

In 1944, when Allies had muc much more LCs than in 1943, all operations except Dragoon were suspended in Mediterranian TO. Besides neither air supremacy nor enough forces were organized for succesful cross-Channel operation in 1943. Mullberry ports were not ready in 1943. Deception operations were only in initial stages so no. There is no way for D Day in 1943.

[Easterling]

And you think a hostile Italy, which the Germans have to occupy & pacify, feed, clothe, & provide fuel for is a picnic?

Why would the Italians become hostile with no Allied landings coming? Did they all become masochistic?

What?:confused::confused: I suppose you think Bomber Command hadn't been attacking Germany since 1940.:confused::confused:The serious damage was all done in late 1943 and in 1944

Before you do, you should remember the U.S. alone outproduced all the Axis powers combined. In 1938. By 1943, the U.S. alone almost outproduced every other power in the war combined.You know, arguments are not won by spouting off random historical information, even if it is correct.
I never said it would be a cakewalk. Nor do I recall anybody else saying it, either.No, but you imply that it would be easier than in 1944, which is absurd.

No. You misunderstand. By mid-'43, Dönitz was abandoning the Atlantic because his boats couldn't survive under the CVE/VLR umbrella with radar & Hedgehog & all the rest of it. What it means is, the buildup for Neptune can happen because the Italian campaign doesn't. You don't need every U-boat sunk, contrary to what you appear to believe. (Even in '45, there were quite a few still in service...:rolleyes: And the Germans were working toward even better boats, so "eradicated in 1944" does not stand scrutiny.)Then how did the Italian campaign cause "unacceptable losses" in OTL?
Besides, the invasion of Normandy would have to come before "mid-43" where you place the point of allied victory in the battle of the Atlantic.

Why?:confused::confused::confused: There were LCs & troops enough for both. (They weren't going off simultaneously, after all.:rolleyes:) It probably means some PTO op has to be delayed or cancelled, which will piss off MacArthur.:rolleyes: (I count that a good thing.:p)Because it will be easier to redeploy forces from the PTO instead of redistributing those available in the ETO...:rolleyes:

Ideally, of course, you'd have Alexander &/or Eisenhower show a trifle more sense & just bottle up the DAK in Tunisia, rather than insist on reducing them, & save 6mo.:rolleyes:What a pitty that they did not have your strategic genius

You appear to believe the "prepared defenses" were on the same scale. For most of the Normandy coast, there weren't any til Rommel got started--in '44.I was talking about the soviet defenses in the Kursk area.
Also, where does your fetish for the Atlantic wall come from? Fortifications are useless without soldiers to man them, and in 1944 the Reich had too few soldiers available to send to normandy, whereas in 1943 it has more.

One: they don't have to "completely neutralize the German transportation system", just the parts of it moving troops & equipment into Normandy. They called that the "French railway desert", & that can be done with Spitfires, Hurricanes, Typhoons, P-47s, & A-36s, all in service in '43.And all failed to stop the Germans from deploying troops to Italy, even if the local air defenses were likely weaker than in France.

Two: where is it set in stone the attacks have to be in daylight? Bomber Command was working quite nicely without fighter escort at night.What about German night fighters?

Three, & most telling in your ignorance: attacks by bombers (without escorts, at night) on railyards, canals, & rivers could have done more than "completely neutralize the German transportation system" into France. They could have shut down the German war economy. How chivalrous were these allies! They could have interdicted all troop movements and completely shut down the German economy allready in the summer of 1943, but choose not do do it. They were probably looking for a proper challenge.


Oh, I don't know. How about the OTL experience of it actually happening when Sicily fell to the Allies?:rolleyes: It wasn't the invasion of the mainland that did it. Or did you not know this?:rolleyes:I know that the armistice was signed after the first allied landings in Italy proper. The loss of Sicily only caused the fall of Mussollini.

Get a clue. All the Axis powers got conditional surrenders OTL.So what conditions did Germany get?
The only condition the Japanese demanded was "retain the Emperor". Guess what: the U.S. agreed. "Unconditional"? Not so much.One wonders why the Japanese went to war in the first place, if they only wanted to retain the emperor

What does that make Germany?:rolleyes:Proper context: I was talking from a US perspective.
But if you want we can go all the way back to the Mukden incident

Within their own borders, instead, yes. Better for Eastern Europe, I'd say. Korea, too. Also, without so much destruction in Japan & Germany, the world is better off. And without their power completely broken, Germany & Japan can continue to be bulwarks against Sov expansion.Because the allies pulling off Overlord in 1943 will impress the Axis powers so much that they will choose to surrender imediately instead of wrecking themselves in a futile fight to the death like in OTL.
Plus, without August Storm (with Japan's surrender sooner), Mao loses the Chinese Civil War... (Much less Sov aid left behind in Manchuria...)If the Soviets want to help Mao they can just send him aid directly, no need for August Storm.

[phx1138]

Why would the Italians become hostile with no Allied landings coming? Did they all become masochistic?
How about after the fall of Mussolini's government?
The serious damage was all done in late 1943 and in 1944
To cities, yes. The ability to damage German conmmunications is the issue. Or do you dispute the Allies had the ability?
You know, arguments are not won by spouting off random historical information, even if it is correct.
You were the one saying the Allies would be at a production disadvantage, not me.
No, but you imply that it would be easier than in 1944, which is absurd.
No, easier than OTL with the Italian campaign. I never suggested anything else, nor AFAIK implied it.
Then how did the Italian campaign cause "unacceptable losses" in OTL?
Unacceptable losses? Learn to read. Unacceptable losses in capacity because of the demands of the Italina campaign. Demands which disappear without it.
Besides, the invasion of Normandy would have to come before "mid-43" where you place the point of allied victory in the battle of the Atlantic.
Why?:confused: June '44 worked nicely; why not June '43? And the victory against U-boats was more like March, but it was clear by July, so I'm giving the Admiralty & HMG a bit of time to get over their panic. (They had a bad period after ONS5 in May.)
Because it will be easier to redeploy forces from the PTO instead of redistributing those available in the ETO...:rolleyes:
Don't be stupid. It's not about redeploying forces, it's about not sending LCs, which were the bottleneck.
What a pitty that they did not have your strategic genius
Thank you.;) They made a mistake. It is known to happen. Marshall also opposed landing at Bone, which could have shortened the North Afirican campaign substantially, because he considered it too risky. I disagree. Was he wrong? Or am I? IDK.
I was talking about the soviet defenses in the Kursk area.
Also, where does your fetish for the Atlantic wall come from? Fortifications are useless without soldiers to man them, and in 1944 the Reich had too few soldiers available to send to normandy, whereas in 1943 it has more.
And troops without prepared defenses are less effective, so they'd be much easier to clean out, no?
And all failed to stop the Germans from deploying troops to Italy, even if the local air defenses were likely weaker than in France.
AFAIK, there wasn't an effort to seal off Italy. There was to seal off Normandy. Had there been one to seal off Italy, it would have been brainlessly easy. Those mountains limit access in a way the land around Normandy doesn't... Which may've been why the Allies didn't bother.
What about German night fighters?
What about them? They didn't stop the city bombing, & that was when the Germans knew approximately what the targets would be. How do you expect them to patrol every mile of railway, river, & canal in Occupied Europe? Or even every railyard (an easier task, to be sure)?
How chivalrous were these allies! They could have interdicted all troop movements and completely shut down the German economy allready in the summer of 1943, but choose not do do it. They were probably looking for a proper challenge.
Chivalry had damn all to do with it, & you know it. It was a lack of strategic vision because Portal & Harris were too busy bombing cities. That you don't know it doesn't make it untrue.
I know that the armistice was signed after the first allied landings in Italy proper. The loss of Sicily only caused the fall of Mussollini.
And the invasion of Italy proper was the product of a strategic mistake which let Axis troops escape Sicily. Mussolini going means new government. Good odds for a treaty.
One wonders why the Japanese went to war in the first place, if they only wanted to retain the emperor
Don't be stupid. They were defeated. They wanted to keep their conquests. They wanted to disarm themselves. They wanted all sorts of things as terms of surrender. The one thing they would have fought on to get was keeping the Emperor. They got it.
But if you want we can go all the way back to the Mukden incident
I'll concede this one.
Because the allies pulling off Overlord in 1943 will impress the Axis powers so much that they will choose to surrender imediately instead of wrecking themselves in a futile fight to the death like in OTL.
Because there's a year or so less destruction of industry & infrastructure, fewer men dead, & the Sovs not occupying Poland & half of Germany & Korea, for a start.

If the Soviets want to help Mao they can just send him aid directly, no need for August Storm.
You think they weren't? The difference is in the enormous scale.

In 1944, when Allies had muc much more LCs than in 1943, all operations except Dragoon were suspended in Mediterranian TO. Besides neither air supremacy nor enough forces were organized for succesful cross-Channel operation in 1943. Mullberry ports were not ready in 1943. Deception operations were only in initial stages
All contingent on there being an Italian campaign. Had Winston not been stupid about it, the planning & preparation for a '43 *Neptune could have been complete in time. So could the Mulberrys & "funnies". I'm unaware of any major breakthroughs needed.
No, B29s operated from China.
Matterhorn was a multi-million dollar boondoggle, & totally ineffective. They needed Saipan. When it fell, the U.S. could've offered the new Japanese government a deal & ended the war without burning down half of Japan's cities.:eek:

Kursk is delayed / canceled.
If Zitadel is cancelled, it follows the Sovs strike first, which will either hold forces in Russia or draw them from France & away from Normandy. Either way, there won't be massive reinforcement.
10-20.000 men drowned in the atlantic, sunken by a sub...
As I recall, most of the troops sent to Britain went by the Queens, & U-boats had about as much chance of sinking one of them as Himmler had of being named Amnesty International Man of the Year.:rolleyes:
so the losses for the allies will rise, cause the americans have basically no time to learn their stuff...
"No time'?:confused::confused: What do think they've been doing for all of 1942 & most of 1943? Besides taking pretty severe losses on unescorted missions deep into Germany. Which Normandy isn't, so they'd be in range of, what, every fighter the Allies could muster?
at night you can´t hit a railroad (if you have difficulty to hit a city as large as berlin!)...
Really? In 1940 that might have been true; by 1942, not so much. More to the point, railroads were in reach of 'phoons & Jugs, which could work nicely in daylight. And following rivers, & mining them, at night was something even Bomber Command could do. Actually, they were really good at it. Following rail lines, too. It's called "contact flying", & it's part of the reason the bomber crews had such a hassle doing actual navigation.:rolleyes: So, finding the railyards would be dead easy.:rolleyes:
so rising allied air losses hurt double, first they do less damage and second they are missed in training and experience to give to green pilots...
Wrong on both counts. Losses on mining missions were very much lower than on city bombing, so much so they were used as training hops. (Or so says Terraine in The Right of the Line.) Intensify them...:rolleyes:
you never ever had trained them properly for these operations...
I'm compelled to ask what you think the Army was doing in SWPA, then? In these conditions, I'd expect training to follow that experience. Might be instead of the nitwits who refused arty prep at Salerno & "funnies" at Normandy get replaced by generals who actually know what they're doing. Maybe even get some LVTs,:cool: instead of the stupid DD Shermans.:eek:
So what is the PoD for a '43 invasion of France?
How about JCS deciding to bottle up DAK instead of reducing it?

[Easterling]

To phx1138:
At this point I have trouble figuring out how you imagine things are going to play out in this ATL. How far in advance should the allies start to plan for this alternate strategy, and what historical events should encourage them to be so confident and risk-taging, when in OTL the allied planner were ever cautios, even towards the end of the war?
Have you thought for a minute about the political costs of this change of strategy. So far from your own posts I made a list of people who would be pissed of by it: McArthur, Portal & Harris, Winston Churchill. All of these influential people who will be lobying against the new plans. How much time would this hipothetical "pro Normandy-43" lobby need to defeat thir opposition and would it be soon enough to allow for all the necessary preparations.
You say the allies should have bottled up the Afrika Korps. This means foregoing the first chance they had to destroy a major Axis army and gain a major morale boost. This would cause even more political problems. And in any way, this option would not save "6 months" like you believe, but no more than 1-2 months. The blocade of North Africa wasn't complete until March or April of 1943, so the option of letting the Axis forces there wither on the wine did not exist until then. And how are the Allies going to invade Sicily while maintaining the encirclement of the Africa Korps, when the naval and land forces used for Husky came from North Africa in OTL?
And how is Italy going to fall without landings on the mainland when the Italians in OTL specifically asked for an allied ocuppation before surrendering?

On economics: I never implied that the Allies would be at a production disadvantage in 1943. Learn to read too! I was talking about forces imediately available. In 1943 the Reich has a stronger army compared to 1944, and the allies have a weaker army compared to 1944, so the Reich has better chances of winning the decisive battle.
Superior production capabilities are one more reason for the allies to bid their time and build up some more forces.

On air power:
When did the British night bombers demonstrate in OTL the kind of accuracy needed to completely shut down the german economy and transportation system?
And how are the allies going to develop the optimal doctrine for airpower without the extra year of fighting?
And German night fighters do not need to guard every target like you believe. They can track the movement of British bombers by radar. Ever heard of the Kammhuber line?

[phx1138]

At this point I have trouble figuring out how you imagine things are going to play out in this ATL. How far in advance should the allies start to plan for this alternate strategy, and what historical events should encourage them to be so confident and risk-taging, when in OTL the allied planner were ever cautios, even towards the end of the war?
That really does depend on the POD, doesn't it? I make no judgment on when.

Have you thought for a minute about the political costs of this change of strategy. So far from your own posts I made a list of people who would be pissed of by it: McArthur, Portal & Harris, Winston Churchill.
I'll agree on the first 3, at least to a point. Without the prestige he gained later, Harris could possibly be replaced. If not, Portal, & he, could simply be told that's how it's going to be, in the interest of victory.

MacArthur might be unhappy, or might not; could be CPac ops are sacrificed to keep him from crying. Nimitz won't like it, but he's much less likely to gripe. And King can also be told, the objective is to win the war.

Churchill? He needed persuading Italy was a bad idea. Can he be persuaded? I don't see why not. Care to explain?

In all cases, if the war ends sooner, & I'm persuaded it would, they'd live with it.
You say the allies should have bottled up the Afrika Korps. This means foregoing the first chance they had to destroy a major Axis army and gain a major morale boost. This would cause even more political problems.
Why? They've defeated DAK. What gain is there in destroying it in detail?
And in any way, this option would not save "6 months" like you believe, but no more than 1-2 months. The blocade of North Africa wasn't complete until March or April of 1943, so the option of letting the Axis forces there wither on the wine did not exist until then.
I'm also relying on 1943: The Victory that Never Was (John Grigg), & Grigg suggests otherwise.
And how is Italy going to fall without landings on the mainland when the Italians in OTL specifically asked for an allied ocuppation before surrendering?
Offer them co-belligerency? Make token landings at Messina?
When did the British night bombers demonstrate in OTL the kind of accuracy needed to completely shut down the german economy and transportation system?
Almost never, precisely because Portal & Harris were so busy making rubble bounce. There were accurate attacks on the Ems-Dortmund Canal as I recall. More to the point, tho, minelaying in rivers & canals didn't require enormous accuracy. (Can you fly along a river? Yes. Can you keep the aircraft centered over it? Yes. Can you pull the drop lever? Yes. Mission accomplished.)

BTW, that's also why German NFs can't succeed. They'd have to chase every intruder over every mile of river & canal, because they'd never know if mines had been laid otherwise. And yes, I have heard of Kammhuber. And Freya. And Giant Würzburg. Have you heard of Gardening? Know how well it worked? Know it was possible to do it on days city bombing was impossible? Know how low the losses were?

Care to examine the impact of lower bomber losses on increased effectiveness of the Army?
And how are the allies going to develop the optimal doctrine for airpower without the extra year of fighting?
I don't see a particular need to change the doctrine. If you want to fire Harris or Portal, or both, I wouldn't object, tho.
said port will not only be wrecked by defending Germans but will also be subject to repeat LW raids from the nearly 3000 aircraft the Germans can deploy from Italy, France, home defense and other sectors that are not the East.
That might be a net benefit for the Allies, if it forces SHAEF or Monty (presuming he's still GOiC 21st AG) to realize logistics are crucial & has the Scheldt cleared, instead of left in German hands.:rolleyes:

If it persuades the U.S. Army to stop supplying endless quantities of crap the troops never actually use,:eek::rolleyes: so much the better.
Goodness gracious, while the Germans were the most capable nation in the war on a unit by unit basis, they were not ten feet tall. By 1943, alot of the men that produced the early victories had been killed at Crete, Stalingrad, etc. Not every German unit that the allies would face in 1943 France would be first rate and lethal.
No, but it's true, even at war's end, the average Heer regular formation was 10% more effective than the comparable WAllied one & still about 50% over the Sovs.
On a macro strategic level, the only reason why the alllies did not land in 1943, or following the 1944 landings, end the war in late autumn 1944 or end the war in the Pacific six months earlier is that that there was a very deep social contract in the USA and UK that did not allow Soviet, German or Imperial Japanese casualty ratios. As a result, the strategic advances were cautious.
An excellent point, one I should have thought of.:o It's also true there was much less war-weariness in Britain (for which I include Commonwealth) in '43 than '44. In OTL Normandy, the Brits were showing a serious casualty aversion. AFAIK, not so in '43. Also, without the losses in Italy, the "infantry crisis" wouldn't obtain.
McArthur as overall command.
:eek::eek::eek::eek::eek::eek: Never, never, never, never, never, never, never, never, never, never, never, never, never.:eek::eek: Beyond the fact there's not room in ETO for both MacArthur's & Monty's egos without creating an explosion,:eek::p FDR would never put Mac so close to the center of Allied power & give him such a platinum-plated opportunity to become President postwar.:eek::eek::eek:

[Easterling]

Churchill? He needed persuading Italy was a bad idea. Can he be persuaded? I don't see why not. Care to explain?

Churchill was a big fan of such "flanking" attacks. Persuading him otherwise would not have been easy.

In all cases, if the war ends sooner, & I'm persuaded it would, they'd live with it.Even if the initial landings are successfull it does not mean the war ends much earlier. In OTL the allies only had to punch through a tiny screen of German troops, and then it was game over. Here, the Germans have more troops available to send to the west, and a better chance of stabilizing the front.

Why? They've defeated DAK. What gain is there in destroying it in detail?Maybe the military experts can recongnize that the DAK has been defeated. But the politicians and the public need a "visible" victory (especially since it would be the first of its kind), so they need to see the axis armies actually surrendering, not just kept in check.
Besides, without a complete victory in Tunisia it will be harder or even impossible to conquer Sicily, and without the fall of Sicily there would be no fall of Mussolini, and no Italian armistice.
I'm also relying on 1943: The Victory that Never Was (John Grigg), & Grigg suggests otherwise. What does Grigg say about abandoning the Italian campaign alltogether, and leaving Germany with its most important European ally still intact?
Offer them co-belligerency? Make token landings at Messina?Token landings are not going to be enough. OTL shows that the Italians were not prepared to resist a German ocuppation. Either Badoglio realizes that the allies plan to abandon him, so he stays in the Axis, or he does sign the armistice, but then is overthrown and the Salo republic ends up controlling more of Italy than in OTL. In any case the situation is improved for the Axis.

I don't see a particular need to change the doctrine. If you want to fire Harris or Portal, or both, I wouldn't object, tho.You said yourself that Harris and Portal did not have the right doctrine. But in 1943 there is still not enough data for allied planners to realize this, so there is no basis for removing them either.
Your scenario requires not only major changes in allied strategy, it allso requires the allies to achieve overnight such great levels of efficiency in their use of airpower as have not been achieved in OTL even late into the war.

[phx1138]

I disagree with the Allied losses being lower due to such social contract. It was because the scale of warfare on eastern front was much higher than elsewhere - and on occasions, allied losses were quite high (like in Ardennes)
Actually, I would, too. It was, in the U.S. case at least, a style of warfare driven by culture more than social contract. The U.S. has historically relied on technology to make up for lack of trained/skilled manpower in a variety of areas, & the military is no exception. Aussie & Canadian armies take a similarly non-European outlook. Don't think the Brits & Canadians were "afraid" of taking casualties; they weren't. And when you look at the bomber offensive...:eek::eek::eek: Don't tell me that's casualty averse.:rolleyes: The main difference between the American & Sov approach is access to technology.

There's also education to consider, which makes using available tech easier; frex, most U.S. troops could drive, but I wager most Sovs (& Germans, BTW) couldn't... (Can't say about Canadians or Brits, but probably many of each could, more than Germans, certainly more than Sovs.) Education also changes your style of warfare. (Less blind obedience, more tactical flexibility...which is why the Sovs & IJA did well in setpiece attacks, less so in reactive or fluid situations.) The German training was probably best in the world, one reason Heer was so damnably hard to beat.
Churchill was a big fan of such "flanking" attacks. Persuading him otherwise would not have been easy.
Easy, no, especially not considering the almost pathological fear of being embroiled in "another Somme". Not impossible, however.
Even if the initial landings are successfull it does not mean the war ends much earlier. In OTL the allies only had to punch through a tiny screen of German troops, and then it was game over. Here, the Germans have more troops available to send to the west, and a better chance of stabilizing the front.
Not, IMO, enough to change the outcome a lot from the OTL schedule. France falls, the Sovs begin advancing more rapidly, since the "safe zone" Germany has been using to rest/train troops from Eastern Front is gone. After invasion, local dominance of the sky (all the Allies ultimately need) means breakout, & after that, a more or less OTL schedule will prevail IMO. Not exactly the same one, true, but close to it. Either way, the war ends before OTL.
Maybe the military experts can recongnize that the DAK has been defeated. But the politicians and the public need a "visible" victory (especially since it would be the first of its kind), so they need to see the axis armies actually surrendering, not just kept in check.
Need? Or want? Who's to say von Arnim will fight to the bullet?
Besides, without a complete victory in Tunisia it will be harder or even impossible to conquer Sicily, and without the fall of Sicily there would be no fall of Mussolini, and no Italian armistice.
Harder? With less force tied up fighting DAK for less time?:confused::confused: (To be clear: less than it took OTL to destroy it in detail.)
What does Grigg say about abandoning the Italian campaign alltogether, and leaving Germany with its most important European ally still intact?
I don't have it in front of me. IIRC, he presumed Italy's fall. How he got to that IDR.
Token landings are not going to be enough. OTL shows that the Italians were not prepared to resist a German ocuppation. Either Badoglio realizes that the allies plan to abandon him, so he stays in the Axis, or he does sign the armistice, but then is overthrown and the Salo republic ends up controlling more of Italy than in OTL. In any case the situation is improved for the Axis.
It may be. I maintain conquering Italy was a net loss for the Allies no matter what happened. (As already said, it ties up enormous resources.) As opposed to using Sicily as a base for bombers, fibos, & MTBs/MGBs, frex. For raiders (commandos & MGBs/MTBs, if not subs) ranging the coasts of Italy, leaving the Germans & Italians compelled to defend all of it. Plus potential deception ops. (Not all of Mincemeat caliber; even planted maps & charts, "lost" from MTBs/MGBs, in the fashion of 8h Army {O'Connor? Who "lost" a copy of a fake plan...} could have benefits.) I do see Italy as the ETO equivalent of CBI: a distraction from the straight road to Germany.

You said yourself that Harris and Portal did not have the right doctrine. But in 1943 there is still not enough data for allied planners to realize this, so there is no basis for removing them either.
Not enough data?:rolleyes: Harris was sending his bombers to known targets that weren't going anywhere & were going to get increasingly stronger defences. What did he need?:eek::confused: Beyond a smack with a cricket bat, I mean.

How about Winston, or somebody, addressing the social contract, the moral issue of wasting bomber crews? Not to mention the enormous impact on Germany's economy. Nor the benefit to the other services. Nor, indeed, to Britain's war economy of not having to replace the damn aircraft.:rolleyes:
achieve overnight such great levels of efficiency in their use of airpower as have not been achieved in OTL even late into the war
Really? How do you figure? Hitting a river with a mine is just so damn hard?:confused: When trainee crews could do it? And drastically reduce the loss rates in the process? I see you prefer to claim it was impossible. Bomber Command's own statistics (number of mines, ships sunk per number of mines, sorties, loss rate) suggest otherwise. Have a look at Terraine's Right of the Line & Saward's (very friendly) bio of Harris for the numbers.

[Easterling]

Harder? With less force tied up fighting DAK for less time?:confused::confused: (To be clear: less than it took OTL to destroy it in detail.)
If the allies do not destroy the DAK, then they must detail forces to maintain the encirclement, including naval forces for the blocade.
If they do not take Tunisia they can not use it as a launchpad for the invasion of Sicily. Instead the invasion will have to be launched from a more distant location which instead will cause some problems, especially in the area of aircover.

It may be. I maintain conquering Italy was a net loss for the Allies no matter what happened. (As already said, it ties up enormous resources.) As opposed to using Sicily as a base for bombers, fibos, & MTBs/MGBs, frex. For raiders (commandos & MGBs/MTBs, if not subs) ranging the coasts of Italy, leaving the Germans & Italians compelled to defend all of it. Plus potential deception ops. (Not all of Mincemeat caliber; even planted maps & charts, "lost" from MTBs/MGBs, in the fashion of 8h Army {O'Connor? Who "lost" a copy of a fake plan...} could have benefits.) I do see Italy as the ETO equivalent of CBI: a distraction from the straight road to Germany.By loosing Italy the Germans not only lost the Italian soldiers that would have fought on their side otherwise, they allso lost the German troops they sent there.
The Italians could defend on their own against commando raids, and with troops to spare. And even if the Germans have to send troops to Italy, as long as these are not engaged in actual combat they do not suffer losses and are thus a smaller drain on Axis resources. Also, garrison troops can be of lesser quality compared to what the Germans sent to Italy in an effort to stop the allies.
The Italian campaign was a drain on allied resources but it was allso an equally large drain on Axis resources, and the allies could better aford it because they had reserves.
By "spending" troops and equipment in the Italian campaign, the allies managed to weaken the enemy before the actual decisive battle, in France.



Really? How do you figure? Hitting a river with a mine is just so damn hard?:confused: When trainee crews could do it? And drastically reduce the loss rates in the process? I see you prefer to claim it was impossible. Bomber Command's own statistics (number of mines, ships sunk per number of mines, sorties, loss rate) suggest otherwise. Have a look at Terraine's Right of the Line & Saward's (very friendly) bio of Harris for the numbers.All I know is that in OTL, the allies never managed to completely stop the Germans from redeploying troops to a certain front, wether they tried it or not. The allies could delay the movement of German troops, not stop it completely.

[phx1138]

If the allies do not destroy the DAK, then they must detail forces to maintain the encirclement, including naval forces for the blocade.
Which existed. Which would be fewer in number than OTL destroying them. (On land, at a minimum. I'm willing to bet the sea & air components would be smaller, too. It's not like the Germans had control of the Med & could pull their own Dynamo...:rolleyes:)
If they do not take Tunisia they can not use it as a launchpad for the invasion of Sicily. Instead the invasion will have to be launched from a more distant location which instead will cause some problems, especially in the area of aircover.
Which doesn't make it impossible.
By loosing Italy the Germans not only lost the Italian soldiers that would have fought on their side otherwise, they allso lost the German troops they sent there.
Conceded.
The Italians could defend on their own against commando raids, and with troops to spare. And even if the Germans have to send troops to Italy, as long as these are not engaged in actual combat they do not suffer losses and are thus a smaller drain on Axis resources. Also, garrison troops can be of lesser quality compared to what the Germans sent to Italy in an effort to stop the allies.
Conceded. Nevertheless, they have to be supplied, which is a drain Germany really can't afford. Germany also has to supply the Italians in large measure, which wasn't the case after the Allies invaded. And all the Italian civilians. It's not all about troop numbers. It's about logistics.

Beyond that, the continuing presence of German troops won't necessarily produce happy feelings among the Italian public.:rolleyes: (IIRC, they were none too fond of the Germans OTL. Even less so, I bet, after they've bounced Mussolini into the street, thought the Allies were coming to help, & seen the Germans come back.:eek:) Nor will repeated commando & gunboat strikes all over the damn countryside every night (nearly every?) bring tidings of joy for the German presence.:rolleyes: I'll wager propaganda leaflets encouraging Italian resistance & sabotage will turn up. Maybe we'd even see an Italian Resistance. (Is that an oxymoron?:rolleyes:) Still think the Germans are better off?
The Italian campaign was a drain on allied resources but it was allso an equally large drain on Axis resources, and the allies could better aford it because they had reserves.
By "spending" troops and equipment in the Italian campaign, the allies managed to weaken the enemy before the actual decisive battle, in France.
That's the conventional wisdom. It's false. The Allies had about twice as many men in Italy as the Germans, & the Allies were also supplying the Italian civilians. It's not only a military issue, nor only troop numbers. It's total logistic demand.
All I know is that in OTL, the allies never managed to completely stop the Germans from redeploying troops to a certain front, wether they tried it or not. The allies could delay the movement of German troops, not stop it completely.
In Normandy, they came as close as they needed to. I see no reason they couldn't duplicate that effort, especially if they added in attacks on canals & mining ops. Would it be easy? No. Possible? Yes.