Phony War, Short War

[Eurofed]

PoD: it is a clear night in Berlin Tempelhof Airport on November 8, 1939, and Adolf Hitler elects to return to Berlin by airplane as planned, after he delivers his Beer Hall Putsch commemoration speech in Munich.

The bomb planted in the Hall by the anti-Nazi joiner Georg Elser goes off as planned at 9.20pm, while Hitler is in the midst of a full-swing tirade against the British. The blast kills Hitler and his deputy Hess instantly. His right-hand man and designed successor Goering is severely wounded as well and dies a few hours later.

With the death of Hitler and without a clearly identified successor, a vicious power struggle for succession spanning a few weeks erupts between Goebbels, Bormann and the Nazi Party, Himmler, Heydrich and the SS network, and the military. Himmler tries to seize power with a coup, which forces the hand of the Heer. The SS coup is crushed, Himmler is shot, and Heydrich purged. The SS are disbanded and their aborning combat branch merged with the Wehrmacht. After some discussion, Reichenau is appointed by his fellow generals and sworn in as new President of the Reich. Todt is nominated Chancellor, Speer takes his place as minister of armaments. Schacht is reinstated as minister of the economy. Goebbels retains his role as minister of propaganda. Joachim von Ribbentrop is fired as Foreign Minister, and the position is given back to von Neurath. Bormann is dismissed and secretly executed on trumped-up charges of complicity in the SS coup because he knew too much. Kesselring becomes new head of the air force.

The new German government immediately assured Stalin that he would continue to abide by the Hitler-Stalin Pact signed in August 1939 "until futher notice". It then approached the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to discuss a ceasefire. Chamberlain reasserted that Germany had to withdraw from Poland before any ceasefire would be considered.

Despite the first snubbing, the new German leadership, largely made up by the Heer and the technocratic moderate wing of the Nazi bureaucracy, was much less sanguine than Hitler about extensive territorial conquest in the East and anxious to put an end to the war with the Entente, now that German grievances with Poland had been settled.

Germany further notified the British government that they were willing to discuss a peace settlement that involved a re-establishment of the Polish state, provided that "sensible German territorial claims" were satisfied.

This brought about a confrontation in the British government: the hardline faction, headed by Churchill and Eden, was for intransigence, and called for continuation of the war till victory. Another faction, headed by Lord Halifax, supported opening peace negotiations, remarking that any possiblity to restore Poland's independence (the British war aim) without bloodshed had to be explored, and that Britain had made no committment about Polish territorial integrity.

Premier Chamberlain was divided: on one hand, he pursued a peaceful policy with Germany, and reluctantly declared war only when forced by proof of Hitler's brutal intransigence and untrustworthiness. The betrayal of Munich's agreement when Hitler had invaded Czechoslovakia stinged; yet Hitler was dead and the new leaders in Berlin seemed to speak a different language. He expressed support to open peace talks about terms that would entail the re-establishment of the independence of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and some proof of sincerity of German intentions would be needed. After a heated debate, the Cabinet voted to support this platform.

On receiving the British answer, a debate ensued in the German government, too. On one hand, control of Czech economic resources was very valuable to Germany, and so was strategic control of Poland as a forward defense against possible Soviet aggression (despite the Non-Aggression Pact, few in Berlin harbored doubts that Stalin would break it if it saw an opportunity). On the other hand, ending the war, which none of the leaders had wanted, would allow to redress the German economy and realign its military for defense in the East. And neither Reichenau nor Todt or the generals were overly interested into the radical plans about racial colonization and assimilation of Czechia and Poland that Hitler had harbored, especially not if the price was a long, exhausting, and risky war with the West. They just wanted to fulfill Germany's traditional territorial grievances about the Versailles settlement (keeping Danzig and as much as of the pre-1914 German territories as they could afford) and maintain Czechia and Poland in the German sphere of influence. There were also doubts that giving too many concessions to the West about Poland would be seen by Stalin as a betrayal of previous accords with Hitler about the partition of Poland.

In the end, it was reluctantly decided to make some tangible concessions to the West about the status of the former Slav nations: the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was given back some degree of autonomy as a puppet state, and the General Government was likewise restored as a Polish puppet state, with a government of Polish collaborators. With some reluctance, it was also decided to end discrimination measures for Jews living within the Polish state. Britain was notified that these measures were a token of German seriousness about a sensible settlement, and more could be done if peace negotiations were started in earnest. At the same time, Russia was told that such measures were an attempt to win peace from the West, and Germany was determined to keep control of the Polish space, and prevent the resurrection of Poland as a threat to Germany and Soviet Union alike.

Stalin was not fooled by German reassurances, however, he saw that the M-R settlement was at risk, and a Western-German peace and detente could happen, which would emperil his strategy. So he accelerated his timetable, trying to win as much as he could while the war kept the capitalist powers busy. The Baltic states, which had been recently forced to accept Soviet bases, were occupied by the Red Army, which installed new, pro-Soviet governments in all three countries. Following rigged elections, in which only pro-communist candidates were allowed to run, the newly "elected" parliaments of the three countries formally applied to "join" the USSR and were annexed into it. Soon afterwards, upon a trumped-up pretext of a false-flag Finnish bombing on Soviet territory, the USSR declared war on Finland.

The new German peace offer, and Soviet actions, strengthened the hand of the peace faction in the British government, and after much debate, a narrow agreement was reached about starting peace negotiations, which were secretly opened in Lisbon.

However, Stalin was not the only one that was not fooled about German intentions, and Mussolini, too, decided to accelerate his own expansionist plans before peace between Germany and the West would close his window for action. Long-standing plans for an attack to Yugoslavia were dusted off, contacts with poro-Italian Croat separatists reactivated, offers for an anti-Yugoslav alliance made to (and accepted by) Hungary and Bulgaria, and Italian troops mobilized. An abortive uprising by Croat fascist separatists was used as a casus belli, and Italy attacked Yugoslavia, soon followed by Hungary and Bulgaria.

Despite the aggressive intentions of the two dictators, the attacks on Finland and Yugoslavia showed that the Soviet and the Italian militaries were quite riddled with embarassing flaws, which allowed the Finnish army to stage a successful defense. Despite the manifold problems of the Italian army, however, the large-scale defection of Slovenian and Croat troops, which were unwilling to fight for a Yugoslav kingdom largely hegemonized by the Serbs, critically hampered the Yugoslav resistance, as did the multi-front war. So the Serbian core of the army was gradually forced to fall back on a "national redoubt" largely made up of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia.

A strange international landscape ensued for a few months, where Britain, France, and Germany, nominally at war, shunned any large land operations and only confronted each other in naval and air skirmishes, while war openly raged in northern Europe and the Balkans. Stalin and Mussolini, stung by the loss of face in their inability to crush minor powers, sacked generals and implemented reforms of the military, and gradually the Red Army and the Italian Army came closer and closer to breaking the stalemate. Heroic Finnish resistance was supported by Swedish military assistance and "volunteers", even if Sweden did not dare to officially intervene in the war. There was some serious talk in the Anglo-French governments of intervening in the Winter War, even if, as long as the state of war with Germany persisted, such an intervention would require the controversial violation of Norwegian and Swedish neutrality. So preparations for sich intervention progressed slowly. As it concerned the Third Balkan War, France made some rumors abour supporting Yugoslavia, but Britain was largely disinterested as long as Italy steered off Greece.

In the meanwhile, peace negotiations between the Germans and the Anglo-French slowly progressed. Gradually a comprehensive agreement was reached.

As it concerns Czechia, it established that Germany would withdraw all troops and restore the independence of the Czech Republic in its March 1939 borders, even if it reserved the right to maintain an economic union and a defense pact with it. The legitminate Czech government by Emil Hacha (which had been fairly friendly to Germany before the invasion and had collaborated during the German occupation) would be restored in power. Germany would The return of the anti-German leaders of the Czechoslovak National Liberation Committee, leaded by Benes, was not to be allowed.

As it concerns Poland, the full independence of Poland would be re-established and its government-in-exile reinstated. Germany would annex Danzig, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, up to the pre-1914 border of the latter two provinces. The province of Posen would be partitioned between Germany and Poland, with Germany annexing a strip in the northern and western part of the province and Poland getting most of it. In order to maintain its own access to the sea, Poland was allowed extraterritorial use of the port facilities of Gdynia as well as an extraterritorial railroad and highway connection to it. Germany and Poland would then enact a population exchange of the respective minorities. Germany guaranteed that ethnic Poles willing to undergo and suitable for Germanization would be allowed to stay, and only those who wanted to maintain Polish national identity or were "politically, culturally, or racially unsuitable for assimilation in the German Volk" (including German Jews) would be expelled.

As it concerned Germany and the Entente, they would return to the status quo ante. With Britain, Germany agreed to reinstate the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, which Hitler had denounced in 1939 during the build-up to war with Poland and limited German Navy to 35% of the British one, and they included submarines in the new version of agreement. Moreover, Germany issued a declaration by which it renounced any further territorial claims in Europe, and offered Belgium, France, and Denmark to repatriate those members of their German minorities that were willing to opt for German citizenship, on the model of the similar German-Italian agreement about South Tyrol. Preliminary accords were also made with France about mutual military reductions on the German-French border.

These terms were acceptable to Germany, Britain, and France, but for political reasons, the Entente was eager to get the explicit assent of the Polish GiE to the peace scheme, which they stubbornly refused to do.

However, their resistance was won when the German negotiatiors made a subtle threat: put it simply, if the Polish leaders refused to make peace, Germany would pull its controlled area back to the 1914 border, enact annexations and expulsions as established, quite possibly in a more extensive way, and then in all likelihood the Soviet Union would quickly sweep in and annex the rest of Poland, without opposition by Germany. In such a case, Poland would be in an even worse situation, and if the Entente really wanted to restore the Polish state, they would have to fight an even bigger war (what they most likey were unwilling to do). The threat worked and the Polish GiE reluctantly assented to the peace scheme. After much controversy, the peace settlement was approved by the German, British, and French governments, and narrowly ratified by the British and French parliaments.

On the impending German-Entente peace, Soviet Russia and Italy (and its allies) redoubled their efforts to subdue their respective enemies. It seemed that the military shake-ups of the recent months had paid off, since Finnish and Yugoslav resistance started to crumble, and it appeared that a strategic breakthrough was imminent. Nonetheless, both Stalin and Mussolini were wary of pressing on for total victory and occupation of enemy countries, since they feared that peace with Germany would free up the Entente for possible intervention in the Winter or Balkan wars. So they made peace offers to their exhausted enemies, which were accepted.

Finland was forced to cede Finnish Karelia and the Petsamo area. Italy annexed western Dalmatia, Inner Carniola, Kosovo, and northwestern Vardar Macedonia. It set up Slovenia and the Banovina of Croatia as independent satellite states. In Voivodina, Backa and Baranja were annexed by Hungary, while Syrmia went to Croatia. Bulgaria annexed most of Vardar Macedonia.

In a relatively short time during April 1940, a series of peace treaties were signed between Britain, France, Germany, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, Finland, and an uneasy peace settled on the continent. Many of the expansionist ambitions and the reasonable irredentist claims of the revisionist powers (Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia) had been satisfied, casting off the humiliating Versailles settlement, and although their leaders might wish for more, they were also wary of pushing them and bringing on them the ire of the other great powers. Britain and France could claim that the independence of Poland and Czechia had been restored, and the one of Finland, preseved without a long and destructive general war with Germany and Russia (even if those states had suffered painful territorial losses). Throughout the continent, people celebrated the return of peace.

[tayboitd]

I like this - especially would like to see what happens in Asia.

[The Red]

I can't see this peace lasting long. Will this TL continue? :)

[shillinger]

Lets see: Hitler dies. Germans purge the Nazis. Germans make peace with the West. Stalin decides to be an ass. Italy gets enlarged.

Yes, this sure is an Eurofed TL.

[Eurofed]

I like this - especially would like to see what happens in Asia.

Asia is indeed an interesting place (in the normal and Chinese sense, likely). The main focus is of course Japan, which may or may not be in a really bad tight spot. America is downright hostile to their merry little adventure in China, yet there is not yet an embargo in place to make them desperate. Without a Nazi Germany on the rampage to make FDR itch to get an excuse for belligerence, it may or may not come in the future.

If it does not, Japan remains bogged down in China for a relatively long while, and it exhausts itself in a (likely futile) attempt to crush Chinese resistance, which in turn keeps China an absolute mess. With avenues with expansion in Europe closed by Entente-German reconciliation, Stalin may easily decide to get wild in China, since the Western powers are not likely to help Japan against him. If he does not, again, Japan remains bog down in a Chinese mega-Vietnam for a long while, until exhaustion overcomes Japanese obsession about loss of face and they pull out. They would still be able to keep Manchukuo and retain a decently-sized empire, however. There would be a lot of dead Chinese and China would made a total mess, with the KMT barely keeping to power, with warlords and Communists in need of a put-down. The silver lining (assuming that China has the good sense to leave Manchukuo alone and does not try a foolish reconquest) is that the potential sponsors for the KMT (US, UK, Germany, USSR) would not be in dearth, both during and after the conflict with Japan.

If he does, the Red Army is not got to have it nowhere as easy as August Storm, but it is still likely to be a curbstomp, with Russia easily getting Manchuria (although Japan may manage to keep Korea, and it surely gets and keeps all of Sakhalin) and forcing Japan to pull out of China, which would basically exchange a Japanese would-be overlord with a Soviet one. Chiang may decide to suck it up, accept the loss of Manchuria and Xinjiang, and focus on rebuilding his country, in such a case the damage is limited; there is Soviet expansionism to keep at bay but again, Western sponsors are likely to send support. If he resists the Soviets, there is still a long resistance war against a stronger expansionist invader which wrecks the country.

If America applies the embargo, Japan is still in a tight spot (although with peace in Europe, they may find themselves in a less desperate situation: Netherlands may or may not decide to go along with the US policy) and could be easily provoked to the usual rampage in South East Asia (although ITTL it might not pick the PH strategy, and instead try to trap the USN in a ambush) and is curbstomped by an Anglo-French-American coalition giving the Pacific War their full and undivided strength.

[pipisme]

I expect Chamberlain will call a general election in the UK for sometime in May or June 1940 after the peace treaties.

[Eurofed]

I can't see this peace lasting long. Will this TL continue? :)

It may or may not continue.

There are several kinds of conflict I can easily see happening in Asia (see my previous post), but I do not foresee any major conflict necessarily exploding in Europe.

The radical Nazi wackos have fallen from power in Germany, and the nation has to redress the economic problems that Hitler left behind by toning down military spending. The Heer-technocratic leadership is far too fearful of losing a war with the West to try and redress economic woes by invading and pillaging Western Europe, and the Lebensraum twisted dreams died with Hitler and Himmler.

Mussolini is not mad enough to go on a solo expansionist rampage against the Entente without Germany to back him, plus he got the sphere of influence in the Balkans he sought.

Stalin reaped as much territorial gains from the M-R settlement as he could before it collapsed due to German-Entente peace, now he is forced to thread cautiously in Europe (East Asia is another matter), lest he provokes the anti-Soviet coalition war he fears. He might still stumble into it, however we may easily assume that the cautious side of him prevails on the paranoid side, and his habit to underestimate his enemies. It could differently, however.

And the Entente is perfectly fine with the new status quo, if the other great powers maintain it.

The only war I easily foresee in Europe's future concerns Romania, if Horthy and/or Stalin get confident, and could possibly involve a de facto Hungarian-Soviet (quite possibly the Bulgarians, too) alliance of convenience curbstomping the Romanians. Stalin would have to tread cautiously, here, however, as this could easily trigger a Western intervention. A limited war could perhaps happen if Hungary starts the war, and the Soviet intervene later. In such a case, it is more likely that the war remains limited, and it ends with Hungary grabbing northern Transylvania, the USSR Bessarabia, and Bulgaria southern Dobruja.

If Stalin remains cautious afterwards, this would surely usher in a long streak of peace in Europe. Of course, pulling successful aggressions in Baltics, Poland, Finland, and Romania without serious consequences could easily lead to Stalin getting overconfidence and victory disease, leading him to make yet another aggressive move in Europe (say against Turkey) and this would surely provoke an anti-Soviet coalition and WWII. OTOH, he could also easily decide to make Japan and China his next victims. This would likely keep Europe at peace, although a Cold War against expansionist USSR would ensue.

[Eurofed]

I expect Chamberlain will call a general election in the UK for sometime in May or June 1940 after the peace treaties.

He would be obliged to, since with return to peace, the normal constitutional five-years maximum duration of the British Parliament would be reinstated, and the last general election happened in 1935.

The outcome of such an election would be interesting. Britain has not suffered a long exhausting war to fuel the Labor triumph (even if it is bound to happen sooner or later, the appetite of the British lower and middle classes for welfare state is only going to grow in the long term). Chamberlain has narrowly avoided a terrible general war and seized a honorable peace, restraining German expansionism to tolerable levels with practically no bloodshed. Hence I would see this election becoming another confortable Tory victory.

Of course, no matter what, Chamberlain is doomed to die soon by cancer (although with a wholly different legacy and place is history as a respected diplomatic mastermind) and a successor would be needed. Churchill ITTL got his anti-German radical stance discredited by new-found German moderation after the timely demise of Hitler (which, weird as it may seem, shall go in the history books as a respected, if nastier, Bismarck figure, say a German Ataturk) and he's headed for another tour of the political wilderness, this time likely for good. Unless either Stalin or Japan go on a rampage, in such a case, he could reinvent himself as an anti-Soviet or anti-Japanese charismatic firebrand. I would say the likely successors are Halifax (more likely, his ideas got vindicated by the peace treaties, and he likely took an hand in drafting them) or Eden (if he rebalances himself on a pro-detente stance).

[Eurofed]

Hitler dies.


The man got so many assassination attempts, and avoided many of them by the most improbable bouts of luck, that a PoD or butterfly reversing any of that luck is always wholly justified.


Germans purge the Nazis.


With Hitler dead in 1939, the Heer is the by far most likely successor, if Goring cannot bring the generals on his side (this TL conveniently wipes out some Nazi bigwigs in the blast, but the succession power struggle could have easily had the same result). And once the generals are in charge, they surely are not going to tolerate Himmler, the SS, and the Nazi wackos (or despised Hitlerite favorites like Bormann) in any position of power. You may notice that competent and moderate Nazi technocrats like Todt and Speer remain part of the new ruling elite. Goebbels, well, he sees the writing on the wall and manages to make himself useful to the new rulers.


Germans make peace with the West.


Chamberlain is still in charge, and he would eagerly reap a honorable compromise peace with Germany if untrustworthy Hitler is gone, both to spare Britain an exhausting war that would accelerate the demise of the Empire, and to make Germany useful as an anti-Soviet bulwark.


Stalin decides to be an ass.


He does what he did IOTL, and his strategy makes sense: he scrambles to reap as much as he can of the sphere of influence the M-R pact allotted to the Soviet Union, before German-Entente peace is finalized and closes that window.


Italy gets enlarged.


Mussolini picks on pretty much the only power that he could afford to, given the diplomatic and military constraints, and succeed, if more due to Yugoslav weakness than Italian strength. Nonetheless, despite the faulty state of Italian military, this is the war that Italy had prepared itself to fight since the 1920s, so a rather more competent Italian performance than OTL Greece is quite plausible, moreover Yugoslavia also gets a multi-front war and Slovene-Croat mass defection to cripple it.


Yes, this sure is an Eurofed TL.

You forgot to mention that the Jews are spared a genocide. :D

[Revolutionary Todyo]

The Japanese always go crazy in the 40s, it's something in the water I believe.

[Biggy]

So 8 mln Poles in areas Germany annexed are ethnicly cleansed?

As it concerned Poland, a tentative agreement was reached that involved the re-establishment of the full independence of Poland, and the reinstatement of its government-in-exile, in exchange for the recognition of the German annexation of Danzig, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, up to the pre-1914 border of the latter two provinces, as well as a partition of the province of Posen according to the scheme proposed in 1848 by the Frankfurt Parliament. Germany and Poland would then enact a population exchange of the respective minorities (including German Jews). A stumbling bloc was represented by the British request of assent by the Polish GiE to the peace scheme, which they stubbornly refused to do. No Polish government or party would agree to this. That means losing 90% of Polish industry and most mineral resources in addition to about 8mln Poles. As to the scheme from 1848:it includes Poznan and most of the region on the German side, with only a couple districts for Poles. Basically Poland has been reduced to a crippled German puppet.

[Onkel Willie]

This is quite good all in all and I see that some of it is also subtly inspired by my TL "The Munich Coup" but with enough differences :D. This could get interesting, especially when 1942-'43 comes around. Will Stalin be cowed by détente between Germany, France and Britain or will his paranoid mind decide that the west is ganging up on him and aggressive to him, inducing a Soviet first strike? I did the latter already so the former (a cowed USSR) would be interesting to see.

Maybe Stalin goes after Japan and sets up communist Korea (spanning the whole peninsula this time) and communist China a few years early and then supports anticolonial movements in Asia in an alt-Cold War. And what of America? I doubt Japan will be foolish enough to attack without a major distraction for Europe in the shape of Germany and Italy and so the US remain neutral. Maybe, after being defeated by a reformed Red Army, the Japanese grudgingly side with the western block centred around Germany, Britain, France and Italy against the USSR.

The US remain a third bloc due to American-Japanese enmity. Nuclear weapons get invented a bit later due to lack of an incentive (threat of Axis A-Bombs) and the space race is generally a bit slower due to slower developing missile technology (no V2 missile or it's introduced later, it's use is limited to terror anyway).

All in all, we have a multipolar cold war:

USA vs. Europe+Japan vs. Sino-Soviet bloc + Korea

[Keb]

No Polish government or party would agree to this. That means losing 90% of Polish industry and most mineral resources in addition to about 8mln Poles. As to the scheme from 1848:it includes Poznan and most of the region on the German side, with only a couple districts for Poles. Basically Poland has been reduced to a crippled German puppet.

In this situation, I don't think the Poles have a choice. The options presented to them are a mockery of independence or Stalin. The West would have left them to rot if they didn't agree.

It's not like they're going to send soldiers to die by the tens, if not hundreds of thousands because the Poles couldn't agree to Germany's (to Britain and France) rather reasonable demands. World War I is still quite fresh in everyone's memories, after all.

If the Government in Exile refuses, then Britain and France exclaim, 'we tried, we really did, both us and the Germans, but those pesky Poles don't want to compromise' ... peace treaty gets signed anyway and the Poles are screwed.

[Biggy]

But who will sign such treaty?
And more importanly why should France and Britain be interested if they previously didn't accept far minor territorial changes?
It doesn't make sense.

[thrashing_mad]

So 8 mln Poles in areas Germany annexed are ethnicly cleansed?

No Polish government or party would agree to this. That means losing 90% of Polish industry and most mineral resources in addition to about 8mln Poles. As to the scheme from 1848:it includes Poznan and most of the region on the German side, with only a couple districts for Poles. Basically Poland has been reduced to a crippled German puppet.

Yeah - quite ridiculous. But then again - this is Eurofed project.;)

[Eurofed]

In this situation, I don't think the Poles have a choice. The options presented to them are a mockery of independence or Stalin. The West would have left them to rot if they didn't agree.

It's not like they're going to send soldiers to die by the tens, if not hundreds of thousands because the Poles couldn't agree to Germany's (to Britain and France) rather reasonable demands. World War I is still quite fresh in everyone's memories, after all.

If the Government in Exile refuses, then Britain and France exclaim, 'we tried, we really did, both us and the Germans, but those pesky Poles don't want to compromise' ... peace treaty gets signed anyway and the Poles are screwed.

Exactly. There is no way that Britain and France were willing to undergo a long, costly, and bloody war with Germany and the Soviet Union in order to restore Poland to its (questionable) 1919-1939 borders. As far as the Entente is concerned, Congress Poland plus western Austrian Poland borders, more or less, are good enough for a Polish state, given the strategic situation, and they have fulfilled their pledge to restore the political independence of Poland. Too bad they can't have their own access to the sea anymore, but again the economic independence of Poland from Germany is not worth risking hundred of thousands of Entente soldiers. At least with this peace treaty restores a Poland which is rather bigger than the General Government rump after the radical Hitlerite annexations (as everyone was keen to remark to the fuming Polish GiE).

So 8 mln Poles in areas Germany annexed are ethnicly cleansed?


Eight millions seems rather exaggerated to me. According to the 1931 Polish census (hardly likely to bias things against the Poles), the population of the Pomeranian and Poznan Voivodeships, as well as the Autonomous Silesian Voivodeship was 1.9 millions (10% Germans), 2.3 millions (7.4% Germans), and 1.5 millions (7% Germans). Admittedly, there were also the Polish minority that was present in southern East Prussia and pre-war German Upper Silesia, but they were negligible numbers in comparison. Of course, German Jews get expelled, too (400,000) as well as Jews from annexed areas (already factored in the numbers above).

Yeah, ethnic cleansing is quite nasty, inhumane, and brutal. It also builds neat, stable borders and reduces the fuel for irredentist wars a lot. IOTL the short straw went to the Germans, ITTL to the Poles.

OTOH, millions of Jews and Poles get to live ITTL. They may suffer economic hardship and displacement for some years, and we likely to see increased Jewish and Polish emigration overseas (and more support for Zionism), as overcrowded Poland struggles to resettle the refugees. It is likely that Poland increases presuure on its own Jewish minority to emigrate.

More to the point, you may expect that Mussolini and Horthy are inspired by the example, and get busy expelling their own Slav minorities, too.


No Polish government or party would agree to this. That means losing 90% of Polish industry and most mineral resources in addition to about 8mln Poles. As to the scheme from 1848:it includes Poznan and most of the region on the German side, with only a couple districts for Poles. Basically Poland has been reduced to a crippled German puppet.

As Keb said, the alternative was whether this, or Poland becoming again part of Russia, with all the joys of Stalinism too boot. With their choice, they get to recover political independence of a Congress Poland plus Krakow national homeland, and a sizable deal of what Hitler had annexed (e.g. Lodz, Masovia).

Do you perchance have a link to a detailed description (optimally a map) a of the 1848 partition scheme ? I have been unable to find it, and I would greatly appreciate getting it for map-making purposes.

[Eurofed]

But who will sign such treaty?


Germany, France, Britain, the Polish GiE, and the Polish collaborationist government in Warsaw. Some face-saving compromise shall be concocted about getting both of the latter two to sign it.


And more importanly why should France and Britain be interested if they previously didn't accept far minor territorial changes?


Because Germany has shown it is serious about making a moderate peace by throwing the restoration of Czechia in the deal (and hence making amends for Hitler's betrayal of Munich). Moreover, the German leadership take over after the death of Hitler, they are not so burdened by his untrustworthiness, which had greatly hardened the Entente's diplomatic stance, and talk a more moderate diplomatic linguage. Up to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Britain and France were unwilling to committ to the unconditional defense of polish territorial integrity, and amenable to settle it with a Munich-like compromise.

Moreover, the campaign of Poland has happened, Poland has fallen, and Germany is threatening to unload Poland to Stalin if it doesn't get a compromise. This means the Entente would have to defeat both Germany and Russia if they are serious about restoring pre-war Poland at all costs. No one but Churchill and a few firebrands are willing to do this if it can be avoided (even more so, because this Germany has no intention to attack Russia, so the Entente would face a stable German-Russian alliance if they mean to go this way). Last but not least, Germany is not asking for anything it did not own in 1793-1914. The historical precedent matters.

[Biggy]

Sorry this makes no sense for so many reasons.
For starters if Stalin is no idiot(and he isn't) he will just say he is satisfied with what SU has, and wants nothing else.
There-the whole plan goes down, and Germany doesn't reach any peace with the West(and I really don't see why suddenly West is giving away all of this, when they denied far less revisions).

Moreover, the German leadership take over after the death of Hitler, they are not so burdened by his untrustworthiness, which had greatly hardened the Entente's diplomatic stance, and talk a more moderate diplomatic linguage.
Hitler demanded Gdansk and was rejected, now they demand half of Poland, and act like Soviet Union is their puppet. That's diplomacy?

[Eurofed]

Yeah - quite ridiculous.


Think of the alternative. It doesn't matter if the German bluff would be actually acted upon or not, the M-R Pact makes the threat credible enough. Germany keeps the 1914 borders, does the ethnic cleansing anyway, cedes the rest to Stalin, and continues the war with the Entente. At that point, even if the Entente wins, Poland would not be resoted, short of the Entente declaring war to the USSR, too. They shunned to do it when it invaded the Kresy, why they should do it now ? And which is the better alternative for the Polish nation, keeping independence in its Congress Poland core, or reverting to the pre-1914 situation as a Stalinist SSR ?

If you prefer, we may easily imagine a variant of this TTL where Churchill is somehow already PM, gets his way, refuses compromise, and the Entente declares war to Russia, too. Since Reichenau, Todt, and the Heer have no intention of going Barbarossa or declaring war to America, it becomes a WWII where the stable German-Italian-Soviet Axis curbstomps the Entente. In practice, Onkel Willie's "Greatest Mistake" TL (without the war with America).

[Eurofed]

For starters if Stalin is no idiot(and he isn't) he will just say he is satisfied with what SU has, and wants nothing else.


Would he ? Does he really expect that the Entente has the balls to make war to a German-Russian combine ? The precedents do not tell so (up to this, the Entente has been wholly passive militarily in the Phony War). If he says yes, he has the opportunity of getting a bigger share of Eastern Europe with limited risk. If worse comes to worse, the Soviet Union can net an even bigger booty in a war with a powerful ally, and "Lebensraum" Hitler is no more, in his place there are pragmatic generals and technocrats he can deal with.


There-the whole plan goes down, and Germany doesn't reach any peace with the West (and I really don't see why suddenly West is giving away all of this, when they denied far less revisions).

Hitler demanded Gdansk and was rejected, now they demand half of Poland, and act like Soviet Union is their puppet. That's diplomacy?

In the meanwhile, Germany conquered Poland. Now they are offering to restore most of it, with no bloodshed. And they act like the USSR shall be their ally of convenience, if the West refuses a compromise. Since, unlike Hitler, they have no intention to invade the USSR, they can afford to be serious about it. If they have a choice, they would prefer an alliance with the West, but if they have to, they can marry with the Bear.

[Biggy]

So the premise of the scenario depands on Stalin helping Germany get peace so that it can focus its strenght on Soviet Union.

Then Germans create a Polish puppet state, completely at their mercy, ethnically cleanse 6-8 mln Poles and ask for peace treaty.

Ok, obviously you are dedicated to this,but really this is a scenario where everybody does what is best for Germany and not for them.

[Eurofed]

So the premise of the scenario depands on Stalin helping Germany get peace so that it can focus its strenght on Soviet Union.


The threat to give Poland to Stalin is made to Britain, France, and the Polish GiE. It's not like there is a Soviet diplomatic delegation to the peace talks.


Then Germans create a Polish puppet state, completely at their mercy, ethnically cleanse 6-8 mln Poles and ask for peace treaty.


I already gave you the numbers that show that the expelled Polish population would be little more than 5 millions. Unless you can show me proof that Poland had a population boom in 1931-39, the fact you keep proffering wholly trumped-up numbers is not a sign that you are willing to discuss the issue in good faith.


this is a scenario where everybody does what is best for Germany and not for them.


So far, the Soviet Union has reaped a bonus by doing territorial expansion with little risk, and the Entente by making a decent face-saving compromise that spares them a terrible war.

[ctesiphon]

Does Germany keep the Sudetenland or does it go to restored Bohemia? Because you said they don't want anything they didn't own pre-1914, and I don't see them restoring it to the Czechs. Or did you mean just the German-Polish border?

[Biggy]

The threat to give Poland to Stalin is made to Britain, France, and the Polish GiE. It's not like there is a Soviet diplomatic delegation to the peace talks.
So the plan depends on threatening others with Soviets but not letting Soviets know they are used as a threat, because the plan will fail. In other words the Germans must tell Allies to keep quiet about their threats or else they won't be anything to blackmail them with. "Do as we demand or we will throw you to the Soviets, but do not tell Soviets about this as our plan will fail then".

I think the plan has serious flaw.

Plus the issue of Soviet spies, the issue that Allies would ask or warn Soviets about their future intentions.


is not a sign that you are willing to discuss the issue in good faith.
Discussing ethnic cleansing of millions in "good faith" sounds a bit awkward...


The whole thing is just silly-the Germans are blackmailing Allies not using diplomacy. And they do it in a way that will give them Stalin's anger once he learns that they use him as a tool.
No Soviet supplies-No German war economy.

This would make good Allies win early scenario.

But I am sure you want to continue, so best to move on.

[Eurofed]

Does Germany keep the Sudetenland or does it go to restored Bohemia? Because you said they don't want anything they didn't own pre-1914, and I don't see them restoring it to the Czechs. Or did you mean just the German-Polish border?

I meant just the German-Polish border. They restore the Czech Republic, but the Munich Agreement stands.

[Bulls Run]

I think it's important to note for the sake of this discussion that "ethnic cleansing" is a modern term and it associations with genocide are a result of the Nazi holocaust on the Jews. A German relocation or deportation of Poles isn't going to be viewed any more negatively than Stalin's relocation of Germans out of Poland after WW 2. I think it will be viewed as a necessary minor evil in the cause of peace in this timeline.

[Biggy]

. A German relocation or deportation of Poles isn't going to be viewed any more negatively than Stalin's relocation of Germans out of Poland after WW 2The relocation of Germans was seen as just by the Allies due to atrocities committed by Nazi Germany and support for NSDAP in German population. What crimes have those people committed or their country that can be compared?
But this is besides the point-Germany made peace offers to UK when it was in far worse shape and situation. Why should UK that is in better situation accept this when Germany is under influence of civil strife and chaos?

[Kelenas]

I think there might also be some misunderstanding about how the German diplomats "use" the USSR as a threat.
As I interpret it, it wasn't phrased as heavy-handed blackmail to portrait the USSR as Germany's lapdog, and more like pointing out worse alternatives ("We're not the only ones with irredentist claims. If we were to offer the USSR to take over the rest of Poland, they might be interested.")[Probably fancier and more carefully worded, though.]
And given that the USSR already participated in the invasion of Poland (September '39), and, if the negotiations last more than three weeks, might already be starting their invasion of Finland (Winter War started in late November), the Entente probably wouldn't doubt that the USSR would accept such an offer, if it was made.

- Kelenas

[Biggy]

nd given that the USSR already participated in the invasion of Poland (September '39), and, if the negotiations last more than three weeks, might already be starting their invasion of Finland (Winter War started in late November), the Entente probably wouldn't doubt that the USSR would accept such an offer, if it was made.But the USSR isn't the bad dog anymore-Germany is trying to ethnically cleanse 6 to 8 million Poles, which means that turning it over to Soviets actually means turning it to a side that is far less involved in atrocities. Come to think of it, it might be preferable for Poles to be under Soviet rule rather than German. The Germans are saying they are going to hand over Poland to Soviets? Well, that means Poles won't be under a regime that ethnically cleansed them in several millions from their core lands.

Basically Germany makes demands even greater than Hitler made before the war, openly talks about cleansing of millions, is in worse situation internally; why should United Kingdom accept its offer if in OTL it rejected them in far worse condition? If things changed, they changed for worse in Germany not in UK.

[The Red]

There are several kinds of conflict I can easily see happening in Asia (see my previous post), but I do not foresee any major conflict necessarily exploding in Europe.

In Asia the Japanese are caught between an even bigger rock and hard place and the Soviets will be actively wanting them to put a foot in the wrong place. However I think Europe would probably be heading for bloodshed as well, too many big powers bordering little ones, too many dictatorships bordering each other.

[Bulls Run]

But the USSR isn't the bad dog anymore-Germany is trying to ethnically cleanse 6 to 8 million Poles, which means that turning it over to Soviets actually means turning it to a side that is far less involved in atrocities.

At this point in this time line though, no atrocities have occurred or, at least, been discovered. This can't have a real influence on British thinking. Also, I think the man on the street in Britain would feel like they'd dodged the bullet in this time line.

[Eurofed]

Biggy, no doubts that the Poles shall hate Germany's guts. But you need to put this in historical perspective. This is not a world that has witnessed the Holocaust (and never will). Its cultural reference for large-scale forced population transfers are the ones that have occurred during the Balkan Wars, and even more so, between Greece and Turkey in the early 1920s. Although harsh and distasteful, it is regarded as a last-ditch tool to prevent future ethnic strife and irredentist wars. The Entente allowed Turkey to expel 1.5 million of ethnic Greeks without batting an eye. This is bigger, but not radically so.

And your beloved "6-8 millions" is, for all that I know, something you pulled outta your butt, since it is way beyond the data of the 1931 Polish census, unless you kinda like explain to us all how the Polish population of West Prussia, Upper Silesia, and Posen demonstrably swelled by 1-3 millions in eight years. Not to mention that many people of mixed language and ethnicity shall likely be quick in rediscovering a newfound and lasting enthusiasm for their German identity (e.g. the Kashubians and Silesians). The radical Nazi with their crazy obsessions about racist blood purity have fallen from power, so the criteria for expulsion is much less about uprooting everyone with Slav blood and much more about kicking out the ones the self-identify as Poles and would likely be the population basis for Polish irredentist claims and nationalist disloyalty to the Fatherland as it happened in the Second Reich.

Germany is not "in worse shape internally". The succession power struggle took place in a few weeks, the new regime has wholly stabilized (and the radical Nazis have been thoroughly purged) under the aegis of the army, which is among the most respected and influential institutions in Germany. The peace negotiations take place months after that.

What was discussed before the war is one thing. In the meanwhile, Germany conquered Poland, without suffering anything on the Western Front, and can hance negotiate from a much better position. And for the Polish government, the implied choice and threat is not between the population transfer and Soviet domination. It is betwen suffering the expulsion from annexed territories, and keeping an independent homeland, or getting the expulsion anyway, and Poland as a Soviet SSR. As in "If you refuse this compromise, which is done for the sake of preventing further ethnic strife between our peoples, we shall be forced to do the planned population transfers anyway, then offer the Soviet Union, which has a long-standing hstorical claim to overlordship of Poland, if they are willing to resume their previous standing. I bet they shall be highly interested."

Soviet conquest of Eastern Poland and the Baltics (where they were generous with deportations) and ongoing Winter War makes the threat wholly credible. And Stalin can always find a workplace for a few extra Pole "immigrants" in the gulag system.

[luis3007]

Soviet conquest of Eastern Poland and the Baltics (where they were generous with deportations) and ongoing Winter War makes the threat wholly credible. And Stalin can always find a workplace for a few extra Pole "immigrants" in the gulag system.

Remember that this is 1939 we're talking about. Germany had barely started with the beginnings of the Holocaust system (and promptly stopped with Hitler's death and the end of his crazy ideas).

So you're the Polish GOIE, Germany tells you this: we will return all pre-1914 territory to you, no strings attached if you sign peace. You obviously refuse believing France-UK will back you up.
Then Germany says they will retreat anyway, deport all polish population in Germany and leave the territory for grabs to whoever reached Warsaw first.

What do you do? Wait until the Soviets get there first? Remember this is the post M-R Eastern Europe, which means the Soviets are a few miles away. Why would Stalin fear the West with a fully guaranteed German non-agression pact in place? Did they do something when the URSS rolled over eastern Poland? Did they do something when the URSS rolled over eastern Finland? You already know how the Soviets are treating the polish citizens in Eastern Poland, up and go to Siberia, or if you're lucky a visit by the ever-friendly KGB :D

You may still hope that the UK-France back you up. But then they tell you that they are fearful of driving Germany (without Hitler's crazy war aims) into the arms of the Soviet Union to form some unholly alliance against which they would have to wage a total war in order to win. For what? Does France hace any territorial claims in Germany? They already have Alsaice-Lorraine. Does the UK have any moral high ground? No, the holocaust hasn't happened, instead it would became another war between imperial powers (again, after all the suffering they got in WWI).

Does the alliance treaty means they will fight to the death for you? No, they answer, instead they tell you to sign and accept the situation, that they will guarantee your recovered independence in its new form and back you up economically and politically against the SU since Germany would no longer be a threath.

So what do you do? :eek:

[Eurofed]

As Europe stepped back from the brink of a general war, Germany turned inward to do some serious housecleaning. The diplomatic and military brinkmanship of the last few years had restored Germany to a position of strength undreamed since 1919, and the national unification of the Fatherland at last had been completed. Yet Hitler’s legacy had left behind some significant problems. The breakneck pace of rearmament in 1935-39 had burdened Germany with a serious potential inflationary problem. The annexation of Austria and Czechia had allowed to plunder their gold reserves and temporarily assuage it, but with peace, that avenue had closed. The only alternative was to curb down military spending for a while, and in order to do that, Germany needed to build up the budding détente with Britain and France, while trying to ensure good relations with the Soviet Union.

Hence Reichenau, Todt, and von Neurath unleashed a charm offensive with the other European great powers, making a tour of state visits in and high-level diplomatic talks with Britain, France, Italy, and the USSR. They signed a non-aggression treaty with Britain. The agreement was finalized to patriate German minorities in Belgium and France that opted for German citizenship. Progress was also made with France about mutual military reductions on the German-French border. In the visit to Moscow, von Neurath confirmed Germany’s commitment to the Non-Aggression Pact and to the secret protocol about the spheres of influence division in Eastern Europe. Both powers reaffirmed their agreement to deem Finland and Bessarabia in the Soviet s.o.i. and Poland and Romania in the German one, economic agreements were extended, and preliminary talks made about limiting military build-up on common borders. Germany expressed its lack of interest about possible Soviet expansion in the Far East (the German government was reconsidering its previous commitment to Japan once the new leadership lost interest in the war against Russia that Hitler had planned), while no agreement was possible about Soviet interests in Turkey and Bulgaria.

Domestically, the team of Todt, Speer, and Schacht had to enact an anti-inflationary program, which caused some economic hardship. However, they were able to prevent a significant spike in unemployment by enacting a program of resettlement in the annexed Eastern territories that had been voided by Poles. The Germans that had been transferred from the Soviet territories, Poland, and from Italian South Tyrol were resettled there as well. Despite the deflationary economic measures, the regime remained quite popular, thanks to the recovery of the 1914 territories in a victorious and relatively painless war. The ruling elite decided to took steps to give a firmer constitutional basis to a regime that had basically took over by coup, with little legal basis (even if backed by the immense prestige of the army among the German people). A plebiscite ratified a new constitution which restored the Imperial monarchy and gave extensive powers to the Emperor, the Chancellor and government, and the National Defense Council (a new constitutional body with ample overseer powers that included the Emperor, the Chancellor, the most important ministers, and the top echelons of the army and the civil service), while allowing the restoration of an elected Parliament and of “loyal” parties. A new Reichstag was elected, with “independent” loyal nationalist-conservative, Christian-democratic and centrist candidates allowed to run alongside members of the Nazi party (the army wanted to balance the influence of the Nazi party with the one of the “traditional” elites and middle class representatives). Reichenau stepped down as President to assume the chairmanship of the NDC and Frederick William of Hohenzollern was crowned Emperor of Germany in a lavish ceremony.

Germany signed an economic and mutual-defense pact (the Berlin Pact) with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Despite its requests, Finland was not allowed to sign it (the German leadership did not wish to imperil its good-neighbor policy with the Soviet Union, even if it gave the Finnish government an economic agreement and a secret military guarantee) while Poland stubbornly refused to join the Berlin Pact. Feeling threatened by its powerful neighbors, and betrayed by the Entente powers, the Polish leadership made efforts to build a mutual defense pact of their own (the Warsaw pact) with other recent victims of expansionist great powers, Finland and Yugoslavia. The WP countries took effort to rebuild their armies after the recent military defeat, even if they were cautious not to offend their powerful neighbors (and Finland added a protocol to the pact that it did not cover wars started by members for “irredentist” aims). Especially Poland was in a precarious position, since it was now landlocked and encircled by Soviet Russia, Germany, and its Czecho-Slovak satellites, and it economic livelihood was now largely dependent on German (or Soviet) good will. So the Polish government had to balance economic and strategic necessity with popular antipathy for Germany and Russia. The onrush of Polish refugees from Germany had aggravated the economic problems caused by invasion, occupation, and territorial losses, so the government struggled to avoid economic collapse. To seek some relief, pressure was made on Britain and France to provide economic support (which was refused when offered by Germany) and to allow increased immigration of Polish Jews in Palestine.

In Britain, soon after the ratification of the peace treaties, the House of Commons was dissolved and a general election held. On the average, the British public was glad of having been spared another ordeal like the Great War, and the Conservative party headed by PM Chamberlain reaped a comfortable seat majority with 46% of the votes, while the Labor party got 40% and the Liberal party confirmed its historical decline with 6%.

In Italy, Mussolini was satisfied with the outcome of the Third Balkan War, which had bolstered his ambition to be the leader of a successful great power, enlarged Italy, and gave it a sphere of influence. His imperialistic ambitions did not stop with irredentist expansion and hegemony in the Western Balkans; however, their fulfillment would have required a war with France or worse Britain, which, despite his propaganda boasts, he was fearful to pursue without the assistance of Germany. So he settled down to organize his new conquests and international influence: taking a clue from the German-Polish peace treaty, he enforced a program of forced mass expulsion of the Slav minorities from Istria and Dalmatia (the overwhelming majority of the German population in South Tyrol had opted for German citizenship and was being resettled to Germany as well) which he substituted with Italian settlers. This ethnic cleansing and repopulation program was also extended to Libya, with the aim to make the “Fourth Shore” an ethnically majority-Italian land within a generation. In the foreign policy field, he organized his newfound ally Hungary and his Slovene and Croat vassals in the economic and mutual-defense Rome Pact, which Bulgaria declined to sign. The “Pact of Steel” alliance with Germany had partially frayed in recent months, owing to Italian neutrality in the war with the Entente, the Molotov-Ribbentrop German-Soviet Pact, which contrasted with fascist Italy’s anti-communism, and the demise of Hitler. However, in the talks with Reichenau and Todt, the value of the German-Italian alliance was reaffirmed, even if its scope was clarified to have a defensive character, and both parties proffered an interest into détente with the Anglo-French, and containment of Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. An economic treaty to enhance German-Italian trade and investment was signed, and Mussolini expressed interest into favoring the fulfillment of its Hungarian ally’s irredentist claims towards Romania. Germany had singled out Romania for membership in its sphere of influence, but so far Romania had stubbornly clung to its links with Britain and France, so tentative agreement to Hungarian irredentist action to “knock Bucharest out of shape” was expressed, even if Germany made it clear that it would not tolerate an encroachment on Moldavia or Wallachia themselves.

As it concerned the Soviet Union, Stalin assessed the outcome of recent events with interest. Regrettably and shamefully, the full conquest of Finland had failed (the officers responsible had already taken a trip to the gulag), but the Finnish threat to Leningrad had been neutralized, and the Socialist Fatherland had still been able to recover much of the land that it had lost during its moment of weakness in the Civil War. The détente between the capitalist great powers made further bold Soviet expansion in Europe rather risky (regretfully, since there still were the issue of Bessarabia, as well as ambitions over Bulgaria and Turkey). However, the new German leadership seemed sincerely anxious of avoiding a military confrontation with the USSR (as confirmed by Soviet intelligence), and their implied lack of interest in the Far East was… interesting. Japan surely had little friends among the capitalist powers, and the Soviet Union had a score to settle. However, recent intelligence reports about the plans of the newfangled little Italian bloc hinted of an additional possibility. Perhaps there might be a way for the Soviet Union to realize the last part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop scheme, after all.

Over the summer of 1940, unrest among the Magyar minority in Romanian built up, stirred up by Hungarian and Italian agents, with repeated requests by Hungary for territorial revision, turned down by Romania (which was confident of defeating Hungary in a conflict) until war broke out. The Romanian army indeed performed competently, but the Hungarian one (like the Italian one) had been extensively revamped after the experience of the Third Balkan War, so they were able to make some serious inroads into Transylvania, even they failed to achieve a strategic breakthrough. The Soviet Union took the relative success of the Hungarian offensive as their clue and sent an ultimatum to Romania, asking the cession of Bessarabia and southern Bukovina. Romania refused, asking for assistance from the Entente, and the Soviet Union attacked. The Red Army, too, showed some signs of improvement thanks to the experience of the Winter War, moreover the Romanians were hard-pressed with fighting a two-front war, and their military situation seriously deteriorated. It got even worse when Bulgaria, too, sent an ultimatum about the cession of southern Dobruja, and joined the war.

After having indulged the comfortable illusion that the peace treaties of Spring 1940 had defused all serious sources of nationalist strife in Europe (but those knowledgeable with the Balkans knew better), the Romanian War was a rude awakening for Britain and France, and anger about renewed Soviet aggression was ripe, even if there was much hesitation to start on the warpath again. Feelers were sent to Germany for a combined action to aid Romania. The German response was that they were highly interested in the protection of Romanian independence from Communist aggression, even if due to their own previous diplomatic commitments, they did not felt bound to protect Romanian ownership of Bessarabia, and they urged for a “balanced” solution to the irredentist issues of Transylvania. Nonetheless, Germany deployed troops on the border with Hungary and sent a note to the parts involved in the conflict, urging for a diplomatic solution (as well as notifying Hungary, Italy, and the USSR that Germany would not oppose their irredentist claims, but it would intervene to protect Romanian independence). Unwilling to fight Soviet Union alone for the sake of Romanian territorial integrity, Britain and France reluctantly supported this platform. German, British, and French weapon supplies were sent to Romania, but its military situation kept deteriorating and Romania was forced to seek an armistice with the Soviet Union. A treaty for the cession of Bessarabia and Southern Bukovina to the USSR was quickly negotiated and signed. A ceasefire between Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania soon followed as well and a conference by Britain, France, Germany, and Italy was organized to settle the remaining territorial issues.

At the conference, it was decided to award northern Transylvania to Hungary, and to enact a population exchange of Hungarian and Romanian minorities between the two countries (about 1.1 million Romanians and 800,000 Hungarians, according to the new borders). Bulgaria was returned southern Dobruja, which it had owned up to 1913. The four powers issued a proclamation by which they guaranteed the new borders of states in Eastern Europe, and bound themselves to settle future irredentist strife by common action. Britain and France joined the anti-Comintern pact with Germany, Italy, and their respective allies, which was turned into a defensive anti-Soviet military alliance. Bulgaria joined the Rome Pact and Romania joined the Berlin Pact. Germany and Italy exchanged a mutual recognition and guarantee of their respective spheres of influences thus resulting.

On reviewing the results of the Romanian War with his close aides, Stalin felt a mix of elation and annoyance. The capitalist powers had at last thrown the mask of their pretensions and made a compact against the Soviet Union, yet their repeated failure to take action was comforting, too. The spineless western democracies, for all their high-sounding talk of international law, had failed to make anything worthwhile to stop the fascist powers or the Socialist Motherland when they had moved. Germany had shown some steel with Poland, yet their recent behavior indicated that the takeover by the reactionaries had dented their resolve, and they would stick to the non-aggression act if not pushed to the wall. Stalin felt an eerie regret that Hitler had passed. For all the obvious hostility of the man to the Soviet Union, Stalin felt a remarkable kinship for Hitler and his ways, and regretted that he had not been a Communist. As for Mussolini, the recent performance of Italy and its allies was noteworthy for the future, but they were still too weak for taking action alone against the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the recent anti-Soviet compact indicated that for all their individual faults, combined action by the four capitalist powers was far too much of a risk for the Soviet Union at its current level of strength, and to be avoided if possible. Current plans for the build-up of the Red Army (its recent performance in the Romanian War was more adequate, if far from optimal) and Soviet industry were to be continued, but plans for action against Turkey were shelved for the moment. Defensive build-up in the European and southern military districts was to be intensified, and contingency plans for a general war with the European powers kept honed, but the USSR would shift to a defensive stance in the West at least for the remaining duration of the Third Five-Year Plan (up to 1943). In the meanwhile, Soviet strategic planning would refocus to the Far East. A much less risky target was available in Asia, one that was little loved by the European capitalist powers, and had old and recent scores to settle with the Socialist Motherland. Marshal Timoshenko was summoned to the Vohzd, and ordered to report on the current state of military preparation in the Far East districts.

[Biggy]

Actually by November 1939 a lot of atrocities happened that were publicised by Polish government.
Anyway-as I said before this scenario makes Germany weaker, but yet UK agreest to terms they rejected when they were in far worse position.
And honestly nobody sane will see this crippled state Germans are proposing as "independent".
Basically this is a German fantasy scenario without any plausibility.

Soviet conquest of Eastern Poland and the Baltics (where they were generous with deportations) and ongoing Winter War makes the threat wholly credible. And Stalin can always find a workplace for a few extra Pole "immigrants" in the gulag system.You know, by 1939 they were hardly any deportations. The whole "evil Stalin will get you" when Germans are cleansing millions is really weak argument.

Remember this is the post M-R Eastern Europe, which means the Soviets are a few miles awayAnd? At least they don't openly call for ethnic cleansing of millions from core Polish territories. In this scenario Soviet control is actually prefered to German one.

You already know how the Soviets are treating the polish citizens in Eastern Poland, up and go to Siberia, or if you're lucky a visit by the ever-friendly KGB Meanwhile Polish citizens in Germany are killed in thousands(Operation Tanneberg), several million are to be ethnically cleansed and the Gestapo is so much friendlier. Remind me why the Soviets are worse for some reason?


Does the alliance treaty means they will fight to the death for you?
Why did they do so in OTL ?


that they will guarantee your recovered independence
But Germany isn't proposing any indepedence. It proposes a crippled entity and ethnic cleansing of millions. They didn't agree to far less harsher terms in OTL, why do they suddenly agree to those terms now?

in its new form and back you up economically and politically against the SU since Germany would no longer be a threath.
Why should the ally against the Soviets in 1939? And why is Germany not a threat?

[shillinger]

-snippy snip-

Hurgan! You have returned. Again. Wonder how long you will last this time.

[luis3007]

Actually by November 1939 a lot of atrocities happened that were publicised by Polish government.
Anyway-as I said before this scenario makes Germany weaker, but yet UK agreest to terms they rejected when they were in far worse position.
And honestly nobody sane will see this crippled state Germans are proposing as "independent".
Basically this is a German fantasy scenario without any plausibility.
You know, by 1939 they were hardly any deportations. The whole "evil Stalin will get you" when Germans are cleansing millions is really weak argument.

And? At least they don't openly call for ethnic cleansing of millions from core Polish territories. In this scenario Soviet control is actually prefered to German one.


Meanwhile Polish citizens in Germany are killed in thousands(Operation Tanneberg), several million are to be ethnically cleansed and the Gestapo is so much friendlier. Remind me why the Soviets are worse for some reason?

I think there is a confusion in terms here in respect to ethnic cleansing. Since I am from a country that experimented its fair share of exterminations and "anti-terrorism" campaigns the term would mean the mass killing of wholesome populations, isn't it?

OTOH what I see here is mass deportation of populations back to their supposed homeland and out of the conqueror's new territories. Is this cruel and unjust? Of course. Is it preferrable over extermination? That too.

So as I asked a few posts back, if you are the government in exile, what would you do? Entrench yourself and attempt to fight to the death with ever-dwindling outside support (remember that Churchill "we will never surrender" isn't the PM) and the posibility, now matter how small, of Soviet annexation. Or accept the still unfair peace offerings, but with the posibility to recover yourself before all is lost?

Now of course this seems to be a German fantasy scenario, but how many real deaths are we talking at this point? 2-5 million? Isn't this better than 200 million? From an objective point of view this TL is better than ours, isn't it?

[Adam]

Now of course this seems to be a German fantasy scenario, but how many real deaths are we talking at this point? 2-5 million? Isn't this better than 200 million? From an objective point of view this TL is better than ours, isn't it?

Slower technological progress and civil rights issues notwithstanding, you could say that.

[Astronomo2010]

very good update, let´s see where this will lead. i´m subscribing:)

[Eurofed]

Now of course this seems to be a German fantasy scenario, but how many real deaths are we talking at this point? 2-5 million? Isn't this better than 200 million? From an objective point of view this TL is better than ours, isn't it?

Unfortunately, I'm no military specialist, but if we sum up the casualties of the Invasion of Poland, the Winter War, the Third Balkan War, and the Romanian War, I think it would be exceedingly unlikely that the total amount would surpass half a million dead in the worst case, and it is likely much lower than that. That's the total amount of blood that Europe has paid to completely undo Versailles and redraw its map to a setup that the three revisionist great powers may find confortable. If the budding Euro Four-Power Alliance can keep Stalin cowed (not a given but definitely possible), and the Anglo-French-German bloc can make Mussolini behave (not difficult at all), that's all that shall ever be paid.

Asia, of course, is another matter. But then again, the great WWII Asian humanitarian tragedy, the Sino-Japanese War combined with the Chinese Civil War, has been raging already. We shall see what shall come of it ITTL.

[Astronomo2010]

hope to see another good update .:)

[Incognitia]

I would like to consider the situation when German negotiators propose this solution at peace negotiations.

I can fully accept that Chamberlain's government would accept the idea of a negotiated settlement; that does not mean that they would accept just any settlement, however.

So; Germany, which has disavowed Western territorial adjustments already, wishes to buy peace from Britain and France by permitting a crippled Polish statelet, comprising all the territories they do not wish to be burdened with administering, to be dependent upon them for ever more - and to do the same with the Czech rump.

Win/win/win for Germany. However, what do Britain and France gain? They have known that this war was coming at least since Munich was signed; that deal was not made because it was acceptable on the face of it, but rather because it bought *time* to prepare for the war.

Unless Poland is restored in pre-war borders, perhaps with a few plebiscites in border territories, I don't think Britain and France gain anything from this deal.
Remember that they've taken no real losses so far in this war; they are growing more ready for war with every passing week; and the deal on the table leaves them with a loss of face and Germany triumphant.

So in the Entente calculus, we are weighing one pro, of ending the war. On the other hand there are several cons; of negating the point of going to war, losing face along with any influence in Eastern Europe, and prematurely ending a war that they believe they can [ultimately] win. Remember that the UK and France together outweigh Germany on almost every measure, bar *current* military strength, and that only applies to the Army; the Air Force disparity is less apparent, and navally...well, OTL shows us enough about that. Germany's advantage is strictly temporary, and unless you expect the Entente powers to weigh the OTL Battle of France in the balance when considering their actions, this temporary advantage is not going to be the most important factor.

Finally, you'd have to be an idiot not to call that German bluff on withdrawal to let the Russians march in. M-R pact or no pact, no sane German government would willingly permit Stalin to control that territory, so close to the German heartland.

In summary, I think the basic premise is sound; Hitler dead, and a new government in place, France and the UK would be willing to negotiate a settlement.
However, they would not be so generous as you suppose in the negotiations.

[Kelenas]

One solution would be to let the UK/France oversee the creation of governments for fully-independent Czech and Polish states. They'd be Puppets of UK/France, then, instead of Germany and should satisfy them at least somewhat.
The expulsion of poles might be iffy, but Germany's counter-offer to take in all german minorities from other countries will probably win the Entene over; France will probably jump at the opportunity to get rid of the german population in Alsace-Lorraine, and other countries (Belgium with Eupen-Malmedy, USSR with the Baltic Germans, Italy with South Tirol, etc) will probably follow.

- Kelenas

[Biggy]

Unfortunately, I'm no military specialist, but if we sum up the casualties of the Invasion of Poland, the Winter War, the Third Balkan War, and the Romanian War, I think it would be exceedingly unlikely that the total amount would surpass half a million dead in the worst case, and it is likely much lower than thatThe September Campaing-210.000-260.000 dead on Polish side
Winter War-150.000 dead Finnish and Soviet casualties

So alone those two conflicts make up around 400.000 dead, add to that continued killings after the end of hostilities in Poland. I didn't add Balkan war, Romanian War etc.

The death toll from ethnic cleansing of 6 to 8mln millions and resulting famine in puppet Poland is hard to estimate-I would say that within 500.000 would for the ethnic cleansing alone, with famine perhaps 1 to 1.5mln deaths.


One solution would be to let the UK/France oversee the creation of governments for fully-independent Czech and Polish states.How can they be independent? Both would be German puppets.

[ctesiphon]

Calm down, it wouldn't be 6-8 million, there were 5 million Poles in the 3 voivodships total in 1931, and the population of whole country increased to around 35 million people from 31 in the years 1931-39, so it can't be 6, and most definitely it can't be 8 million, even with the Poles around Oppeln and in Ermland. Plus, I'm not sure how many of those Poles were actual Poles, the Govt. faked the census in the East, so I wouldn't trust them entirely in the West. Also there could be some *Volksdeutsche among them, if the new regime in Berlin accepts those, and possibly not all Poles would go - even after WWII there were many Germans left in Silesia. But yeah, the rump Polish statelet will have very serious difficulties to accommodate the refugees from Greater Poland, Silesia and the Corridor without extensive foreign relief.

That I find Allies, especially French, unlikely to accept Germany with Polish and Czech (and Slovakian) puppets and all of Silesian industry is another thing.

[Biggy]

I'm not sure how many of those Poles were actual Poles, the Govt. faked the census in the East, so I wouldn't trust them entirely in the West.Nazi Census in 1939 in areas they annexed from Poland gave 597,784 Germans as living there compared to 7,8mln Poles. So only a very small part of population was German and there is no reason for Nazis to fake the number of Germans as lower.


That I find Allies, especially French, unlikely to accept Germany with Polish and Czech (and Slovakian) puppets and all of Silesian industry is another thing.
Indeed there is no reason for numerically superior and stronger Allies to accept German victory on the European continent. Historically Allies refused German terms under much worse conditions and this time it is actually Germany that appears weaker than they.

[ctesiphon]

Territories Germany gets in Eurofed's scenario, and Nazi-annexed Poland from OTL are two different things. And most of those 500k+ Germans of yours lived in those three voivodships, not in north Mazovia.

[Biggy]

Territories Germany gets in Eurofed's scenario, and Nazi-annexed Poland from OTL are two different things. And most of those 500k+ Germans of yours lived in those three voivodships, not in north Mazovia.
They do overlap, while being of course smaller, but that means only that the number of Germans will be less the the number given above, not bigger.
Still millions of Poles will be ethnically cleansed-giving a good propaganda boost against Germany, even as death toll among Polish population rises early in the war both during the ethnic cleansing and resulting famine in General Government..

In face of such crisis, its hard to imagine collaborationists willing to accept ruling Polish puppet state established by Nazi Germany-they will probably have to reach for some fringe groups bordering on criminal edge. Of course such groups will have very little support and will need to enforce their rule through brutal force.


Come to think of it-this might be even bigger-Greater Poland was one of the agricultural centers of Poland with high productivity which exported its products-if Germans succesfully cleanse the Polish population there, this whole production will fall, and effects will be felt throughout whole region, dooming it to a huge famine.
The death count of its victims might be far larger and certainly won't be limited to the population from Greater Poland and other territories annexed alone.

[Kelenas]

How can they be independent? Both would be German puppets.

Didn't you read my sentence? Because it would be the UK/France who would oversee the forming of the governments in those countries (read; install a government to their liking), instead of Germany. In which case they'd be British/French puppets, not German.
It was a suggestion on my part that would make the peace suggestion easier for the Allies to swallow.

The death toll from ethnic cleansing of 6 to 8mln millions and resulting famine in puppet Poland is hard to estimate-I would say that within 500.000 would for the ethnic cleansing alone, with famine perhaps 1 to 1.5mln deaths.
You seem to automatically assume that Germany will chose the most horrible modus operandi possible for the forced population exchange, which I find doubtful.
The new german leadership knows full well how dependent it is on Allied goodwill, and both France and the UK will likely take a very close look at the whole process. Meaning Germany will try to be on its best behavior in regards to transportation, food reserves (neither the Allies nor Germany will be ignorant of the interruption in food-production), medical supplies, etc. pp.

They won't be happy, of course, as it will be on their cost, but the alternative is the continuation of a war that no member of the German military leadership sans a few Nazi fanatics wanted, and one they're certain they can't win. So they'll grit their teeth, present a forced smile, and try to present themselves from their best side for any Allied observers.
"The forced population transfer is an unfortunate necessity, but we're doing or best to make the transition as smooth and unproblematic as possible."

Their saving grace is that the Allies want war just as little, even if they're more certain they can win; they were mainly concerned with putting a leash on Hitler, and Poland was a (failed) means to that end. Now that he and his cronies are gone and replaced by a (from allied perspective) more sensible leadership, they won't care all that much about Poland, as long as they can claim that they upheld their Guarantee of Polish independence.

Harsh, yes, but if they have to sell out someone else to spare their own people the renewed horrors of war, they'll do so, as they have done before (Munich Agreement).

- Kelenas

[Biggy]

Didn't you read my sentence? Because it would be the UK/France who would oversee the forming of the governments in those countries (read; install a government to their liking), instead of Germany. In which case they'd be British/French puppets, not German.
Except that they are encircled by Germany, which also controls their trade and has most of industry. In other words-they are fully under control of Germany, regardless if it allows English or French to play with them at the moment.

You seem to automatically assume that Germany will chose the most horrible modus operandi possible for the forced population exchange, which I find doubtful.
That Germany is run by people that believe Slavs are inferior race at best, at worst the don't even see them as fully human. There is no reason to believe they will be gentle.

The new german leadership knows full well how dependent it is on Allied goodwill, and both France and the UK will likely take a very close look at the whole process. Meaning Germany will try to be on its best behavior in regards to transportation, food reserves (neither the Allies nor Germany will be ignorant of the interruption in food-production), medical supplies, etc. pp.
And why should Allies agree to that? They entered a war over one city-Gdansk-now for some reason they allow Germany to take 1/3 of Poland and ethnically cleanse millions?


They won't be happy, of course, as it will be on their cost, but the alternative is the continuation of a war that no member of the German military leadership sans a few Nazi fanatics wanted
That highly debatable view, plus how are you sure that Allies don't want to continue the war, rather then allow Germany to dominate Europe?


and one they're certain they can't win.
United Kingdom was engaged in war even when France fell, here France still stands. They have no reason to believe they will lose(they didn't historically), especially when Germany is torn apart by civil strife from discontent SS and Hitler's followers.

as long as they can claim that they upheld their Guarantee of Polish independence.
They never made such guarantee. They guaranteed Polish western border:) That's why Poland under Soviet control in 1945 didn't violate any Allied obligations to Poles. Plus really-Poland as proposed in this scenario is the extreme version of puppet state and not independence.

[Eurofed]

@Kalenas: the peace deal indeed heeds what you suggests about Poland, since Germany pulls out and allows the Polish GOIE to retun to power, which was as anti-German and pro-Entente as you could get. As it concerns Czechia, they withdraw the troops and restore full powers to the legal Czech government by Emil Hacha, which was fairly pro-German. In other words, they restore the political independence and the constitutional government of both countries.

@Incognitia: we need to facto the whole European situation in Winter-Spring 1940, as the Entente sees it, in order to adjudicate their choices. There is not just the ongoing war with Germany over Poland. The other revisionist great powers (Soviet Union and Italy) are on the move, with the Winter War and the 3rd Balkan War. All three powers are at war all over Eastern Europe to settle their own grievances against the Versailles order, in an apparent fairly coordinated move, and both powers are known or suspected to be in a semi-alliance with Germany. Not just a German-Soviet bloc is quite scary enough, but Italy is performing in Yugoslavia rather better than OTL 1940, so it keeps the respect owed to the military potential of a great power. They also know, or may easily suspect, that the new German leadership is much mor pragmatic in its foreign policy, and if forced, may accept a stable full alliance with the Soviet Union. With the demise of Hitler and his cronies, the Chamberlain government deems Stalin the greater evil. With a budding German-Soviet-Italian Axis, Eastern Europe is all but lost to the Entente. They have two choices, accept sensible German demands over Poland, and hence pull Germany and Italy back to anti-Soviet containtment, or start a total war against the GSI Axis.

The latter course entails a war that, even in the most optimistic expectations, would rival WWI in the human and financial costs, and put the global standing of Britain and France at huge risk. And Entente has no reasonable certainty that they would win (even without factoring the superior military potential of the GSI Axis, German-Soviet economic cooperation pretty much kills the effectiveness of blockade as a weapon against Germany). This is surely not what Neville Chamberlain is prepared to accept if he has an alternative, and the territorial integrity or pro-Entente allegiance of the Eastern European states spawned by the Treaty of Versailles is surely not worth putting the British Empire at risk in his view.

There are of course, those who disgree, typically Churchill, but he's not yet PM nor in a position to sway the cabinet to his will. We can certainly figure a wholly plausible TL variant where Churchill and like-minded firebrands are able to sway the British government to intransigence, even with Hitler and his cronies out of power. There were, as a matter of fact, OTL advanced Entente plans to invade Norway, intervene in the Winter War, and bomb Baku, and that's what the Entente would do if they get their way.

Of course, since this Germany shall never do Barbarossa, and shall heed Soviet reasonable demands for a sphere of influence in Finland, Turkey, etc., this shall immediately provoke the formation of a solid German-Soviet-Italian alliance that shall proceed to curbstomp the Anglo-French, with Britain losing everything from Dover to Karachi, and Japan surely jumping in to grab everything east of Calcutta. In other words, the collapse of the British Empire, and Eurasia under the unshakable boot of the fascist-communist hegemony for all foreseeable time. Churchill can only hope that Reichenau and Stalin shall graciously save his skin by declaring war to America, or FDR is able to persuade isolationist America to expand the Pacific War to a huge conflict with the Euro Axis behemoth, but it is far, far from the most likely outcome. Otherwise, he can only pray that British-Dominion military and industrial potential and logistical difficulties are enough to prevent the German-Soviet-Italian-Japanese Axis (with Vichy France and Spain sure to join) from overrunning India, making the Indians pull out of a hopeless fight, pulling a Sealion, bombing or blockading Britain into a wasteland, etc. etc. I wouldn't bet on it. And even if America joins the war, Europe shall be a hopeless fight, with nukes the only plausible chance. And all of it for a futile attempt to try and keep 3 voivodeships Polish. Big choice.

[Kelenas]

Except that they are encircled by Germany, which also controls their trade and has most of industry. In other words-they are fully under control of Germany, regardless if it allows English or French to play with them at the moment.
Except that Germany would be encircled exactly the same way by countries that are either Allied (France), pro-Allied/anti-German (Belgium, Poland, Czech [after their experience]), or neutral (Denmark, Netherlands, USSR). Germany's sole ally would be Italy, whose commitment might be questionable, now that Hitler is dead.

That Germany is run by people that believe Slavs are inferior race at best, at worst the don't even see them as fully human. There is no reason to believe they will be gentle.
You did notice that Eurofed killed of pretty much the entire Nazi leadership (where the racism and hate-mongering against Slavs, Jews, Roma, etc, originated from) in the very first post, right?
The new leadership has little reason to continue the previous policies, especially when it seeks rapprochement with its former enemies.

And why should Allies agree to that? They entered a war over one city-Gdansk-now for some reason they allow Germany to take 1/3 of Poland and ethnically cleanse millions?

That highly debatable view, plus how are you sure that Allies don't want to continue the war, rather then allow Germany to dominate Europe?
The german military leaders of the time wanted to reverse the Humiliation of Versailles as much as every other German, but, unlike Hitler, argued against a war, for various reasons their own (perceived weakness of the German military, memories of the Great War, etc).
On the Allies' side, the higher echelons of the British Government, Chamberlain and Halifax, had hoped to reach a deal with Germany in regards to Danzig and the Corridor - despite the guarantee the gave Poland.
The main reason this didn't happen was due to Hitler's duplicity and aggressiveness, as seen after the Munich Agreement, where he overran Czech against the guarantee he, himself, had made in regards to Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity.
With him out of the way, and a German leadership that is less fanatical and more sensible, they will be more willing to negotiate an agreement.


United Kingdom was engaged in war even when France fell, here France still stands. They have no reason to believe they will lose(they didn't historically), especially when Germany is torn apart by civil strife from discontent SS and Hitler's followers.
The SS, at that point in time, counts at 100,000 at the very most; probably less, and the training of its troops and officers was inferior to those of regular forces (as shown during the Polish campaign), and in regards to heavy weaponry like tanks or artillery completely dependent on the Wehrmacht.
And given that the SS under Himmler's leadership were the ones who originally tried to stage a coup after Hitler's death, and the Wehrmacht merely the ones restoring order, there won't be that much civil unrest, either (aside from some utter hardcore-nazi fanatics still left).

They never made such guarantee. They guaranteed Polish western border:) That's why Poland under Soviet control in 1945 didn't violate any Allied obligations to Poles. Plus really-Poland as proposed in this scenario is the extreme version of puppet state and not independence.
Point taken; I looked it up and they did indeed guarantee Polish territorial integrity.
However, at the same time, the British under Chamberlain and Halifax were still hoping to strike a deal with Germany in regards to Danzig and the corridor, despite the guarantee they had handed Poland.

- Kelenas

Edit: In regards to Allied determination to fight, in face of the overall European situation, Eurofed made some interesting points already.

[Mulder]

Except that they are encircled by Germany, which also controls their trade and has most of industry. In other words-they are fully under control of Germany, regardless if it allows English or French to play with them at the moment.

That Germany is run by people that believe Slavs are inferior race at best, at worst the don't even see them as fully human. There is no reason to believe they will be gentle.

And why should Allies agree to that? They entered a war over one city-Gdansk-now for some reason they allow Germany to take 1/3 of Poland and ethnically cleanse millions?


The OP specified that Himmler and his ilk are dead and gone. The junta now in charge in Germany might not like Slavs, and especially, since they are Junkers, Poles, but they are not genocidal. They might follow genocidal orders, as they did in OTL, but they are not the kind of people who would want genocide themselves just for the sake of it.



That highly debatable view, plus how are you sure that Allies don't want to continue the war, rather then allow Germany to dominate Europe?


United Kingdom was engaged in war even when France fell, here France still stands. They have no reason to believe they will lose(they didn't historically), especially when Germany is torn apart by civil strife from discontent SS and Hitler's followers.



Yeah, Himmler and a few nutjobs can tear Germany apart, right, when they are opposed by like the entire population and army. And, historically, France fell. IN this TL, there is a strong possibility that France would still fall if the Entente does not make peace. And then what? This Germany is not run by lunatics, the junta does not want to attack the Soviets (at least without peace in the west), and Germany declaring war on the US is just ASB in this scenario, since even if Japan attack Pearl Harbor as in OTL, nobody with anything resembling a brain in charge in Berlin will do anything else than throw them to the wolves.

[Incognitia]

@Incognitia: we need to facto the whole European situation in Winter-Spring 1940, as the Entente sees it, in order to adjudicate their choices. There is not just the ongoing war with Germany over Poland. The other revisionist great powers (Soviet Union and Italy) are on the move, with the Winter War and the 3rd Balkan War. All three powers are at war all over Eastern Europe to settle their own grievances against the Versailles order, in an apparent fairly coordinated move, and both powers are known or suspected to be in a semi-alliance with Germany. Not just a German-Soviet bloc is quite scary enough, but Italy is performing in Yugoslavia rather better than OTL 1940, so it keeps the respect owed to the military potential of a great power. They also know, or may easily suspect, that the new German leadership is much mor pragmatic in its foreign policy, and if forced, may accept a stable full alliance with the Soviet Union. With the demise of Hitler and his cronies, the Chamberlain government deems Stalin the greater evil. With a budding German-Soviet-Italian Axis, Eastern Europe is all but lost to the Entente. They have two choices, accept sensible German demands over Poland, and hence pull Germany and Italy back to anti-Soviet containtment, or start a total war against the GSI Axis.

The latter course entails a war that, even in the most optimistic expectations, would rival WWI in the human and financial costs, and put the global standing of Britain and France at huge risk. And Entente has no reasonable certainty that they would win (even without factoring the superior military potential of the GSI Axis, German-Soviet economic cooperation pretty much kills the effectiveness of blockade as a weapon against Germany). This is surely not what Neville Chamberlain is prepared to accept if he has an alternative, and the territorial integrity or pro-Entente allegiance of the Eastern European states spawned by the Treaty of Versailles is surely not worth putting the British Empire at risk in his view.

There are of course, those who disgree, typically Churchill, but he's not yet PM nor in a position to sway the cabinet to his will. We can certainly figure a wholly plausible TL variant where Churchill and like-minded firebrands are able to sway the British government to intransigence, even with Hitler and his cronies out of power. There were, as a matter of fact, OTL advanced Entente plans to invade Norway, intervene in the Winter War, and bomb Baku, and that's what the Entente would do if they get their way.

Of course, since this Germany shall never do Barbarossa, and shall heed Soviet reasonable demands for a sphere of influence in Finland, Turkey, etc., this shall immediately provoke the formation of a solid German-Soviet-Italian alliance that shall proceed to curbstomp the Anglo-French, with Britain losing everything from Dover to Karachi, and Japan surely jumping in to grab everything east of Calcutta. In other words, the collapse of the British Empire, and Eurasia under the unshakable boot of the fascist-communist hegemony for all foreseeable time. Churchill can only hope that Reichenau and Stalin shall graciously save his skin by declaring war to America, or FDR is able to persuade isolationist America to expand the Pacific War to a huge conflict with the Euro Axis behemoth, but it is far, far from the most likely outcome. Otherwise, he can only pray that British-Dominion military and industrial potential and logistical difficulties are enough to prevent the German-Soviet-Italian-Japanese Axis (with Vichy France and Spain sure to join) from overrunning India, making the Indians pull out of a hopeless fight, pulling a Sealion, bombing or blockading Britain into a wasteland, etc. etc. I wouldn't bet on it. And even if America joins the war, Europe shall be a hopeless fight, with nukes the only plausible chance. And all of it for a futile attempt to try and keep 3 voivodeships Polish. Big choice.

You draw an interesting series of logical leaps.
Primarily, you link the war between the Entente and Germany over Poland, with Italy messing around in Yugoslavia, and the USSR having fun in the Baltic.

There's a huge gap between seeing a country far away, to which you have no commitments, fall under the boot of an invader (viz Abyssinia, the Baltics in OTL, Nationalist China), and permitting the country on whose behalf you declared war to go gently into that good night.

I'm sure that many would find Finland and Yugoslavia's travails...regrettable. However, the reality is that Britain is not going to act on their behalf. On the other hand, Britain declared war on behalf of Poland.
It would take a real firebrand, or an idiot at the Foreign Office, to allow the separate issues to become so entangled that Italy and the USSR would back Germany.
After all, who is Italy's bigger rival for direct influence in the Balkans? Whose opinion is going to sway Hungary, or Romania? Germany, or Britain?
Who is competing with Stalin in the Baltic? Germany, or Britain?

It's easy to say that Britain's Empire is so big that it's a tempting target for any ambitious power; and that would be true. However, to suggest that three very different, untrusting regimes should all sink their differences and turn outwards, is far easier said than done.

I return to one of my initial points: I'm not saying that what you suggest is impossible.
I just think it's a lot more difficult than you're suggesting, and if you want it to sound plausible it needs rather more justification.

[Biggy]

They have two choices, accept sensible German demands over Poland. But the Germans are demanding annexation of 1/3 of Polish territory that even by Nazi estimates was over 80% Polish and ethnic cleansing even in your minimal version of 5mln people. That's hardly "sensible demand" even disregarding economic consequences.

The OP specified that Himmler and his ilk are dead and gone. The junta now in charge in Germany might not like Slavs, and especially, since they are Junkers, Poles, but they are not genocidal. They might follow genocidal orders, as they did in OTL, but they are not the kind of people who would want genocide themselves just for the sake of it.
You did notice that Eurofed killed of pretty much the entire Nazi leadership (where the racism and hate-mongering against Slavs, Jews, Roma, etc, originated from) in the very first post, right?
The new leadership has little reason to continue the previous policies, especially when it seeks rapprochement with its former enemies.This. The German leadership demands annexation of territory over 80% Polish by Nazi standards, and ethnic cleansing of several million people(not even taking into consideration the massive famine that would follow). In view of such demands its rather strange to claim it is not ridded with nationalism, hatred for other nations and imperialistic demands and doesn't carry over Nazi policies isn't it?


On the Allies' side, the higher echelons of the British Government, Chamberlain and Halifax, had hoped to reach a deal with Germany in regards to Danzig and the Corridor - despite the guarantee the gave Poland.The city was not part of Poland, the issues in question were trade links and roads.

Yeah, Himmler and a few nutjobs can tear Germany apart, right, when they are opposed by like the entire population and army.Which goes against the fact that they were actually supported by a lot of people.

This Germany is not run by lunatics, the junta does not want to attack the Soviets (at least without peace in the west)It doesn't have a choice, unless it wants to be dependent on Soviet economic aid to avoid British blockade.

Except that Germany would be encircled exactly the same way by countries that are either Allied (France), pro-Allied/anti-German (Belgium, Poland, Czech [after their experience]), or neutral (Denmark, Netherlands, USSR).Polish and Czech states would be nothing more than puppets that Germany could exterminate at will if would desire to do so, not real countries.
As to the rest-it shows why this is German fantasy-when it suits German interests USSR is allied, when it suits German interests USSR suddenly becomes neutral. All positions of countries are seen through the prism of German benefit, and not their own goals. Soviet Union is practically reduced to a tool of German policy dictated at whim, without any own policy and claims at all.

German-Soviet-Italian-Japanese Axis (with Vichy France and Spain sure to join)
Why would Japan join an alliance with Soviet Union? Why would Soviets join an alliance of nations that have hostile ideology to its political model, territorial disputes and put it at odds with several more countries like USA? As to Spain, I recall reading several threads on the subject and it seems that it would cause more trouble to Axis then it was worth-Germans would need to guard it against any invasion and air raids, and it was vulnerable to famine in case of British blockade.


I must also confess that two following thoughts came into my mind. The first being, that without Hitler, German military might actually adopt a more conservative strategy when dealing with France, leading to a more extended war, with possible static front. If this lasts till 1941 than Germany will be defeated sooner then OTL as Allied war production gears up to expected levels. Even with French defeat in such war, German losses will be higher as well.
Second idea that seems to be neglected is how supported was the war against Soviet Union, a German militaristic and nationalistic government such as the one proposed no doubt will be seeing Soviets as giant on clay feet, waiting to fall(especially in light of Winter War), and the idea of leading a war against Soviets was very popular. Perhaps not in the timeframe of Hitler but certainly such war would be supported.

[Eurofed]

I just think it's a lot more difficult than you're suggesting, and if you want it to sound plausible it needs rather more justification.

Ok. In order to answer to this, I've put the TL on hold and I've drafted a variant of this TL, where a variation in butterflies leads to a radical difference in outcome. Instead of Europe narrowly avoiding WWII and the Holocaust, we have the ultimate Axis, with the same PoD. Best-case and worst-case scenarioes. Here (http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=158023) is the other thread.

[Kelenas]

This. The German leadership demands annexation of territory over 80% Polish by Nazi standards, and ethnic cleansing of several million people(not even taking into consideration the massive famine that would follow). In view of such demands its rather strange to claim it is not ridded with nationalism, hatred for other nations and imperialistic demands and doesn't carry over Nazi policies isn't it?
The Nazis were racist in the extreme, whereas the new junta would likely be more practical (even if they don't like Poles or Slavs or whoever), and widen their criteria about germans living in Polish territories.
And their territorial demands are - as far as I can tell from Eurofed's posts - a restoration of their 1914 borders; territories that they have held for over a century, and as such have a rather substantial claim over (as do the Poles, which is, after all, one of the cores of the problem).
While this is undoubtedly nationalistic (something pretty much all other nations of the time will find completely normal and understandable), it is hardly based on "hatred for other nations" or "imperialistic demands" as you say, at least to the Allies (who still have extensive colonial holdings, and thus easily qualify as far more imperialistic as the Germans do at this moment in the timeline) - the Poles will undoubtedly see this very different.

The city was not part of Poland, the issues in question were trade links and roads.
No, but most of the territory around it (the Corridor) was, rendering the point rather moot.

Which goes against the fact that they were actually supported by a lot of people.

Hitler was supported by a lot of people. As far as they were concerned, he was the one who lifted the Great Depression and gave them work, he was the one who brought Austria into the German fold, etc.
Without him, the Nazi party has a lot less credibility, as opposed to the Heer, which has been part of the political and social landscape in Germany for a long time, and is now a source of national pride again.

Polish and Czech states would be nothing more than puppets that Germany could exterminate at will if would desire to do so, not real countries.
As to the rest-it shows why this is German fantasy-when it suits German interests USSR is allied, when it suits German interests USSR suddenly becomes neutral. All positions of countries are seen through the prism of German benefit, and not their own goals. Soviet Union is practically reduced to a tool of German policy dictated at whim, without any own policy and claims at all.
So your criteria on what country is a puppet is based on whoever could militarily overrun them in the shortest amount of time? Would that make all of Central and South America into US-Puppets, then?
The obvious answer is no, and the same goes for Poland and Czech.
And in regards to the USSR, no one ever claimed they were allied, and I honestly don't know where you got that. What was talked about was the possibility of a more pragmatic Germany becoming allied with the USSR in the face of continued UK/French opposition, with a second deal over the rest of Poland as a catalyst.

Why would Japan join an alliance with Soviet Union? Why would Soviets join an alliance of nations that have hostile ideology to its political model, territorial disputes and put it at odds with several more countries like USA? As to Spain, I recall reading several threads on the subject and it seems that it would cause more trouble to Axis then it was worth-Germans would need to guard it against any invasion and air raids, and it was vulnerable to famine in case of British blockade.
If they are given the choice between the Soviet Union next door, with the resources and manpower they can provide, and Japan at the other side of the world, with... nothing to offer besides it strategic position, at best, then the German leadership, if they are even marginally pragmatic, would drop Japan in a heartbeat.
Even Hitler was pragmatic enough to trade with the USSR and sign a non-aggression treaty, and the new german junta is far less fanatical.

You draw an interesting series of logical leaps.
Primarily, you link the war between the Entente and Germany over Poland, with Italy messing around in Yugoslavia, and the USSR having fun in the Baltic.

There's a huge gap between seeing a country far away, to which you have no commitments, fall under the boot of an invader (viz Abyssinia, the Baltics in OTL, Nationalist China), and permitting the country on whose behalf you declared war to go gently into that good night.
The USSR is one of the few - possibly even the only one - of the great powers who poses a credible threat to the crown jewel of the British Empire; India. You can bet that the British will keep an eye on them, and IOTL were already thinking about possible strategies for a war with the Soviet Union; only the fact that were also at war with Germany at the same time prevented them from doing anything.

- Kelenas

[Astrodragon]

I agree with Ingognita - its an interesting timeline, but I think you're being too generous to germany in the terms they get.

A lot of this is, I feel, going to depend on timing. germany's best bet for good terms is to play the 'allied-with-Moscow' card - without this, the Allies are basically in their OTL position, preparing for a long war they will win, so they'd be tough on terms.
However this card is going to be ragged after the Winter War starts - first, it shows the Soviet army to be imcompetant, ad even after they win its obvious that it was by weight of numbers. So the longer the negotiations go on, the more difficult it gets to use this against the allies. Not to mention the internal struggle its going to pose Germany - even without Hitler, Stalin is very obviously not their friend, they want to use his threat, yet also the Soviet army isnt very good...its going to be a complex balancing act on all sides.

My personal feeling is that Germany will have to give a bit more back to the Poles - enough to make it less of a loss of face for the Alies - say a bit more land, a sea access (maybe the Polish Corridoor in reverse), something to make the resettlements less contentious and painful, but overall a peace settlement is likely. There are also things Germany can conceed which dont really hurt her -for example, voluntary restrictions on U-boat building and numbers, to make Britain at least more comfortable. They could also agree to reductions in arms, which they are going to have to do anyway if they dont want their economy to collapse, but making a virtue of it.

The ironic thing over Poland is that its overall in Germany's advantage to have a reasonable strong buffer between them and Stalin.

As for the rest of Eastern Europe, most of it wasnt exactly pro-German until after the FoF, so what gets settled there is going to depend a lot on when and how Stalin goes fishing. However is he in any state to do so after the obvious state of the army as shown up in the Winter war??

But please continue the TL, with some tweaks it has interesting possibilities...

[Eurofed]

A lot of this is, I feel, going to depend on timing. germany's best bet for good terms is to play the 'allied-with-Moscow' card - without this, the Allies are basically in their OTL position, preparing for a long war they will win, so they'd be tough on terms.
However this card is going to be ragged after the Winter War starts - first, it shows the Soviet army to be imcompetant, ad even after they win its obvious that it was by weight of numbers. So the longer the negotiations go on, the more difficult it gets to use this against the allies. Not to mention the internal struggle its going to pose Germany - even without Hitler, Stalin is very obviously not their friend, they want to use his threat, yet also the Soviet army isnt very good...its going to be a complex balancing act on all sides.


Well, I could fiddle with timing to let German-Entente peace happen not long after Winter War starts, I guess.


My personal feeling is that Germany will have to give a bit more back to the Poles - enough to make it less of a loss of face for the Alies - say a bit more land, a sea access (maybe the Polish Corridoor in reverse), something to make the resettlements less contentious and painful, but overall a peace settlement is likely. There are also things Germany can conceed which dont really hurt her -for example, voluntary restrictions on U-boat building and numbers, to make Britain at least more comfortable. They could also agree to reductions in arms, which they are going to have to do anyway if they dont want their economy to collapse, but making a virtue of it.


Well, I can certainly write a more comprehensive Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which is extended to the U-Boats, and a land arms reduction with France, since those things are slated to happen anyway. I suppose I could throw a treat to Poland in the form of an extraterritorial port facility in Gdynia and/or Memel and an extraterritorial railroad to it, guaranteed by the Entente. But I am rather opposed to let Poland get a territorial settlement much better than the 1914 border (which I've already slightly improved), for various reasons. Not the least that Hurgan's whinings about how the world has a moral duty to suffer WWII in order to let the Corridor stay Polish really bring out the worst in me, as far as anti-Polish sentiment is concerned. :mad::mad::mad:


The ironic thing over Poland is that its overall in Germany's advantage to have a reasonable strong buffer between them and Stalin.


<shrug> As far as I'm concerned, Congress Poland plus Curzon Line Austrian Poland is good enough for that purpose. Obviously, General Government Poland would not, which is one of the reasons why I'm making Germany backtrack from Hitler's annexations to the pre-1914 stuff (there are of course others, such as it is much less of a loss of face for the Entente letting Germany keep what it has owned for 126 years, the resettlements are less vast, and this Germany would prefer to get less land but be sure of its permanent German character, and so on).


As for the rest of Eastern Europe, most of it wasnt exactly pro-German until after the FoF, so what gets settled there is going to depend a lot on when and how Stalin goes fishing. However is he in any state to do so after the obvious state of the army as shown up in the Winter war??


Well, Romanian army was decent, but not that good to withstand a three-way war, with the Hungarians and the Bulgarians getting experience from the war with Yugoslavia. IMO the Red Army could afford another limited war with Romania in late 1940, also because Bessarabia was a more friendly terrain than Karelia.

[Astronomo2010]

well let´s see if the peace is mainted, or War starts in The Far East Between Japan and USA. :)

[Astrodragon]

Well, I could fiddle with timing to let German-Entente peace happen not long after Winter War starts, I guess.



Well, I can certainly write a more comprehensive Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which is extended to the U-Boats, and a land arms reduction with France, since those things are slated to happen anyway. I suppose I could throw a treat to Poland in the form of an extraterritorial port facility in Gdynia and/or Memel and an extraterritorial railroad to it, guaranteed by the Entente. But I am rather opposed to let Poland get a territorial settlement much better than the 1914 border (which I've already slightly improved), for various reasons. Not the least that Hurgan's whinings about how the world has a moral duty to suffer WWII in order to let the Corridor stay Polish really bring out the worst in me, as far as anti-Polish sentiment is concerned. :mad::mad::mad:



<shrug> As far as I'm concerned, Congress Poland plus Curzon Line Austrian Poland is good enough for that purpose. Obviously, General Government Poland would not, which is one of the reasons why I'm making Germany backtrack from Hitler's annexations to the pre-1914 stuff (there are of course others, such as it is much less of a loss of face for the Entente letting Germany keep what it has owned for 126 years, the resettlements are less vast, and this Germany would prefer to get less land but be sure of its permanent German character, and so on).



Well, Romanian army was decent, but not that good to withstand a three-way war, with the Hungarians and the Bulgarians getting experience from the war with Yugoslavia. IMO the Red Army could afford another limited war with Romania in late 1940, also because Bessarabia was a more friendly terrain than Karelia.

I dont think you need to change things to be terribly more generous to Poland - most of what I was thinking are more 'face-saving' things - for example, allowing Poland their version of a Polish corridoor doesnt really cost germany much, and negates all the issies of the 'poor locked in Poles', a little give on the subs pacifies Britain, and Germany cant afford the naval buildup anyway (a naval race with an aggressive Britain has only one winner, and it isnt germany...)
Small things that a good diplomat would suggest to oil the passag of the bits you really dont want to give up - Germany needs a bit of smoke and mirrors here

As for the timing - well, its one of the interesting things about the TL :)
Germany's diplomacy was rubbish in WW2, you need it a lot better this time around. And it has to compete with Britains, which was always effective.
But you already got rid of Ribbentwit, which helps..maybe a bit more clearing out would be a good idea. Chamberlain in power helps, hes too fixated on peace to look too closeley at things, however he will be keeping an eye on Russia. Ironically, anything which distances germany from Russia will probably have him backing Germany overall (see what I mean about its all going to be an interesting balancing act in this TL, and of course there are always going to be things which will come back and bite various parties :)

[Kelenas]

Wasn't there actually a Naval Agreement with Britain, which Hitler then violated as he enlarged the Kriegsmarine?
Given that the new german leadership wants to make nice with Britain, they'll probably try to uphold that Agreement, even if only in retrospect, and get rid of some surplus ships/submarines. They might gather some points with the British or French here, if they suggest that some of the ships are handed over to the Allies, rather than scrapped, and could probably get some concessions out of it.
Not sure which ships - if any - would be handed over, and what concessions the allies might give in return, but it's something that crossed my mind.

- Kelenas

[Revolutionary Todyo]

Well they could hand over some submarines or maybe a few ridiculously big battleships.

In exchange for economic assistance?

[Eurofed]

Okay, I've rewritten the peace accords. Poland keeps extraterritorial access to Gydnia port facilities. Poles that are willing/suitable for Germanization aren't expelled from pre-1914 annexed territories. Britain and Germany reinstate the naval agreement, with submarines included. Germany patriates willing ethnic German minorities in France and Belgium. Preliminary talks are made about a mutual force reduction agreement on the German-French border.

I rather dislike the idea that Germany cedes parts of its fleets to the Entente. It looks too much like Versailles, it would bring back too many humiliating memories for the Germans.

I'd really prefer not to tamper with the existing timing of the TL, if it can be avoided.

Frankly, it seems a balanced peace treaty to me, given that Germans are sitting in Warsaw and the Entente is not exactly burning with desire to do the Great War remake.

[Astrodragon]

Okay, I've rewritten the peace accords. Poland keeps extraterritorial access to Gydnia port facilities. Poles that are willing/suitable for Germanization aren't expelled from pre-1914 annexed territories. Britain and Germany reinstate the naval agreement, with submarines included. Germany patriates willing ethnic German minorities in France and Belgium. Preliminary talks are made about a mutual force reduction agreement on the German-French border.

I rather dislike the idea that Germany cedes parts of its fleets to the Entente. It looks too much like Versailles, it would bring back too many humiliating memories for the Germans.

I'd really prefer not to tamper with the existing timing of the TL, if it can be avoided.

Frankly, it seems a balanced peace treaty to me, given that Germans are sitting in Warsaw and the Entente is not exactly burning with desire to do the Great War remake.

Given the circumstances, I'd say that was a treaty the Allies could sign. The longer term ramifications for them would be interesting - I would suspect that both France and Britain would keep their peacetime forces at a considerably higher level that pre-war, and the British will continue their naval modernisation and buildup. There would be lots of accusations of abandoning the Poles, but I dont think it would affect the intention to stop the war at all.

I agree Germany wouldnt hand over any ships, although they'd have to scrap some subs to comply with the treaty , but subs are a lot less emotive than battleships.

Are the Germans going to hand back to the (new) CZ any of the military gear they stole from them in 39? It would look good politically if they did, but youd have to fight the instinctive reaction of the Generals to giving up anything. In the longer term, it wouldnt matter much, getting rid of it would allow an easier to maintain military. A lot would depend on what was expected to happen in the next 6-12 months.

I cant remember from the original, but what about Italy? I cant see the allies being happy if treaties tie Germany to Italy so that they have to fight Germany again if Italy acts up...maybe insisting any treaty with Italy is defensive, so germany stays out of it unless Italy is attacked??

[Eurofed]

Given the circumstances, I'd say that was a treaty the Allies could sign. The longer term ramifications for them would be interesting - I would suspect that both France and Britain would keep their peacetime forces at a considerably higher level that pre-war, and the British will continue their naval modernisation and buildup.


Both are indeed quite likely (although there are also the ongoing German-French border force limitation talks, which are in French interest to pursue), although I expect that, as years go by, Entente military preparedness tends to shift from an anti-German to an anti-Soviet containtment as main justification (similar to what happened IOTL after WWII, but a swifter process, since the Entente and Germany ITTL have no compelling reasons for lingering animosity).


There would be lots of accusations of abandoning the Poles, but I dont think it would affect the intention to stop the war at all.


I don't think those accusations are going to get much appeal in the mainstream public (an analogy that would apply, I think, is accusations of abandoning Georgia in 2008, more or less).


I agree Germany wouldnt hand over any ships, although they'd have to scrap some subs to comply with the treaty, but subs are a lot less emotive than battleships.


Wholly agreed.


Are the Germans going to hand back to the (new) CZ any of the military gear they stole from them in 39? It would look good politically if they did, but youd have to fight the instinctive reaction of the Generals to giving up anything. In the longer term, it wouldnt matter much, getting rid of it would allow an easier to maintain military. A lot would depend on what was expected to happen in the next 6-12 months.


Well, Germany, Czechia, Slovakia, and Romania form an economic-defense union in 1940, the Berlin Pact, so a brisk trade, including weapons, is going to take place in next few years between Berlin and Prague. I indeed suppose Germany may gift CZ with some weapons and other economic gifts to sweeten the deal (a make-up gift to apologize for the occupation), it may be the original Czech-built stuff they stole in '39, it may be German brand-new stuff, the details are unimportant IMO. There is also the issue of the gold reserves germany stole as well in '39, my expectation is that Germany discreetly notifies CZ that they are not (yet) in the position to make any restitution about them, but they shall make something about it as their budget situation ameliorates over the years.


I cant remember from the original, but what about Italy? I cant see the allies being happy if treaties tie Germany to Italy so that they have to fight Germany again if Italy acts up...maybe insisting any treaty with Italy is defensive, so germany stays out of it unless Italy is attacked??

Indeed, as part of the 1940 round of diplomatic talks, Germany and Italy clarify that their alliance stands, but it has a defensive character. Which is acceptable to both powers and the Entente. Mussolini has built his own sphere of influence with Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bulgaria (the economic-defense Rome Pact) and settled irredentist claims in the East, so Italy is now closer to be a satisfied power. Mussolini no doubt would no doubt love to pull Greece in the Pact, which, if he learns to use sweets instead of threats, may just work, although there is bound to be some Bulgar-Greek friction, and annex some French stuff, which he recognizes is a folly to try, unless there is a new European conflagration.

Germany and Italy also make an economic treaty which may be a good basis for an economic union in the future, although this is not (yet) expanded to their respective Pacts (Italy does not want Germany to steal its newfound Balkan markets). This may change in the future if (when) German-Italian economc integration deepens. On the other side, as French-German detente progresses, some far-sighted fellow may notice that French and German economies, too, stand to gain a great deal from integration.

[Astrodragon]

Both are indeed quite likely (although there are also the ongoing German-French border force limitation talks, which are in French interest to pursue), although I expect that, as years go by, Entente military preparedness tends to shift from an anti-German to an anti-Soviet containtment as main justification (similar to what happened IOTL after WWII, but a swifter process, since the Entente and Germany ITTL have no compelling reasons for lingering animosity).



I don't think those accusations are going to get much appeal in the mainstream public (an analogy that would apply, I think, is accusations of abandoning Georgia in 2008, more or less).



Wholly agreed.



Well, Germany, Czechia, Slovakia, and Romania form an economic-defense union in 1940, the Berlin Pact, so a brisk trade, including weapons, is going to take place in next few years between Berlin and Prague. I indeed suppose Germany may gift CZ with some weapons and other economic gifts to sweeten the deal (a make-up gift to apologize for the occupation), it may be the original Czech-built stuff they stole in '39, it may be German brand-new stuff, the details are unimportant IMO. There is also the issue of the gold reserves germany stole as well in '39, my expectation is that Germany discreetly notifies CZ that they are not (yet) in the position to make any restitution about them, but they shall make something about it as their budget situation ameliorates over the years.



Indeed, as part of the 1940 round of diplomatic talks, Germany and Italy clarify that their alliance stands, but it has a defensive character. Which is acceptable to both powers and the Entente. Mussolini has built his own sphere of influence with Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bulgaria (the economic-defense Rome Pact) and settled irredentist claims in the East, so Italy is now closer to be a satisfied power. Mussolini no doubt would no doubt love to pull Greece in the Pact, which, if he learns to use sweets instead of threats, may just work, although there is bound to be some Bulgar-Greek friction, and annex some French stuff, which he recognizes is a folly to try, unless there is a new European conflagration.

Germany and Italy also make an economic treaty which may be a good basis for an economic union in the future, although this is not (yet) expanded to their respective Pacts (Italy does not want Germany to steal its newfound Balkan markets). This may change in the future if (when) German-Italian economc integration deepens. On the other side, as French-German detente progresses, some far-sighted fellow may notice that French and German economies, too, stand to gain a great deal from integration.

Given the lack of Hitler and some farsightedness on the various sides, this looks like a pretty reasonable deal for everyone (OK, the Poles get rather shafted, but in the long term its in germany's interests to be nicer to them).

The loser in the long term is, of course, Russia (oh, and Japan, who if they make a move in the Pacific will get curbstomped to an extent that made OTL look gentle). Now we have to see how aggressive and cunning Stalin can be, and what the Japanese are going to do now they really dont have any sane war options left...

[machine3589]

As far as I'm concerned, Congress Poland plus Curzon Line Austrian Poland is good enough for that purpose.

Well, there is a nice map I have which shows what the Germans wanted out of their eastern border. Hope it helps you define your version.

[Eurofed]

Well, there is a nice map I have which shows what the Germans wanted out of their eastern border. Hope it helps you define your version.

That map refers to the claims of a defeated Germany in 1919, and hence it is unsuitable to TTL, where Germans are sitting in Warsaw while they negotiate. What I would rather need is a map that shows the partition proposal of the Posen Province made by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848. I'm pretty sure the proposed border would rather rather more east than what the defeated Germans dared to claim in 1919.

As I said, I'm quite opposed to make Poland's lot any better than what I wrote, for various reasons, some of them shall be more clear with future updates.

(OK, the Poles get rather shafted, but in the long term its in germany's interests to be nicer to them).


This sane Germany has got from Poland what it wanted, and as of now would be quite happy to provide economic relief and a good neighbor policy, in the hope to pull Poland in its sphere of influence, but the Poles are spitting in their face. Trouble is, they find the Soviet marginally, but not too much, better, and they are also getting alienated with their previous Entente sponsors, as the latter get closer and closer to Germany. Poland is in a quite precarious position, their only real support in Europe their little league of losers with Yugoslavia (which is in a quite similar stance of resentful isolationism re Italy and the Entente) and Finland (which however only waits a nod from Germany to run in its arms). Of course, isolationism is not a sustainable course in the conditions of Poland and Yugoslavia, something has to give. We'll see what in the future.

[Eurofed]

During 1939 and 1940, Japan had followed the changes in the international situation with growing unease. Owing to Japanese invasion of China, the western democracies remained strongly hostile to Japan, with increasingly severe attempts to force Tokyo to give up China through economic warfare. Moreover, with the budding détente between the Entente and the fascist powers of Germany and Italy, it had lost the possibility of an alliance with Germany and Italy, or at least of easing the pressure of the Entente if they got embroiled in a conflict in Europe. Although some significant tension between the budding front of Germany, Britain, France, and Italy, on one side, and Soviet Union on the other side seemed to linger under the façade of general détente in Europe, few in Japan were able to tell whether this meant that a general war in Europe was still to be expected in the general future, or if the Soviet giant would turn its gaze on the Far East. After the Soviet-Japanese border war of 1938-39, which Japan had lost (even if very few Japanese would admit it), an uneasy de facto ceasefire had settled on the border of Manchukuo, even if Soviet diplomacy had gently rebuffed all Japanese feelers for a possible non-aggression pact. As a consequence, debate had raged for a while about the possible solution to the Japanese strategic impasse. True to the character of Japanese militarism, the most obvious solution (giving up total conquest of China, which was dragging more and more Japanese resources in a huge guerrilla quagmire, even if Japan and its Chinese puppets nominally controlled all of eastern China,) was flatly refused, and an alternative of aggressive options was debated. The classic “strike north” and “strike south” strategic options were on the table, which envisaged either a large-scale attack against the Soviet Union or the invasion of South East Asia and a war against the colonial powers of Britain, France, and Netherlands. Both options had very serious drawbacks, the war against the intact potential of the Soviet Union, which had proved recently proved superior in the test of the border war, or against the Anglo-French-Dutch, which could easily be supported by America, or, less likely, Germany and Italy (if not even both the US and the fascist powers).

However, the ongoing debate was suddenly cut short for Japan when, on 15 May, 1941, the Soviet Union started its strategic offensive in East Asia by attacking Japan and invading its puppet states of Manchukuo and China-Nanjing, as well as northwestern China, through the Soviet puppets of Mongolia and Xinjiang (the latter was nominally part of China, but de facto independent under the rule of pro-Soviet warlord Sheng Shicai). The Soviet offensive was supported by the stepped-up military activities of the Chinese Communist party, that controlled a de facto independent area (the Soviet Republic of China) in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia provinces. With the onset of the Soviet offensive, the CCP entity and its army broke the anti-Japanese alliance with Nationalist China and started a general offensive against both the Japanese and the KMT. The Soviet attack of course put a sudden end to all serious talk of “strike south” and the JIA scrambled to realign its resources to defend against the Soviet offensive. Pretty much from the start, it appeared that Japan was going to fight this war at a serious disadvantage. The Red Army retained the serious superiority in equipment and doctrine that it had allowed the victories in the border war, while the overconfident and hidebound JIA had done little to correct the flaws which that war had exposed. Over the summer, the Japanese forces were gradually but relentlessly pushed back, and the Red Army conquered northern Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, as well as the Qinghai region in western China. The JIA was hard-pressed to stop the Soviet onslaught, and its leaders shamefully admitted that in the current situation, Japanese control of southern Manchuria and northern China, if not Korea itself, was at dire risk. The Japanese empire could not manage the war with the USSR and Nationalist China at the same time (even if China was facing the same strategic dilemma), especially not with access to world trade curtailed by the western embargo. One of the two conflicts had to cease, or Japan risked to lose everything.

After much heated debate, the Japanese government reluctantly decided to send feelers to China and the western powers for a compromise peace. And luckily for Tokyo, the Soviet bold move and military success was prompting a reassessment in the other capitals, too. The KMT regime had always considered the Communists, not the Japanese, the worse long-term threat, and only the large scale Japanese invasion of 1937 had forced it to realign its priorities. But the Soviet attack was pushing Nationalist China to change its priorities again, Japan was apparently being pushed back, and the Soviet invasion in the west, as well as the CCP’s actions, left little doubt that the Soviets were making their own big bid for the control of China. So the KMT government was open-minded to a compromise peace with Japan, too, and its pleas for aid to the West against the Communists were quite loud. For the European powers and America, the Soviet offensive in the Far East on one side was a reassurance that, in the brief term, a Soviet general attack in Europe was unlikely, on the other side it indicated that Stalin’s expansionist ambitions went much deeper than just recovering the Tsarist Empire’s boundaries in Eastern Europe or even seeking a rematch with Japan about control of Manchuria. A Soviet Union that successfully seized control of China could easily turn and seek to do the same with Europe. In the European capitals and to a lesser degree, in America (American antipathy for Japan was still widespread for its long-standing strategic rivalry with the US in the pacific, as well as for the Sino-Japanese war), public opinion and the leaders really started to deem the USSR, not Japan or lingering distrust among the European powers, as the main threat and strategic concern.

Of course, it was the growing unspoken consensus among the Entente and the Axis powers, all previous plans of European balanced disarmament had to be quickly shelved and seriously reversed. Nonetheless, it was better if such rearmament was done in a way that would not harm the budding détente between the European powers, and if the economic burden could be ameliorated as much as possible. Urgent diplomatic talks were exchanged between Berlin, Rome, Paris, and London all over the second half of 1941 and early 1942, and in spring '42 their outcome was the Rome accords that established the European Defense and Economic League. The new organization created a customs union between Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the Benelux countries, as well as a defensive military alliance, mutual recognition and guarantee of status quo in Europe between the four powers and their spheres of influence, and a commitment to reciprocal consultation about military rearmament. Britain did not directly join the EDEL, owing to its imperial commitments, but it was an observer, as well as Portugal and the European clients of Germany and Italy. The recent experience of the Berlin and Rome pacts, and the German-Italian economic cooperation, had suggested the vast potential for economic development that a larger European economic cooperation could provide, easing, it was hoped, the burden of rearmament. However, concerns about losing their privileged trade status pushed Germany and Italy to stall the full adhesion of their clients to the EDEL (for the moment), even if they got observer status, and its defense guarantee covered them. Germany, France, and Italy agreed to shelve all plans for disarmament, and replace them with a partial and balanced force reduction on common borders. Consultations for a large build-up of land and air forces of the four powers were held, according to the new EDEL framework. A broad agreement to step up containment of Communist influence and subversion in Europe was affirmed. Following this policy, the French government picked the occasion of a Communist-led general strike to ban the French Communist Party.

As it concerned the situation in Asia, the Four-Power Pact (as the directory of Germany, Italy, France, and Britain was often called) expressed its interest to Japan and China to mediate a compromise and willingness to provide economic support if the former could be done. US President Farley (who had won the 1940 Dremocratic nomination and the Presidential election after the conservative wing of the Democratic party had mutinied against FDR and successfully stopped him from getting the nomination for an unprecedented consecutive third term by exposing the truth about his poor health) was less sympathetic to Japan but still expressed willingness to end all embargo measures against Japan if it accepted a compromise peace with China. With some difficulty, Farley got the Land-Lease Act passed in Congress which amended the Neutrality Acts and allowed the President to provide free US weapons and supplies to China.

In the fall of 1941, Japan and China signed a peace treaty, with the mediation and the concurrence of the Four-Power Pact and the USA. Japan agreed to pull its troops out of the areas it still occupied in central and southern China. Nationalist China provided an amnesty to the collaborationist forces of China-Nanjing, and integrated them in the KMT administration and army. China recognized the independence of Manchukuo and guaranteed Japan a privileged share of its own resources and markets (even if the Four Powers and the US were guaranteed to keep their own shares, too). All the powers recognized and guaranteed Japanese ownership of Korea and its sphere of influence in Manchukuo, and agreed to curb support for Korean independence. China and Japan became de facto allies against the Soviets and the Communists (even if they did not agreed to anything like an official alliance to minimize the political backlash to the KMT government), since Japan was allowed for the duration of the war to keep its forces deployed in China on the front with the Soviets and the CCP. The Four-Power Pact pledged to provide weapons, supplies, and economic support to Japan and China. America would do so only to China, although it pledged to open back its markets and resources to Japan.

The Sino-Japanese peace treaty allowed both Japan and China to redeploy their forces against the Soviets and the CCP forces, and none too late to prevent their total military collapse. Over the rest of 1941, the Soviets (although increasingly overextended) pressed on their offensive, and by the end of the year they had overrun southern Manchuria (putting an ironic twist to the Chinese recognition of Manchukuo, although Japan still placed some value in it, hoping in a future successful re-conquest), Hebei, Shanxi, Gansu, as well as Shaanxi, Henan, and Shandong. Sino-Japanese resistance stiffened, and the front stabilized at the Yalu river on the border of Korea, and on the line made by the Yellow River and its Wei affluent, in China. The Soviets, elated for the remarkable success of their offensive, exploited the pause in the operations to reorganize their overextended forces and their conquered territories. The CCP took control (under the watchful supervision of the Soviets, of course) of northern China, where Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. The Mongolian People’s Republic annexed Inner Mongolia. Xinjiang (with Qinghai and northern Gansu) and the non-Mongol areas of Manchuria were set up as independent Soviet puppet states, recognized by the PRC. Japan could however exploit its vast naval superiority to expel the Soviets out of northern Sakhalin and did so.

As he reviewed the course of the war and the international situation, Stalin had reason to be satisfied: the Far East strategic offensive had been a huge success, and even if the Japanese imperialists and the KMT reactionaries had been able to stabilize the front, it was understandable, given the overextension of Soviet forces late in the offensive. The capitalist powers had so far failed to intervene on behalf of Japan and the KMT, and the reports of Soviet intelligence indicated that for the moment they maintained a defensive stance in Europe. The Vozd felt confident enough to authorize STAVKA to increase mobilization level and forces deployment in the Far East theater in order to prepare for the 1942 operations. The strengthening of the capitalist powers’ front in Europe and its revamped rearmament were certainly a very serious concern for the future, but as long as they limited themselves to send weapons and money to the Japanese-KMT alliance, the Soviet Union (at least as long as it was busy in Asia) could deal with them by maintaining a strong defense in Europe, which was to be maintained for the coming year in the current conditions. A definitive decision about the strategic course in Europe would be taken after the war in the Far East was settled. Nonetheless, even if military options were ruled out for the moment, there might be something different that could done to improve the strategic stance of the Socialist Motherland and keep the imperialist bloc off balance. There may be a few chinks in the imperialist bloc’s armor that they had overlooked to cover, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, which the Soviet intelligence and the Komintern could exploit.

[Astrodragon]

Interesting...:)

One point about Europe, though.
By the POD, Britain and France are starting serious work on their nuclear programs. Given the idea in Germany that a bomb wasnt feasable, and the need to save money, it seems very likely that money will be withdrawn.
However will France keep its work going, in secret, with Britain? Both countries think a bomb is possible (if difficult), and both have reasons for wanting it - Britain as something that will enable them to reduce the size of their army (which they never want to keep large), and France as an ace in the hole if Germany proves not to be as cuddly as it seems to be right now.
However with peace apparently having broken out all over Europe, I cant see US work going forward at any speed (although obviously some, mainly theoretical, work will continue).

Indeed, with no interest in the US and Germany stopping its program, will Stalin think bombs are viable? Much of the information he got from western agents was helpled by the fact that the USSR was an ally at the time - its rather different now they are obviously not.

Not going to have any effect in the short term, but in a few years....

[Eurofed]

One point about Europe, though.
By the POD, Britain and France are starting serious work on their nuclear programs. Given the idea in Germany that a bomb wasnt feasable, and the need to save money, it seems very likely that money will be withdrawn.
However will France keep its work going, in secret, with Britain? Both countries think a bomb is possible (if difficult), and both have reasons for wanting it - Britain as something that will enable them to reduce the size of their army (which they never want to keep large), and France as an ace in the hole if Germany proves not to be as cuddly as it seems to be right now.


Take into account that Soviet expansionism is currently making Germany, France, Britain, and Italy do a hasty 180° turn about disarmament (and Goering and the generals' clique might easily be more confident than Hitler about the potential of the nuclear program), and future events are likely to make them even more determined about that stance. If (as it seems likely) the intra-European detente and cooperation deepens, we might well even see some amount of Anglo-German-French-Italian cooperation about the nuclear programs in the medium term.


However with peace apparently having broken out all over Europe, I cant see US work going forward at any speed (although obviously some, mainly theoretical, work will continue).


They might change their mind if China goes Red.


Indeed, with no interest in the US and Germany stopping its program, will Stalin think bombs are viable? Much of the information he got from western agents was helpled by the fact that the USSR was an ally at the time - its rather different now they are obviously not.


Of course, ITTL it also depends on how many spies the Soviets are able to keep around, when the Red Scare starts (in Britain and France, it's just taking off).

[The Red]

A nice twist on the old "Soviets take Manchuria as a consolation prize". Although I can't see a KMT/Japanese formal alliance, not after what the Japanese had done, it would be Jiangs political death.

[machine3589]

That map refers to the claims of a defeated Germany in 1919, and hence it is unsuitable to TTL, where Germans are sitting in Warsaw while they negotiate. What I would rather need is a map that shows the partition proposal of the Posen Province made by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848. I'm pretty sure the proposed border would rather rather more east than what the defeated Germans dared to claim in 1919.

Yeah, but this border has much stronger arguments in Germany`s favour then most of Posen. Even though Posen had been in Germany for a long time, it was hardly ever German. The border on my map clearly divides the parts that were significantly German from the strongly Polish parts. The only exception being the city of Posen, but if we go by that criteria, Lodz should be German as well.

[Eurofed]

Yeah, but this border has much stronger arguments in Germany`s favour then most of Posen. Even though Posen had been in Germany for a long time, it was hardly ever German. The border on my map clearly divides the parts that were significantly German from the strongly Polish parts. The only exception being the city of Posen, but if we go by that criteria, Lodz should be German as well.

Germany owned Posen for 126 years, never did Lodz. This matters. Germany successfully enforced most of the historical criteria. However, it makes the show of giving back some bits of the Posen Province, and the fact that it bases its solution on a classical proposal by a body with such liberal-democratic credentials as the Frankfurt Parliament (not Nazis or Junkers) carries its weight, too. So does the fact that they are descalating their claims from Hitler's much more impressive annexations, which also included Masovia, Lodz, western Lesser Poland. Hence they get most of Posen, but Lodz Germans are evacuated to the Fatherland.

In the end, the Entente is accustomed to see the 1914 border on a map, Poland is getting its access to the sea, the willingness to do a WWI remake to make the world safe for 1919 Poland is not just there.

[shillinger]

Germany owned Posen for 126 years, never did Lodz.

Technically, Prussia owned Posen for 126 years, not Germany. And it also owned Lodz for 14 years.

EDIT: I think this border is what you were looking for: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6c/Deutscher_Bund.png

[thrashing_mad]

I think that you have really poor understanding about Posen, and how important it was for Poland. Premise of this TL seems to be that this 'Hitler-less' Germany is more credible state, that Allies can negotiate with - right? Unfortunately, annexing Posen to expulse all Poles from there is pretty much continuation of Hitler`s aggressive policy. Where is logic in Allies accepting yet another German demands - given that they consequently breached all previous agreements, and right now they are actually at war?

[Eurofed]

Technically, Prussia owned Posen for 126 years, not Germany.


Irrelevant technicality even for the Entente.


And it also owned Lodz for 14 years.


That is one more reason why giving it back to Poland, free of Germans, is a worthwhile bargaining chip.


EDIT: I think this border is what you were looking for: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6c/Deutscher_Bund.png

Yup, I think so, thank you a lot for finding this out, :D although I think I shall enforce some balanced smoothing it out of the various salients to make the border a bit smoother and strategic-friendly.

[Eurofed]

I think that you have really poor understanding about Posen, and how important it was for Poland.


I am basing my decisions on a reasonable guess of how much facing a WWI remake to restore pre-war Poland is more vital (not) to the Entente than preventing such bloodshed with a reasonable compromise peace based on a time-honored historical criteria.


Premise of this TL seems to be that this 'Hitler-less' Germany is more credible state, that Allies can negotiate with - right? Unfortunately, annexing Posen to expulse all Poles from there is pretty much continuation of Hitler`s aggressive policy.


Population transfers to settle festering irredentistic disputes were much more acceptable back then than they are in the post-Holocaust world. The Entente had gone along with something of similar magnitude with Greece and Turkey two decades ago, apparently with very positive results as it concerned preventing further wars.


Where is logic in Allies accepting yet another German demands - given that they consequently breached all previous agreements, and right now they are actually at war?

The only really serious breach of Germany's word occurred about Czechia, and as a matter fact the new German leaders are backpedaling on that as part of the deal. The Entente really wants to wiggle out of this war, if it can be done at all. Hitler wanted the Entente to recognize his total annexation of Czechia and Poland to turn them into a Lebensraum playground, his successors ask to restore the Munich settlement and a time-honored historical border, with some substantial adjustments to molllify it (the partition of Posen province, the extraterritorial access to the sea), and a sensible population transfer to end future ethnic strife. The difference, in the Entente's eyes, is huge.

You know, all this Pole-centric whining is not really putting me in the right state of mind to give Poland any break in the future of the TL, quite the contrary.

[thrashing_mad]

I am basing my decisions on a reasonable guess of how much facing a WWI remake to restore pre-war Poland is more important to the Entente than making a reasonable compromise peace based on a time-honored historical criteria.

Yeah, but Posen was ethnically dominated by Poles, and Allies mostly used ethnicity of given region when drawing borders after WW1. So not sure how reasonable it is.

Population transfers to settle festering irredentistic disputes was much more acceptable back then than it is in the post-Holocaust world. The Entente had gone with something of similar magnitude with Greece and Turkey two decades ago, apparently with very positive results as it concerned preventing further wars. But Posen never really was German. Poles from Greater Poland had long tradition of insurgency which started right after partitions. Turkey and Greece exchanges happened due to geographical reasons - here it doesn`t work because region is directly connected with rest of Poland.

The only really serious breach of Germany's word occurred about Czechia, and as a matter fact the new German leaders are backpedaling on that as part of the deal. The Entente wants to wiggle out of the war, if it can afford it.Start of WW2 was most serious breach, when Allies finally realised that Hitler can`t be trusted.

You know, all this Pole-centric whining is not really putting me in the right state of mind to give Poland any break in the future of the TL, quite the contrary.Well, it`s your TL, but it`s posted on open forums. I just wanted to give you some feedback, so that next time you could design your German-wanks in more plausible manner. ;)

[Mulder]

I am basing my decisions on a reasonable guess of how much facing a WWI remake to restore pre-war Poland is more important to the Entente than making a reasonable compromise peace based on a time-honored historical criteria.



Population transfers to settle festering irredentistic disputes was much more acceptable back then than it is in the post-Holocaust world. The Entente had gone with something of similar magnitude with Greece and Turkey two decades ago, apparently with very positive results as it concerned preventing further wars.



The only really serious breach of Germany's word occurred about Czechia, and as a matter fact the new German leaders are backpedaling on that as part of the deal. The Entente really wants to wiggle out of this war, if it can be done at all. Hitler wanted the Entente to recognize his total annexation of Czechia and Poland to turn them into a Lebensraum playground, his successors ask to restore the Munich settlement and a time-honored historical border, with some substantial adjustments to molllify it (the partition of Posen province, the extraterritorial access to the sea), and a sensible population transfer to end future ethnic strife. The difference, in the Entente's eyes, is huge.

You know, all this Pole-centric whining is not really putting me in the right state of mind to give Poland any break in the future of the TL, quite the contrary.

Well, I don't think trashing_mads comments qualify as whining at all (unlike the ramblings of Hurgans latest sockpuppet) and I think his point has merit. Posen, unlike West Prussia or Upper Silesia, is a part of the Polish heartland, and losing it forever (which would be the result of any population exchange) would be very harsh to Poland and I don't think the Entente would be willing to accept it. While I don't think France and Britain would want to reenact WWI to keep the Corridor or the stolen bits of Upper Silesia Polish, Posen has a different quality. I mean, Germany wants something from the ENtente (peace), and I think the Entente will ask a price for it, and that price would be the release of Czechia in its post-Munich border and the release of Poland minus West Prussia and Upper Silesia. And if Germany insists on its historic claims to Posen, the Entente can still counter that with the equally invalid historic claim of Czechia to the Sudetenland. I mean, seriously, Germany does not need Posen. And even if the Entente would accept your scenario, it still has the side effect of turning Poland hardcore Sovietophile, since the SOviets only annexed lands where Polish claims were dubious at best and did not ethnically cleanse Polish core lands.

[thrashing_mad]

Well, I don't think trashing_mads comments qualify as whining at all (unlike the ramblings of Hurgans latest sockpuppet) and I think his point has merit. Posen, unlike West Prussia or Upper Silesia, is a part of the Polish heartland, and losing it forever (which would be the result of any population exchange) would be very harsh to Poland and I don't think the Entente would be willing to accept it. While I don't think France and Britain would want to reenact WWI to keep the Corridor or the stolen bits of Upper Silesia Polish, Posen has a different quality. I mean, Germany wants something from the ENtente (peace), and I think the Entente will ask a price for it, and that price would be the release of Czechia in its post-Munich border and the release of Poland minus West Prussia and Upper Silesia. And if Germany insists on its historic claims to Posen, the Entente can still counter that with the equally invalid historic claim of Czechia to the Sudetenland. I mean, seriously, Germany does not need Posen. And even if the Entente would accept your scenario, it still has the side effect of turning Poland hardcore Sovietophile, since the SOviets only annexed lands where Polish claims were dubious at best and did not ethnically cleanse Polish core lands.

That`s exactly my point.

[Eurofed]

Well, I don't think trashing_mads comments qualify as whining at all (unlike the ramblings of Hurgans latest sockpuppet)


I was thinking of Hurgan's unnerving ramblings that really PO me, when I complained about whining. Sorry to trashing_mads if it seemed I was lashing at him.


and I think his point has merit. Posen, unlike West Prussia or Upper Silesia, is a part of the Polish heartland, and losing it forever (which would be the result of any population exchange) would be very harsh to Poland and I don't think the Entente would be willing to accept it. While I don't think France and Britain would want to reenact WWI to keep the Corridor or the stolen bits of Upper Silesia Polish, Posen has a different quality. I mean, Germany wants something from the ENtente (peace), and I think the Entente will ask a price for it, and that price would be the release of Czechia in its post-Munich border and the release of Poland minus West Prussia and Upper Silesia. And if Germany insists on its historic claims to Posen, the Entente can still counter that with the equally invalid historic claim of Czechia to the Sudetenland. I mean, seriously, Germany does not need Posen. And even if the Entente would accept your scenario, it still has the side effect of turning Poland hardcore Sovietophile, since the SOviets only annexed lands where Polish claims were dubious at best and did not ethnically cleanse Polish core lands.

Make no mistake, I can see the sizable merit of your argument, but I also have my own story reasons to be hesitant to use the 1807 border, which otherwise would be fine. Poland's geopolitical alignment hangs in the balance, regardless of whether I let it keep Posen or not, and I would rather prefer not to place Soviet tanks west of Posen, if it can be avoided, regardless of whether Europe and the USSR go in Cold or Hot War mode in the next few years. Even the 1914 border is a big deal for Germany's nerves, if Poland goes in the Soviet bloc.

[Eurofed]

Ok, after some hard thinking, if it really, really makes you guys more comfortable with the TL, I suppose I can let Poland keep most of Posen, and partition the province of Posen according to the map that Machine3589 posted, more or less. Germany still gets whole West Prussia, however. I see no compelling reason to give Poland a salient east of Torun. This modified peace deal, as I see it, is very generous to Poland, given that they utterly lost the war, their claim to the Corridor and Upper Silesia was rather questionable to begin with, and they keep an extraterritorial access to the sea.

Now I have to keep Germany from freaking out too much if Poland goes to the Soviets. :(

[Astrodragon]

Ok, after some hard thinking, if it really, really makes you guys more comfortable with the TL, I suppose I can let Poland keep most of Posen, and partition the province of Posen according to the map that Machine3589 posted, more or less. Germany still gets whole West Prussia, however. I see no compelling reason to give Poland a salient east of Torun. This modified peace deal, as I see it, is very generous to Poland, given that they utterly lost the war, their claim to the Corridor and Upper Silesia was rather questionable to begin with, and they keep an extraterritorial access to the sea.

Now I have to keep Germany from freaking out too much if Poland goes to the Soviets. :(

Given Polands circumstances, this is quite generous.
Maybe Germany can angle it into some agreements from the allies if Poland starts lurching towards Russia, after all Chamberlain in particular isnt going to be happy about somethnig like that hapenning.
Of course, it does somewhat ruin the idea of using the German-Russian threat..:)
But whoever said diplomatic balancing acts were easy?:D

[Eurofed]

Maybe Germany can angle it into some agreements from the allies if Poland starts lurching towards Russia, after all Chamberlain in particular isnt going to be happy about somethnig like that hapenning.


This is more of a post-Poland issue, but it is already happening in the TL, with more slated to happen as the USSR expands its influence on the map.

In comparison to the Bolsheviks grabbing China, Germany's little sins in Central Europe are getting forgotten rather quickly (and the fact that they can be heaped on Hitler's tombstone helps a lot). The Entente is gradually turning to a full-fledged Cold War mindset, with all that entails (including the creation of the proto-EU, even if the political differences between the western democracies and the fascist regimes of course make any political integration impossible for the moment. However they replace it with military cooperation, and foreign policy is, to a degree, made similar by the drives of anti-Soviet containment) and future developments in Eastern Europe shall only seal that viewpoint for good. As to whether this TL sees a Cold War or it turns Hot, it mostly hangs in the choices of a Stalin giddy with success.

[Aranfan]

Two things:

1. The KMT would never ally with Japan. No. A truce while both separately focus on the Communists might be possible.

2. Your EU is moving way too fast. France and Germany are going to enter a monetary and customs union only a couple of months after they were at the brink of war with each other? Really?

[Eurofed]

1. The KMT would never ally with Japan. No. A truce while both separately focus on the Communists might be possible.


I've already revised that part to indicate that the KMT and Japan make a de facto alliance, not an official one. Officially, Nationalist China and Japan make peace and Japan withdraws its troops from eastern China, except alongside the front with the Soviets, where the KMT allows them to stay and fight for the duration of the war against Communism. Which is in China's best interest. Jiang always thought that Mao, not Japan, was the worst enemy. History has seen other examples of sworn enemies turned allies, e.g. Romania changing sides in late 1944.


2. Your EU is moving way too fast. France and Germany are going to enter a monetary and customs union only a couple of months after they were at the brink of war with each other? Really?

Actually, it is almost a couple years (end of phony war in early 1940, Rome accords by end of 1941). If you wish, I can push the Rome accords slightly later to spring 1942 (I'd prefer not later that that for story reasons), and limit them for the moment to a customs union and a defensive military alliance, with the monetary union scheduled to happen later. But there are good precedents in 1940 for an European monetary union (the Latin Monetary Union (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_Monetary_Union)), and this is meant to re-establish that kind of thing, a fixed exchange rate between national currencies, it is not (yet) anything like the euro. Moreover, in these two years, there have been a series of measures, like the border forces reductions, and the repatriation of German minority in Alsace, that have greatly diminished the bad blood between France and Germany. And as IOTL, fear of the Bear is the force that is driving the European powers together.

EDIT: done so, the proto-EU does not include a monetary union (yet) and its creation is moved to spring '42.

[Astrodragon]

Its going to interesting to see the British reaction.
Historically, Britain has always aided the weaker European faction to prevent anyone dominating Europe. Now is hapenned by collaberation, rather than conquest.
Given the Empire, I cant see the UK joining in anything, but I could see diplomatic and trade agreements. Britain could well be, in the initial phase of any shooting war between east and west, more in the position of the SA in OTL, the arsenal and help, as they wont have an army big enough to make huge impact. When and where they'd come in would depends a lot on what hapenned...

[Revolutionary Todyo]

Why is it that Britain always stays out of these continental alliances?

It doesn't make much sense to me, some economic strength and some of the largest armies on earth to compliment their navy. It looks win.

[Astrodragon]

Why is it that Britain always stays out of these continental alliances?

It doesn't make much sense to me, some economic strength and some of the largest armies on earth to compliment their navy. It looks win.

We dont. We wait until someone looks like dominating Europe, then pile in on the other side :D:D

We finally made one re Belgium, and look at all the trouble it caused.....:rolleyes:

[Revolutionary Todyo]

We dont. We wait until someone looks like dominating Europe, then pile in on the other side :D:D

We finally made one re Belgium, and look at all the trouble it caused.....:rolleyes:

Belgians have been nothing but trouble :mad:

But still, this organisation is designed to prevent anyone in Europe becoming too powerful. Plus it provides economic and defensive benifits. Why would you stay out of it?

[Astrodragon]

Belgians have been nothing but trouble :mad:

But still, this organisation is designed to prevent anyone in Europe becoming too powerful. Plus it provides economic and defensive benifits. Why would you stay out of it?

Because of the Empire.
Britain would certainly do trade deals with this new Euro block, but why should they do mnore? It would tie them down into a European strategy which forces a bigger army on them - that means they either have to break the economy with defence spending, or abandon the Empire. Not sensible from Britains POV.

However they would certainly take a most friendly interest in helping the group make Europe a peaceful place, thats in Britains interest, and if its attacked by Russia, expect first British arms/aid, followed possibly by a declaration of war.

Acting like the USA did in 1939 actualy makes a lot of sense for Britain, although the reasons are somewhat different.

[Revolutionary Todyo]

Why on earth would they need a bigger army? By joining this block they are joining three of the most powerful militaries on the planet (as I've mentioned). They can actually afford to reduce the army size now, knowing that they can rely on their allies for assistance.

Also we must remember old Winch (Churchill), who was a commited Europhile. If he gets in power, likely since we'll need an fire-brand for the coming war with Russia, then he may decide to tighten these European bonds.

This may also slow the inevitable decline of the empires as neither Britain or France will be invaded and ravished or end up in debt to the USA.

[JJDXB]

I've already revised that part to indicate that the KMT and Japan make a de facto alliance, not an official one. Officially, Nationalist China and Japan make peace and Japan withdraws its troops from eastern China, except alongside the front with the Soviets, where the KMT allows them to stay and fight for the duration of the war against Communism. Which is in China's best interest. Jiang always thought that Mao, not Japan, was the worst enemy. History has seen other examples of sworn enemies turned allies, e.g. Romania changing sides in late 1944.



Actually, it is almost a couple years (end of phony war in early 1940, Rome accords by end of 1941). If you wish, I can push the Rome accords slightly later to spring 1942 (I'd prefer not later that that for story reasons), and limit them for the moment to a customs union and a defensive military alliance, with the monetary union scheduled to happen later. But there are good precedents in 1940 for an European monetary union (the Latin Monetary Union (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_Monetary_Union)), and this is meant to re-establish that kind of thing, a fixed exchange rate between national currencies, it is not (yet) anything like the euro. Moreover, in these two years, there have been a series of measures, like the border forces reductions, and the repatriation of German minority in Alsace, that have greatly diminished the bad blood between France and Germany. And as IOTL, fear of the Bear is the force that is driving the European powers together.

EDIT: done so, the proto-EU does not include a monetary union (yet) and its creation is moved to spring '42.

I do not think it is moving too fast. The EEC was founded on the premise that Europe (at least western) would be too large economically to become puppet states to either sides of the Cold War. It was in effect, to avoid being trampled out by the larger armies and industries of the US and USSR. With the USSR ITTL very much acting like a warmonger, the individual W.European countries couldn't hope to win a war against the USSR individually, so they create this alliance to ensure that if it ever happens, ITTL EU will be able to respond. It was born out of necessity, just like the EU OTL

[Astrodragon]

Why on earth would they need a bigger army? By joining this block they are joining three of the most powerful militaries on the planet (as I've mentioned). They can actually afford to reduce the army size now, knowing that they can rely on their allies for assistance.

Also we must remember old Winch (Churchill), who was a commited Europhile. If he gets in power, likely since we'll need an fire-brand for the coming war with Russia, then he may decide to tighten these European bonds.

This may also slow the inevitable decline of the empires as neither Britain or France will be invaded and ravished or end up in debt to the USA.

Because the other powers are going to insist on a military contribution that includes an army of more than token size. Which was one of the reasons making treaties was an issue in the 30's.
Remember, Britain also has worlwide commitments around the world. If ANY army is demanded by Europe (and it will be), a serious increase is needed.
They cant reduce the army size, it isnt decided by the needs of Europe, its decided by the needs of the Empire. Britain (particularly in 1940), is NOT a European state, and trying to make it one will cause serious domestic political problems.
Even an alliance expecting British sea and air power alone is an issue - what happens if Japan starts getting aggressive in the Pacific?

[Revolutionary Todyo]

1) Why is a large army being demanded? Britains strategy for European wars has always been a small army, a large navy, and a powerful land based ally. I think that France, Germany and Italy can respect this due to the fact Britain is providing a truely global sphere of influence as well as an alternate front for war with Russia.

2) If the army size is decided by the empire then surely the army will still be reduced, and the empire will still decline? Remember, the Great War still happened and the empire is on the way down.

3) True, the British people may see themselves as British first but it will be the same in Germany. After all they have just had the notion of their greatness hammered into their skull by the old Nazi regime, they could take years to get rid off it. Besides this organisation sounds more like a European League of Nations, and if it brings stability then why wouldn't they at least accept it?

4) Is Japan likely to start another war after losing the one with Russia? Also this alliance could deter Japan especially since the USA is likely to join in this Euro-Japanese gang bang.

[Eurofed]

Besides this organisation sounds more like a European League of Nations,

It is part that, but it is also akin to an early EEC and to an European NATO. The element that is noticeably absent is supranational political integration like the EU, it is wholly geared to intergovernmental cooperation and integration. There would be little point otherwise, given the extensive political differences between democracies like France and Benelux, fascist regimes like Italy and Spain, and the neo-Kaiserreich hybrid that Germany has become. This shall likely change in the very long term if/when all the European members return to full democracy.


4) Is Japan likely to start another war after losing the one with Russia? Also this alliance could deter Japan especially since the USA is likely to join in this Euro-Japanese gang bang.

Like many other issues, this also revolves on whether the big fight between Russia and the Euros stays Cold or goes Hot, and if the latter happens, whether it happens while the Far Eastern War is still raging or not. Japan, at the moment, is getting weapons, supplies, and economic support from the Euros, and the USA has made its own markets and commodities available again, so Tokyo is ATM friendly with the western powers.

Regardless of how the war ends (likely not well for Japan and China, unless the Euros or America joins it, but with Western support, they might avoid total defeat), if rational minds prevail in Tokyo, they would remain a part of the budding anti-Soviet Euro-Japanese alliance, and reap the economic benefits its entails. If Russia wins the war, and psychos get the upper hand in Tokyo, it could do something like the OTL rampage. This would the worst case for Japan. Best case would be if Stalin stumbles in war with Europe while Japan remains friendly to the latter.

America is ATM still isolationist, although it has lifted the embargoes to Japan and is sending Land-Lease to China. It is quite happy with the formation of the Euro bloc, and is reassessing Russia as the worst threat to peace instead of Japan. It is so far the power less likely to join a conflict, although if a conflict starts in Europe, it would certainly support the Euros with Land-Lease.

[Revolutionary Todyo]

Thank you EuroFed.

So do you see any realistic reason why the Uk would stay out of the FPP?

[Eurofed]

So do you see any realistic reason why the Uk would stay out of the FPP?

You mean the Four-Power Pact ? It is a full member, the FPP is the informal diplomatic directory of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. It is distinct from the EDEL, which a a formal European economic-military-diplomatic cooperation/integration organizion of the continental powers. In it, Germany, France, Italy call the shots, Benelux and to a lesser degree Spain are the influential minors, other states like Portugal, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Romania have picked an observer status or hover nearby like Finland and Greece, but have not (yet) got full membership for various reasons. This may (quickly) change in the future when the Communists make more mess. Ireland, the Scandinavian states, and Turkey are perhaps interested, but have taken no stance yet. Poland and Yugoslavia stay out in isolationist resentment, and this does not bode well for their political-economic stability and with a Russia increasingly turned bold on the world stage by success in Asia.

As it concerns Britain, it has picked an observer seat and not full membership, precisely because of the worldwide strategic and economic committments to its Empire, like Astrodragon mentioned. It is quite supportive of the EDEL, but it wants to be left free to adjust its committments to Europe to suit its imperial responsibilities. However, as it concerns the policy towards the USSR, America, China, and Japan, the Euro Big Four are more or less acting in fairly good agreement. As it concerns the part that Britain would play in the possible coming war with Russia, strategic planning is ATM in flux for the Euro powers. They are shifting their strategic planning from an intra-european war betwen former Entente and Axis powers, to a Pan-European anti-Soviet war, possibly a world war vs. Russia and Red China (they hope that Japan has been pushed by Soviet expansionism into being an asset and not a threat, and hat it can stop total Communist takover of East Asia, but they can't be sure). There is a great deal of rearmament being done (improving their resources to afford it is one of the reasons they have started European economic integration in earnest). And stuff like the T-34s has scared the beejus out of Euro observers, the Red Army has grown in many aspects even much stronger than they expected given its Winter War previous performance, so there is a scramble to modernize weapons as well.

To recoup, the FPP is like an Euro G7, EDEL is like an Euro LoN/EEC/NATO hybrid. Britain belongs in the former, is associate but not full member in the latter. Whether this setup is going to change in the long term, too early to tell. It depends on many things, such as if TTL is going to see a Cold War or a WWII, the pace of decolonization and democratization in Europe, etc.

[Eurofed]

The international situation during early ’42 was largely dominated by the creation of EDEL, which structured the growing détente of the last two years between the former Entente and Axis powers into a powerful new economic and military European bloc, led by Germany, France, and Italy. Britain, although it picked the role of friendly associate to the EDEL (which was formalized by Britain getting an observer seat), opted out of full membership, since the British Empire bound it to extensive economic and military commitments outside of Europe. The growing threat of Soviet warmonger expansionism had bound the previously bickering Euro powers together, as well as the realization that the conflicts and peace settlements of ’36-’40 had created a situation where, in the presence of a perspective common enemy, greater benefits could be achieved by economic and military cooperation between equals than by further all-out intra-European imperialistic conflict and competition.

The other main event was the restart of large-scale military operation in the Far Eastern War after the relative lull in winter ‘41-‘42. An increased amount of Soviet forces had been deployed to the Far Eastern theater, to make do for the longer front and the extensive garrison duties of occupied northern China. Although the CCP regime was getting some serious popularity from the reforms it implemented in conquered areas, it also reaped substantial enmity as well given its obvious nature as a puppet of the Soviets, which dealt just as brutally with resistance to their rule as the JIA had done. At the review done by the STAVKA, the Red Army had performed more than adequately during the last year’s offensive, although some significant flaws remained. Japan had been dealt a very serious and humbling blow by the Red Army, but restored full access to the world markets, and European supplies were helping to redress the balance to a degree. Euro weapons were being deployed and proved to be less inferior to Soviet ones than Japanese homebrew ones in many cases. However, European military observers, which had been sent to the conflict in sizable numbers, were astonished to the effectiveness of certain Soviet equipment and doctrines, and their reports spurred a great deal of effort back home to adapt EDEL armies. At the same time, they struggled to persuade the hidebound JIA officers to modernize their land doctrines to match the Soviet ones. As it concerned Nationalist China, corruption, the controversial nature of the de facto alliance with Japan, and obvious military inferiority to the Soviets remained its damning weak points. However, the peace with Japan had allowed it to refocus its (limited) military potential against the Communists, and some assets had been recovered by the integration of the former pro-Japanese collaborationists. Much more importantly, China had again unrestrained access to the world, and the Euros and America were now pouring economic support (which allowed to restrain previous rampant inflation to a serious degree), weapons, supplies, and counselors. The latter struggled to put Chinese troops into a shape adequate to fight the Soviets, as well to prod the KMT to curb corruption.

In the end, the military balance still favored the Soviets, but not overwhelmingly so as at the start of the war. As a consequence, the new Soviet-CCP strategic offensive allowed the Communists to break the Yellow River-Wei and the Yalu defensive lines, and to advance into central China, but with serious effort and casualties, and the KMT-Japanese resistance got noticeably stiffer and more effective as time went on. In the Korean front, the Soviets were able to break out from the Yalu, but the Japanese fell back to a new, stronger defensive line across the waist of the Korean peninsula, between Chongju and Hamhung, and all Soviet efforts during the rest of ’42 were unable to break it. In mainland China, the Communist offensive achieved a strategic breakthrough of the the Yellow River-Wei line, and it poured into central China, but increasingly effective and stubborn Sino-Japanese resistance delayed and fought on its advance enough that by the end of the year, the front stabilized again on the Yangtze river, despite a last-ditch Soviet offensive, before the need for reorganization imposed another operational pause.

In the last part of the year, the effects became apparent of the large-scale Communist infiltration-subversion operation that Soviet intelligence and the Komintern had started to keep the Euro powers harried. Extensive support had been provided to Communist and “progressive” nationalist movements in the European colonial empires, and as a result, anti-colonial revolts exploded in French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. Even the British Raj was not immune from the turmoil. Although the Indian anti-colonial movement during the ‘30s had been firmly under the leadership of the moderate parties of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, enough dissatisfaction lingered with the limits of the constitutional system given to India with the Government of India Act 1935 to create a political space to the radicals. Communist support was directed to the Forward Bloc faction of the INC, lead by Subhas Chandra Bose, that broke rank with the Congress Party and created Azad Hind as a pro-Soviet revolutionary pro-independence organization. An increasing amount of unrest, with riots, strikes, and anti-British guerrilla swept India as well at the hands of Azad Hind, with generous support by the Soviets. The Communist subversion offensive affected Europe as well. Communist organizations had been wiped out to a clandestine fringe by police repression in Germany, Italy, Spain, the eastern European clients of Germany and Italy, and, since the banning of the PCF, France as well, or marginalized by increasingly hostile public opinion in Britain and the Benelux. However, since the German-Polish War and the 3rd Balkan War, Poland and Yugoslavia had set themselves apart in Europe, in bitter isolationist resentment against the Axis powers that had defeated them as well as against the Entente powers that had failed to rescue them. Growing cooperation between those two blocs had only enhanced their isolation, and added up to the economic woes created by defeat. This created a fertile field for socio-political instability, which Communist agents set down to exploit. Besides vanilla Communist political activism, Soviet agents fostered the re-creation of Pan-Slav pro-Russian nationalist organizations in Poland and Yugoslavia, which proved fairly successful at infiltrating many stratus of society, including the army. Due to the long-standing ties between the Russians and the Bulgarians, this Pan-Slav movement proved remarkably effective at infiltrating Bulgaria as well, despite its ties with the EDEL.

At the beginning of 1943, this ensued into a series of pro-Soviet coups and revolutionary uprisings by Communist/Pan-Slav nationalist fronts in Bulgaria, Poland, and Yugoslavia. In Bulgaria, the coup/uprising was fully successful after a few days of fighting. The revolutionary junta ousted the king and the pro-Italian ruling elite, withdrew the country from the EDEL, and opened its border to Soviet troops for “protection”. In Poland and Yugoslavia, however, anti-Soviet elements were able to rally together an effective resistance against the Communist/Pan-Slav coup/uprising, and both countries quickly fell into civil war. Both the Soviets and Britain/EDEL rushed to supply weapons and supplies to either sides, while debate raged in the four Euro powers whether direct military intervention in the Polish and Yugoslav civil wars was warranted. Germany denounced the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia, and the EDEL plus Britain issued a declaration by which they warned that further acts of Communist military aggression and subversion in Europe and Asia would be answered with “extreme forcefulness”. EDEL cooperation was enhanced by the creation of an integrated High Staff, and a monetary union (a fixed exchange rate between national currencies), and Britain upgraded its strategic planning talks with the EDEL powers. Portugal, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Romania, Finland, and Greece were admitted to the EDEL as full members in relatively short order (Finland joined the German sphere of influence and Greece the Italian one, while Portugal kept its British satellite status), while Turkey as well expressed its interest.

In Europe and America, the Red Scare was at full swing, fueled by the Soviet advances in China, anti-colonial unrest in Asia, and Communist expansion in Eastern Europe, as the governments rushed to crack down on real or supposed Soviet espionage and Communist infiltration. European leaders and public opinion still debated whether, in the light of the situation in Asia and Europe, containment by generous support to local anti-Communist forces and belligerents or “rollback” direct military intervention in eastern Europe and China, repression or reforms in the colonies, was the correct course. In America, public opinion was shifting in earnest to deem Communist expansion, not Japan or the bickering between the European powers, the worst threat to peace, although the country remained bound to isolationism and only a fringe advocated military intervention in China. US President Farley prevailed on isolationist and anti-Japanese opinion in Congress to have the Neutrality Acts amended to allow the “cash and carry” sale of war material to Japan, as long as it arranged for the transport using their own ships and paid immediately in cash, and Land-Lease to China was increased. Britain and the EDEL were guaranteed full access to Land-Lease in case of a conflict in Europe.

In the USSR, Stalin and its aides had motives for optimism as well. Although the ’42 offensives had reaped less extensive success than the previous year, the Socialist front now controlled half of China, and the Japanese imperialists and the KMT reactionaries had been pushed back further, although with rather more effort than expected, due to logistic overextension and the cursed meddling of the European and American capitalists. It was expected that as the Chinese Communist regime took root in northern and central China, it would be able to provide more contribution to the war effort. The operations of Soviet intelligence and the Komintern in Asia and Eastern Europe had kept the European capitalist powers off-balance, allowing the Socialist Motherland to advance its strategic standing. However the conflicts in Eastern Europe and Asia were yet not won for the Socialist front, and various options were available, in the face of the growing solidity of the European-Japanese bloc. An all-out effort to conquer southern China and/or kick the Japanese out of Korea ? Continue ongoing support to the pro-Soviet forces in Poland, Yugoslavia, India, and South East Asia ? Direct military intervention in the Eastern European civil wars, or even an all-out strategic offensive in Europe ? The Red Army had completed its multi-year expansion and modernization program, and with assimilation of the lessons from the Far Eastern War, STAVKA planners reported that the Socialist Motherland could now afford an all-out offensive in Asia to crush Japan and the KMT while maintaining strategic defensive in Europe, or a general strategic offensive in Europe while shifting on the defensive in the Far East, but a two-front war was a big risk.

Finishing the war in Asia and bringing whole China and its resources in the Socialist camp seemed like the most obvious option, although the growing compactness of the capitalist bloc in Europe worried Stalin. The wimps had done little more than giving weapons and money to the enemies of the Socialist Motherland and striking down anti-imperialist revolts in Asia so far, but would they find the spine to do more in the future with their ongoing rearmament, maybe backstabbing the USSR while it was busy in Asia ? Would a pre-emptive attack in Europe the way to triumph or too much of a risk, and was it better to wait and finish the job in East Asia, building up Socialist China as an strong asset to the Motherland, or call it a day with half of China, and shift to Europe ? Peace or war in Europe and Asia, the decision was largely in the hands of the Red Tsar.

[Brasidas]

Finishing the war in Asia and bringing whole China and its resources in the Socialist camp seemed like the most obvious option, although the growing compactness of the capitalist bloc in Europe worried Stalin. The wimps had done little more than giving weapons and money to the enemies of the Socialist Motherland and striking down anti-imperialist revolts in Asia so far, but would they find the spine to do more in the future with their ongoing rearmament, maybe backstabbing the USSR while it was busy in Asia ? Would a pre-emptive attack in Europe the way to triumph or too much of a risk, and was it better to wait and finish the job in East Asia, building up Socialist China as an strong asset to the Motherland, or call it a day with half of China, and shift to Europe ? Peace or war in Europe and Asia, the decision was largely in the hands of the Red Tsar.


Even taking Stalin's irrationality as a given, I'd lose a chunk of suspension of disbelief if the SU went whole hog into military adventures in europe at this point.

It's got a substantial, winnable land war going on in asia, with a huge chunk of its forces tied up. If they can pile their way down to Indochina, they're set up to hold down everything, improve their ability to intervene in southeast asia and perhaps India, and realign a substantially larger and combat-experienced army against europe.

At minimal cost. While cooperation improves apace among the major european powers, and their observers are making err.. productive observations, they're not exactly going to be deploying a couple hundred divisions on the Polish border.

[Eurofed]

Even taking Stalin's irrationality as a given, I'd lose a chunk of suspension of disbelief if the SU went whole hog into military adventures in europe at this point.

It's got a substantial, winnable land war going on in asia, with a huge chunk of its forces tied up. If they can pile their way down to Indochina, they're set up to hold down everything, improve their ability to intervene in southeast asia and perhaps India, and realign a substantially larger and combat-experienced army against europe.

At minimal cost. While cooperation improves apace among the major european powers, and their observers are making err.. productive observations, they're not exactly going to be deploying a couple hundred divisions on the Polish border.

This is, of course, quite correct and the rational course. I'm just giving due coverage to Stalin's paranoia in the Soviet PoV. I agree that in all likelihood, the SU is not going to contemplate major military adventures in Europe until it has finished the job in Asia (The STAVKA warns Stalin against risking a two-front war). If a war starts in Europe before then, it's because the civil wars in Eastern Europe escalate out of control, after Euro and Soviet intervention, which is pretty possible at this point. The pro-Soviet coups/uprisings in Bulgaria, Poland, and Yugoslavia, as well as the unrest in the colonies, have fairly freaked out the Euros.

[Eurofed]

As I contemplate the future course of the TL, I could use some advice:

If the SU-CCP conquer all of mainland China, where would the KMT diaspora go ? Taiwan is Japanese ITTL, and protected against the Soviets by IJN superiority, so they can't go there.

As above, is the SU is victorious in mainland China, would they press for total conquest of Korea, too, or would they offer Japan a compromise peace, and would Japan accept or refuse it (if the Soviets conquer Korea, the war is effectively over due to a strategic stalemate) ?

How do you expect the civil wars in Poland and Yugoslavia to turn out ? I am open-minded to all kinds of outcomes, White victory, Red victory, a partition/division sponsored by the Euros and Soviets. I only want to have the same outcome turn out in both countries for story reasons.

The big issue if of course whether Europe and Stalin remain locked in Cold War or start *WWII after the war in China is over. I can see both outcomes having roughly equal chances. I try to keep Stalin's paranoid craziness balanced with rational opportunism, but I think that with Red China in his pocket with relatively little effort, a defeated Japan, an intact Russia, and no nukes in sight, he easily may well have the balls to try conquest of Europe.

I'm roughly assuming that Euro, American, and Soviet nuclear projects could be started after the Soviets conquer China.

[Kelenas]

One of the western powers might offer the KMT asylum; the French in Indochina, or the British in Singapore, for example, for various reasons.

Regarding Korea, I don't see the Soviets simply stopping there without good reason. My guess is that they'd at least try to take it, though various circumstances (logistics, shorter front where their numerical superiority is less of a factor, the IJN) might force them to stop.

The civil wars... dunno. If both powers (Europeans and Soviets) support their chosen side, I could see the wars turning into long, drawn-out and bloody affairs, that would end either inconclusive, or perhaps with a marginal victory for the Whites (the European powers simply have a larger industrial base than the USSR, not to mention that they don't have to prop up a new puppet regime in China).
But at the same time, I could also see the civil wars as the spark that sets off *WW2 between the Europeans and the Soviets, by spilling over the borders. Even against Stalins wishes or plans.

- Kelenas

[Eurofed]

I had forgotten, how do you see the anti-colonial unrest in India, Indochina, Indonesia turn out after China turns Red ?

[Kelenas]

Not all that different, yet, to be honest. The CCP will be busy for several years trying to bring order into its own house, and the USSR already has a lot on it's plate. They might drop off some shipments of weaponry for insurgents there now and then, to keep things simmering, but for the moment I think'd they place higher priorities on the civil wars in Poland and Yugoslavia.

- Kelenas

[Brasidas]

One of the western powers might offer the KMT asylum; the French in Indochina, or the British in Singapore, for example, for various reasons.

There's the historical retreat of the Third Army, into Burma and northern Thailand. The last evacuation of it to Taiwan didn't happen until 1961. http://kmtchiangmai.com/history_en3.html

Thailand's not going to be a defeated belligerant at this point (so no KMT forces are likely to wander in there), but Burma's firmly in British hands here. That's where I'd put the KMT.

Indochina's got a bit of a history with China, and the locals may be more militantly against forces retreating there. Then again, you can create a cassus belli for the expansion of the war.

Purely by Chinese forces, without puppet strings to the Soviets, of course :).

[The Red]

Just don't let this guy advise Stalin and all will be fine.

http://www.aeropause.com/wordpress/archives/images/2009/07/cc_screen_kane.jpg

[Eurofed]

Errata: All existing TL references to Walther von Reichenau as a leader of post-Nazi Germany are hereby revised to mean Walther von Brauchitsch instead.


The civil wars in Eastern Europe initially seemed bound to turn out into fairly long, drawn-out, and most bloody affairs, largely resembling the Spanish Civil War that had occurred the previous decade, as both the European powers and the Soviets poured out abundant support to the respective sides they supported. Shortly after their explosion in Poland and Yugoslavia, a similar situation developed in Romania, too. Although that country was bound to the EDEL, Comintern infiltrators exploited lingering nationalist frustration within Romanian society for the loss of Northern Transylvania to stir up an anti-EDEL wing of Romanian nationalism that blamed European powers for the territorial losses that Romania had suffered. Much like it has happened with Poland and Yugoslavia, those nationalists were used by Romanian Communists as allies to stage a pro-Soviet insurrection. The anti-Communist and pro-European forces within Romanian society backed the government against the rebels, and the country was driven to the third civil war in Eastern Europe.

Over time, however, it appeared that the White fronts were gradually getting the upper hand in Poland and Romania, thanks to greater support for the anti-Communist cause among the Polish and Romanian peoples. To many Poles and Romanians, the Red fronts, although they ostensibly sported significant Pan-Slav or nationalist elements, appeared little more than a pawn of the Soviets to establish Russian domination over their countries, and there was widespread resentment against the Soviets for their previous invasions and grabbing of the Kresy and Bessarabia. Although the German-Polish and Hungarian-Romanian wars had created a significant amount of bad blood in Poland and Romania towards the European powers, if forced to a choice many Poles and Romanians still preferred their countries to be clients of the EDEL than vassals of Stalin. Over 1943, therefore, the White Polish and Romanian fronts, with the plentiful support of the EDEL, gradually gained momentum despite the best efforts of the Reds and Soviet support to them, till by early 1944, the Polish and Romanian civil wars were essentially won by the Whites. Only a few pockets of disorganized and demoralized Red forces remained that crossed the Polish-Soviet and Romanian-Soviet borders to seek refuge into Soviet territory.

In Yugoslavia, the civil war turned out to be a much more balanced conflict, since the Yugoslav peoples were more divided in their attitudes towards Communism, the USSR, and the European powers. Over time, however, a different prevailing alignment of the various ethnic groups seemed to emerge, with the Serbs giving greater support to the Red front and the Croats and Bosnian Muslims swinging more to the White side, even if there were plenty of Serb people among the White forces and of Croats-Bosnians among the Red forces. The conflict took a rather savage dimension, as plenty of atrocities occurred on both sides, also because of the emerging ethnic antagonism to latch onto and fuel the political divide. It spilled over to areas of Croatia, as the Serbian community took up arms to support their Bosnian brethren, which moved the Croat government forces to crack down the insurgency and intervene directly in Bosnia. Over 1943, the confused fighting gradually evolved to the emergence of definite front-lines, as the Red front gained the upper side and eventually the largely undisputed control in Serbia, Montenegro, and eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the White front, with the support of the Croat forces, did the same in western-central Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Croatian Krajina and Slavonian Krajina regions of Croatia.

This was helped by, and in turn caused, large-scale population displacement and ethnic cleansing that occurred because of the increasing ethnic-antagonism character of the civil war. The Serb community largely fled the areas held by the Whites and Croats, while the Croats and Bosnian Muslims did the same with the areas controlled by the Red and Pan-Slav forces. By late ’43-early ‘44, a definite front-line and eventually a military stalemate and something close to a de facto truce had emerged between the two sides on a line running through Bosnia close to Tuzla and Sarajevo. The region controlled by the Reds (Serbia, Montenegro, and eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina) was set up as the Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia, ruled by a “popular front” controlled by the Communist party, that aligned with the Soviet bloc, while western-central Bosnia, controlled by the Whites, successfully petitioned for annexation to Croatia. Poland joined the EDEL and, reluctantly, the German sphere of influence.

Stalin was not really pleased by the course that the civil wars in Eastern Europe were taking, but with a major war still running in East Asia, which tied up a quite large portion of the Red Army, there was no helping, since a two-front general war was deemed too risky. Therefore, it was resolved to make a supreme effort and bring the war with Japan and Nationalist China to a successful conclusion before anything radical was done in Europe. After the usual winter operational pause, the Red Army, supported by Chinese Communist forces, unleashed a major strategic offensive on both the Korean and Yangtze fronts.

The Japanese defensive line across the “neck” of the Korean peninsula buckled but held, although it pushed the IJA to reinforce the front in Korea at the expense of the Chinese one. In China, the Yangtze line saw a robust and valid Japanese resistance, but the KMT forces, still of inferior quality despite ongoing Western efforts to improve their level, gave up in several points of the Yangtze defensive line, allowing the Communist forces to achieve a multiple strategic breakout. The Japanese had insufficient strategic reserves to plug the breaks, owing to the resources redeployed to reinforce the Korean front, and the Yangtze defensive line collapsed, allowing the Red Army and its CCP allies to overrun central China. Japanese-KMT frantic attempts in the following months to rebuild effective defensive positions in southern China failed, their efforts hampered by the Soviet numerical superiority and the collapse of morale among KMT forces.

Logistical overextension was the only main check to the pace of the Soviet-CCP strategic offensive, but it was a temporary stopgap: Nanjing, Shanghai, and Wuhan fell to the Soviets with the provinces of Sichuan, Chongqing, southern Hubei and Anhui, and Zhejiang in July-August ’43. By October-November, the renewed Soviet fall offensive overrun most of southern China, with the conquest of the provinces of Guizhou, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Fujian. The KMT government retreated to Canton, which fell with the rest of Guangdong and Guangxi in December ’43-January ’44. The Japanese forces in southern China kept fighting a stubborn rearguard battle, but were eventually forced to re-embark. They kept control of the Hainan island, which, like Taiwan, was beyond Soviet reach thanks the naval supremacy of the IJN. The remaining KMT forces largely redeployed to Hainan, which became the seat of the Nationalist Chinese government. The rest retreated to the Yunnan province (which remained under partial Nationalist control for some years, as diehard KMT elements kept fighting a guerrilla war against the CCP government in the region) and through it, into Burma, where the British authorities welcomed them.

However, for all ends and purposes, the Soviets and their CCP vassals had effectively accomplished the conquest of mainland China, a quite impressive feat which was lavishly celebrated by Soviet propaganda as another landmark accomplishment of the Communist movement after the Russian Revolution and the fruit of Stalin’s leadership and military genius. Much as emboldened the Communists worldwide, it stroke fear and anger in the hearts and minds of the anti-Communist international public opinion, and it greatly alarmed the governments and public opinions of the European powers, the USA, and the British Dominions, where a fair deal of recrimination took place about how China had been “lost” to the Bolsheviks. Although China was left in a quite weak state by its own long-standing, deep economic and technological backwardness and by decades of domestic strife and repeated foreign invasions, in the long term it had the potential to grow much stronger and be a quite powerful resource to back the power of the Soviets. It also meant that the USSR would be in a much better strategic position to project its influence in the Indian subcontinent and in South East Asia. This fact was not lost to the British government, which ordered its own forces to occupy Tibet, which became a British protectorate and swiftly declared its independence from China. This action was mirrored by a similar one in the Balkans, where Italy, deeming Communist control of the Montenegrin coast a strategic threat, occupied Montenegro with its own troops and expelled the DRY forces. Montenegro was soon set up as an independent Italian satellite with the support of local anti-Communist partisans and Montenegrin separatists.

As it concerned the Soviet dictator himself, he was greatly emboldened by the Soviet victory in China and became confident that the Red Army, after its remarkable successes in East Asia, would be able to win a general war in Europe, too. However, the actions of the European powers in Tibet and Montenegro worried him since he deemed it a sign that even the capitalist European powers deemed an eventual conflict with the USSR inevitable. He regarded the eventual outcome of the civil wars in Eastern Europe inacceptable, since, even if it had netted the USSR control of the Yugoslav (effectively Serbian now) and Bulgarian satellites, it had left Poland and Romania in full control of the White government. The European powers, through their newfangled EDEL imperialist cartel, were back in full control of an anti-Soviet “cordon sanitarie” which stretched from Finland to Greece and appeared to be a major strategic threat to Soviet security. Stalin was therefore eager to bring the bulk of the Soviet army back to Europe and prepare to deal with it in a decisive way. But in order to do so, besides ensuring that the CCP grip was sufficiently solid on the Chinese mainland, he needed to bring the war with Japan to a conclusion.

About the consolidation of the CCP regime, it seemed headed to happen in an acceptable way. Many Chinese loathed it as the puppet of the Russian foreign invaders, which ensured that anti-Communist insurgents kept sufficient popular support among the Chinese people to establish sizable pockets of guerrilla resistance against the CCP in some regions of China for several years. However, some policy measures (especially the land reform) gave it a measure of popularity, and the harsh repression of any noticeable or suspected opposition terrorized many others into passive obedience. It therefore seemed feasible to enact a gradual redeployment of the bulk of the Soviet occupation forces back to the European theatre; Stalin deemed it wise to keep a sizable number of Soviet armies (mostly the ones that before the war were kept to defend the Soviet borders in Asia) within the PRC and the other Soviet satellites of Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria, both to ensure their defence from foreign threats and domestic anti-Communist resistance, and to keep their local puppet-rulers pliant to the will of the Kremlin.

Moreover, of course, there was still the issue of the war with Japan, which kept a sizable amount of Soviet forces tied up in the Russian Far East, Manchuria, and northern Korea. In radical opposition to the huge Soviet successes in mainland China, the efforts of the Red Army to break through Japanese defensive lines in northern Korea turned out to be abject failures throughout ’43. The Red Army sometimes made piecemeal minor gains, which often were later nullified by Japanese counteroffensives, but the IJA strategic defence line across the “neck” of the Korean peninsula stood despite several Soviet offensives over the year. The flow of European and American support to Japan, combined with the strength of the Japanese defensive position, IJN naval support, and the fateful decision of the IJA command to prioritize defence of Korea had saved the Korean peninsula, even if the latter had spelled the doom for South China.

Stalin was frustrated with the strategic stalemate in Korea, and in February ’44, he made a peace offer to Japan, offering to recognize Japanese sovereignty over northern Sakhalin (which was beyond Soviet reach anyway, thanks to IJN naval supremacy) and the Korean peninsula. The Japanese government refused it and a few more Soviet offensives and Japanese counter-offensives took place in the following two months, which only confirmed the strategic stalemate to both sides. Much as the Soviets were stalled in their efforts to conquer Korea, short of committing even more forces to the Asian theatre, which Stalin was unwilling to do, so the Japanese had little hope of re-conquering northern Korea and Manchuria, not to mention mainland China, short of a direct European intervention. After a fierce debate in the Japanese government, Tokyo notified its willingness to accept a peace deal if the Soviets pulled back to the Yalu river and recognized Japanese control over the entirety of Korea and of Sakhalin. Stalin swallowed the bitter pill and accepted the terms. He planned to reopen the issue after he was finished dealing with matters in Europe, much like the Japanese entertained hopes to have a rematch in better conditions if and when Stalin found itself in a general war with the European powers. Soviet troops withdrew from northern Korea and redeployed in the Russian Far East and Manchuria to take a defensive position against Japan, or were scheduled for transfer to Europe.

So in April ’44, the Soviet-Japanese war was over, with a decisive Soviet victory with had wiped out the humiliation of the Russo-Japanese war, established Soviet control over Manchuria and China, and shown the terrifying power of the Red Army war machine for everyone to see. Japan had been humiliated and forced to give up everything it had fought for since 1931, even if the core of its military power and its most precious imperial asset had survived the Soviet onslaught. The Soviet-Japanese war had settled the issue once and for all of strategic direction for Japanese foreign policy; after the conflict, short of a few extremists which again advanced plans for seeking compensations for loss of China with expansion in South East Asia and were sharply rebuffed, a general consensus emerged in Japanese ruling circles about the necessity to remain vigilant and protect the Japanese Empire from the looming Soviet threat, and of close cooperation with the European powers to fulfil this primary objective.

In Europe, Soviet conquest of mainland China and victory over Japan was taken as a pretty sure sign that a general war with the Soviet Union was coming and the Bolshevik tyrant would soon cast its greedy eye on the European nations and their colonial empires. There was some uncertainty and debate on the direction of the next major Soviet expansionistic move, whether in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, or South East Asia, but one was expected in the near future. The option of an European pre-emptive strike was seriously discussed in the closing months of 1943 in the EDEL and British ruling circles, but turned down for various reasons, political and strategic. Nonetheless, the rearmament and military cooperation programs of the four European powers were stepped up further, and their newfangled strategic planning talks were upgraded when Britain joined them and intensified its military and economic cooperation with the EDEL, although it kept its official association limited to its observer role due to its imperial commitments.

Soviet-sponsored colonial revolts were still smouldering in French Indochina, Dutch East Indies, and the British Raj, but European military repression had largely put them down. However it was greatly feared that CCP control of China would enable the Soviets to smuggle support in India and Indochina to the insurgents and alight the revolts again. Others argued that given the recent success of its military adventures, the USSR and the Communist movement would not bother anymore with such indirect subversion tactic, and would just use direct military aggression again, although there was much debate about what the next objective might be. Nonetheless, Germany, Italy, France, and Britain re-affirmed their commitment to a common defence action in case of renewed Soviet expansion in Eurasia. Talks were started with Japan about a formal alliance with the EDEL and a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and economic and military cooperation was intensified.

In America, Soviet conquest of mainland China and victory over Japan completed the ongoing shift of the US public opinion and ruling elites to deem the Communist bloc, not Japan, the worst threat to American national security and strategic interests. Although public opinion remained mostly wary of entanglement in European conflicts, a fairly large bipartisan consensus, short of the extreme isolationist wings of both parties, emerged to grant “all aid to Europe short of war” in case of conflict with the Soviets. President Farley, the Congress, and most other Republican and Democratic candidates for the 1944 Presidential election supported this platform. The “Red Scare” was in full swing in Europe, the Dominions, and the USA, and known or suspected Communist sympathizers were the object of widespread scorn, anger, and marginalization by a paranoid public opinion in the Anglosphere countries. In Germany, Italy, and France, Communist organizations were already outlawed and actively repressed by the police.

In the Soviet Union, Stalin was very pleased with the outcome of the Soviet-Japanese war and for the first time in his career as absolute leader of the USSR, he felt strongly confident that the battle-tested Red Army could easily come on top in a major military confrontation with the imperialist-capitalist European bloc. Although the failure to conquer Korea irked, it was easily justified by him with the Soviet naval inferiority; any future moves against Korea and the Japanese Home Isles were put on the backburner till the European bloc was dealt with, and the Socialist Motherland could build up its air-naval power. In the meanwhile, a sizable amount of Soviet support was directed to help the PRC state-building effort and make it a valid member of the Communist bloc, while the USSR itself redirected its assets towards the coming confrontation with the European bloc, which Stalin now deemed inevitable. The Red Tsar ordered to redeploy the bulk of the Red Army on the European and Central Asian borders, stepped up the efforts for military preparedness of the USSR, and issued the STAVKA a directive to draft a comprehensive plan for a strategic offensive in Europe and the Middle East, provisional name Operation Suvorov. A final decision about it, however, was postponed till the Soviet leadership could deem that the situation in China was stabilized enough to be largely manageable by local CCP forces, and Soviet military power had been properly redeployed to the Western theatre, refitted, and prepared.

[Eurofed]

So, as you see, this long-dormant TL got some update life at last. :D

In the light of last update events, I pose the following question to TL readers that may be quite useful for future development:

How long it may take for the PRC to stand more or less on its own without Soviet overseers babysitting it every step of the way, and for the USSR to properly switch from a major war effort in East Asia to one in Europe and the Middle East ?

About the former issue, I notice that IOTL the PRC regime was apparently able to go from end of the Chinese Civil War to intervention in the Korean War in little less than a year. Mainland China is likely to be as screwed ITTL by Japanese and later Soviet invasions as it was IOTL by a longer Japanese invasion, so it does not seem it would take much. About the latter issue, I lack such a clear reference, although I'm tentatively assuming that the German build-up from France to Barbarossa may be a useful comparison here.

How long do you deem an European nuclear program would take ? I assume it would be the absolute limit to how long a mid-late 1940s Euro-Soviet WWII may last.

A nitpick issue: if and when this TL progresses to an Euro-Soviet WWII, do you think the original TL name would still be appropriate ? Although it may be actually interpreted as referring to the Entente-German war being cut short, it may also be interpreted as meaning there is no WWII in this TL, which may be misleading.

[Kelenas]

The Korean war was somewhat limited, though, IIRC?

In any case I think it's reasonable that the PRC would be able to contribute ground forces to the Soviets within a year or two, though I figure they'd be limited in number, in part due to logistics (transporting people and equipment from China to Europe shouldn't be cheap or easy) and in part due to the fact that a lot of China is probably still in shambles in one way or another.

The more time passes, the more the PRC can contribute in terms of resources and equipment, rather than just raw manpower.

One thing I could see them as being quite important, though, is agriculture. IIRC the Soviet Union depended quite heavily on US food imports as part of Lend-Lease, in part because their breadbasket - the Ukraine - had been overrun by the Nazis, and in part because they had pretty much every person possible fighting on the frontlines, rather than working on the farms.

- Kelenas

[Eurofed]

In any case I think it's reasonable that the PRC would be able to contribute ground forces to the Soviets within a year or two, though I figure they'd be limited in number, in part due to logistics (transporting people and equipment from China to Europe shouldn't be cheap or easy) and in part due to the fact that a lot of China is probably still in shambles in one way or another.

The more time passes, the more the PRC can contribute in terms of resources and equipment, rather than just raw manpower.


Well, I did not necessarily mean when the PRC would be able to make major manpower contributions for an European front, rather when the PRC regime would mostly be able to ensure its own domestic stability and protect its own borders, at least as much as the PRC was able to do during the Korean War, without tying down a lot of Soviet troops. For the PRC to be a major WWII player it would take much more time, likely a decade or so or development, because indeed most of China was still in shambles in one way or another.

[basileus]

I'd bet Stalin in such a situation could simply sit and wait for the capitalists to make the first move. I cant' see him, even in the most favorable of situations, to launch an umprovoked campaign against all of Europe. He was no Hitler - indeed, he was a staunch paranoid isolationist. Only exceptional circumstances ITTL brought to this great aggrandizements of Soviet power, just like exceptional circumstances occurred OTL.
If you bet on a flashpoint, however, Romania for a host of reasons is the right one - but more than a general conflict, I can see a very tense proxy war.

[Wendell]

This was a good update on an interesting timeline, but, yes, the title could use revision.

[mcdo]

As to the contributions of the PRC to the Comintern, I think it depends on how much damage was done to industry in China. Japanese Manchuria had quite a bit of heavy industry, but in this scenario, it was fought over for much longer than in OTL. It looks like there was also heavy fighting near Wuhan and possibly Shanghai, other sites of industry in China. How much was destroyed in the fighting? Did the KMT and IJA engange in scorched earth tactics? Did the Soviets ship any Japanese industry back to Russia as war reperations? If so, the PRC will be industrializing from scratch. While Chinese forces and administrators might be able to take over within a few years, China will be an industrial drain for a decade or more. They will need everything: farming equipment, locomotives, heavy machinery... I imagine that China will be a huge long-term asset for Moscow, but they will have to invest for a generation before it really starts paying off.

[Wyragen-TXRG4P]

Actually, Goering could sort this problem out very easily.

Build an eastern version of the Maginot Line, from the baltic to the black sea.


Constructing the Maginot Line required very little of France´s defence budget, Germany have 3 times the industry of France and in this case, a significant backing from France and the UK. The european alliance would have what? A capacity at least half a dozen times greater than France in the 1930s?

The Red Army would have to waite until at least a dozen or more atomic bombs are available, before starting an invasion of europe. Probably even more, if 1 or 2 additional lines are built behind sometimes later. By that time, rockets able to hit major cities in the SU should be available.

[Eurofed]

I'd bet Stalin in such a situation could simply sit and wait for the capitalists to make the first move. I cant' see him, even in the most favorable of situations, to launch an umprovoked campaign against all of Europe. He was no Hitler - indeed, he was a staunch paranoid isolationist. Only exceptional circumstances ITTL brought to this great aggrandizements of Soviet power, just like exceptional circumstances occurred OTL.
If you bet on a flashpoint, however, Romania for a host of reasons is the right one - but more than a general conflict, I can see a very tense proxy war.

Stalin's aggressiveness in ATL scenarioes is indeed a fairly controversial topic on this board. After much consideration about the subject, I've come to the conclusion that his OTL restraint before and after WWII was essentially the result of prudence and opportunism combined with the USSR being too weak in comparison with its potential enemies. Those conditions do not really apply ITTL, and I think that to say Stalin would never choose a general war under any circumstances if it is his choice is to misunderstand (or whitewash) his character.

In the late '30s, the Soviet basic industrialization or the modernization of the Red Army was not yet done, and Stalin wished to prevent the Entente and Axis powers making a common front against him (and he hoped for the Axis and the Entente to exhaust each other in a prolonged WWI-like stalemate, which would would enabled him to conquer Europe with little risk, but the swiftness of the German victory over France disrupted those plans). In the late '40s, the USSR was wrecked, its manpower reserves exhausted, its economy in shambles, and the Americans had nuclear supremacy.

None of these conditions apply ITTL: the USSR has gotten farther with its industrialization and military build-up, the Red Army has been battle-tested and has won a major victory in Asia, the European anti-Soviet front has formed anyway, and nukes do not exist yet.

As it concerns Stalin's paranoia, yes he was exceedingly paranoid. However, paranoia does not necessarily (or that often) push the subject to prudence, it may easily drive one to pre-emptive attacks instead. TTL Stalin may decide it is better to strike against the European alliance before it gets too strong. Remember, the man was prone to miscalculating his enemies' willingness or ability to fight (Winter War, Barbarossa, Korean War). So far, his decisions and guesses have been more or less correct, he got no early Barbarossa sobering experience, and he has reaped confirmation about the correctness of an aggressive foreign policy from his Asian victories. For him to get a dose of victory disease becomes rather plausible.

Having said that, I see no problem about having an Euro-Soviet war start with some flashpoint instead of just a reverse Barbarossa (although if such a general war does happen, IMO it is surely bound to expand from Scandinavia to Central Asia in extremely short order). It is that by this point, many potential East-West flashpoints have been already settled. I fail to see how Romania might be one, since Bessarabia, Dobruja, and Transylvania have been settled, and Romania is firmly in the EDEL camp. Please care yo elucidate ? I do see a potential nifty flashpoint, but it is not Romania.

I'd assume that the proxy wars stage ITTL was already done with the Polish-Yugoslav civil wars and the Comintern-sponsored unrest in India and South East Asia. This is still the pre-nuclear age, there is only so much antagonism the great powers are willing to tolerate before they deem to heck with it, I'm going to escalate.

[Eurofed]

Actually, Goering could sort this problem out very easily.

Build an eastern version of the Maginot Line, from the baltic to the black sea.

Constructing the Maginot Line required very little of France´s defence budget, Germany have 3 times the industry of France and in this case, a significant backing from France and the UK. The european alliance would have what? A capacity at least half a dozen times greater than France in the 1930s?


This is an excellent idea, IF there is the time and opportunity to build such a modern Great Wall (how many years is it going to take, even with all the pooled industrial resources of Europe ?). OTOH, this is also something that Europe might build after a war, if it does not end in a decisive victory. ;)

[basileus]

Stalin's aggressiveness in ATL scenarioes is indeed a fairly controversial topic on this board. After much consideration about the subject, I've come to the conclusion that his OTL restraint before and after WWII was essentially the result of prudence and opportunism combined with the USSR being too weak in comparison with its potential enemies. Those conditions do not really apply ITTL, and I think that to say Stalin would never choose a general war under any circumstances if it is his choice is to misunderstand (or whitewash) his character.

In the late 30s, the Soviet basic industrialization or the modernization of the Red Army was not yet done, and Stalin wished to prevent the Entente and Axis powers making a common front against him. In the late '40s, the USSR was wrecked, its manpower reserves exhausted, its economy in shambles, and the Americans had nuclear supremacy.

None of these conditions apply ITTL: the USSR has gotten farther with its industrialization and military build-up, the Red Army has been battle-tested and has won a major victory in Asia, the European anti-Soviet front has formed anyway, and nukes do not exist yet.

As it concerns Stalin's paranoia, yes he was exceedingly paranoid. However, paranoia does not necessarily (or that often) push the subject to prudence, it may easily drive one to pre-emptive attacks instead. TTL Stalin may decide it is better to strike against the European alliance before it gets too strong. Remember, the man was prone to miscalculating his enemies' willingness or ability to fight (Winter War, Barbarossa, Korean War). So far, his decisions and guesses have been more or less correct, he got no early Barbarossa sobering experience, and he has reaped confirmation about the correctness of an aggressive foreign policy from his Asian victories. For him to get a dose of victory disease becomes rather plausible.

Having said that, I see no problem about having an Euro-Soviet war start with some flashpoint instead of just a reverse Barbarossa (although if such a general war does happen, IMO it is surely bound to expand from Scandinavia to Central Asia in extremely short order). It is that by this point, many potential East-West flashpoints have been already settled. I fail to see how Romania might be one, since Bessarabia, Dobruja, and Transylvania have been settled, and Romania is firmly in the EDEL camp. Please elucidate ? I do see a potential nifty flashpoint, but it is not Romania.

I'd assume that the proxy wars stage ITTL was already done with the Polish-Yugoslav civil wars and the Comintern-sponsored unrest in India and South East Asia. This is still the pre-nuclear age, there is only so much antagonism the great powers are willing to tolerate before they deem to heck with it, I'm going to escalate.

Romania for strategic reasons. Bulgaria is in the Soviet field, just like (southern) Yugoslavia. Romania may feel embittered by having been practically abandoned by the West and sacrificed by the Wester powers. All in all, a Soviet option may appeal to some sectors of the population, thus reproducing the Polish and Yugoslavian situation. But this time Stalin will likely wish to physically connect he countries under his heel...

[Eurofed]

Romania for strategic reasons. Bulgaria is in the Soviet field, just like (southern) Yugoslavia. Romania may feel embittered by having been practically abandoned by the West and sacrificed by the Wester powers. All in all, a Soviet option may appeal to some sectors of the population, thus reproducing the Polish and Yugoslavian situation. But this time Stalin will likely wish to physically connect he countries under his heel...

I see. Well, it is entirely possible that Stalin again tries the Red subversion trick on Romania, but if he does, I do expect the Communist insurrection attempt to fizzle and die rather quickly, nothing like Poland and Yugoslavia. This for several reasons: pre-civil war Poland and Yugoslavia were left in a neutral geopolitical vacuum, which armed their economies and gave a sense of national insecurity. Romania is firmly anchored to the EDEL. I reasoned out that TTL Romania would turn out a fairly loyal and stable member of the Euro bloc just like it did OTL for the Axis, despite the losses it suffered, since the situation is quite similar. Romania has been already attacked by the Soviets, and the Romanians have witnessed how much misery the Polish and Yugoslav civil wars brought to those countries, so Communist infiltration would find little appeal within the Romanian people. Morevoer, they don't have anything like the cultural affinity to Russia that Serbia and Bulgaria had.

I may write an aborted Communist insurrection attempt in Romania, but likely it would be quickly snuffed out by the government and put the European powers even more in a Red Scare mood, but I doubt it would be the main flashpoint. The strategic reasons you quote are good, but proxy subversion would fail for the reasons I quoted, if Stalin want Romania, he likely has to send the Red Army to grab it, and this would immediately cause a general war.

Rather, I was thinking that the main falshpoint might be the Middle East. Turkey eventually joins the EDEL, which makes Stalin feel even more encircled and pushes him to grab Iran, either by direct invasion or by using Azeri separatists as proxies. The EDEL sends troops to support the Shah, there are the first armed skirmishes between Euro and Soviet troops, Stalin thinks war is inevitable and orders Suvorov.

[Wyragen-TXRG4P]

None of these conditions apply ITTL: the USSR has gotten farther with its industrialization and military build-up, the Red Army has been battle-tested and has won a major victory in Asia, the European anti-Soviet front has formed anyway, and nukes do not exist yet.

As it concerns Stalin's paranoia, yes he was exceedingly paranoid. However, paranoia does not necessarily (or that often) push the subject to prudence, it may easily drive one to pre-emptive attacks instead. TTL Stalin may decide it is better to strike against the European alliance before it gets too strong. Remember, the man was prone to miscalculating his enemies' willingness or ability to fight (Winter War, Barbarossa, Korean War). So far, his decisions and guesses have been more or less correct, he got no early Barbarossa sobering experience, and he has reaped confirmation about the correctness of an aggressive foreign policy from his Asian victories. For him to get a dose of victory disease becomes rather plausible.

Having said that, I see no problem about having an Euro-Soviet war start with some flashpoint instead of just a reverse Barbarossa (although if such a general war does happen, IMO it is surely bound to expand from Scandinavia to Central Asia in extremely short order). It is that by this point, many potential East-West flashpoints have been already settled. I fail to see how Romania might be one, since Bessarabia, Dobruja, and Transylvania have been settled, and Romania is firmly in the EDEL camp. Please care yo elucidate ? I do see a potential nifty flashpoint, but it is not Romania.

I'd assume that the proxy wars stage ITTL was already done with the Polish-Yugoslav civil wars and the Comintern-sponsored unrest in India and South East Asia. This is still the pre-nuclear age, there is only so much antagonism the great powers are willing to tolerate before they deem to heck with it, I'm going to escalate.



He may well want middle-eastern oil, striking through Iran, to support the much expanded Soviet military and weaken the european powers. Later, this could evolve into an attempt to establish a foothold in Egypt and eastern africa. The PRC would probably support that latter move, in exchange for sending surplus populations there, India´s population may be in serious troubles in the next decades.


Stalin didn´t want to conquer europe itself, Hitler had plenty of plans for the european Soviet-Union but Stalin seriously lacked plans for western europe or even Germany. Too many problems.

But what if someone else than Stalin took power or at least, a Stalin which isn´t our Stalin, so to state?

Why not a Soviet leader that instead of being a neo-nationalist isolationist, is an internationalist* of sort? In the sens that he wants a World Union of Soviets or at minimum, Eurasiafrica under the red banner.

With a correct POD, it would be surely be less outrageous than Himmler taking power, even furthering Hitler´s lebensraum grand vision, restarting a war with a fully mobilized US while inventing rock´n´roll in the way.


* I´v read plenty of complaints from "communists" how tragic it was that Stalin turned the Soviet-Union ideologically away from internationalism (beside corrupting a democratic society, of course).

[Eurofed]

I've revised last update to have a civil war happen in Romania similar to the ones in Poland and Yugoslavia. It ends in a White victory much like Poland, for much the same reasons.

[Astronomo2010]

quite good update, this timeline, is going RED ALERT Style. I forsee A Total war Between the WEST Against USSR.:)

[Cam the not-so-great]

Good Job! Looking forward to the next update. Stalin will be in for a nasty war if he attacks a unified Europe. :D