A Plethora of Princes - (Thread 2) : A New Europe

[Grey Wolf]

Where are the British ? A familiar cry at the end of the 1820s and into the early 1830s. The answser, of course, was at home, fighting with each other. First the civil unrest, then the civil war in Ireland, then the civil war across the whole of the United Kingdom. The first had brought a gradual weakening of the British presence in other theatres, the second brought a strategic withdrawal, the third brought a complete concentration on the home front.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, the Battle of Navarino had seen the defeat of Ottoman-Egyptian efforts to put an end to Greek independence. But the defeat had led to the breaking apart of the relationship, and to the rapid growth of Egypt as a power. Russian intervention led to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and to Russian protection of the Ottoman Empire, but attempts by France and Britain to counter this on the one hand, and to stand off against the Egyptians on the other were undermined by the political unrest sweeping both countries. France was soon bogged down in Algiers, the new monarchy of Louis Philippe I committing to continue the campaign started by his predecessor, as well as going to war with the Netherlands over Belgium. Britain was soon deep into the Irish civil war, soon to become a general conflagration across the whole of the British Isles. In this atmosphere of Western distraction, Russian dominance spread, and Egyptian power continued to grow unchecked.

In Portugal the Liberal opposition to the usurper King Miguel attempted to gain British support. An alternative regime was established in the Azores, a Liberal uprising occurred at Oporto but the forces of conservatism were too strong, and with British aid not forthcoming Miguel was able to secure his hold upon the throne.

In Spain, in 1834 the death of Ferdinand VII plunged the country into civil war. By a sanction as pragmatic as the eponymous one which had brought Maria Theresa to the Austrian throne, Ferdinand had arranged for the succession of his daughter as Isabella II. But in so doing he had overturned tradition and had knocked back from the succession his own brother, Don Carlos. Carlos's revolt gained aid from Miguel's Portugal, and after a civil war lasting a couple of years, Carlos had forced his niece into exile and secured his rule in Madrid.

The birth of two new nations occurred at this time, both forged in the last resort by warfare. Greece initially offered the throne to Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the widower of Princess Charlotte of Great Britain, but he turned it down due to the instability raging there. Under Ernest Augustus' auspices, the claims of his wife's brother, Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz were put forward as an alternative. Not directly the heir to the Grand Duchy (that was his brother George), Charles was seen as an acceptable candidate, and despite the instability of Britain in this period, the backing of its leading power brokers was enough to secure the election.

The second new nation to make an appearance on the map of Europe was that of Belgium, born of a revolt in the former Austrian Netherlands which had been under the rule of the North since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Born at the same time as the overthrow of the conservative Charles X was occurring within France, the future of Belgium was tied up closely with the fortunes of the Orleanist monarchy coming to power in France.

The Belgian National Congress in February 1831 offered the throne to King Louis Philippe I's second son, the sixteen year old Prince Louis. Although not initially enthusiastic, the political chaos in Great Britain encouraged Louis Philippe I to take the gamble. He supported his son's candidature and Louis was accepted as king in Brussels. The war between France and the Netherlands would continue for some time, but would eventually end in a complete victory for the dual Orleanist houses, with the whole of Limburg and Luxembourg incorporated within the new kingdom of Belgium as the Netherlands went down in eventual defeat.

Grey Wolf

[unsunghero]

Very interesting timline thus far. Are we going to see a a greater conservative triumph in Europe in this TL ie - no revolutions of 1848 or perhaps stillborn in Paris, so it doesn't spread?

[G.Bone]

Will there be a map forthcoming or is it a minor change in the borders of the Low Countries?

[Grey Wolf]

Will there be a map forthcoming or is it a minor change in the borders of the Low Countries?

I've got a map - its not mine, but it shows the details. Basically, the eventual settlement in OTL split Limburg and gave the Netherlands the dangly bit we know and love, and split Luxembourg carving half of it off as a Grand Duchy in personal union to the Netherlands crown, whilst it remained in the male line.

Grey Wolf

[Grey Wolf]

Very interesting timline thus far. Are we going to see a a greater conservative triumph in Europe in this TL ie - no revolutions of 1848 or perhaps stillborn in Paris, so it doesn't spread?

The strange thing about European history in the nineteenth century is what the hell was going on 1830-1848 ? There seems to be a kind of hole in research and knowledge. I have information on the events in the Eastern Mediterranean, and if I can find the book I have it all well covered (the book went into hiding when I tidied up before my parents' visit last weekend). But elsewhere ? Its as if the history of Europe runs into a fog around the early 1830s and doesn't properly emerge until 1848. Very strange thing history when that happens.

As to the question, Louis Philippe I's reign is a boost to the more liberal elements, and one can imagine that an Orleanist Belgium allied the more closely (and not bound by neutrality as per OTL) would be similar in outlook.

I don't know what the name for the Mecklenburger royal family is ? Anyone ? King Charles I of Greece will have an increasingly uncomfortable time as his main backers collapse into civil war (i.e. Britain) ands he finds himself pulled principally between the intrigues of France and of Russia.

Russia in crushing the Poles has gone along the line as OTL, whilst Portugal and Spain have become more conservative. But will it last, and will it have any particular far-reaching effects for the rest of Europe ?

Grey Wolf

[Grey Wolf]

The series of crises affecting Britain, and developing into the full-blown civil war of 1832-1836 had effectively removed British interests from many parts of the world, not least among them the Eastern Mediterranean. During the 1830s Britain had not been more than a spectator to events in this theatre, Ernest I Augustus' pressing of the claims of Charles of Mecklenburg to the Greek throne being the only notable success, and the last at that. For the rest of the decade, Britain had been largely an irrelevance, and the powers of France and Russia, both able to field significant fleets despite their own distractions, had dominated the theatre. The decline of Ottoman power, and the subsequent rise of that of Mohammed Ali's Egypt had unbalanced the scales of power, but for most of the decade had not tipped them over completely. Egypt, with its new possessions in Syria and the Lebanon, had continued to build and field an impressive fleet, whilst the Ottomans, since the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi under effective Russian protectorship had seen a halt of some sorts to their own decline, but no great increase to conter-balance the ambitious Egyptians.

The Spring of 1839 saw Sultan Mahmud attempt to bring his rebellious and by now fully-autonomous vassal back under control. Taking advantage of a revolt across Syria caused in a large part by high Egyptian taxes, the Ottoman forces crossed the Euphrates and invaded. However, the Ottoman fleet, although numerically the equivalent of the Egyptians was greatly inferior in quality, and Mohammed Ali was able to retain control of the seas.

At the same time, Russia was seriously distracted by events in the Caucasus which threatened its control of the coastline there, and was willing to offer the Ottomans only defensive support, and even then only if the need really was pressing. Most of the Black Sea Fleet was needed off the Caucasus coast.

Orleans France, continuing its upward progress in international affairs, backed the cause of Egyptian independence.

Britain, however, continued to be a minor power in the theatre. The Radical government had finally succeeded in extending its control into the countryside, and had replaced the House of Lords with a Senate, one half elected and one half hereditary. It had dis-established the Church of England and thrown out the Bishops from the process of government, and was struggling to find a happy medium in the new Senate, where accusations of exclusion and favouritism undermined the decision-making process. King George V had married Princess Marie of Saxe-Altenburg and in early 1840 they produced an heir, also named George, an event which eased the hearts of those who feared the succession reverting to the Cambridge line, now ruling as Kings of Hannover. But a settling down of politics within Britain was not the same as a reassertion of influence upon the seas, and only a small squadron was dispatched to the Eastern Mediterranean, enough to watch events unfold and to report upon them, but too weak and without orders to intefere.

The death of Mahmud, following on shortly from a major defeat of his forces, caused another major change in the theatre as the comander in chief of the Ottoman Navy defected to the Egyptian cause, taking his entire fleet with him. Although mutinies and rebellious attitudes would decrease the number of ships that Mohammed Ali was able to deploy, this represented a severe loss for the Ottomans, and a material gain for the Egyptians.

With Russia unable to commit to more than the defence of the Marmara, and with France leaning increasingly towards Mohammed Ali, neither Austria nor Prussia were in any situation to act. Austrian warships joined with the British contingent in a joint patrol, but neither was sufficiently strong enough to act, even had the inclination being there.

By the end of 1839 with Egyptian forces pressing into Asia Minor, and with no other aid forthcoming, Sultan Abdulmecit came to an accord with Mohammed Ali that effectively granted Egypt all of its wishes, including de facto independence.

In Paris, King Louis Philippe I and his government hailed this as another victory for French interests. In Saint Petersburg, Tsar Nicholas I was only too aware of what a defeat this would prove to be for Russian interests. To all effects and purposes Unkiar Skelessi was dead, sacrificed by necessity for operations upon the Georgian coast. Russia had retained Georgia and the Caucasus, but had lost its protectorship of the Ottoman Empire

Grey Wolf

[G.Bone]

Just curious- why did Prussia suddenly shift from East Germany to West, bordering near the Netherlands? On other maps it shows Prussia being in between present day Poland/Germany (right where the Oblast is), with small territories in the west. I was wondering if you could clarify me how and why they shifted over.

Oh- and how is the Hannover line doing, seeing that they are English to begin with (i.e. they were raised there) and now they are in Germany? Is Hannover a stronger power because of that or is Germany a mess overall?

[Gladi]

Bright day
It is only Prussian possesion, not Prussia itself (well it is Prussia, but you should know what I mean).

[Grey Wolf]

Just curious- why did Prussia suddenly shift from East Germany to West, bordering near the Netherlands? On other maps it shows Prussia being in between present day Poland/Germany (right where the Oblast is), with small territories in the west. I was wondering if you could clarify me how and why they shifted over.

Oh- and how is the Hannover line doing, seeing that they are English to begin with (i.e. they were raised there) and now they are in Germany? Is Hannover a stronger power because of that or is Germany a mess overall?

Prussia was originally an area of then-Poland
It was granted as a duchy to the elector of Brandenburg
He became so powerful he applied to be a king
As he was a member of the HRE, he became King IN Prussia
The name Prussia took over that of Brandenburg
By dynastic marriage etc, and results of the Napoleonic wars too, Prussia gained most of Rhineland-Westphalia as well

Regarding Hannover, OTL they split off from Britain in 1837 with the accession of Victoria when they required a male monarch and went with Ernest. They had previously been ruled by viceroys (royal dukes such as Sussex).

In this ATL, Hannover is still united as a kingdom with Britain under Ernest jduring the civil war. I have him drawing reserves from there, and later sending his brother Cambridge to do a kind of Mackensen role and organise things. In 1836 with the Radicals-Whigs alliance in London, the peace agreed places Cambridge's line on the throne of Hannover

I certainly don't see this as being any worse than OTL, with Ernest Augustus as King of Hannover so in the unmentioned period I have Hannover doing relatively well

Grey Wolf

[G.Bone]

Ah....interesting.....

Thanks for the answer.

When will the major changes in Europe come in?

[Grey Wolf]

Ah....interesting.....

Thanks for the answer.

When will the major changes in Europe come in?

This is where I am having trouble

The ATL date for Europe is somewhere in the mid 1840s, and the major changes are :-

Belgium - an Orleanist king, a bigger country, an alliance with France
Greece - a Mecklenburger king, no Britain in the international consideration
Egypt - de facto independent, a French aligning, holding onto Syria, large navy
Portugal - Miguel as king, conservative
Spain - Carlos as king, conservative
Britain - George V, Radicals ascendant, eclipse of traditional conservatives
Hannover - Adolphus I, Cambridge dynasty, split from Britain by defeat
Ireland - King Francis I, Orlanist, alliance with France, independent from Britain

These are quite significant changes though their full effect has yet to come into play

Grey Wolf

[Grey Wolf]

I was thinking that
http://www.realcasadiborbone.it/uk/archiviostorico/cs_071.htm
offers a different way out of the 1840s

Maybe in France, Louis Philippe I abdicates and his son Ferdinand takes over as king. This dampens the chain of events as per OTL

Meanwhile in the Italian peninsular, events do occur as per OTL in Naples, but the bright hopes for a monarchical confederation are realised as revolutions are not sweeping Europe and as Piedmont-Sardinia is not able to have realistic hopes of acquiring territory (eg Lombardy) from Austria.

Democrats and republicans are still a danger to the plan, but Neo-Guelphism gains ground. Perhaps one can postulate that King Ferdinand I's France backs this ?

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

While primarily a Britain-centered TL (and a fascinating one at that), I have some Ottoman comments.

As I mentioned on the other site, while things could go down as you have them, I think Navarino is LESS likely to occur in this TL. Philhellenism was largely an artificial and self-indulgent movement that I would think a Britain in the midst of civil war would not entertain. Without them, the Ottomans/Egyptians are likely to prevail.

In OTL, Mehmed Ali's invasion of Syria was brought on by his frustration at having spent so much money on the Greek campaign for nothing, and felt he should be rewarded for obeying the Sultan's commends to supress the Wahhabis and Greeks. If successful in Greece he would have had to be rewarded, probably with governorships in Syria. Upon his death, they would likely return to Ottoman control, especially as Ottoman power began to eclipse Egyptian power by mid-century.

While the Ottomans were at a nadir in 1800, by 1830 the situation had improved markedly, and I think you are underestimating their vitality and overestimating Egypt's. Egyptian rule was generally very unpopular as Mehmed Ali was in it for the money and tended to be rapacious.

Just as a curiousity, why do you like Mehmed Ali so much? He was actually a horrible person. He cared nothing for his subjects, invaded the Sudan in a genocidal frenzy to acquire a slave army after his attempts at creating a slave army out of Egyptian peasants didn't work out, never kept his word, was a treacherous bastard, was horrible to his children, and in general was just a bastard.

While energetic, as was his son Ibrahim (but NOT the rest of his descendants), he was IMHO no match for Mahmud II, nor did his armies have the staying power of Ottoman troops, nor did he have sufficient legitimacy to replace Ottoman power in the Near East with his own.

[Bulgaroktonos]

I'm actually going to agree with Abdul here. After Mehmet Ali and his son, the Egyptians are just going to be eclipsed by the Ottomans. While I would say the death blow to Ali's ideas surrounding industrialization came with the ACW (where Cotton went from 45% to 95% of export revenue), trade tables from the 1840s already begin to show signs of a slow down in Egyptian manufactured goods from the period of Ali.

Regardless of the character of Ali, if the Ottomans are able to maintain Greece and manage to keep the Europeans from interfering on an even greater scale, I think that the Ottomans may be able to end up in a much stronger position via Egypt by the 1860s.

[Grey Wolf]

While primarily a Britain-centered TL (and a fascinating one at that), I have some Ottoman comments.

As I mentioned on the other site, while things could go down as you have them, I think Navarino is LESS likely to occur in this TL. Philhellenism was largely an artificial and self-indulgent movement that I would think a Britain in the midst of civil war would not entertain. Without them, the Ottomans/Egyptians are likely to prevail.

In OTL, Mehmed Ali's invasion of Syria was brought on by his frustration at having spent so much money on the Greek campaign for nothing, and felt he should be rewarded for obeying the Sultan's commends to supress the Wahhabis and Greeks. If successful in Greece he would have had to be rewarded, probably with governorships in Syria. Upon his death, they would likely return to Ottoman control, especially as Ottoman power began to eclipse Egyptian power by mid-century.

While the Ottomans were at a nadir in 1800, by 1830 the situation had improved markedly, and I think you are underestimating their vitality and overestimating Egypt's. Egyptian rule was generally very unpopular as Mehmed Ali was in it for the money and tended to be rapacious.

Just as a curiousity, why do you like Mehmed Ali so much? He was actually a horrible person. He cared nothing for his subjects, invaded the Sudan in a genocidal frenzy to acquire a slave army after his attempts at creating a slave army out of Egyptian peasants didn't work out, never kept his word, was a treacherous bastard, was horrible to his children, and in general was just a bastard.

While energetic, as was his son Ibrahim (but NOT the rest of his descendants), he was IMHO no match for Mahmud II, nor did his armies have the staying power of Ottoman troops, nor did he have sufficient legitimacy to replace Ottoman power in the Near East with his own.

As stated on AHF, Navarino is in 1827 which, whilst after the POD of Alexandrina Victoria's death is before the crisis over Catholic Emancipation raises its head. Thus I don't think the changes kick in soon enough to prevent Navarino, and without preventing it don't prevent Greek independence.

As to the vitality of Egypt, militarily HE did beat Mahmud II and it was the Anglo-French-Austrian alliance which chased him out of Syria, at the same time France drifting off towards a pro-Egyptian stance. Only the blockade of Alexndria coupled with the attack on Acre led to Mohammed Ali's having to withdraw. He had already defeated the main Ottoman force, the main Ottoman fleet had defected to him, and Russia was unale to do much since its main force was engaged in putting down revolts along the Georgian coast. All this is as per OTL.

While I admit an ATL may go differently, I guess the main reason I am going with Mohammed Ali is to provide an interesting alternative. Egypt in this period and Alexandria were not the backwaters and primitive abodes general history would disregard them as being. I don't make personal statements about rulers really - if I did I would have shunted Andrew Jackson aside as I don't find him a nice person at all, and Ernest Augustus himself whilst a fascinating person in many respects had all that freaky protestant crap that I can't stand from the likes of the mad Ian Paisley. But in alternate history, interesting characters make for interesting history. Besides, one of the most sympathetic historical characters is Victoria, so having her reign till 1901 would be...unrealistic !

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I'm actually going to agree with Abdul here.

Will wonders never cease?

The Greek revolt was pretty much the only revolt by mainland Greeks against the Ottomans in their entire history, bought on by the horrible misrule of Janissary notables. Soon after they were destroyed and more responsible central administration imposed in the remaining Ottoman territories.

If the Greek Revolt had failed, this opens the question, then what? Pretty much all Greeks would still be in the Ottoman Empire. How would that affect development of the Ottoman Empire? The Greeks at this time did not think of themselves as 'Greeks', they thought of themselves as Romans, and the basis for Bulgarian, Serbian, and Rumanian nationalism was resistance to GREEK rule, not Ottoman, as these peoples were all subject to the Orthodox Patriarchy.

I really can't even speculate. It could go any number of ways. Without the example of one Balkan people gaining independence, would that retard the others? Would a later revolt happen and succeed? Probably only if timed to coincide with a major external war. Would the Greeks become a dominating influence in the empire? Possibly, as they were the commerical middlemen for the West.

[Grey Wolf]

I'm actually going to agree with Abdul here. After Mehmet Ali and his son, the Egyptians are just going to be eclipsed by the Ottomans. While I would say the death blow to Ali's ideas surrounding industrialization came with the ACW (where Cotton went from 45% to 95% of export revenue), trade tables from the 1840s already begin to show signs of a slow down in Egyptian manufactured goods from the period of Ali.

Regardless of the character of Ali, if the Ottomans are able to maintain Greece and manage to keep the Europeans from interfering on an even greater scale, I think that the Ottomans may be able to end up in a much stronger position via Egypt by the 1860s.

Well, on the one hand I spent about a week deciding where this was going to go and am not making it up on the off-hand. Thus, I am not about to change it now :)

A chap called Jomard is interesting. In 1839 he was a major advisor to Mohammed Ali and well-trusted. Just before the uprising in Syria and the Ottoman invasion he came up with a 40-page dossier on plans to put in motion - the full integration of the Syrian economy with the Egyptian, the establishment of a forestry school, the improvement of the Naval Academy and its merger with a remodelled Polytechnique to create a sufficient number of sailors to allow Egypt to dispense with its use of Greeks.

Egypt, with Syria, Lebanon and that area of modern Turkey around Alexandretta is a different proposition than just OTL Egypt. As is an Egypt that is victorious and recognised as de facto independent by all the powers, rather than having been defeated, forced out of Syria in 1840 and forced to agree an accord with the Ottoman sultan under threat.

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

While I admit an ATL may go differently, I guess the main reason I am going with Mohammed Ali is to provide an interesting alternative

Perhaps, but this isn't really an 'alternative' for you, lol, you do it all the time! If not for the powers, Mehmed Ali would not have been able to hold Syria long, as Ottoman power was increasing rapidly and his rule was deeply resented. The Ottoman admiral that defected to him did so for various reasons, and the personnel, as residents of the Ottoman core, were not likely to be willing to serve long-term in Egypt!

In any case, Egypt was deeply overcommitted, and if not for the intervention of the Powers would likely have collapsed entirely under the strain. He was attempting to digest a huge and difficult empire (Egypt, Sudan [!], Arabia [!], Crete, Syria, Somaliland, Eritrea, etc. with very limited financial and human resources, and no legitimacy, the importance of which can not be overestimated. He continued to pose as the loyal servant of the Sultan even at his most treasonous for that very reason.

Also, Egyptian historians tend to portray him as a great man, struggling for the independence of Egypt from the Ottoman yoke. This could not be further from the truth - he was out to further his own ambitions in the Ottoman context, not 'liberate' Egypt. He was a Turk, after all.

[Bulgaroktonos]

I find the Greek influence question to be an interesting one. There certainly was a growing influence of Armenians, Jews, and other Christians in Anatolia and "Palestine" during this same time (to the great displeasure of many Muslims). IIRC, by the time of the Young Turks, Jews and the assorted Christians had a great amount of control over commerce throughout the empire and when they left after WWI, that is what allowed the Turks to basically create an industrial build up out of nowhere.

Now with Greece still in the fold, I don't really think there would be too many insurrections from the other nationalities. The other Great Powers might not want it. They saw the failure of Greece, and with a stronger Ottoman Empire, capable of keeping Russia off the Bosphorus on its own, countries like Great Britain and France might not be so willing to attempt to weaken it a second time.

With the growing strength of commercialism within the Ottoman empire, I believe that the Greeks might well become a huge force within the bureaucracy and executive powers, because even with a separate Greek nation in OTL, the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish merchants in Constantinople/Istanbul were highly influential even after the war.

[Bulgaroktonos]

Will wonders never cease?


One should hope not.

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I don't think you should change the TL, I'm just discussing. :) As I mentioned above, Mehmed Ali had zero interest in declaring independence - the idea was inconceivable, as he had no authority or legitimacy except as a servant of the Sultan.

Plans such as Jomard's were great on paper, and generally totally failed in implementation. If Mehmed Ali had succeeded in gaining Syria, it would have reverted to the Sultan upon his death. The addition of Syria would not have greatly magnified Egyptian power, as the expense of holding it would have balanced the increase in revenue.

There is a tendency to misread the Ottoman Empire as a fragile, crumbling state ruled by a Turkish minority oppressing groaning minorities itching to free themselves. In reality, the Arabs would have viewed it much as the Greeks did the Roman Empire. It simply WAS 'The State'. The Turks had no more a priviledged role in it than did they - quite the opposite, the Turks benefited LEAST from the Ottoman Empire of all its peoples.

In reality, it was a fairly vital polity, and required huge external pushes to separate its territories, and eventually destroy it.

Well, on the one hand I spent about a week deciding where this was going to go and am not making it up on the off-hand. Thus, I am not about to change it now :)

A chap called Jomard is interesting. In 1839 he was a major advisor to Mohammed Ali and well-trusted. Just before the uprising in Syria and the Ottoman invasion he came up with a 40-page dossier on plans to put in motion - the full integration of the Syrian economy with the Egyptian, the establishment of a forestry school, the improvement of the Naval Academy and its merger with a remodelled Polytechnique to create a sufficient number of sailors to allow Egypt to dispense with its use of Greeks.

Egypt, with Syria, Lebanon and that area of modern Turkey around Alexandretta is a different proposition than just OTL Egypt. As is an Egypt that is victorious and recognised as de facto independent by all the powers, rather than having been defeated, forced out of Syria in 1840 and forced to agree an accord with the Ottoman sultan under threat.

Grey Wolf

[Grey Wolf]

John. I'm confused - how did the powers HELP him in 1840 ? It was an Anglo-Austrian naval force which destroyed the fort at Acre, it was mainly British naval power which meant that he could no longer retain contact with Syria, and it was the realisation of what a full-scale blockade of Alexandria would mean that led to him seeling terms...

With Britain not there, with Russia unable to come into play, and with France playing both sides, what is there to stop him ? Ibrahim had defeated the main Ottoman force and fears were of an advance into Asia Minor. Although there was dissension and mutiny among the Ottoman fleet after its defection, the Egyptians were able to keep order, they posted police and they mixed the crews. Ottoman vessels sailed with Egyptian ones on several occasions without mishap. I agree its not a long-term solution, but it is sustainable in the short-term.

In addition, Egypt relied a lot on its overseas contacts. It built its own line of battle ships at Alexandria but bought from foreign powers the smaller frigates. Experts like Jomard were also brought in, and foreign technicians within the fleet and arsenal basically allowed them to operate at a standard much higher than that of the Ottomans, if looking for a comparison

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I would agree, and the growth of Armenian influence was to a large extent a result of the Greek Revolt. Without it, the Greeks would have been a dominant influence in Ottoman commerce and the navy, and even bigger than historical in the Foreign Ministry.

What would happen would depend largely on how long the Ottomans can hold things together. If the empire gets mired in large external wars, you could see a larger and more successful Greek Revolt even a fulfillment of the Megali Idea - if it all holds together to the end of the 19th c, you could perhaps even see a weird Greco-Ottoman state, or a decentralized Ottoman Empire. It's hard to imagine areas with overwhelming Greek majorities like the Morea and Athens remaining in an Ottoman state indefinitely, however, but the northern half of today's Greece was quite a patchwork of faiths and ethnicities.

I find the Greek influence question to be an interesting one. There certainly was a growing influence of Armenians, Jews, and other Christians in Anatolia and "Palestine" during this same time (to the great displeasure of many Muslims). IIRC, by the time of the Young Turks, Jews and the assorted Christians had a great amount of control over commerce throughout the empire and when they left after WWI, that is what allowed the Turks to basically create an industrial build up out of nowhere.

Now with Greece still in the fold, I don't really think there would be too many insurrections from the other nationalities. The other Great Powers might not want it. They saw the failure of Greece, and with a stronger Ottoman Empire, capable of keeping Russia off the Bosphorus on its own, countries like Great Britain and France might not be so willing to attempt to weaken it a second time.

With the growing strength of commercialism within the Ottoman empire, I believe that the Greeks might well become a huge force within the bureaucracy and executive powers, because even with a separate Greek nation in OTL, the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish merchants in Constantinople/Istanbul were highly influential even after the war.

[Bulgaroktonos]

John. I'm confused - how did the powers HELP him in 1840 ? It was an Anglo-Austrian naval force which destroyed the fort at Acre, it was mainly British naval power which meant that he could no longer retain contact with Syria, and it was the realisation of what a full-scale blockade of Alexandria would mean that led to him seeling terms...

With Britain not there, with Russia unable to come into play, and with France playing both sides, what is there to stop him ? Ibrahim had defeated the main Ottoman force and fears were of an advance into Asia Minor. Although there was dissension and mutiny among the Ottoman fleet after its defection, the Egyptians were able to keep order, they posted police and they mixed the crews. Ottoman vessels sailed with Egyptian ones on several occasions without mishap. I agree its not a long-term solution, but it is sustainable in the short-term.

In addition, Egypt relied a lot on its overseas contacts. It built its own line of battle ships at Alexandria but bought from foreign powers the smaller frigates. Experts like Jomard were also brought in, and foreign technicians within the fleet and arsenal basically allowed them to operate at a standard much higher than that of the Ottomans, if looking for a comparison

Grey Wolf

No doubt the Egyptians had a great amount of potential. I would say that for a good 2 or 3 decades, the Egyptians were as powerful as the Ottomans. Ali and Ibrahim could do just about whatever they wanted and the Ottomans couldn't do anything about it. The problem is, in my mind, cotton. Ali has introduced cotton.

As cotton grows even more important, Egypt is going to become a natural choice for Britain and industrialized Europe, if not by the ACW, then at least gradually as long-staple cotton becomes valued over the American breeds. This problem is compounded with the relative ignorance of the Egyptian population. They don't know how to make machinery. They can run it, and work with it, but they can't maintain it. Ali and Ibrahim were constantly bringing in foreigners to rebuild broken stuff, or buying parts from abroad. This coupled with the failures of Ali's limited educational reforms signal, to me at least, that Egypt's pre-eminence in the region is short-term unless A)the ACW never happens, or B)the educational reforms of Ali go through with much greater success and scale, and Ali and successors are then able to bargain with the European powers over cotton because Egypt is fully capable of maintaining its own industries without foreign dependence.

[Grey Wolf]

No doubt the Egyptians had a great amount of potential. I would say that for a good 2 or 3 decades, the Egyptians were as powerful as the Ottomans. Ali and Ibrahim could do just about whatever they wanted and the Ottomans couldn't do anything about it. The problem is, in my mind, cotton. Ali has introduced cotton.

As cotton grows even more important, Egypt is going to become a natural choice for Britain and industrialized Europe, if not by the ACW, then at least gradually as long-staple cotton becomes valued over the American breeds. This problem is compounded with the relative ignorance of the Egyptian population. They don't know how to make machinery. They can run it, and work with it, but they can't maintain it. Ali and Ibrahim were constantly bringing in foreigners to rebuild broken stuff, or buying parts from abroad. This coupled with the failures of Ali's limited educational reforms signal, to me at least, that Egypt's pre-eminence in the region is short-term unless A)the ACW never happens, or B)the educational reforms of Ali go through with much greater success and scale, and Ali and successors are then able to bargain with the European powers over cotton because Egypt is fully capable of maintaining its own industries without foreign dependence.

The main book I am relying on is a strategic overview

I would definitely be interested in buying one that covers these decades, into the 1850s etc from an Egyptian home front perspective

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

All you say is true, but was not sustainable in the long-term. Mehmed Ali was simply massively overextended. How was he to pay for all this? The revenues of Egypt and Syria were not huge, and the rest of his domains were a large financial drain.

His military strength compared favorably to the Ottomans early on because the latter were in the midst of a total reordering of their polity, which would soon see them eclipse the Egyptians in every conceivable category of military strength. Mehmed Ali was opportunistically taking advantage of this window by making a big power grab.

I'm arguing that the Powers unintentionally helped him by ending his overextension. If they had not, I believe Egypt would have collapsed utterly under the strain of debt and discontent.

Mehmed Ali only got away with what he did due to his successes and the prestige they afforded. Once he ran into inevitable reverses and the crushing taxation he had to levy to support his ambitions took their toll on his subjects' patience, he would have no scope to resist reviving Ottoman power. Remember that he, and all his subordinates, thought of themselves as Ottomans, not Egyptians. It is very easy and convenient, not to mention theoretically a necessity, for a discontent Egyptian official or general to defect from Mehmed Ali to the Sultan.

John. I'm confused - how did the powers HELP him in 1840 ? It was an Anglo-Austrian naval force which destroyed the fort at Acre, it was mainly British naval power which meant that he could no longer retain contact with Syria, and it was the realisation of what a full-scale blockade of Alexandria would mean that led to him seeling terms...

With Britain not there, with Russia unable to come into play, and with France playing both sides, what is there to stop him ? Ibrahim had defeated the main Ottoman force and fears were of an advance into Asia Minor. Although there was dissension and mutiny among the Ottoman fleet after its defection, the Egyptians were able to keep order, they posted police and they mixed the crews. Ottoman vessels sailed with Egyptian ones on several occasions without mishap. I agree its not a long-term solution, but it is sustainable in the short-term.

In addition, Egypt relied a lot on its overseas contacts. It built its own line of battle ships at Alexandria but bought from foreign powers the smaller frigates. Experts like Jomard were also brought in, and foreign technicians within the fleet and arsenal basically allowed them to operate at a standard much higher than that of the Ottomans, if looking for a comparison

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

The main book I am relying on is a strategic overview

I would definitely be interested in buying one that covers these decades, into the 1850s etc from an Egyptian home front perspective

Grey Wolf

I'd recommend:

All the Pasha's Men : Mehmed Ali, his Army and the Making of Modern Egypt (Cambridge Middle East Studies)
by Khaled Fahmy

It's about $30 in paperback.

[Bulgaroktonos]

The main book I am relying on is a strategic overview

I would definitely be interested in buying one that covers these decades, into the 1850s etc from an Egyptian home front perspective

Grey Wolf

Hang on, let me see if I can find all those accursed books I used, and have yet to return to the library.....

....shifts through assorted laundry, suitcases.....

Alright, here's a few

For some of the social tensions relations in the Middle East that were developing around 1800 and that era, Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the 18th Century by Abraham Marcus

For a masterpiece and incredibly researched book on Cotton and its path through Egypt, read Cotton and the Egyptian Economy 1820-1914. E.R.J Owen.

The Egyptian Question Muhammed Kutluoglu

Probably hard to find but The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Origins of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria by Asad J. Rustum American Press, Beirut 1936

Those are the book I would recommend

[Grey Wolf]

All you say is true, but was not sustainable in the long-term. Mehmed Ali was simply massively overextended. How was he to pay for all this? The revenues of Egypt and Syria were not huge, and the rest of his domains were a large financial drain.

His military strength compared favorably to the Ottomans early on because the latter were in the midst of a total reordering of their polity, which would soon see them eclipse the Egyptians in every conceivable category of military strength. Mehmed Ali was opportunistically taking advantage of this window by making a big power grab.

I'm arguing that the Powers unintentionally helped him by ending his overextension. If they had not, I believe Egypt would have collapsed utterly under the strain of debt and discontent.

Mehmed Ali only got away with what he did due to his successes and the prestige they afforded. Once he ran into inevitable reverses and the crushing taxation he had to levy to support his ambitions took their toll on his subjects' patience, he would have no scope to resist reviving Ottoman power. Remember that he, and all his subordinates, thought of themselves as Ottomans, not Egyptians. It is very easy and convenient, not to mention theoretically a necessity, for a discontent Egyptian official or general to defect from Mehmed Ali to the Sultan.

Hmm, how long is long-term - by 1839 this period of his rule had been going on for over 10 years, he had kept his fleet in commission, had continued to build new ships and was well able to go on the offensive.

In addition, the settlement made with the powers in 1840 gave 1/4 of all future revenues to Istanbul, which must not have been an insignificant figure or the percentage would have been higher.

The agreement also forbade Mohammed Ali from building new warships - he attempted to break this almost immediately by laying down new ships of the line. Again implying that financially there was sufficient stability to try to continue as before.

Besides, in the ATL I am theorising a greater role for France, already something of a friend to the Egyptians in some ways.

Grey Wolf

[Bulgaroktonos]

If you can avoid the ACW, or get those reforms through then I'll give Egypt till about 1870 before the cotton monoculture really starts to take its toll, and they are no longer able to sustain their armed forces, as Britain finds that cotton does really well in India too, thus cutting Egypt into a smaller slice of their source, hurting the Egyptian economy, as Britain was their biggest buyer.

Oh, and for the military problems, perhaps you should look for The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Disturbances in Palestine, by Rustum.

[Grey Wolf]

John, ordered the one you mentioned

Bulgar, I looked for the ones you mentioned on Amazon and the ones which came up came up as unavailable.

Thanks for the names/titles though

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

By the Crimean War, the Ottomans held their own one-on-one against Russia and the Egyptian troops were considered worthless by all involved.

Egypt since Mehmed Ali's succession was in a constant state of crisis, two problems of which were never resolved - one was terrible morale, the other, financial. Morale was poor because Mehmed Ali's taxes were crushing and his conscription ruthless. Also, from a military perspective, some peoples simply make better soldiers than others. Egyptian farmers simply due not approach hardy Anatolian peasants in fighting capabilities.

There is nothing wrong with you TL, but upon Mehmed Ali's death, the entire house of cards is going to come tumbling down. The Sultan has merely to neglect to appoint his successor to governorship of Syrian provinces, and that is that.

I cannot emphasize enough that Egypt was NOT independent, nor did anyone in Egypt consider that they were. Mehmed Ali's power was personal, WITHIN the Ottoman Empire. It was only foreign intervention that increasingly made Egypt autonomous. Even as late as the 20th c Ottoman influence in Egypt was much greater than is generally perceived, and until 1882 the Khedive's authority was legally and actually constrained by whatever powers were granted to him by the Sultan.

With regard to fleets, I would remind you that by the 1870s the Ottomans had the THIRD largest fleet in the world, and we're talking ironclads. Ordering them does not imply sufficient financial resources to do so without severe consequences.

Hmm, how long is long-term - by 1839 this period of his rule had been going on for over 10 years, he had kept his fleet in commission, had continued to build new ships and was well able to go on the offensive.

In addition, the settlement made with the powers in 1840 gave 1/4 of all future revenues to Istanbul, which must not have been an insignificant figure or the percentage would have been higher.

The agreement also forbade Mohammed Ali from building new warships - he attempted to break this almost immediately by laying down new ships of the line. Again implying that financially there was sufficient stability to try to continue as before.

Besides, in the ATL I am theorising a greater role for France, already something of a friend to the Egyptians in some ways.

Grey Wolf

[Bulgaroktonos]

John, ordered the one you mentioned

Bulgar, I looked for the ones you mentioned on Amazon and the ones which came up came up as unavailable.

Thanks for the names/titles though

Grey Wolf

No problem. I didn't think you'd have much luck. You could try a library. A university library preferably.

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

No problem. I didn't think you'd have much luck. You could try a library. A university library preferably.

Those were really interesting looking suggestions - I'll have to run down to the NYC library to find them. Unfortunately, you can't check out books like that but have to read them in the library - but fortunately I'm unemployed at least for another two weeks so I have the luxury... anyway, thanks for the recommendations.

[Grey Wolf]

By the Crimean War, the Ottomans held their own one-on-one against Russia and the Egyptian troops were considered worthless by all involved.

Egypt since Mehmed Ali's succession was in a constant state of crisis, two problems of which were never resolved - one was terrible morale, the other, financial. Morale was poor because Mehmed Ali's taxes were crushing and his conscription ruthless. Also, from a military perspective, some peoples simply make better soldiers than others. Egyptian farmers simply due not approach hardy Anatolian peasants in fighting capabilities.

There is nothing wrong with you TL, but upon Mehmed Ali's death, the entire house of cards is going to come tumbling down.

Doesn't this ignore the fact that Ibrahim defeated Hafiz at Nezib, and ina fight of roughly equal force killed 1000 and captured 17000 of the enemy. This reduced the Ottoman to less than parity with which to oppose any Egyptian strike into central Anatolia

Whilst the Syrian revolt was caused by the financial hardships of Mohammed Ali's taxes he effectively crushed the rebellion before the Anglo-Austrian naval attacks on his coast.

Returning to the ATL, I am aware that the OTL successors to Mohammed Ali were not great but they did succeed to a vastly different Egypt than if he had had a constant role of success. Apart from anything else, they would have inherited a good-sized fleet (since he would not have been bound by firman to no longer construct new vessels without permission)

The book I have suggests that Mohammed Ali's manning policies for the fleet worked reasonably well, and that later reforms could well have built upon this, as per Jomard's plan.

Grey Wolf

[Bulgaroktonos]

Of course. Just beware of Owen. You'll come out of reading that book knowing more about the export tables of Alexandria during March of 1847 than you would ever need to know. But by far, he is the most informative on the effects of cotton on the Egyptian economy.

[Grey Wolf]

Those were really interesting looking suggestions - I'll have to run down to the NYC library to find them. Unfortunately, you can't check out books like that but have to read them in the library - but fortunately I'm unemployed at least for another two weeks so I have the luxury... anyway, thanks for the recommendations.

Unfortunately I cannot access the university library. I tried and was told I needed to have a recognised research project signed off by a member of the faculty. I don't think an idol timeline qualifies !

Grey Wolf

[Bulgaroktonos]

Doesn't this ignore the fact that Ibrahim defeated Hafiz at Nezib, and ina fight of roughly equal force killed 1000 and captured 17000 of the enemy. This reduced the Ottoman to less than parity with which to oppose any Egyptian strike into central Anatolia

Whilst the Syrian revolt was caused by the financial hardships of Mohammed Ali's taxes he effectively crushed the rebellion before the Anglo-Austrian naval attacks on his coast.

Returning to the ATL, I am aware that the OTL successors to Mohammed Ali were not great but they did succeed to a vastly different Egypt than if he had had a constant role of success. Apart from anything else, they would have inherited a good-sized fleet (since he would not have been bound by firman to no longer construct new vessels without permission)

The book I have suggests that Mohammed Ali's manning policies for the fleet worked reasonably well, and that later reforms could well have built upon this, as per Jomard's plan.

Grey Wolf

In slight contrast to Abdul, I think Egypt's big problem is going to be economic. The people didn't like Ali, but for the most part, he couldn't be taken down. IIRC, he had secret police, and a pretty firm stranglehold on the whole country. If Ali and his successors can effectively manage to wrangle with Europe over cotton, and manage to run their own economy using native labor and knowledge, then they might have a chance of being able to have Europe obey Egypt during the ACW, rather than Egypt just selling to Europe because Europe wants it. It would be tough, and would require a vast amount of political acumen, but its not outside the realm of possibilty.

The real challenge is getting Egypt to diversify its output VERY quickly. I'm talking Stalinist Russia transformation quickly. If it gets caught with nothing but cotton during the cotton glut of the 1870s, when Egypt, India, and the American South are all producing, then Egypt is probably going down. It needs to be able to able to produce many of its manufactured goods and parts on its own by 1865-1869, or its going to become dependent on Europe.

[Grey Wolf]

The real challenge is getting Egypt to diversify its output VERY quickly. I'm talking Stalinist Russia transformation quickly. If it gets caught with nothing but cotton during the cotton glut of the 1870s, when Egypt, India, and the American South are all producing, then Egypt is probably going down. It needs to be able to able to produce many of its manufactured goods and parts on its own by 1865-1869, or its going to become dependent on Europe.

Doesn't this ignore whatever revenues Egypt was getting from Syria ? I freely admit to ignorance here, but the revolt in 1839 was over these, and I don't think the revenues came by way of cotton. Just ordinary taxation ? But Egypt must have valued them sufficiently to continue to impose them at this level.

Also, how set in stone is the cotton economy ? What was Egypt doing before the ACW cut off Southern US supplies ? If these supplies had never been cut off ? I was under the impression that Egypt upped its output massively in order to cover this, gain monies etc...but am not sure this makes sense ? But if the US goes a different way...?

Grey Wolf

[Bulgaroktonos]

....breaks out Owen....shudders.....

Alright, Owen give me figures reading like this.

1835-6

Total Revenue from Land tax, agriculture, manufactured goods: 76,607,000 Francs

Long Staple Cotton profits: 90,879,520 piastres (1 Pt=.25 Francs)

Short Staple Cotton profits: 250,000 piastres

Longstaple Francs (1836 conversion, mine): 22,719,880 Francs.

So, roughly 30% of Egypt's revenues were due to Long Staple Cotton in 1836. Cotton remains to be roughly 25-30% all the way to 1861.

Hang on, I need to go back to check your questions, so this post isnt quite finished.

[Grey Wolf]

....breaks out Owen....shudders.....

Alright, Owen give me figures reading like this.

1835-6

Total Revenue from Land tax, agriculture, manufactured goods: 76,607,000 Francs

Long Staple Cotton profits: 90,879,520 piastres (1 Pt=.25 Francs)

Short Staple Cotton profits: 250,000 piastres

Longstaple Francs (1836 conversion, mine):22719

I guess one assumes that revenues from Syria are included in this ?

One can also see that cotton profits are greater than land tax etc

But this is mid 1830s - why would these revenues go DOWN ? Is it not that the revenues increased massively in the 1860s ?

I am aware of course that industrialisation will require increasing revenues over subsequent decades

Grey Wolf

[JHPier]

As to Egypt's economy: let's not forget that part of the 1839 treaty limited Egypt's right to set its own customs tariffs, fixing them to less than 5% IIRC. That sort of thing is hell for your ability to build up industry in the face of already-established competition (like Britain's in this age).

[Bulgaroktonos]

Okay, basically, cotton dominates Egypts exports. Except for 1848-9 when the cotton prices hit the floor, cotton has an overwhelming dominance on the Egyptian export market. In 1836, cotton is 808,000 pounds leaving Alexandria, out of a total export market of a little over a million.

You are right, these revenues go up incredibly during the 1860s. But everything else stops.

Cotton goes from 1.4 million dollars in export value in 1861, to 15.4 million in 1865. Its huge. They up production significantly to meet the demand, but the thing is, they are the only major supplier of cotton. During this same time, the importation of machinery goes down, and textile exports go down. This signals to me, a decrease in their position as a manufacturer, and a move towards a situation similar to that of a colony. Egypt sells Britain the cotton, Britain sells them the shirts. By the 1870s, the South has come back on the scene, and India has also begun producing cotton, and after 1869, British imports of cotton continue to steadily decrease by roughy 2 million pounds ever 5 years, as Britain becomes less reliant on Egypt.

Before the ACW, the Egyptians had a relatively balanced trade sheet. They sold cotton to Europe, but it was only 45% of their exports and they also sold a large number of manufactured goods. But during and after the ACW, the latter becomes almost non-existent, and they rely almost solely upon cotton as a source of external revenue.

If the ACW never happens, Egypt is going to be in an advantageous position. Long-staple cotton is better than American Middling or short-staple, but the ACW put the Europeans in a place they did not want to be: reliant on Egypt for cotton. So they were willing to compromise after the ACW to get cheaper cotton elsewhere, while also buying enough from Egypt to keep them from changing back to a manufacturing position. If Egypt keeps the price right, then it is very likely Egypt will be able to steadily increase its revenues on cotton because of the better quality of Long-Staple Cotton. It's very hard to go from high quality back to low quality after a long time, and if Egypt keeps sales of cotton to Europe high, European manufacturers might simply be stuck with the better quality Long-Staple after a certain point, ensuring Egyptian control of that market.

If it does happen, than Egypt needs to make sure it continues to manufacture goods to avoid the cotton glut of the 1870s and 1880s, while also managing to be able to produce the machinery on its own. I'd go with a larger education reform under Ali, to try and educated some of the poorer Egyptians on how to work in factories and fix machinery. Revenues in cotton are going to fall after the ACW no matter what, and if Egypt takes the same path, its going to be heavily reliant upon Europeans, who use the 1860s as a chance to increase their presence in the Egyptian cotton monoculture, making policy and such. Furthermore, output is harder to up at this point, as much of the land is under cultivation, and without a home grown industry, all machinery is imported, leaving only the richest farmers able to buy it.

Not sure if it all makes sense, Owen is making my brain hurt. As for the values of cotton exports durin the ACW, if you can find the conversion for Francs to English Pounds during this time, that should be your value.

[Grey Wolf]

Thank you - this is fascinating

I would say that the major danger is always over-extension, whether in sales or in expenditure

As you show if revenues stay at a sustainable lower level then they are predicatable.

I do not think the ACW was inevitable. I have always been fascinated by how in 1861 the Southern states in an embryonic CSA were able to buy things in from the North, even naval supplies. At this early stage no war, just a developing situation

Grey Wolf

[Grey Wolf]

I was thinking that
http://www.realcasadiborbone.it/uk/archiviostorico/cs_071.htm
offers a different way out of the 1840s

Maybe in France, Louis Philippe I abdicates and his son Ferdinand takes over as king. This dampens the chain of events as per OTL

Meanwhile in the Italian peninsular, events do occur as per OTL in Naples, but the bright hopes for a monarchical confederation are realised as revolutions are not sweeping Europe and as Piedmont-Sardinia is not able to have realistic hopes of acquiring territory (eg Lombardy) from Austria.

Democrats and republicans are still a danger to the plan, but Neo-Guelphism gains ground. Perhaps one can postulate that King Ferdinand I's France backs this ?

Grey Wolf

So, January 1848 events in Sicily kick off larger scale events in Italy

In February, Louis Philippe I abdicates in favour of the popular Ferdinand

There is no revolution in Paris, things do not spread across Germany or Austria

In Italy, events proceed partly as per historical, but without the weakness of Austria, and thus with a continued Habsburg influence, Piedmont-Sardinia will act in a very different way

The Pope will emerge as a leader, probably in unison with Ferdinand II of the Two Sicilies, and quite likely Ferdinand I of France will prove to be an important ahistorical element

Thoughts ?

Grey Wolf

[G.Bone]

Will there be a "council" of some sort between the major rulers of Italy in that period?

[Grey Wolf]

Will there be a "council" of some sort between the major rulers of Italy in that period?

I should imagine so

Looking at OTL you had the Pope's leadership for a while, then when things started to go bad, partly because of the actions of Piedmont-Sardinia you had a meeting in the Two Sicilies of the rulers etc.

I would imagine that in the ATL a kind of blend would come about. I've yet to factor Mazzini or even Garibaldi into the equation. But the Pope added to Ferdinand II would be a strong combination in this TL

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Ottoman manpower resources are vastly greater than Egyptian. Also, you don't need equal forces to defend extremely difficult mountainous terrain, especially when it's your heartland and the enemy army is composed of people who drop dead in the cold.

What you are ignoring is the crushing financial burden of Mehmed Ali's campaigns - while the revenues of Syria were small compared to Egypt, he still levied crushing taxes because he needed every penny he could get. He was not motivated by the desire to form a new empire, he wanted riches. Discontent with his rule was universal in ALL the territory he controlled. This means the Sudan, Arabia, Egypt, and the Levant. Keeping just Egypt afloat led to a debt nearly as large as that of the Ottoman Empire by the 1870s. To maintain all of that and finance his reform programs and military efforts would have been impossible in the long run. Maintaining a large fleet is terribly expensive, both in terms of ship and crew costs and maintenance, as non-steam ships were militarily worthless within a couple of decades, and soon iron ships are necessary.

The reason the Egyptians are no match for the Ottomans in the long run is that the morale of the Egyptian army was always very low. It's just that at the beginning, they had more modern training than the Ottomans. His window of superiority was very short - as I mentioned, just a decade later the Ottomans were able to beat the Russians one-on-one. Mehmed Ali's "manning methods" were essentially to drag people kicking and screaming from their farms and chain them to their posts. Egyptians used to mutilate themselves to escape conscription.

Also, if your book was written by a Westerner, it will greatly exaggerate the impact of Western advisors. British histories attribute all Ottoman reforms to the efforts of Stratford Canning, which is absurd.

Doesn't this ignore the fact that Ibrahim defeated Hafiz at Nezib, and ina fight of roughly equal force killed 1000 and captured 17000 of the enemy. This reduced the Ottoman to less than parity with which to oppose any Egyptian strike into central Anatolia

Whilst the Syrian revolt was caused by the financial hardships of Mohammed Ali's taxes he effectively crushed the rebellion before the Anglo-Austrian naval attacks on his coast.

Returning to the ATL, I am aware that the OTL successors to Mohammed Ali were not great but they did succeed to a vastly different Egypt than if he had had a constant role of success. Apart from anything else, they would have inherited a good-sized fleet (since he would not have been bound by firman to no longer construct new vessels without permission)

The book I have suggests that Mohammed Ali's manning policies for the fleet worked reasonably well, and that later reforms could well have built upon this, as per Jomard's plan.

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

As to Egypt's economy: let's not forget that part of the 1839 treaty limited Egypt's right to set its own customs tariffs, fixing them to less than 5% IIRC. That sort of thing is hell for your ability to build up industry in the face of already-established competition (like Britain's in this age).

That was due to the Capitulations, which Egypt would have been subject to anyway as a legal part of the Ottoman Empire, and even if Egypt somehow managed to achieve independence, it could only do so by being recognized by the powers, which would still subject them to this. Historically, these lasted until WWI.

Mehmed Ali had been evading these restrictions, another reason why he's in deep doo-doo in the long term. The Treaty merely reaffirmed an existing obligation.

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

OK, Bulgaroktonos has done much of this, but let me see if I can sum this up in a brief and coherent way.

Mehmed Ali required 100,000 troops to hold Syria. Huge drain. Sudan also required a large garrison. Conscription was brutal, causing people to mutilate themselves to escape it, and whole villages would flee, requiring them to be resettled by force, all of which are drains on productivity and funds. The revenues of Syria were never able to cover the cost of the occupation, so Syria, as was Sudan and Arabia, were large net DRAINS on the economy. This is why Mehmed Ali had wanted to be granted Syria by the Sultan and why legitimacy was so important.

Economic collapse began BEFORE the powers intervened, while MA was riding high. To bulletize:

- Mehmed Ali overextended economically, setting up all sorts of factories that required a large number of foreign personnel. They required high salaries and generated resentment. The native labor pool did not have the skills necessary to run or administer this array of facilities. As a result, their efficiency, rather than rising over time, actually fell. To have been successful would have required specialist vocational schools, which would have required middle schools, which would have required primary schools, which would have required large numbers of teachers, which would have required teacher-training schools, which would have required... in any case, you get it, a very, very expensive and incredily time-consuming process. The Ottomans, who had a far more realistic and long-term plan, took a century to accomplish this.

- Mehmed Ali increased his revenues by establishing monopolies over everything, including all agricultural production. I'm sure you can see problems with this, but more later...

- The price of cotton fluctuated wildly, making the financial situation very unstable and the government dependent upon loans to make ends meet. In 1836-7 the price of cotton fell suddenly, causing a drastic reduction in revenue, and leading to the bankruptcy of the foreign merchant houses of Alexandria from which MA had been borrowing. The result was that he had to decentralize, handing back agricultural land to notables who had to cover arrears and guarantee revenues, to reduce administrative costs and make up the immediate budget shortfall - but this encouraged the sale of crops illegally to merchants in excess of the fixed government price which led to further decreases in revenue and led to a more or less permanent state of revolt where the people used every method at their disposal to evade taxes. However, the alternative was the total economic and political collapse of Egypt.

In any case, in terms of your TL, I feel the result would be a general collapse of Egypt around 1840 that would likely lead to Ottoman recovery of Syria, and unknown consequences for Egypt. Possibly the Ottomans might try to move in, but this would probably be too soon for them; probably you would end up with a situation much as historical but with a worse-off Egypt, and likely abandonment of the Sudan.

I have also read Owen - you should get it; it appears to be available for 12.70 Pounds. I find it indispensible for my Ottoman TLs.

Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914.

[Grey Wolf]

I don't know how to respond to this. I'm beginning to find History depressing. One set of facts counters another set of facts. Both sets of facts seem not to allow for the interpretation that is the natural result from reading the other. It begins to make no sense at all.

As to my poor attempts to find a timeline that might survive more than a week, I don't know if you have factored in any butterflies at all, as much as I don't really like that term. The statements that Mohammed Ali's rule was inherently weak seem to ignore, or I suppose push aside, the fact that during the 1830s his rule prospered DESPITE British actions in the early 1830s, and despite being contrained in the later 1830s by a British-led coalition. If instead of malign British influence we replace it with initially mild friendship from the French ?

I honestly haven't a clue about most things. What caused the downturn in cotton prices at the end of the 1830s ? Is this something still in play ? On the other hand, surely one's lenders going bust helps in that you don't have to pay them back !

I don't know any country in this period that had even general primary education, Britain was moving that way with education reform acts but I rather doubt that it was universal primary education that had much to do with the industrial revolution in most countries. Russia, for example, funded its naval expansion and modernisation with scholarships for a couple of DOZEN promising students in imperial establishments.

I do think you have a tendency to have Ottoman resilience, as in survival, turn into Ottoman reclamation of lost glories. They never got Algiers back. They never reclaimed any lands lost to the various European states. Why should they come back to reclaim Egypt and its outlying provinces if they are lost ?

I am also somewhat dubious of the idea that an Islamic vassal of the sultan cannot dream of being an independent monarch. The Sultan although Caliph does not have effective or any rule over a vast number of Islamic nations. He may have a degree of theoretical influence, but he does not have a way to exercise it. I feel that you are colouring the independence argument with implications that are unnecessary to it. Practically, Mohammed Ali could not care less whether the Ottoman sultan remains theoretically his overlord on religious and traditional bases. He is looking for EFFECTIVE and LONG-LASTING independence of action, a hereditary principle for Egypt, freedom to act as he wishes.

How a MORE successful Egypt should collapse in 1840 is complete befuddlement to me. An Egypt hemmed in by Great Power politics, forced out of Syria etc, survived. Why should a more successful one which has crushes the rebellion and beaten off Ottoman forces collapse ?

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Despite being occupied by Britain in 1882, Egypt was still legally part of the Ottoman Empire until 1914, and the Ottomans had more influence there than is generally realized. Why? Why was it necessary to maintain this arrangement, rather than just proclaim Egypt independent and a British protectorate? While there is no reason why a Muslim ruler could aspire to becoming an independent monarch, there are lots of reasons why an Ottoman governor cannot. Egypt was NOT a vassal, it was a PROVINCE. There is a big difference. The relationship between the two was not loose like that between the Ottomans and Tunis, or the Principalities. The evolution of Egyptian autonomy was a process that took 100 years, and didn't really accellerate until the 1870s, due to the crises the Ottomans were facing at the time, primarily financial.

There is a difference between reclaiming Algiers or Tunis, which are far from the Ottoman center, and which had never been under direct rule, to Syria, which is adjacent to the Ottoman core and HAD been an integral part of the empire, moreover had no other potential government, and was still a part of the empire.

I do not at all think MA's rule was weak, quite to the contrary, it was very, very strong. I am saying the ECONOMIC basis for his domain was very fragile, and he was horribly overextended.

I am not suggesting that universal primary education was necessary, but Egypt was beginning with zero - it's hard to expect illiterate peasants to be able to operate an industrial infrastructure suddenly created, and in fact, Mehmed Ali himself conceded his industrial policies were a total failure.

As for the economic troubles of the late 1830s, they were not just due to a fall in cotton prices, it was a general economic collapse. While lenders going bankrupt may very well obviate the need to repay them, it also eliminates your ability to make up budget shortfalls, meaning you can't pay your troops, administrators, and foreign advisors, nor subsidize your factories, buy arms, etc. Also, as they were merchant houses, not just banks, not only are you drying up your only source of capital, but you are losing the outlet for sale of your products, to generate your revenues. Again, the Ottomans are more economically resilient due to a much, much greater economic diversity.

I also said I though Egypt was probably too much for the Ottomans to swallow in the 1840s. I do not think Syria was, however - as it was Syria was largely beyond central control when MA moved in, yet the Ottomans reestablished central power over the entirety of the Balkans, Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, the Persian Gulf, and Yemen, all within two decades. THAT is resilient. While not strong enough to reclaim territories lost to EUROPEAN powers, they certainly were strong enough to reclaim them from MUSLIM powers, particularly those that were merely autonomous parts of the Ottoman Empire. I think you greatly underestimate the depth, effectiveness, and purpose of 19th c Ottoman reform - from having to devote the entire resources of the empire to defeating one little pasha in Albania in the 1820s they went to being able to hold their own against RUSSIA in the Crimean War and in 1877 (Serbia and Rumania being required to tip the balance). As opposed to Egyptian reform, which was entirely for the personal ambition of Mehmed Ali, not the strengthening of the State.

I am saying that the economic difficulties faced by MA were independent of his military success. He was not occupying economically productive areas; the Hejaz was always a large drain on Ottoman resources, the Sudan did not produce a surplus, ever, even under British rule (until the 1920s), and Syria did not begin to economically develop until after the period in question. British intervention did not just force Mehmed Ali to back away from his gains, it also forced the Sultan to grant Mehmed Ali LEGAL, DYNASTIC control over Egypt, which would not have occurred otherwise, and would have expired upon his death. He was simply expending enormous sums to hold territories that did not even come close to paying for themselves - it is not a stretch to say that this couldn't continue indefinitely! And all contemporary accounts of the condition of Egypt agree that it was miserable.

In any case, none of this invalidates your TL in the slightest - I'm just saying that MA's overextension would eventually have caused his failure. If anything it presents interesting alternatives to what happened in OTL - it could lead to different powers having control of Egypt, greater French control of the Ottoman economy, even French protectorate over Syria. It also gives latitude for the expansion of one of your favorite evil empires, Russia; if Britain is too preoccupied to help, the Sultan will turn to Russia, as he did in 1833. That could lead just about anywhere!

In any TL I have worked on with greater Ottoman success, it is always generated by retention of the Balkan provinces lost in 1878, which immensely increase the revenues of the empire while not materially increasing its expenditures, as the same number of troops were required to garrison the remnant after Berlin as had been the case before. In the case of MA, Egypt was his only productive province, albeit a fairly rich one, at least by Ottoman standards.

I don't know how to respond to this. I'm beginning to find History depressing. One set of facts counters another set of facts. Both sets of facts seem not to allow for the interpretation that is the natural result from reading the other. It begins to make no sense at all.

As to my poor attempts to find a timeline that might survive more than a week, I don't know if you have factored in any butterflies at all, as much as I don't really like that term. The statements that Mohammed Ali's rule was inherently weak seem to ignore, or I suppose push aside, the fact that during the 1830s his rule prospered DESPITE British actions in the early 1830s, and despite being contrained in the later 1830s by a British-led coalition. If instead of malign British influence we replace it with initially mild friendship from the French ?

I honestly haven't a clue about most things. What caused the downturn in cotton prices at the end of the 1830s ? Is this something still in play ? On the other hand, surely one's lenders going bust helps in that you don't have to pay them back !

I don't know any country in this period that had even general primary education, Britain was moving that way with education reform acts but I rather doubt that it was universal primary education that had much to do with the industrial revolution in most countries. Russia, for example, funded its naval expansion and modernisation with scholarships for a couple of DOZEN promising students in imperial establishments.

I do think you have a tendency to have Ottoman resilience, as in survival, turn into Ottoman reclamation of lost glories. They never got Algiers back. They never reclaimed any lands lost to the various European states. Why should they come back to reclaim Egypt and its outlying provinces if they are lost ?

I am also somewhat dubious of the idea that an Islamic vassal of the sultan cannot dream of being an independent monarch. The Sultan although Caliph does not have effective or any rule over a vast number of Islamic nations. He may have a degree of theoretical influence, but he does not have a way to exercise it. I feel that you are colouring the independence argument with implications that are unnecessary to it. Practically, Mohammed Ali could not care less whether the Ottoman sultan remains theoretically his overlord on religious and traditional bases. He is looking for EFFECTIVE and LONG-LASTING independence of action, a hereditary principle for Egypt, freedom to act as he wishes.

How a MORE successful Egypt should collapse in 1840 is complete befuddlement to me. An Egypt hemmed in by Great Power politics, forced out of Syria etc, survived. Why should a more successful one which has crushes the rebellion and beaten off Ottoman forces collapse ?

Grey Wolf

[Grey Wolf]

British intervention did not just force Mehmed Ali to back away from his gains, it also forced the Sultan to grant Mehmed Ali LEGAL, DYNASTIC control over Egypt, which would not have occurred otherwise, and would have expired upon his death

I'm not sure about this

On the one hand, the rulers of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli (before suppression ?) and Baghdad had all made hereditary statelets

As I read it, the hereditary principle was Mohammed Ali's compensation, his minimum bargaining position when forced back.

I've got 2 new unicorns, one called Snotty and one called Boogie, which is apparently US slang for bogey

Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

British intervention did not just force Mehmed Ali to back away from his gains, it also forced the Sultan to grant Mehmed Ali LEGAL, DYNASTIC control over Egypt, which would not have occurred otherwise, and would have expired upon his death

I'm not sure about this

On the one hand, the rulers of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli (before suppression ?) and Baghdad had all made hereditary statelets

As I read it, the hereditary principle was Mohammed Ali's compensation, his minimum bargaining position when forced back.

I've got 2 new unicorns, one called Snotty and one called Boogie, which is apparently US slang for bogey

Grey Wolf

True. To clarify, I meant that the personal attachment of Syria to Mehmed Ali would have ended with his death. By 1848 the Ottomans were in a position to back that posistion, but probably not with regard to Egypt. Also, most of those rulers held their positions illegally, a convenient pretext for bringing them back into the fold - on the other hand, dynastic rule over Egypt confirmed by the Powers is a different proposition entirely...

Remember also that Mehmed Ali was an Ottoman, not an Egyptian - he was actually even an ethnic Turk, from Kavalla, now part of Greece. Even in 1914 the language of the Khedival family was Ottoman Turkish, not Arabic. His family spent as much time as they could get away with in Istanbul, not Cairo - there are numerous palaces and villas in Istanbul that belonged to the Khedival family that testify to that.

Mehmed Ali did not aspire to be the dynastic ruler of Egypt, that was merely the consolation prize. His ambitions were much higher and in an Ottoman context.

[Grey Wolf]

Mehmed Ali did not aspire to be the dynastic ruler of Egypt, that was merely the consolation prize. His ambitions were much higher and in an Ottoman context.

How much do you think Mohammed Ali was actually aiming at the sultanate/to become padishah etc ? Was this a consistent aim/goal in the period or did it raise its head on the back of success ?

If Britain and Austria had not worked to set him back in 1840+, do you think that the defection of the Ottoman fleet and his victory over the Ottoman army sent against him in Syria would have led to an attempt on the imperial throne itself ?

Despite serious distractions in the Caucasus, would Russia have come to the Ottoman Empire's defence under Unkiar Skelessi ?

Grey Wolf

[fhaessig]

Sorry to jump in on this at this late date, but I have a question about the maps of the belgium/netherland border at the beginning of the thread.

I'm surprised that a Belgium that has effectively won a war against the Netherland ( instead of a rebellion ) includes Maastricht but not the South shore of the Schelde and likely, Welcheren. Why is it so?

The south shore of the Schelde allows the dutch to effectively netralise the port of Antwerpen whenever they chose, thereby choking the main port of Belgium of trade and definitely makes it useless as a Navy base. I'm sure the Belgium/french would be much more interested at gaining this shore, and likely Welcheren too, in order to protect both side of this sea access than at gaining Maastricht. Especially as there is bound to be some ennemity leftover from the war, so Belgium will not be able to count on dutch goodwill. Militarily, the shore is wide open, though Welcheren may be more difficult ( then again, it may not). So why is this not part of Belgium in this TL?

Thanks for giving us again a very good timeline, anyhow.

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

How much do you think Mohammed Ali was actually aiming at the sultanate/to become padishah etc ? Was this a consistent aim/goal in the period or did it raise its head on the back of success ?

If Britain and Austria had not worked to set him back in 1840+, do you think that the defection of the Ottoman fleet and his victory over the Ottoman army sent against him in Syria would have led to an attempt on the imperial throne itself ?

Despite serious distractions in the Caucasus, would Russia have come to the Ottoman Empire's defence under Unkiar Skelessi ?

Grey Wolf

It's hard to tell. With control over the Holy Cities, he may very well have thought he had a shot at the Caliphate, but that would likely have been an opportunistic goal.

I would imagine he would have aimed to become Grand Vizier with a power base sufficient to make it a secure, and perhaps even dynastic, post. I think many of his dynastic hopes died with Ibrahim, however, as the rest of his surviving sons weren't too impressive.

I think you may be overrating the importance of the defection of the Ottoman fleet - besides the immanent obsolescence of the ships themselves, control over the fleet was largely dependent upon the whim of the commander, the personnel could not be retained indefinitely, and he would have to pay them. The impact is that the Ottomans have to build some new ships.

The Ottomans had several armies, not just the provincial one Mahmud sent against Syria. To overthrow the empire he would have to face several more entrenched defensively, fighting in rough terrain, then would have to cross the Straits somehow. An attempt on Constantinople would certainly fail, and probably just bring in the Powers in any case. Even without them the Ottomans will prevail, defensively.

I doubt Mehmed Ali had any delusions that he could accomplish this - more likely he was angling for the best possible position in negotiations. He would never be accepted as Sultan - the best he could achieve is an Imperial marriage to strengthen his posistion (and the title "Damad" for men married to the daughters of Sultans).

[Grey Wolf]

But how much is one ignoring the role of Britain in this ? They not only had DIRECT influence (bombardment of Acre with the Austrians, threats to blockade Alexandria, show of force etc) but an indirect one in shackling and attempting to direct French interests.

I do think one is ignoring France too much here. Louis Philippe's France evinced an interest even in OTL in an independent Egypt, proving an unreliable ally to Britain and this can be seen in the force which attacked Acre - British and...AUSTRIAN !

Unshackled by Palmerston (one could kill him in the civil war to prevent his influence even), French foreign policy could well have been quite different from OTL. With commitments in Algiers, France is unlikely to bend more to the hostile against Egypt but to look for a wedge against Russia, who are still the protectors of the Ottoman Empire under Unkiar Skelessi.

In the ATL, Britain only sends a squadron to observe in 1840-ish. The civil war and the disagreements between the factions who emerged victorious, plus problems in N America make any active role out of the question and this is going to be obvious to France.

Russia is heavily occupied in the Caucasus. OK, the extent of this is not properly understood in Paris, but is that not more likely to make France suspicious of them, and look for a policy that works against them ? Austria on its own cannot mobilise sufficient naval force or political capital to go after Mohammed Ali without France, and if France does not go that way, then Austria, like Prussia, is more or less an irrelevance when it comes to Egypt.

Grey Wolf

[Grey Wolf]

Sorry to jump in on this at this late date, but I have a question about the maps of the belgium/netherland border at the beginning of the thread.

I'm surprised that a Belgium that has effectively won a war against the Netherland ( instead of a rebellion ) includes Maastricht but not the South shore of the Schelde and likely, Welcheren. Why is it so?

The south shore of the Schelde allows the dutch to effectively netralise the port of Antwerpen whenever they chose, thereby choking the main port of Belgium of trade and definitely makes it useless as a Navy base. I'm sure the Belgium/french would be much more interested at gaining this shore, and likely Welcheren too, in order to protect both side of this sea access than at gaining Maastricht. Especially as there is bound to be some ennemity leftover from the war, so Belgium will not be able to count on dutch goodwill. Militarily, the shore is wide open, though Welcheren may be more difficult ( then again, it may not). So why is this not part of Belgium in this TL?

Thanks for giving us again a very good timeline, anyhow.

I don't see it as being politically feasible for Belgium to aim to be larger than it was legally BEFORE 1830

I don't see an annexation of non-Belgian lands at all

In addition, Louis Philippe is the main benefactor here and in OTL he was not as into Belgian independence as history shows (he would have liked to partition it with Austria)

Thanks for the comments
Best Regards
Grey Wolf

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I'm not ignoring France - that's why I said "without European support". However, it seems to me that France would be looking in this case to rebuild its formally dominant position among the Powers at the Sublime Porte, not alienate it further by backing Egyptian territorial ambitions against the Ottomans. However, I don't see why things couldn't go any number of ways - I'm just saying that a large empire is going to exhaust Egypt in the long run, while time greatly favors the Ottomans, with or without Syria.

But how much is one ignoring the role of Britain in this ? They not only had DIRECT influence (bombardment of Acre with the Austrians, threats to blockade Alexandria, show of force etc) but an indirect one in shackling and attempting to direct French interests.

I do think one is ignoring France too much here. Louis Philippe's France evinced an interest even in OTL in an independent Egypt, proving an unreliable ally to Britain and this can be seen in the force which attacked Acre - British and...AUSTRIAN !

Unshackled by Palmerston (one could kill him in the civil war to prevent his influence even), French foreign policy could well have been quite different from OTL. With commitments in Algiers, France is unlikely to bend more to the hostile against Egypt but to look for a wedge against Russia, who are still the protectors of the Ottoman Empire under Unkiar Skelessi.

In the ATL, Britain only sends a squadron to observe in 1840-ish. The civil war and the disagreements between the factions who emerged victorious, plus problems in N America make any active role out of the question and this is going to be obvious to France.

Russia is heavily occupied in the Caucasus. OK, the extent of this is not properly understood in Paris, but is that not more likely to make France suspicious of them, and look for a policy that works against them ? Austria on its own cannot mobilise sufficient naval force or political capital to go after Mohammed Ali without France, and if France does not go that way, then Austria, like Prussia, is more or less an irrelevance when it comes to Egypt.

Grey Wolf

[fhaessig]

I don't see it as being politically feasible for Belgium to aim to be larger than it was legally BEFORE 1830

I don't see an annexation of non-Belgian lands at all


Thanks for the comments
Best Regards
Grey Wolf

I'm not quite sure I understand. I thought the setting of Louis-Phillippe's son on the belgium throne involved a war with the netherlands. Did I misunderstood?

If not, I don't think the legallity of owning some mostly unpopulated, marshy lands really has any impact on the peace treaty. Border readjustment occu all the time in those things, even for short wars.

It's not as if there were a lot of people involved.

If I misunderstood and there hasn't been a real war, then, forget what I said.

[Grey Wolf]

I'm not quite sure I understand. I thought the setting of Louis-Phillippe's son on the belgium throne involved a war with the netherlands. Did I misunderstood?

If not, I don't think the legallity of owning some mostly unpopulated, marshy lands really has any impact on the peace treaty. Border readjustment occu all the time in those things, even for short wars.

It's not as if there were a lot of people involved.

If I misunderstood and there hasn't been a real war, then, forget what I said.

No you did not misunderstand

I just guess I have a different interpretation on this as well as on most other things

I just don't see that a victorious Belgium would be able to secure international recognition for anything ore

I had thought that my maximum Belgium was the greatest possible, giving all of Limburg and Luxembourg to them

Grey Wolf

[fhaessig]

No you did not misunderstand

I just guess I have a different interpretation on this as well as on most other things

I just don't see that a victorious Belgium would be able to secure international recognition for anything ore

I had thought that my maximum Belgium was the greatest possible, giving all of Limburg and Luxembourg to them

Grey Wolf

OH, it's certainly great enougth. I just said I thought it would be more interested in a secure channel from sea to antwerpen than in some village on the border and would have swapped for this on the peace table. It's not a question of a bigger belgium, but on where it has grown.

[JHPier]

If not, I don't think the legallity of owning some mostly unpopulated, marshy lands really has any impact on the peace treaty. Border readjustment occu all the time in those things, even for short wars.

It's not as if there were a lot of people involved.
What do you mean, underpopulated? Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is and was as densely populated as any rural part of The Netherlands. Moreover, it is and was a solidly protestant part. They would NOT have appreciated being included in a catholic state.

[fhaessig]

What do you mean, underpopulated? Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is and was as densely populated as any rural part of The Netherlands. Moreover, it is and was a solidly protestant part. They would NOT have appreciated being included in a catholic state.


??? ARe we really speaking about the same piece of Land?

I'm speking aboiut the south bank of the schelde. When driving there it didn't seem to me to include any big town, even nowadays.

And, IIRC, Welcheren was mostly marshy grounds at the time.

Am I wrong?

[JHPier]

??? ARe we really speaking about the same piece of Land?

I'm speking aboiut the south bank of the schelde. When driving there it didn't seem to me to include any big town, even nowadays.

And, IIRC, Welcheren was mostly marshy grounds at the time.

Am I wrong?I said: "Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is and was as densely populated as any rural part of The Netherlands", rural being the operative word. There are half a dozen or so smallish towns, nowadays of maybe 10-15.000 people, and a larger number of villages, on a piece of land that is a maybe just a tad bigger as Nantucket.
Walcheren merely holds the provincial capital, Middelburg, and the province's main port, Vlissingen, plus a few smaller towns.

[fhaessig]

I said: "Zeeuws-Vlaanderen is and was as densely populated as any rural part of The Netherlands", rural being the operative word. There are half a dozen or so smallish towns, nowadays of maybe 10-15.000 people, and a larger number of villages, on a piece of land that is a maybe just a tad bigger as Nantucket.
Walcheren merely holds the provincial capital, Middelburg, and the province's main port, Vlissingen, plus a few smaller towns.

So forget about Welcheren, if those cities already existed by mid-19th century, which I suspect is the case.

About the south bank of the schelde, I didn't mean to imply they were totally deserted. However, if, as was the case, AFAIK, the population is limited to some villages, I don't think it is outside of the possibility for them to be handed over by the dutch authorities, if they are compensated with simillar land elsewhere. This was done all the time in 19th century treaties ( for a really extreme exemple, have a look at how the border was drawn at Frankfuhrt treaty - and this is still reflected in french internal divisions nowadays - ).

I have another question about belgium in this TL. What about the linguistic status? Is all of Belgium going to convert to french language by the end of the 19th century, as it nearly was OTL ( antwerpen was 40% french speaking )? Bigger dutch-speaking parts would argue against it. OTOH, a french King in Bruxelles is not really going to encourage the Vlaams language, and this will have repercutions.

[JHPier]

About the south bank of the schelde, I didn't mean to imply they were totally deserted. However, if, as was the case, AFAIK, the population is limited to some villages, ....I don't know what your concept of "some villages" is, but as I said before, there were a couple of towns there, not big ones, true, but still 3-4 times larger then a village.
And while Limburgers were a bunch of b-y papists anyway, the people of Zeeuwsch-Vlaanderen were not.
I have another question about belgium in this TL. What about the linguistic status? Is all of Belgium going to convert to french language by the end of the 19th century, as it nearly was OTL ( antwerpen was 40% french speaking )? Bigger dutch-speaking parts would argue against it. OTOH, a french King in Bruxelles is not really going to encourage the Vlaams language, and this will have repercutions. Since 19C-Belgium was wholly French-speaking, on the official level, and Flemish emancipation a post-WWI phenomenon, I don't think it matters much.