The future Taiwan Straits War:

[raharris1973]

A Sino-American war over Taiwan is something I see as plausible, even if it’s not very probable.

Here’s how things would match up.

The Chinese have some big advantages on the surface: their commitment to the issue, their size, their growth trajectory and their proximity to the island. They could be more dangerous to any intervening US naval forces than any foe since Japan in WWII.

However, local geography, the fact that Taiwan is separated from the mainland by a strait several times wider than the English channel, does a lot to make it hard for China to apply its advantages to this particular situation. It will remain difficult for China to effectively squeeze its power through that narrow windpipe for a decade or more after the overall correlation of forces begins to shift in its favor.

If China has any idea what it’s doing, it won’t use force unless it can actually get forces across the strait to occupy Taiwan and end the war. If occupied, the Taiwanese would probably accept that guerrilla resistance is futile, like most Dutch and Frenchmen accepted when the Nazis occupied them. China would be likely to find enough collaborators to help run the place. The world wouldn’t organize a counter-invasion if China entrenched itself on the island.

The problem is that getting a force across the Taiwan straits, and getting it there so it’s still in a condition to fight at the other side of the water, is a daunting logistical task. You have your typical trade-off in that the forces that are lightest and easiest to insert into the battlefield, airborne and marine troops, have the least firepower and mobility once they get there. So many things that you have to get right in amphibious and airborne invasions, can go horribly wrong.

Let me digress a minute to dispense with China’s supposedly easier options, like missile strikes, bombing and blockade. They are easier to perform and pose less risk of Chinese Army forces being defeated and made PoWs. They have a huge drawback though. They piss off the Taiwanese public without decisively finishing the war. A prolonged campaign of stand-off terror tactics would just strengthen pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, permit others to begin to help Taiwan with air defense, missile defense, ASW and anti-mine warfare, and make it more likely that more countries will recognize Taiwan. No democracy has ever surrendered its own sovereignty without ground forces coming in to take it away.

Here’s how I see future Sino-US war over Taiwan playing out-

Beijing, provoked by either a Taiwanese declaration of independence or something it thinks it can interpret as a Taiwanese declaration of independence, prepares to invade.

The US picks up on some signs and gets ready to intervene.

China launches the invasion. Over 50-50 odds that enough things go wrong and US and Taiwanese resistance is competent enough that the first wave fails. China may have the wherewithal to launch a second or third wave, along with heavy stand-off missile attack, before they’ve expended usable airborne & amphibious assets. But the likelihood of a latter wave’s success is even lower than the first. The US will probably suffer some of its most significant air force and navy casualties in many decades but won’t lose it’s interdiction capability against a would-be Chinese occupying force.

So China has lost the battle, can continue missile attacks for some time, and is mad as hell. I’ll say the default assumption is that China can keep popular outrage directed at the United States, and not its own regime. Selected individuals in the Chinese hierarchy will be scapegoated as incompetents and slackers, but not the regime as a whole.

In the economic sphere, US-Chinese trade halts. The Chinese stop buying treasury bonds, but once shooting starts, the US freezes Chinese assets. Other purchasers of US bonds will start to worry about the dollar, but if it looks like there’s going to be a run, the US will probably impose capital flow restrictions by fiat. Who knows how the financial flows will look when restrictions are eventually lifted. China will intern enemy aliens. That’s hundreds of thousands of people. The US will monitor some Chinese aliens and intern others [diplomats and those with an intel connection], but nothing like the WWII stuff and nothing at all versus Chinese-Americans. China seizes US assets and properties in China. The US and Taiwan will blockade Chinese ports. Russia will make a fortune as an alternate shipping route, esp. Vladivostock. China’s POL situation will still be more precarious because land delivery routes are no match for the sea. Chinese agents may attempt some sabotage in the US, but I don’t know how much terrorism would be in their plans. There would definitely be some spontaneous violent outbursts by some Chinese citizens in the USA.

Trade effects – countries which can produce substitutes for Chinese products have an opportunity to make money, but retailers are screwed and there’s big inflationary pressure. Meanwhile, Chinese light industry suffers, and Beijing has to resume some aspects of the command economy to shift productive inputs to support the war effort. It will get to find out how interchangeable these parts are.

China needs to decide what it can do. I think nuclear escalation against CONUS is out, they don’t want to get themselves killed. I don’t think they’re WWII Japanese here. They just might use nukes against US targets at sea, but from this starting point I’d say that’s still much less than a fifty-fifty chance. They might nuke Taiwan, betting that the US won’t initiate an intercontinental exchange over it. It is nuking their own country, but it’s a traitorous part of the country, and they might consider it more vital to make the point that if they can’t get it, nobody can. I still rate that as a very much under fifty-fifty likelihood—China cannot 100% rule out escalation. Conventional missile strikes may very well go beyond the immediate Taiwan straits theater. China may very well attack US bases on Okinawa, Micronesia, Guam or the Philippines with conventional missiles. That is doubly likely if the US launches conventional attacks on the Chinese mainland (around where they are assembling their invasion and missile forces for instance) that kill Chinese civilians in the homeland, something foreigners have not done since WWII.

One of the potentially interesting and dangerous things is how China might seek to cause trouble for the US in retaliation for the way it perceives the US trying to break up China.
China will want the US to have a difficult time on the Korean peninsula. Theoretically it might want to start another Korean war to have a ground front with the USA that plays more to China’s land combat advantages. North Korea certainly isn’t postured to refuse Chinese offers of “help”. However, I think China would hesitate to get fully involved in a Korean War because they would end up having to waste too much of their effort shooting at South Koreans, who are quite capable and who outnumber US forces on the peninsula many times over, and who are generally disposed to be friendly to China. For Korea therefore, I’d bet they’d want to enhance whatever nuclear capabilities North Korea may have, and may promise North Korea whatever it wants to encourage them to start a war on the peninsula, but they’d hang the North Koreans out to dry and not engage their own forces.

A Sino-US war would bust open any feeling of a common stand against terrorism. China would start supporting whatever militant Muslim factions there are out there that are aimed mostly at the Americans. If still living, and capable of getting messages out, I’m sure Bin Laden and Zawahiri would issue a fatwa supporting the Chinese and making the decision to put the Uighur struggle on ice in return for assistance from China. In their messages over the last couple years they show signs of trying to manipulate great power rivalries, for instance by offering the Europeans a truce; Bin Laden long ago wrote about wanting to make an alliance with the Japanese and working with them to get revenge for Hiroshima. The Chinese could provide safe haven for some Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda affiliated planners, not the biggest names but mid-level folk.

The area where China has the most capability to cause the US trouble is in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Chinese could encourage the Pakistanis to ditch their unpopular ties with the Americans, and provide aid for the Pakistanis to support neo-Taliban fighters to try to take back Afghanistan and restore it as an Al-Qaeda haven. They could enhance the deal by offering the Pakistanis material aid, and maybe even an ICBM or two as a deterrent to make Pakistan un-invadable. Some Pakistanis would know that rejection of the US is very dangerous, but they would also know that popular feeling, up through the middle military ranks, would be so desirous of siding with China that would go along to avoid getting shot.

The US and China would compete for influence in Central Asia, and Russia would be in a very precarious situation. Working out funds and logistics would be tricky but China could also sell a few turnkey nuclear weapons to countries like Iran and Venezuela. It may not even make as much money as they would like, but it helps accomplish the objective of giving the Americans lots of other problems to think about.

Al-Qaeda needs no encouragement to try to overthrow pro-US regimes in the Muslim world, and China could advertise itself as an alternative ally to either post-revolutionary or existing regimes in places like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Chinese could just hope to encourage a bunch of revolutions, and if only one or two work or cause the US a serious headache, that’s good enough. Deals with Pakistan and attempts to secure land delivery routes for oil from Iran through Central Asia will strain relations with India and Russia. However, Russia and India would not be inclined to stick their necks out to really intervene for or against China no matter what, so the Al-Qaeda, Pakistan, Taliban, Iran bunch offers a better prospect of messing with Uncle Sam’s day. In the case of India, China can figure that the trouble that India might cause by helping dissident Tibetans is less of a risk than the damage that a pro-Taliban, pro-Al-Qaeda Pakistan could do to the US. In the case of Russia, it will have too much money to be made as the closest oil supplier to China to complain much.

I guess there’s an argument that the Chinese would be hesitant to try to redeem a losing Taiwan war by helping Al-Qaeda. Why get in bed with people who have religious designs on Xinjiang for instance, and why disrupt relations with other countries who would be offended by alignment with global terrorists. I think ultimately this argument is weaker than the one I just made about why they would get reckless. China could be reckless because unlike the US or USSR during the cold war it doesn’t have a delicate system of international alliances to defend. It can figure that it won’t have strategic interests that would clash with new nuclear powers like Iran, and that if the terrorists ever turned on China, dictatorial controls and mass reprisals against Muslims in China could defeat the terrorist threat. It need not sustain cooperation with Al-Qaeda and others for long, just enough to keep the pot boiling for a nice half decade while they re-build for a second try at Taiwan. A China that is losing in Taiwan will be in no mood to follow Spock-like logic and forbearance.

So, in conclusion, the most dangerous potential aspect of a Sino-US war over Taiwan in the next decade isn’t an intercontinental nuclear exchange, or a military defeat of US forces, it’s that anything other than a quick Chinese victory could drive China into collaboration with Al-Qaeda and countries who see themselves on Washington’s hit list.

Thoughts?

[Leo Caesius]

My understanding of the military situation of Taiwan is that it would be virtually impossible to occupy without first slaughtering most, if not all, of the people on the island. The Chinese would have to pursue a "scorched earth" policy that would make them a pariah in the eyes of the world and make any conquest of Taiwan virtually meaningless except for internal propaganda value.

OTOH, international support for Taiwan is waning, every year. There is a local group that seeks independence but IIRC a majority of Taiwanese still seek an (eventual) reunification with a (democratic) China. Furthermore, the Taiwanese and Chinese economies are intertwined to a degree even more inextricable than the American and Chinese economies. Eventually the court of world opinion is going to swing in favor of the Chinese, and Taiwan will be forced to come to some sort of political understanding with China. The Chinese have everything to gain from waiting, and they are well aware of this fact.

I'm not saying that this is just; it's a bit like forcing a battered wife to return to her home. However, fewer and fewer countries recognize Taiwan every year, and the supporters who were formerly most staunch are now wavering in their resolve. China sees this (indeed, is deliberately engineering this) and stands to reap the benefits from a long wait. For this reason I suspect that a Taiwan Straits War is improbable without some sort of major change within China itself (rise of a nationalist and militaristic regime?).

Incidentally, when you mentioned the English Channel, the image of a China-Taiwan Chunnel formed in my mind. I wonder if it would be possible for the Chinese to tunnel their way to Taiwan? I'm sure they have the manpower.

[raharris1973]

"For this reason I suspect that a Taiwan Straits War is improbable without some sort of major change within China itself (rise of a nationalist and militaristic regime?)."

I wouldn't call a change to such a regime likely, but then again, we always consider everything except linear continuation of current trends unlikely.
The world, and most of all China, has been very lucky that for the last three decades the Chinese government has been so constructively focused on economic growth, being very "Meiji"-like. They've got no reason to change that overall strategy, but, never underestimate human capacity for stupidity, even when its those clever, long-term thinkin', oh yeah, and "inscrutable" Chinese.

BTW you're kickin' butt and takin' names in your political threads. But you knew to back off when you were getting too personal. You're class act, chief.

[Kadyet]

To note regarding China-Taiwan war possibility:
Chinese doctrine is that they will not fight the superpower. Thus, they have organized their military around a two-week timetable for invasion (as it will be approximately two weeks until significant USN forces arrive, the Kitty Hawk CBG does not qualify as significant in this thrust).

Any invasion of Taiwan will begin with total surprise as per Chinese doctrine. It will begin with missile and air bombardment lasting until ROCAF and ROCN are incapable of offering meaningful resistance. They will not sail otherwise.

PLA objectives are to seize two ports by landing (iirc) two light or medium corps next to them and then taking the ports themselves. Heavy divisions will use these ports to conquer Taiwan.

There is serious doubt about the morale of the ROCA, especially in the event of an invasion. It is quite possible that units will defect to the PLA.

Quite disturbingly, the PLAN has begun a crash building program, building a much higher number of landing craft than they had previously.

[raharris1973]

The arguments that China and America would do everything to avoid such a clash are weaker than you might think.

On China’s side, some argue that China would hesitate because:

1. It would disrupt Chinese economic growth
2. If you needed to fight over Taiwan it would be reduced to rubble and be worthless.
3. They would lose Taiwanese investment

The weaknesses of those arguments are as follows:
1. China would probably consider the economic setback only temporary. If they were confident they could get Taiwan in the end, they would figure it would be worth the short-term sacrifice. They will especially think this if Taiwan looks like its going to declare independence and become lost forever. The Chinese have feelings too, they aren’t just logical, green-blooded Vulcans doing cost-benefit analysis.

2. The idea that worry about physical destruction on Taiwan will make it worthless is weak. First of all, seizing Taiwan would not be about maximizing value from Taiwan, it is seen as necessary for preserving all China. Second, as the recovery of industrial Europe after the world wars shows- even seriously destructive wars can be overcome in economic terms in under a decade. And as the German experience in occupied Europe shows, its easy to draw economic value from occupied territories if they are urbanized and poor guerrilla country (France and the Low Countries were assets to Berlin) – China would hope its military operations run as smoothly as the German conquest of France, which resulted in a strengthening of the Reich economy and increased Franco-German trade. The Taiwanese, like the occupied west Europeans, could not refuse to be productive. They need to work to eat. For some reason, industrial countries recover faster from wars, and have a better cost-benefit ratio for the occupier, than underdeveloped and predominantly rural areas like Gaza, Afghanistan, or WWII Yugoslavia.

3. Taiwanese investment is no deterrent to a Chinese invasion. If war broke out, Beijing could seize all-Taiwanese owned properties in a heartbeat. Taiwanese investment in China probably just acts a deterrent against Taiwan declaring independence. I have no idea why people assume that in wartime, Marquis de Queensbury rules of capitalist ownership would be a big worry for China.

On America’s side, some argue that the US would never fight China over Taiwan because:

1. Americans don’t know or care much about Taiwan.

2. Americans know China is too big to mess with. They don’t want a land war in Asia.

3. American forces are stretched thin

4. Americans don’t want to trade Peoria for Taipei.

5. Americans can’t take casualties, period.



The weaknesses in these arguments are that

1. The American people tend to follow their leaders if they say there is a security threat, even if they’ve never heard of the place. From a cold, calculating abstraction, it’s easy to say Taiwan isn’t worth it. But, in the heat of rising tensions in the straits, Americans elites will believe that this will be a defining moment where the Chinese will learn how much they can throw their weight around. They would be afraid of China getting the idea that it could throw its weight around the whole western Pacific in the century to come. That is simply the psychology of great power rivals. It’s kind of like 1950 all over again, if you asked the leaders in May whether Korea was important to defend, they said no, but when confronted with actual aggression in June they changed their minds. The public will go along with leadership reasoning at least for a few years before questioning it, they always do.

2. China’s size is intimidating, but it also makes arguments that you don’t want them to build aggressive momentum stronger. A land war in Asia? Well, over Taiwan, in wouldn’t be a land war, it would be a sea and air war, which we’re better at and more confident about.

3. American forces are stretched thin. Yes they are, but that’s more in the ground forces than the air and sea forces, the US wars in the Middle East mostly rely on different assets than a Taiwan Straits war would.

4. Peoria for Taipei is a reference to a Chinese threat to use nuclear weapons. But since the US nuclear arsenal is massive, a Chinese threat won’t be convincing and US leaders will believe the Chinese an American nuclear arsenals neutralize each other.

5. Americans can take casualties. It’s casualties when combined with uncertain objectives and a feeling that the effort is futile that discourages Americans. Because the Americans would be able to destroy so much Chinese hardware and sink invasion fleets, victory will be seen as quite probable. There will be at most a saboteur problem in Taiwan, not a guerrilla problem. You don’t have guerrillas, you don’t have a chance of beating the US, most would think.

[Susano]

The People'ls Liberation Army has not enough amphibious assets to launch an invasion of Taiwan. What it ha sis imply not enough to bring a sufficient amount of men onto the island. Of course, their generality knows so.
CHinese plans would thus be different: No outright invasion, but war by other means. The Chiense Navy could block the islands two biggest harbours, thus cutting off 85% of all Taiwanse trade, including ALL oil imports. Generally Taiwan is very dependant on imports, so that alone could force them on their knees. Electronical warfare could black out Taipeh and infest the Taiwanse computer networks. And China has 600 misisles pointed at Taiwan.
So, no there wouldnt be an outright invasion. Because it is not possible. But China has other means.