View Full Version : different outcome to pearl harbor
Nor
October 25th, 2008, 04:10 AM
if is said that the japanese plan to attack pearl harbor was expected before it had happened. so i am wondering if a battle at pearl harbor would of had the same unifying affect with the american population as the surprise attack did. how could the difference effect the outcome of the war?
Germaniac
October 25th, 2008, 05:10 AM
Well, If the Navy had been able to get out of the Harbor and engage the Japanese forces you basically have 8 Battleships 8 crusiers and 30 destroyers against 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 9 destroyers. In a pre war view the American Fleet should win, But while the two Kongo class stand very little chance against the colorodo's and pennsylvania's, The Aircraft carriers might take an even greater toll on the Battleships. Without the air superiority of the american forces, the Japanese might have a field day against the under protected battleships, being out to sea and in deep waters the destroyed battleships will not be raised and used again. It will be near the same feeling when americans see the Pacific fleet was destoryed, but being that it was destoryed in an actual battle might be worse. Americans might also not be so inclined to join the navy now that theve seen an entire fleet destroyed
Blue Max
October 25th, 2008, 08:04 AM
if is said that the japanese plan to attack pearl harbor was expected before it had happened. so i am wondering if a battle at pearl harbor would of had the same unifying affect with the american population as the surprise attack did. how could the difference effect the outcome of the war?
I think it would be pretty close to the same. Short of the USA taking long term steps that would force Japan to cancel the operation (and they would cancel it if it were somehow compromised) the USA would at least be strategically surprised and out of position. This would mean that the USA could draw a higher price against Japan, and that might improve its immediate military situation, but some facts are going to remain the same:
Even if the USA draws a higher price of the Japanese Attack, you've still got a very angry United States. You might not have the Pearl Harbor Commission afterward, but FDR is in a war, Churchill's hand is forced by the Japanese attacks on British Assets (not that he would have been kept out anyway) and Hitler makes the same move as before.
Little changes politically, but major changes strategically. See Calbear's Pacific War Redux for a luckier and better US situation in the Pacific.
The Dean
October 25th, 2008, 08:27 AM
If the American ships were steaming at action stations they would be more difficult to hit and able to fight back more effectively against the aircraft. Also if they had known the attack was coming and went to meet it could they not have called on the American carriers? How many hours steaming away were they?
The Dean
October 25th, 2008, 08:46 AM
I've checked it out, The Enterprise was close enough to have joined the fleet from Pearl on the 7th. Saratoga and Lexington could have reached the area with a day or twos notice.
mattep74
October 25th, 2008, 08:47 AM
If the American ships were steaming at action stations they would be more difficult to hit and able to fight back more effectively against the aircraft. Also if they had known the attack was coming and went to meet it could they not have called on the American carriers? How many hours steaming away were they?
Well, Enterprise had its planes within range of Pearl since some came in during the attack and were shot down and the carrier itself arrived at Pearl that evening so she was wery close. Dont know were Lex and Yorktown were.
The Dean
October 25th, 2008, 08:57 AM
Well, Enterprise had its planes within range of Pearl since some came in during the attack and were shot down and the carrier itself arrived at Pearl that evening so she was wery close. Dont know were Lex and Yorktown were.
From the Dept of Navy History site (http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-9.htm) The Lex was 500 miles SE of Midway, Saratoga just finished refit and ready to sail in San Diego and Yorktown still in the Atlantic fleet. Enterprise was on task to ferry 12 Wildcats to Wake but I don't know if there was a full air component on board.
Andrew Hudson
October 25th, 2008, 10:25 AM
It wouldn't have had that much difference on the support for the Pacific War. Assuming the air defences were prepared and the attack had been driven off and the American fleet was at sea the United States was hardly likely to have just shrugged off a hostile act. There would probably have been no surface enagement as the Kongo class were fast battelships and could have outrun the Americans even though the American's would have outgunned them. They would have had little impact in the far east as the battelships would have had to operate in an area where Japan would have had air superiority, they would have probably been sunk but without the feeling of treachery that Pearl Harbour generated
It might however have made the United States more amenable to a negotiated settlement. The biggest question would have been whether Hitler would have been as eager to declare war on the United States
For the reasons above, I am sceptical about the Pearl Harbour conspiracy theories although the aircraft carriers just happened to be at sea. Apparently intelligence warning was disbelieved. As with most things in history, the cock up theory is more likely as with 9.11
Nor
October 25th, 2008, 01:18 PM
what i know about the prelude to the attack is that FDR had a hard time giving support to england because the american populace at that time wanted t stay out of another foreign war.
as for the outcome at pearl harbor, the ijn may have been surprised themselves (not to sure if the inj had a sub sreen or scout planes) and including the fact that they where under strict radio silence. if they where surprised, would that outcome still of had the same affect?
eltf177
October 25th, 2008, 03:04 PM
From what I've read Kido Butai was under orders to return to Japan if spotted prior to launching the attack.
Let's suppose the USN Catalina's were patroling North of Pearl as well as South and spotted the fleet, which turns back. This would certainally be recognized as a hostile act, though probably not enough to do much more than increased survelliance of the IJN. What questions would the US ask Japan regarding all of this? Does Japan recall troops heading for Malaya and the DEI?
Given Japan's desperate straits I can't see Kido Butai turning back but Nagumo launching the attack (IIRC Yamato actually expected the attack to be much more heavily opposed and figured on losing some carriers).
CalBear
October 25th, 2008, 05:47 PM
From the Dept of Navy History site (http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq66-9.htm) The Lex was 500 miles SE of Midway, Saratoga just finished refit and ready to sail in San Diego and Yorktown still in the Atlantic fleet. Enterprise was on task to ferry 12 Wildcats to Wake but I don't know if there was a full air component on board.
The only USN carrier that was carrying a full airwing on December 7 was the Ranger; she was actually over strength. Yorktown was only a few fighters short.
Here are the details
USS Lexington
Bombing Squadron Two (VB-2) with 15 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless
Fighting Squadron Two (VF-2) with 16 Brewster F2A-3 Buffalos
Scouting Squadron Two (VS-2) with 1 Douglas SBD-2 and 14 SBD-3 Dauntless
Torpedo Squadron Two (VT-2) with 12 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators
USS Saratoga
Bombing Squadron Two (VB-2) with 15 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless
Fighting Squadron Two (VF-2) with 16 Brewster F2A-3 Buffalos
Scouting Squadron Two (VS-2) with 1 Douglas SBD-2 and 14 SBD-3 Dauntless
Torpedo Squadron Two (VT-2) with 12 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators
USS Ranger
Fighting Squadron Five (VF-5) with 18 Grumman F4F-3 and 1 F4F-3A Wildcats
Fighting Squadron Forty One (VF-41) with 17 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats and 2 North American SNJ-3s
Scouting Squadron Forty One (VS-41) with 8 Vought SB2U-1 and 2 SB2U-2 Vindicators
Scouting Squadron Forty Two (VS-42) with 9 Vought SB2U-1 and 6 SB2U-2 Vindicators
Torpedo Squadron Four (VT-4) with 3 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators
USS Yorktown
Bombing Squadron Five (VB-5) with 19 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless
Fighting Squadron Forty Two (VF-42) with 18 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats
Scouting Squadron Five (VS-5) with 19 Douglas SBD-3 Dauntless and 2 North American SNJ-3s
Torpedo Squadron Five (VT-5) with 14 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators
USS Enterprise
Bombing Squadron Six (VB-6) with 17 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless
Fighting Squadron Six (VF-6) with 16 Grumman F4F-3A Wildcats
Scouting Squadron Six (VS-6) with 10 Douglas SBD-2 and 8 SBD-3 Dauntless
Torpedo Squadron Six (VT-6) with 18 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators and 2 North American SNJ-3s
USS Wasp
Fighting Squadron Seventy One (VF-71) with 18 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats
Fighting Squadron Seventy Two (VF-72) with 17 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats, 2 Vought SB2U-2 Vindicators and 1 North American SNJ-3
Scouting Squadron Seventy One (VS-71) with 4 Vought SB2U-1 and 13 SB2U-2 Vindicators and 2 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators
Scouting Squadron Seventy Two (VS-72) with 18 Vought SB2U-3 Vindicators
USS Hornet (still working up)
Bombing Squadron Eight (VB-8) with 19 Curtiss SBC-4 Helldivers
Fighting Squadron Eight (VF-8) with 19 Grumman F4F-3 and 2 F4F-3A Wildcats
Scouting Squadron Eight (VS-8) with 20 Curtiss SBC-4 Helldivers
Torpedo Squadron Eight (VT-8) with 8 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators and 7 Naval Aircraft Factory SBN-1s
Wildcats were in short supply and the changeover from Vindicators to SBD dive bombers was not complete.
CalBear
October 25th, 2008, 06:04 PM
Overall the Pearl Harbor attack best case scenario for the U.S is roughly five hours warning. This is enough time to get the AAA guns both shore and ship manned, set full watertight integrety on all ship, get the fighters ready and warmed up and generally have a warm welcome waiting the JNAF. Lees than that you wind up with ncreasgingly limited effectiveness. Twelve hours is too long, that allows the Fleet to begin to sortie, but not enough time to form up for mutual defense. More than 12 hours the attack doesn't happen because the quail's been flushed and flown.
Riain
October 25th, 2008, 09:47 PM
CalBear, 5 hours may be the optimum, but what trigger is closest to this optimum? The Ward sinking of the mini sub is less than 5 hours, and the radar contact is even less. Wasn't 5 hours before the first bomb dropped 4AM and thus still dark? Or was there a chance plane, ship or sub in the general vicinity to give this optimal warning in fluke circumstances?
mattep74
October 26th, 2008, 08:33 AM
CalBear, 5 hours may be the optimum, but what trigger is closest to this optimum? The Ward sinking of the mini sub is less than 5 hours, and the radar contact is even less. Wasn't 5 hours before the first bomb dropped 4AM and thus still dark? Or was there a chance plane, ship or sub in the general vicinity to give this optimal warning in fluke circumstances?
According to Wikipedias site about the attack it sais the following
At 03:42[28] Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper USS Condor spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted destroyer USS Ward.[29] That midget probably entered Pearl Harbor, but Ward sank another at 06:37.[29][30] A midget on the north side of Ford Island missed Curtiss with her first torpedo and missed the attacking Monaghan with her other one before being sunk by Monaghan at 08:43.[29]
Wards big misstake was sending its battlereport in by code and it took over 1 hr to decode it apperantly. Had the alarm gone of at 06.37 and the radarguys said that the planes were coming from north east and not north west Pearl could have gone to red alert and sent fighters into the air.
But its all speculation now and some of the airmen that didnt lift off survived to fight another die while the crew on the ships didnt
Derek Jackson
October 26th, 2008, 09:51 AM
As I understand it some people worked out from the decoded Japanese messages to the embassy that Japan would go to war in early December. Maybe had this got passed up the line and the appropriate messages were sent US forces all over the Pacific would be on alert.
Had this been combined with an understanding of just how vulnerable aircraft are on the ground..
Well there would be an aware alert force at Pearl Harbor, relevant water tight doors on ships would be sealed.
In OTL the Japanese aircraft were detected on radar but their significance was not understood.
Maybe the American aircraft could have been got in the air by the time the Japanese arrived.
For sure the Japanese had better craft but they would be near the limit of their range whereas the US craft would be over their own base.
Japan could suffer a serious tactical defeat. Just maybe the Japanese fleet could have been defeated Between 7th and 10th of December.
This does not stop the US going to war with Japan. It might (but probably will not stop Hitler's declaratin of war.)
Query would a serious defeat around Hawaii have made any difference to Japan's campaign in the Phillipines?
The Dean
October 26th, 2008, 10:12 AM
Wards big misstake was sending its battlereport in by code and it took over 1 hr to decode it apperantly.
Did they actually send a contact report in code? That goes against all radio security procedures. The enemy know where they are so now they know what that location looks like encoded!
Markus
October 26th, 2008, 12:28 PM
Well, If the Navy had been able to get out of the Harbor and engage the Japanese forces you basically have 8 Battleships 8 crusiers and 30 destroyers against 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 9 destroyers.
You forgot three CV, about 130 land based fighters and 57 land based bombers. With advance knowledge of the attack itīs "goodbye Kido Butai". With less than one hour warning you could have still gotten the fighters in the air and the ship and shorebased AA ready. That will reduce the damage to a minumum and and cripple the IJNīs aviation.
The Dean
October 26th, 2008, 12:33 PM
You forgot three CV, about 130 land based fighters and 57 land based bombers. With advance knowledge of the attack itīs "goodbye Kido Butai". With less than one hour warning you could have still gotten the fighters in the air and the ship and shorebased AA ready. That will reduce the damage to a minumum and and cripple the IJNīs aviation.
Only one CV the Enterprise was close enough to intervene and according to Calbear's source that had on board-
Bombing Squadron Six (VB-6) with 17 Douglas SBD-2 Dauntless
Fighting Squadron Six (VF-6) with 16 Grumman F4F-3A Wildcats
Scouting Squadron Six (VS-6) with 10 Douglas SBD-2 and 8 SBD-3 Dauntless
Torpedo Squadron Six (VT-6) with 18 Douglas TBD-1 Devastators and 2 North American SNJ-3s
Markus
October 26th, 2008, 12:36 PM
With enough advance knowledge all three could be there.
CalBear
October 26th, 2008, 04:24 PM
With enough advance knowledge all three could be there.
To get the Sara there you will need several weeks warning. She was in Bremerton getting a routine dry docking in early Novermber.
mattep74
October 26th, 2008, 06:28 PM
If enought warning to allow Saratoga to be on station, wouldnt it be a good idea to have every sub in the pacific fleet have wolfpack like ambush? Even if the torpedoes were faulty i dont see that if 10-20 american subs fire at the same time that every freaking torpedoe will be a dud
Markus
October 27th, 2008, 12:26 PM
To get the Sara there you will need several weeks warning. She was in Bremerton getting a routine dry docking in early Novermber.
Yes, but he said "if is said that the japanese plan to attack pearl harbor was expected before it had happened." If that means as expected as the attack on the Philipines Sara is likely to be near PH.
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