A Better Show in 1940

[Michele]

A Better Show by the Luftwaffe in 1940

Question: Could the Luftwaffe put up a better show in 1940, being more effective in engaging the British in an air campaign? Answer: Yes.
Question: Would this be beneficial to Germany in the long run? Answer: not necessarily…

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In 1936, General Walther Wever, chief of staff of the fledgling new German armed force, the Luftwaffe, miraculously survived a potentially deadly accident. Wever was an able, competent chief of staff. Had he died, he would have been hard to replace, also because it would take a skillful man to get along with Erhard Milch, the ambitious second in command of Goering.
Instead, Wever remained in service as an invaluable chief of staff, filling in wherever Goering found the homework too boring. General Albert Kesselring, a promising officer coming from the ranks of the Heer, was chosen as his deputy.
Goering, Wever and Kesselring managed to corral Milch to dealing mostly with aircraft production. In that field he could vent his propensity for feuding by quarrelling at length with Great War ace Ernst Udet, instead of bothering the others about strategic choices and doctrine theories. Even so, the German heavy bomber designs got scrapped; Wever would have liked them, but they could only be built in puny numbers. Goering drew a line at that, given that he thought the Führer would ask how many bombers the Luftwaffe had, not how large they were.
But with Wever pushing for those strategic weapons, at least some doctrinal thought went into the concept of strategic bombing. Wever managed to stop Udet's requirement that the Ju 88 be a dive bomber, too. This would later turn out to be a meaningful improvement over an otherwise quite likely outcome.

Kesselring drew the right conclusions from the Spanish Civil war experience. He got interested in EW, not only radio direction (Knickebein) but also the studies about air radar. He was highly unimpressed by the Luftwaffe's aces' lone-knight mystique, and pushed for tighter command and control, effective radio communications, team tactics. From his position in the Luftwaffe staff, he managed to muster enough clout, even though Goering would normally be against such ideas, as a matter of principle - if and for as long as he could be bothered with technical details.

Kesselring, almost casually, developed a fixation for the air bases and airports in and around Madrid. He was surprised that the enemy air force kept flying off them while under sustained attack by the Italian Aviazione Legionaria in early 1937. He initially thought that was due to the Italians botching it. So he ordered a series of raids, followed by photo recon flights. He repeated the attempts at different times, by different means, with different durations. By the end of 1938, he came to the conclusion that airstrips in particular and air bases in general were very tough targets, hard to destroy for good. On the contrary, he thought they could however be effectively kept out of action, albeit temporarily, provided that one was able to sustain an onslaught with at least one air attack per day.

Meanwhile, the continuing multi-sided disputes about ground attack, tactical bombing, strategic bombing that involved Wever, Udet and Milch over those crucial pre-war years yielded an unexpected side effect. Wever, in order to assuage Udet about being overruled as to the Ju 88 being no dive bomber, decided he would give him something; a better ground attack option. He convinced Goering that the Bf 110 was really a multi-purpose aircraft, that a "destroyer" (Zerstörer) should have been even more effective against ground targets, too; in short, that it should have been always able to operate in a dual role, long-range fighter or ground attack aircraft. By the beginning of the war, most of the Bf 110 force could already be fitted with bomb racks and most of the pilots of these aircraft had a reasonably good training in the ground attack role.

In 1939, Wever, the good chief of staff that he was, seeing war coming, ordered a complete review of the intelligence material about all European air forces, the Polish, French and British in particular. Some more homework went into that, than it would probably have been done under a lesser man.

[Michele]

2.

When the war broke out, Kesselring managed to obtain permission from Wever to have a double hat. He remained his deputy at the Luftwaffe Oberkommando staff, but also took command of Luftflotte 1, thus getting further hands-on experience after Spain, and additional personal prestige.

Most of the Bf 109 fighter force was held back in Germany as a defensive asset, thus the main escort and attack fighter committed in Poland was the Bf 110. This allowed great flexibility, as the Bf 110s were initially mainly used as escorts, but after a few days they were put to good use as attack aircraft. Since the Lotnictwo Wojskowe had refused to play dead, they came in handy; as escorts, of course, but also as a much faster, better armed attack aircraft than most. The Bf 110's strafing runs got almost as much publicity as the Stuka's dives.

A fact Kesselring duly noted was that despite the Luftwaffe's efforts, destroying the enemy aircraft strength on the ground was difficult. The Poles had dispersed their few aircraft over several discreet (or outright secret) satellite airstrips, and the Brygada Poscigowa had to be destroyed through air combat, mostly. However, he concluded that it would pay to also try going for the airfields, provided a saturation effort, sustained over time, could be carried out.

His subordinate, General Grauert, brought an interesting detail to his attention in a report. The Luftwaffe had been experimenting with drop tanks for its Bf 109s, even though the pilots loathed them because they negatively affect the performance. On September 4, a bomber Gruppe of Grauert's 1. Fliegerdivision, escorted by a Staffel of Bf 110s, was engaged twice while on a bombing mission over the Warsaw marshalling yards. The Bf 110s easily chased away the Polish fighters in the first interception, but in this fight they burned up most of their fuel and had to head back to their relatively distant airfield. A couple of PZL P.11 fighters showed up in the vicinity of the front lines and seriously damaged three German bombers.
The following day, having the same mission profile for his bombers, Grauert decided to use as escort the Bf 109s of LG2. This was a "model" unit, testing new devices. Its pilots were by then used to take off with external payload: a bomb or a drop tank. This time, no Polish interception took place, but the Bf 109s were able to stay with the bombers all the time and land with plenty of unused fuel. Had enemy fighters showed up, even at the last moment, the escorts would have been there to protect the bombers, and possibly to score hits.
Thus, Kesselring decided to intensify the experiments with drop tanks, and, in particular, to find out whether the current, leaky model could be replaced.

During the short Polish campaign, Wever saw that another important lesson from the Spanish Civil war was confirmed: combat attrition would always be higher than expected. By October 1939, he took steps to strengthen his flight schools, increasing the number of veterans temporarily detached back to the schools as trainers.

Wever also noticed another thing: if the kill claims were correct, then the pre-war intel estimates as to the enemy aircraft numbers were wrong, or vice versa.
He tasked an intelligence officer to investigate on this. By January of the following year, having access to plenty of captured Polish documents, the worrisome conclusion seemed to be that both figures were wrong; the intelligence underestimated the Lotnictwo Wojskowe, but the fighter pilots grossly overestimated their kills. The OKL kept this conclusion a well-guarded secret, but Wever and Kesselring were now both aware of this potential problem.

[Michele]

3.

During the winter of 1939, the Luftwaffe, tirelessly spurred by Wever, kept preparing and training for the continuation of the hostilities. The Polish campaign had confirmed what Wever feared as to the output of the training centers, so he managed to establish two new schools.

Hitler's desire to attack France as soon as possible caused a series of redeployments, replacements and transfers. Fortunately no winter war ensued, but in this occasion two generals pointed out to Kesselring that the ground services needed to be strengthened and made more effective, in order to reduce both the number of non-operational aircraft at any given time and the delays caused by redeployments. Kesselring started trimming personnel away from Luftgau, garrison and office work positions and sending them to the ground crews.

Wever also came up to Goering with the idea of an Unternehmensbefelshaber for future operations, an operation commander. In theory, when more than one Luftflotte was committed to an operation, the coordination would take place at the OKL; but in practice, that was too far back and high up, and too large an organisation, while the Luftflotte commanders had a lot of free rein. The Polish campaign had just shown that Luftflotten might have problems in cooperating with each other. An HQ coordinating the Luftflotten for a given operation or campaign should improve the overall effectiveness.
Goering accepted the idea in principle; he thought of it as a good perk for some of his old chums, somebody personally faithful to him, maybe Udet, who was smarting for a more active post. But Wever, though not stating it, was actually thinking about Kesselring.

In December, 1939, the first two bomber Geschwader phased out the Do 17 and became operational with the Ju 88. This bomber was unable to dive-bomb, since Udet's requirement had been overruled back in 1938. The Ju 88 was thus much lighter than it could have been. This bomber's top speed was 485 km/h with a payload of 2,000 kgs. This was not only quite faster than the He 111; it also meant that after bombing, the Ju 88 would be almost as fast as the main British fighter, the Hurricane Mk I.

In January, 1940, Kesselring organized a Kriegsspiel featuring a series of coordinated attacks on several targets, with many bomber units involved, escorted by several fighter units. He had the commanders use the standard radio equipment the bases and aircraft involved would be equipped with; the exercise was a large-scale failure due to communications breakdowns. Enraged, Kesselring pushed through an overhaul of the whole system; while looking for ways to improve it, he met with a communications officer, Ulrich Steinhilper, who suggested that fighter unit commanders should be able to talk with bomber unit commanders. Kesselring slapped his forehead and ordered just that.
This started a flurry of memos and, more importantly, backroom meetings among old comrades. The fighter Gruppe and Geschwader commanders positively hated the idea; if they had to become radio geeks, holding back from the action to coordinate with bombers, how could they down more enemy fighters, which is why they would be the air in the first place? Goering sided with them, and for the time being, the order was countermanded.

The Norwegian and French campaigns unfolded somewhat predictably, though the cumulative effect of all the improvements in the Luftwaffe was certainly felt. Less losses were incurred, generally, than what might have happened without those improvements. The exception is that the Bf 110 force took some more losses, actually, but this was because it was employed far more as an attack aircraft tool. In exchange, more British light vessels were damaged in Norwegian waters, and the Bf 110, when equipped with two small bombs and AP ammo for its two 20mm cannons, also turned out to be a good vehicle hunter.
The combat-readiness rate was satisfactory for Wever. More trainees reached the units from the schools than expected. More losses were inflicted on the enemy air forces than one could have hoped, including on the RAF units deployed on the Continent.
An experimental series of missions was carried out against a few chosen Belgian and French air bases, bombing them both at night and in daylight. At night, this involved the elite Kampfgruppe 100, specially trained for using the Knickebein radio guidance system, bombing the targets first with incendiary ordnance; the fires served to guide in subsequent waves of other bombers. These operations were followed by early-morning recon flights, which usually showed the accuracy wasn't all that good anyway, but some disruption had taken place and some damage had been done to the runways. The targets were further kept under attack during the day, with one or two small raids, usually one of them by level bombers at high altitude and the other either by escorted Stukas or unescorted Bf 110s. At the end of these tests, Kesselring concluded this approach had fair chances of keeping the bases non-operational, though he was aware the opposition met by day over those targets was weak.

The Norwegian experience showed the Luftwaffe anti-shipping capabilities could be improved, anyway. Yes, the Bf 110s was able to seriously damage light vessels, and the Stukas were accurate in placing larger bombs on ship decks, but AP bombs would be needed, and the torpedo bomber force was hampered both by unreliable torpedoes and aging aircraft. Wever tried to take steps to improve this situation, too, with less success than in other fields.

At the end of June 1940, the Luftwaffe could count on the following:

Strength Serviceable
level bombers, Do 17 (1) 182 137
level bombers, Ju 88 729 515
level bombers, He 111 (2) 673 528
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total level bombers 1,584 1,180

dive bombers, Ju 87 436 304

fighters, Bf 109 (3) 1,231 874

fighter-bombers, Bf 110 (4) 322 219

night fighters, sundry 91 69

recon, liaison, attack, sundry 562 406

maritime and torpedo, sundry 244 187

(1) included about 60 aircraft mostly used for long-range recon and weather recon.
(2) included 34 aircraft of KGr 100 and 101, "pathfinder" Knickebein units.
(3) included 66 aircraft in one Schlacht- and one LehrGruppe, trained as fighter-bombers too.
(4) all trained for the fighter-bomber role, but also included 37 aircraft in ErProGr 210, specially trained for high-accuracy pinpoint attacks.

[juanml82]

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[Michele]

4.

The lull after the battle of France was short-lived. Germany defeated France in an incredibly short time, also because of the excellent performance of the Luftwaffe; but Hitler was in a hurry to achieve stability in the West, which meant dragging the British to the peace talks.

By June 16, Kesselring had taken stock of the situation and he clearly saw the chance of an important air campaign. Wever and Goering agreed, and on that date Goering acknowledged Hitler's order not to intrude into the British air space - in hopes of a negotiated settlement. But he also ordered his subordinates that outside that space, the RAF was fair game, anywhere else, for instance over the Channel.

Wever organized a staff meeting on June 21, summoning his Luftflotte commanders and other top officers. He made a general after-action assessment of the Luftwaffe's operations in France, pointing out things that worked well. However, he also highlighted cases of ineffective cooperation between the Luftflotten, between units, and in particular between bombers and fighters. He underscored the communications problems. One such communications failure brought about the final bombing of Rotterdam, which gave the enemy fuel for their propaganda. On two other occasions, lack of communication between bombers and fighters caused problems, and on one such occurrence a bomber was downed and two damaged by French fighters.
Therefore, he announced, tests would begin immediately to equip the Gruppe and Geschwader commanders' fighters with radios capable of communicating with the bomber units' commanders. These wouldn't be a burden for the fighter pilots when engaged in defensive interceptions or Freijagd sweeps, but would be used when on close escort duties.
Additionally, should a sustained air war be waged against Britain, Wever planned to establish the already discussed Unternehmensbefelhaber position. He portrayed it as a forward post of the OKL, coordinating operations among the Luftflotten. This time, he had managed to let each Luftflotte commander believe he might be the chosen commander for this job, so the opposition to this idea was minimal.

Meanwhile, Luftwaffe units were redeploying to French bases along the Channel. The assignments to the Luftflotten clearly placed the emphasis on direct operations against Britain: Luftflotte 5, deployed in Norway and Denmark, soon saw its Bf 109s reassigned to France, and only had a token number of bombers. It had its complement of coastal aircraft. Its Bf 110s were only a Staffel from LG 1, one of the "model" units; its pilots had been testing and training with the new, improved and sizable drop tanks. The Bf 109s and about half of the bombers that Luftflotte 5 had at the end of the Norwegian campaign, went to France.
Some time later, Luftflotte 5 got its one reinforcement batch: two Staffeln of the new Ju 88Cs, the gunship/heavy fighter version of this aircraft.

On June 24, after having been repeatedly urged and even threatened by Wever, his intel staff delivered a preliminary report assessing the British mobile radar station captured near Boulogne. It was wrapped in ifs, but the disturbing likelihood seemed to be that the enemy had a radio detection system much better than what could be expected. Kesselring wasn't going to ignore this report.

Talks had begun about a landing operation, and on June 26 Keitel required the OKL to submit plans for such a venture. Air superiority had already been acknowledged as a precondition, thus the Luftwaffe plan would have to foresee operations to achieve that. Wever, Kesselring and the latter's right-hand man, Deichmann, started working on the plan. It was however already evident that the tempo had to increase immediately, if the attempt had to be carried out before the autumn. Indeed, small skirmishes were taking place over the Channel and other sea areas; patrol clashes, and Luftwaffe lone recon flights being ambushed.
Wever decided these had to quickly evolve into more sizable engagements.

On June 29, Wever managed to convince Goering that the right man for the Unternehmensbefehlshaber position was Kesselring. He pointed out that it was only a temporary, functional posting, not a promotion; just an experiment, and besides, this HQ would probably have to deploy to some inconvenient backwater like Calais (actually, Kesselring would set up shop in Paris). Goering accepted. Sperrle had a bout of rage at the news, but it was too late to do anything; he decided to wait for some mistake that could be pinned upon Kesselring's "meddling" to complain. Stumpff went along without too much complaint. Therefore, the command structure came to be the following:
Adlerangriff Unternehmensbefehlshaber (Paris): Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring
Luftflotte 2 (Brussels): Generaloberst Stumpff
Luftflotte 3 (Paris): Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle
Luftflotte 5 (Stavanger): Generaloberst Jeschonnek

On June 30, a report landed on Kesselring's table just as he prepared for the move to Paris. A weather recon aircraft which had taken off from Brest two days before had been reporting low cloud cover for 10/10. It was flying over a sea of clouds, no sightings reported - until it was intercepted by a flight of Hurricanes out from nowhere, and downed. To Kesselring, this was a confirmation: the British couldn't have spotted this Heinkel by visual means.
His chief of staff, Deichmann, argued that if the purpose was to have the British fighters come up and fight, then it might be better to leave their detection system working. But Kesselring decided he'd try both approaches: fight them while their tall antennas stand all along the coast, and while they don't. The score would tell him what was better.

[Michele]

5.

June 29 and 30, and July 1 and 2, 1940 saw some desultory air fighting over the Channel. Upon orders by Kesselring, the Germans were now more actively seeking confrontations, but a combination of unstable weather and sheer chance prevented any serious action from taking place.
This, however, allowed the Germans time to set up for the immediate task at hand. Goering had singled out two Fliegerkorps for the specific objective of closing the Channel to the enemy shipping, one from each Luftflotte. Sperrle was lukewarm about the task, thus most of the work seemed likely to end up in the hands of General Lörzer's II Fliegerkorps, in the Pas de Calais. Lörzer, in turn, was tempted to delegate the task to Oberst Fink, commander of KG 2. This would mean the Kanalkampfführer (commander of the Channel battle) would be a bomber Geschwader commander, having to ask to his peers for fighter escort. The fact alone that the leader would be a bomber commander implicitly pointed out that the objective of the operation was indeed the shipping.
But Kesselring was going to have none of that. At this time, while Deichmann was setting up his HQ in Paris, he was working on the general plan for a short air war against Britain, with the final aim of achieving air superiority - which would allow the landing operation. Therefore, he had by then very clear in his mind that the ships in the Channel were interesting in that the British fighters would have to defend them (outside the Führer's no-go zone over the British soil); to him, the primary target were the British fighters.
If ships could be sunk, so much the better, but that was secondary.
Thus he ordered Stumpff and Lörzer not to delegate down the chain of command; Fink might be the tip of Lörzer's and Stumpff's sword, but he wanted Stumpff commanding the operation, since he'd be the one having under his command not only bombers but also fighters and fighter-bombers. Stumpff also transferred ZG26 to the II Fliegerkorps, which added to the elite ErProGr 210. This was a telling decision, because the vague job description of the Bf 110 had left, until that time, most of the machines in Jagdfliegerführer units, i.e. fighter units.
At the same time, Kesselring reminded Sperrle that Goering's order mentioned Von Richtofen's VIII Fliegerkorps. The focus of the action would be on the Straits of Dover, thus Luftflotte 3 should be in the front seat, but Kesselring's main task was to make sure the Luftflotten's efforts are coordinated, and thus he fully expected Von Richtofen's assets to support Lörzer. When, by July 2, it had become clear that Sperrle was about to obfuscate, object to and obstruct any attempt to "order him around", Kesselring simply crossed the city and showed up for a half-day visit at Sperrle's HQ, with Sperrle snorting and chafing. Kesselring didn't go away until Sperrle had accepted to commit Von Richtofen in coordinated operations with Lörzer.

On July 3, the Kanalkampf began in earnest. At first sight, the attacks might have seemed simply occasional anti-shipping raids. But actually, the difference was made by the fact that at least somebody in the chain of command was aware of what were the real primary targets and what the end purpose of the operation was. The Stukas were thus committed only very sparingly; the main anti-ship platform was the Bf 110 in its fighter-bomber role (on a few occasions, II./LG 2, now testing the Bf 109 as a fighter bomber, also had a go). This meant less ships were sunk outright; smaller bombs were used, and the shallow fighter-bomber dive was far less accurate than what a Stuka could do in its near vertical dive. However, many of these ships were smallish trawlers and coalers, not particularly tough, and the Bf 110s peppered them with good bursts of 20mm fire. Had they been attacked by Stukas only, it might have been a matter of either being sunk or missed; with the Bf 110 raids, virtually no ship in an attacked convoy got away without extensive damage and casualties to the crew. Which meant the British still had to come up and try to defend the convoys.
In the air, the near absence of Stukas meant, first, very few losses for them, obviously. It also meant more losses for the British fighters, since most of the German fighters were not tethered to the slow, highly vulnerable Ju 87s and could react not just by fending off the enemy, but by actively counterattacking. It also meant less losses on the Bf 109s, for the same reason. There was a price to pay, of course: a higher loss rate for the Bf 110s themselves, but Kesselring was willing to pay that. He had no intention of telling this to his Zerstörer crews, but he thought they were more expendable. Pure fighters would always be needed to achieve and maintain air superiority, bombers would be needed later as flying artillery,... Bf 110s could always be useful as fighter-bombers, but less indispensable than the other two.

Another difference in comparison to previous Luftwaffe operations was the greater cooperation between Luftflotten. Convoys were often attacked throughout the day, with the two large units taking turns.
Additionally, Kesselring, by encouraging Stumpff, Lörzer and Osterkamp, and by goading Sperrle and his subordinates, managed to do, already in this first stage of the fight, what he would do later, too: change tactics often. The British were never going to know if a raid on a convoy would be immediately followed by a second, or not; or whether it would feature Stukas or not. On a few occasions, the Germans sent in simultaneously a high raid with Stukas and escorts, and a low raid with Bf 110s without bombs, just to strafe the ships, and the British were hard-pressed to react properly and timely. It did not always work, because the more complex the choreography, the greater the potential for mistakes; but on the other hand, the British were also still learning their ropes. Sometimes, the radar operators misjudged the height of a raid, a mistake which was bad enough if that was the one and only raid coming; but much worse if there was a complex pattern to be sprung on the defenders.

Air Chief Marshal Dowding, commander of Fighter Command, had no easy choices. He could scramble his fighters from forward airfields upon detection of enemy raids, but the targets were often quite off the coast, and it repeatedly happened that the scrambled Squadrons arrived late, or worse yet, were still climbing to altitude when arriving and were "bounced" from above by the enemy, taking losses. Alternatively, he could keep constantly flying combat air patrols (CAPs) over the convoys, but this was exhausting for the pilots and a waste of resources, so these patrols had to be small, maybe a flight (6 fighters). This in turn meant the patrols could be quickly outnumbered by a fast fighter-only attack, of which the Germans sent in some, too. In both situations, the British fighters took heavy casualties.

Throughout these days of July, Wever was working about the requirements for achieving air superiority over the Channel and the coast, and no matter which way he tackled the problem, he always came down to the kill ratio needed. If the Luftwaffe was to provide cover to the landing forces and the convoys, and to serve as flying artillery, it needed to survive in sizable numbers after the fight for air superiority; this meant it must down many more enemy aircraft than it lost itself. A choice might have been to engage the enemy only when advantaged; choose the sure kills, so to speak. But the problem with this was, given the numbers involved and the very short time window, that the Luftwaffe could simply not waste any sunny day; it needed to attack very very often, it could not afford to pass an opportunity to fight just because it implied the risk of losing some aircraft.
The solution was to find ways to stack the conditions; force the enemy to fight at a disadvantage as often as possible. What Kesselring was already doing with the convoys until then was a good starting point.

Indeed, over the time between July 3 and July 21, the Luftwaffe often came out ahead. The final average kill ratio was 1.5:1, in favor of the Luftwaffe. It was far from being enough to achieve air superiority by September, especially given the rate of replacements. But Kesselring, anway, even after discounting a bit his pilots' inflated kill claims, still believed the real ratio to be something like 2:1, so he concluded that there was a chance.
Most of the pilots downed were also lost in this context, since the fighting took place over the sea. The Germans came out slightly ahead, however, having a sea rescue service (the British, by and large, had none). The British decided not to acknowledge the German He 59 rescue planes' right to use the Red Cross symbol on July 17. That was bad news for the Germans, but on the other hand, it happened only a few days before the end of the Kanalkampf.

Indeed, on July 21, the Admiralty decided to suspend, at least temporarily, the merchant convoy transit in the Dover area. On July 23, daylight warship movements in the area were also discontinued. The Kanalkampf was already over.

Meanwhile, on July 11 Hitler's Directive 16 had been issued; Seelöwe, the invasion of Britain, became a contingency plan. On July 15, the first top joint service meeting was held; Raeder, Von Brauchitsch and Wever were present. Since the Luftwaffe's first task was to achieve air superiority over the Channel and the coast, Wever understandably asked for the ban against attacks on British soil to be lifted. Hitler agreed.
This sent the planning for operation Adlerangriff, the beginning of the air warfare against Britain proper, into high gear. Wever, Kesselring and Deichmann had been working on it already. The crucial staff meeting took place in Paris, at Kesselring's HQ, on July 22. And there was somebody present who had already done his homework and had a complete, well thought-out proposal to push through...

[Karlos]

Very interesting, go on.

[Michele]

6.

The staff meeting was held in Kesselring's HQ in Paris, on July 22. Goering appeared in his new white gala uniform. Wever, Kesselring, Sperrle, Stumpff and Jeschonnek were of course present; additionally, most of the Fliegerkorps and Jagdfliegerführer commanders were there.
Wever put forth his (and Kesselring's) plan. It was divided in two parts; the second wass to protect and support the landing operation Seelöwe; the first, to make this possible, by achieving air superiority over the Channel and the South-Eastern English coastline. In order to do that, Fighter Command was to be destroyed; in the impossibility of doing that, given that the Luftwaffe couldn't attack all of the British Isles' territories, it had to be weakened as much as possible, and what remained of it after this process had to be barred from intruding in the area of operations.
Therefore, the main, if not the only target, was Fighter Command; its operational aircraft, its men, its air bases, and its supplies, in that order. Not only the air-to-air combat, but also the bombing operations had to stay focused on that; attacking other targets could be done as a secondary option, insofar as this could force the British to scramble their fighters, so that they could be engaged in the air.
It followed that Fighter Command's air bases were the primary target for bombing and strafing operations. The secondary targets for bombing were the aircraft factories, those producing fighters, not bombers. Fighter Command's airfields must be attacked in succession, starting with the Southernmost ones and moving North as they were destroyed; but the airfields were to be attacked again and again, in order to make sure the British couldn't repair and use them again.

Goering interrupted Wever at this time. He mentioned intelligence reports claiming the British are already short on fighters. He stated that repeatedly hitting the same targets was unnecessary, once his bombers had razed a ground installation, it was destroyed. He added that the defeat of the British fighter force could be achieved in three weeks, by attacking any kind of ground targets with the bombers; this would force the fighters up, where the Luftwaffe aces would quickly down them.
He thanked Wever for his excellent work on such a meticulous plan, but said he thought the enemy had been overestimated. He asked the Luftflotte and Korps commanders to make their own suggestions as to the strategy and lists of targets. Personally, Goering thought the attacks should already begin to focus on British ports and shipping, so as to start strangling the island nation. Grauert immediately said he agreed; the RAF had to be attacked, too, and the motor industries and the Royal Navy, switching to other ground targets as the invasion began. Lörzer stated that while the British might try to conserve their fighters' strength, and/or withdraw them North, by attacking London the Luftwaffe could force them to fight instead. This was generally considered a good suggestion, but not immediately applicable because Hitler had forbidden attacks on London, for the time being. Sperrle believed the main effort should go against shipping, ports and the Royal Navy. The British would find themselves short on everything; the Royal Navy would be weaker when the invasion came; and the RAF would be forced to react, thus being defeated as an afterthought. Junck was pessimistic as to a quick invasion and believed a long-haul strategy would be needed; for that, it would be better to start with the shipping and all kinds of industrial targets, in particular the armaments industry.

Kesselring intervened. He pointed out that everybody agreed that a correct choice of targets - be they the RAF bases, the seaports, or the cities - would be needed to force Fighter Command to come up and fight, which was the one necessary requirement. Therefore, he said, there was no need to decide straight away about a hard and fast target list; his HQ, as the Unternehmensbefehlshaber, could change the target selection as the operation unfolded, depending on what targets would seem to bring about the most intense and desperate reaction by the enemy. He said that if and when the Führer would allow attacks on London, he was sure that could be the way to have the enemy scramble for their last fight. He added that he hoped Fighter Command would be defeated in a short time as predicted, but contingency plans had to be done, just in case that didn't happen. He concluded that further details can be left to his staff. Goering agreed.

Later that day, Wever and Kesselring met in private. The plan that was going to be actually carried out was their own original plan. Secondary targets might be attacked sometimes, as nuisance/diversion actions by smaller raids, and/or if weather prevented the attack of main targets; they would also serve as a token to show Goering, if and when he asked about the attacks on the British seaports or industries. But actually, from then on the Luftwaffe's sights would be on Fighter Command.

[Michele]

Very interesting, go on.

Thanks, I will.

[Michele]

7.

Adlertag, the day in which the direct air attack against the British air defenses began, was July 26, 1940. The few days after the Paris staff meeting were used for final preparations and detailed planning, and also to wait for a spell of favorable weather forecasts.

Kesselring and his chief of staff, Deichmann, had discussed again the issue of the British radio direction stations. Kesselring finally decided to have a go at Fighter Command without touching them for a few days. After which, he would try to attack them, too, for a few more days. He reserved the decision about what choice would be better, depending upon the results achieved.

The first day of the offensive didn't see the full array of attack types being used. However, the Germans did use the Bf 110s in their fighter-bomber role. The raids came in two main great waves, one in the morning, the other in the afternoon. Luftflotte 2 attacked the airfields of Lympne, Manston, Hawkinge and Detling in the morning. In the afternoon, it went in some more depth, but by using a sideways move over the sea, coming in from the East at Manston (again), Gravesend, Eastchurch and Rochford. Luftflotte 3 chose a more concentrated approach, concentrating its airfield attacks, both in the morning and the afternoon, on Tangmere, Westhampnett, Worthy Down and Warmwell, even though changing weather conditions did not allow a second go against Warmwell. Anyway, a couple of minor raids from this Luftflotte were tasked with attacking targets other than airfields, thus Southampton and Portsmouth got their sirens blaring.

From the list above, it is already obvious how the Luftwaffe was concentrating on airfields, and also that truly diligent intelligence work done was already paying off; only three of the airfields listed above did not belong to Fighter Command.

About half of the raids featured level bombers, a quarter went in with Stukas (but in small numbers) and a quarter with Bf 110s carrying bombs. The attack on Lympne was virtually pointless, as it had been deemed too exposed and it was going to be used mostly as an emergency landing strip. The morning attack on Manston was particularly successful, on the contrary, because it was carried out quickly and from medium altitude with Bf 110s. It was a pity that at this moment, only one of the experimental night-fighter units was deployed there, because two hangars suffer substantial damages and with them the aircraft inside - only, they were Blenheims. The other attacks were reasonably successful as these things went at the time, that is, not terribly: because the early-warning system worked rather well. Mistakes were made by the operators as to altitudes and bearings, but the warning, as such, was given timely, and no operational fighters were on the ground when their bases were attacked. Even so, the Germans managed to destroy a few fighters that were grounded, under repairs.

The enemy reaction was substantial, prompt and dangerous. The fair weather the Luftwaffe counted on turned out to be very useful both to the Observer Corps in confirming the radar data, and to the intercepting Squadrons in locating the Germans. The approach over the sea wasn't actually a way to get in unnoticed, given the radars. And the afternoon mass drive by Luftflotte 3 was probably too large: even though there was plenty of fighter escorts, some Hurricanes from Middle Wallop get through to a Stuka Staffel.

The end result was that the British lost 18 fighters, 4 of them on the ground, not counting the Blenheims and a couple of bombers. The Germans lost 34 aircraft, including 7 that did make it back but would never be operational again. Of these, 9 were Bf 109s, 11 were Bf 110s, 6 wre Stukas and 8 were other bombers. The final kill ratio was 1.8:1 in favor of the RAF. Kesselring, however, believed it to be 1:1 (and Dowding 2.5:1).

On July 27, the patterns were almost the same, though the targets partially changed (not entirely; Kesselring was determined to see whether Manston, Hawkinge and Tangmere could be kept closed down by attacking them repeatedly). The results were similar, too.
Kesselring understood, on the morning of July 28 (a day in which there was less air activity due to a sudden worsening of the weather), he had a problem which he would not have as a Luftflotte commander: by adding a higher command layer, he managed to unify the strategic direction, but he was one step farther from the units. Therefore, his reaction-decision cycle was longer. He tried to counter this by demanding the Fliegerkorps to send copies of their reports directly to his HQ, too, but this was one step too far and both Sperrle and Stumpff first reacted angrily and then tried to sabotage this; Kesselring would never entirely solve this problem.

But for July 29 and 30, he managed to tweak the approach a bit. More fighters were sent along (changing the ratio to bombers from 2:1 to 2.5:1), some Gruppen in advance Freijagd sweeps. Stukas were only used when they could be well protected, not so much by having fighters tethered to them, but by sending them in as a second or even third wave (this did not always work, though, given that the British used to scramble their fighters in waves, too). More importantly, Bf 110s were used for surprise attacks against airfields close to the coast (Hawkinge and Warmwell); they didn't approach at high altitudes, and moved in fast. Not fast enough to surprise British fighters on the runways, but fast enough to prevent interception, or at least favorable interceptions. V./LG1 put in three high-accuracy small attacks on aircraft factories in the Southampton area, disrupting for a few days the production of Spitfires.

On the night of July 29, two Knickebein raids were launched, both spearheaded by some 15 "pathfinders", against two more distant, until now untouched airfields. The one against Middle Wallop was a complete failure; the recon photos taken at dawn showed that a nearby village must have been hit by the first incendiary bombs, and attracted the rest of the raiders. But Biggin Hill suffered some marginal damage. The dispersion was too high for these raids to be really effective; there were craters all over the countryside.
But, Kesslering conclude, should a shortage of fighters reduce the number of bombers that can be used in daylight, this might be a good way to keep some pressure up against the enemy at all times.

A relative lull followed for two days, due to weather conditions and the need to give the crews some rest. The Luftwaffe had not mounted maximum-effort onslaughts yet. By attacking clusters of relatively close targets, they had managed to send in recon aircraft, for after-action assessment photos, mixed with the flights attacking other targets. In this way, they got a lot fo recon photos. Kesselring summoned Sperrle and Stumpff on August 1, and they went over the after-action assessments. The kill ratio had improved; they thought it to be now Luftwaffe:RAF 1.5:1 (it was actually 1:1.2 in favor of the RAF), but Kesselring was far from satisfied with it. Very recent recon photos seemed to confirm Kesselring's educated guess as to airfield serviceability. Manston and Tangmere showed signs of intense repair works still going on, and no air activity; there were no recent photos of Hawkinge. By contrast, airfields that had been bombed once, especially if at the beginning of the operational cycle, seemed to be perfectly operational.
The reports also showed that an overwhelming number of raids has met with some opposition. Only a very small number of attacks was unopposed.

The three generals agreed that it was time to step up the effort; that more non-conventional tactics must be used; and most importantly, that it was time to try, for a week or so, attacks against the British radio direction stations.

[Michele]

8.1

Looking at things from the other side of the hill, until that time Dowding could be cautiously satisfied. Fighter Command was under pressure, but he was sure it was dishing out more than it suffered (he also had a safe baseline figure as to the enemy losses which the Germans lacked: the wrecks on British soil). Some of the airfields were undergoing repairs, but filling in the holes in the runways was a quick job. Losing hangars and other buildings was going to degrade the overall logistical capabilities, but with so many air bases, that could be sustained.

However, on August 2 the Germans launched Operation Abmähen; a cycle of raids featuring a determined effort to take out the British radars, along with renewed attacks on the airbases. At dawn, the radar stations of Dover, Rye, Fairlight and Pevensey were attacked by Luftflotte 2, and those of Truleigh, Poling and Ventnor by Luftflotte 3 (East to West). The attackers were, respectively: ErProGr 210 (17 Bf 110s) escorted by I./JG 3 (27 Bf 109s); I. And II: KG 53 (37 He 111s) escorted by the whole JG 26 (89 Bf 109s); II:/LG 2 (25 Bf 109s in the fighter/bomber configuration), unescorted; II./StG 2 (26 Ju 87s) escorted by I. and II./JG 51 (61 Bf 109s), from Luftflotte 2; and V./LG 1 (23 Bf 110s) escorted by I./JG 27 (28 Bf 109s); I./StG 77 (28 Ju 87s) escorted by I. and II./JG 2 (51 Bf 109s); and the two available Gruppen of ZG 2 (57 Bf 110s) escorted by two Gruppen of JG 53 (61 Bf 109s). This list is so detailed in order to show that at that time, the Germans had enough precision-bombing potential with plenty airpower left to subsequently attack the airbases.
The British were taken by surprise, both by the hour of the raid and by the fact that the radar stations had never been targeted this far. Ventnor had always been particularly exposed, and its defenders didn't make it in time; the Bf 109 fighter/bombers' raid on the CHL station of Fairlight went unchallenged, being too fast in; and #145 Squadron, scrambling from Westhampnett (its base, Tangmere, was still under repairs) to protect Poling, got wrong interception data. They pursued the attackers over the sea, but by then it was too late to prevent the bombing.
Dover went off the air for the whole day due to multiple damages, but repairs were completed by the next day. Rye, attacked by level bombers, suffered no real damage and remained fully operational, after its antennas swayed in the explosions. Fairlight was bombed with great accuracy, but the Bf 109s' puny payload wasn't enough to cause real damage and the station was operational within the hour, though with personnel losses. Pevensey was hit hard, with an antenna collapsing and the power being cut; it would remain not operational for three days. Something similar happened to Truleigh and Poling. Smaller, mobile units were sent there to fill in the gap, but they had inferior range and accuracy. Ventnor was flattened, power went off in the whole area, and it took some ten days to be finally operational again; here, too, a mobile unit was deployed, but it took two days for it to arrive and set up.
The net result was that in the East, Rye and the stations of Dunkirk (near Canterbury) and Foreness, which weren't attacked, could take up the slack; the radar cover was still there. But a huge hole had been punched in the CH between Rye and Worth Matravers. Attempts could be made at plugging it with the aforementioned mobile stations, and the CHL station of Beachy Head could do some of the work; also, near the CH station of Poling there were further CHL antennas, which survived. But the early warning capability in this area was very low, and would remain so for some time.
It came at a cost; the Germans lost 13 aircraft of all types, to the loss of just 3 British fighters. This toll was going to increase, too, as the British would realize they had to defend the radar stations more effectively.
Three days later, Kesselring, after perusing the reports of these attacks and those to come on the same targets, would draw the following correct conclusions: level bombers and Bf 109s with light bombs shouldn't be used against these targets; Bf 110s and Stukas were to be used; the latter were more effective but would pay a higher price than the former.

At about 11:00, the Germans launched the main attack, against Fighter Command airfields. They knew from the recon flights that the day before, Tangmere, Hawkinge and Manston were still undergoing repairs (they didn't know that Hawkinge was by then serviceable again), so Luftflotte 2 focused on West Malling (which had no fighters), Biggin Hill, Kenley and Gravesend, and Luftflotte 3 on Warmwell, Westhampnett, Boscombe Down and Middle Wallop. Token daylight raids were thrown in against naval and industrial targets in Portland and Southampton for good measure.
All told, the Germans sent about 350 bomb carriers escorted by some 550 Bf 109s. The proportion might seem too low, but it's important to mention that some 100 of the bomb carriers were Bf 110s, which needed escorts way less than the bombers. The British, unsurprisingly, reacted more effectively over Kent, where they had radar cover. Gravesend was untouched due to local haze, and Detling (no Fighter Command base) was bombed instead. ZG 26 was particularly effective over Biggin Hill, because the raid was fast enough to be mistaken for a fighters-only party, not to be engaged under standing orders. The other two airfields attacked by Luftflotte 2 suffered moderate damages. In the air, the British maintained their margin in this area, downing just less than one fighter and one bomber per each fighter they lost.
Things went differently in the West. The Beachy Head CHL station gave a late warning, with inaccurate bearings. Fortunately, there were no units on the satellite airfield of Warmwell. However, #145 was not scrambled in time, and it was just taking off as the bombs start falling over Westhampnett; this unit had had two fighters downed in the morning, and now five more were lost, either destroyed on the ground or in the air fight. Considering that the day before it had 11 serviceable Hurricanes, the Squadron was almost been wiped out. Boscombe Down was empty save for a few trainers, and the two Squadrons based at Middle Wallop could make it in the air and engage the attackers of their base, but at a distinct altitude disadvantage; and anyway, two Hurricanes that were undergoing repairs were destroyed in a hangar fire. #238 Squadron was bounced from above and lost three fighters in two minutes.

Before the evening, the Germans sent in a few more nuisance raids; snap, low-altitude strafings of Westhampnett and Tangmere in the West, Hawkinge, Lympne and Manston in the East (Lympne being a waste of effort, but the Germans didn't know that). Also, some of the radar stations were strafed too; a mobile unit that had just arrived in the Poling location was destroyed, and here and there personnel was surprised while carrying out repairs, and killed. At Hawkinge, two Hurricanes of #245 Squadron were destroyed on the ground.

The first day of operation Abmähen ended with 36 British fighters destroyed, including 9 on the ground (something that would never have happened if the radar network had been intact), for the price of 32 German aircraft of all types. It was a 1.125:1 ratio, finally in favor of the Luftwaffe, with substantial figures involved.

Similar patterns and tactics were employed on August 3. The British had managed to glue together a rickety radar cover, mostly because the stations' ranges overlapped to start with. However, the Germans attacked it again, going over some of the targets of the previous day, and adding Foreness and Worth Matravers at the two ends. This time the British expected the wave of raids, but many of their forward airfields were out of commission, which, coupled with the less than extensive radar coverage, meant that Rye took it for two days' worth of repairs, and Fairlight, whose light damage had already been repaired, went off for the day. Foreness was going to come back on line in some three hours, while the power was severed for the whole area of Poling, meaning that both the CH and CHL stations were non-operational. Worth Matravers was unscathed; but the end result still was that the gap in the middle of the British defense line was widening.

The consequences were immediately evident in the midday wave. Some intermittent cloud cover had begun gathering here and there. This meant some bomber Gruppen had to give up their primary target, which was bad for the Germans; but on the other hand, it also meant the Observer Corps had a harder time. When the clouds were added to the lack of effective radar coverage, the result was that a few raids were not even detected, and some of those that were detected could not be timely intercepted.
In the air, there were less fights than the day before, for all the reasons above plus sheer chance. As far as air combat went, the British remained still ahead, but only slightly.
However, the runways of Westhampnett and Gravesend, which had just returned operational, were cratered again. At Manston, where the airstrips were still not usable, the last hangar collapsed, and one fighter was destroyed on the ground.

At the end of the second day of operation Abmähen, the loss ratio was 1.1:1 for the Germans, which still was no good news for them; but in addition to the slight advantage, the majority of Fighter Command bases South of London were not operational, some were not going to be for at least a couple of days, and the radar system was in tatters.

In the night, another radio-guided raid took place. The Knickebein raids required time to be prepared, and the Germans had accepted that they couldn't launch more than one of them every two or three days, if they wanted them to be accurate. This attack targeted the Hawker compounds at Kingston-upon-Thames. It was fairly successful, causing some disruptions in the production of the Hurricanes.

August 4 was a rather cloudy day, with largely unpredictable cloud cover. Only a few raids were launched, and some of them were recalled or bomb secondary targets of no consequence. A couple of attacks against radar stations did take place, with mixed results. Aircraft losses were negligible for both sides.

On August 5, the Germans expected to resume the offensive, but the weather was rather indifferent again, especially over Kent. Only a few attacks were ordered, and of those, several had to resort to secondary targets because of lack of visibility over their primary ones. This was, however, a situation for which the Germans had a contingency option ready by then. Since they knew they could not launch an all-out broad-front effort, and since they were aware that damage on the ground was going to be limited, on that day the Germans used the bait and switch tactics, in order to win the fight in the air. Only a handful of bombers were employed on each raid, with about four fighters for each bomber (one outrider ahead in a Freijagd sweep, one high up over the bomber, one flying close escort, and a reserve behind for the last leg of the journey). It was probably a luck for the British that interceptions were particularly difficult, between the clouds and the incomplete radar coverage. The runways of Tangmere were cratered again. The day's tally was five British fighters for three enemy aircraft downed.

But overall, over these days of bad weather the maintenance teams could work to repair runways and antennas, the aircrews could rest and the commanders could assess the latest developments. The crews were not overly tired for the time being; no German bomber had flown more than one mission per day, and of those fighter pilots who had flown twice in a day, none had had more than one escort mission. The British took off more often, but many Squadrons failed the interception, were late, or were recalled, so only a few actually fought twice in a day. The commanders, on the other hand, had their headaches...

[Michele]

9.

Kesselring met with Sperrle, Stumpff and an envoy from Luftflotte 5 on August 5. A comparison of the loss figures, coupled with a hard look at the recon photos of the damage done to the radar stations, showed a difference. Luftflotte 3, attacking into the breach of the radar system on August 2, 3, and 4 seemed to have fared better than Luftflotte 2 on the same days, attacking in an area where the damage to radar was visibly less extensive; and both fared better than in the previous attack cycle, carried out without going after the antennas. This outcome was achieved even if some aircraft were unavoidably lost in the raids against the radars. It is worth noting that the Germans weren't always listening to the stations' emissions, so they didn't always know it when they had actually shut down more radars than the recon photos let them see. Nor did they know that power outages help putting some stations off-line.
The evidence was not definitely conclusive, but for once, the Luftwaffe commanders agreed on something: it was worth giving this approach a try for some days more.
Additionally, Kesselring showed his colleagues something he and Deichmann had been working on: the Schwindelsack ("bag of tricks"). It was a collection of tactical choices meant to surprise and ambush the British, keeping them off balance. They were going to be tested and applied in the days to come.
To that date, the Luftwaffe could rely on the following currently operational aircraft:
level bombers, all types: 1,081
dive bombers: 258
Bf 109s: 699
Bf 110s: 193
The Zerstörers had suffered most, followed by the Stukas; Kesselring however was mainly unhappy about the Bf 109 losses. Also, the rate of serviceability had dipped, the operational fighters were just 68% of the total actually on strength. Kesselring made it clear that this was not acceptable; it remained to be seen whether the ground crews could improve the situation.

Meanwhile, in Bentley Priory, Dowding had no easy choices to make. The most obvious issue was that the defense of the radar stations had to be greatly improved. By then, Dowding had already requested twice a better protection for them from Anti-Aircraft Command. General Pile was more than willing to provide it, but the point was that AA guns were in short supply. Taking them away from the Army or the Royal Navy wasn't easy, so what could be redeployed to the coast had to come either from the Command's reserves or from batteries already assigned to the RAF. The most needed items, i.e. medium-caliber, quick-firing guns to engage low-level attackers (namely, 40mm Bofors guns), were particularly scarce. Dowding also asked Balloon Command to deploy balloons around two radar locations; these were intended to hinder low-level attacks.
Park had asked for more personnel for repair and maintenance work at his bases, and for more AA. Dowding allocated the personnel, and began the painful process of juggling the AA resources he already had at hand. Officially unknown to Dowding, Park was also cutting through the red tape by directly asking local Home Guard commanders to cooperate on a volunteer basis.
Another measure Dowding had already undertook was the redeployment of three of his Squadrons onto Bomber Command and Coastal Command bases. There, they were less likely to be targeted, it seemed, and more likely to have operational runways. On the down side, there were logistical and organizational problems.
Finally, Dowding went over his OB and decided to start rotating Squadrons between the frontline and the quiet area of #13 Group. Some Squadrons already needed rebuilding. Fortunately, pilots weren't in short supply; many of those who lost their fighter had parachuted to safety, or had crash landed without consequences. On the other hand, the aircraft reserve was dwindling, as the factories had begun coming short on their deliveries.
To that date, Fighter Command's daylight currently operational fighters were:
Hurricanes: 371
Spitfires: 245
Defiants: 33
---
Total: 649
There also were about 180 fighters not with operational units, plus 11 Gladiators, and 103 Blenheim night fighters (better not used in daylight).

August 6 was a beautiful summer day, but the Luftwaffe only sent in recon flights and small nuisance attacks by strafing fighters and lightly loaded fighter bombers. The fact was that staging well-organized, carefully choreographed mass raids was difficult and time-consuming. The nuisance raids managed to slow down repair work at Hawkinge and Tangmere, and to destroy a makeshift, vulnerable replacement installation at Ventnor. Four German planes were lost to just one Hurricane.

On August 7 the weather was fine again, and the Luftwaffe did show up in strength, with multiple raids heading straight towards the radar stations at high altitude. The British had had time to repair several stations, and/or to deploy mobile units, and the early warning system was almost as good as new.
Luftflotte 2 deployed some 40 Stukas and 60 Bf 110s in four raids against Foreness, Dunkirk, Dover and Rye. These were heavily escorted by some 250 fighters. The British were ready, this time, and the battle was hard and bitter. The Germans paid a toll, but by 10:30 they managed to mow down two antennas at Dover, to cut the power line to Foreness, and to damage the Rye installations (which however was going to come back on line in a few hours). Dunkirk only suffered light damage and remained operational.
Luftflotte 3's raids took place earlier in the morning, at dawn. They headed towards Pevensey, Truleigh and Poling. They were very high and fast, marked as fighters. Indeed, #615 Squadron, scrambled for confirmation, sighted two small raids, reported they were only fighters, and quickly disengaged.
Later in the morning, at 11:00, similar trackings were reported. Once more, just one Squadron was scrambled from a rear-area airfield. When the Squadron Leader reported what he saw, it was too late – this was one of Kesselring's tricks. The three radar stations were attacked each by a Staffel only of Bf 110s. They weren't numerous enough, and no antenna was damaged, but the attacks went unchallenged save for AA fire. Additionally, at Pevensey, which had just returned operational after heavy damage and a power failure, a bomb hit the transmitter building, destroying critical equipment even if the antennas remained standing. At Poling, the Bf 109 escorts dived down and strafed the buildings, the personnel, and a priceless mobile radar unit. AA fire took its toll here, but the overall result was that the radar cover was seriously damaged, again.

In the afternoon, the main event took place. The Germans launched, between Luftflotten 2 and 3, no less than 12 smallish raids, mostly with level bombers, at varying heights, starting again with the airfields from the coast and then inland. Bf 110s, with little or no Bf 109 escort (so that most Bf 109s could escort the level bombers), were used for quick raids against the most exposed targets.
The British reacted, but they lacked coordination and accurate tracking, and with so many raids they failed to predict what the targets were going to be. For the first time, Park asked his colleague, Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory, to send in reinforcements from #12 Group. Three Squadrons took off from Duxford, and formed up a fighter Wing, but that took time, and when they reached the combat zone, the Germans were already retreating. Also for the first time, the Defiant fighters of #141 Squadron were used in combat. They were bounced by Staffel 1./JG 26, and lost six aircraft and eight men in one action.

At about the same hour, Luftflotte 5 put in its first appearance. It was a diversion raid. It was comprised of a seaplane decoy flight, which worked to attract the attention of inexperienced operators. The real attack featured only one Staffel of true Ju 88 bombers, all carrying only half their payload; the rest of the main raid was made up by Ju 88C heavy fighters, and by Bf 110s, who managed to come out this far thanks to the new, improved drop tanks. The raid still lost three aircraft for no damage of consequence. It would serve to convince Dowding that he couldn't leave the Eastern coast ungarrisoned, had Dowding entertained that notion. But for the time being he didn't anyway.

In the evening, Westhampnett, Hawkinge and Manston were strafed (the Germans had rightly concluded that Lympne wasn't operational, otherwise they would have strafed it too). There was no warning at all, as the fighters flew low all the way in. A seriously damaged Hurricane was destroyed in Westhampnett, otherwise there was not much further damage, but there were losses among the airfield maintenance and ground crews, which would delay repairs on both the runways and the aircraft.

On the following day, the weather was good again. The Germans focused on the radar stations that appeared to have suffered little damage (so they attacked Foreness once more, which was not operational, but they didn't know it had no power). Notwithstanding the repair efforts by the British, and the deployment of some more AA guns around the stations, the Central and Eastern approaches across the Channel were now largely unguarded; Fighter Command was blinded.

The midday wave thus struck hard. The British still had some radar reports, and the Observer Corps; but maybe this was worse than nothing, as their reactions were belated and confused. All of #11 Group was scrambled, save for one reserve Squadron and for the shocked survivors of #141. #12 Group sent in a 3-Squadron Wing again, and that was late again; #10 Group had to defend Middle Wallop and Boscombe Down. The Germans applied another of Kesselring's suggestions, the Wartung raids. It means "maintenance", but they did the opposite. While the main, most heavily escorted raids attacked airfields closer to London and inland – and drew the attention of the defenses – smaller flights of bombers, maybe just one Staffel, with much less escort, maybe a Staffel of fighters, detached themselves from the tail of those formations and bombed the more exposed airfields, already attacked many times. The purpose was to prevent or delay the repair work. Most of these Wartung raids included in their payload mix a number of anti-personnel mines and delay-fused bomblets.

On August 9, the script was more or less the same, but the British were learning. Through tireless night-long efforts, Dunkirk had remained always operational and Truleigh had been repaired; they were now surrounded by tethered balloons, which would make dives and low-level attacks very dangerous. Westhampnett, Lympne and Manston had been abandoned, either for good or for the foreseeable future, while Hawkinge and Tangmere were now getting lower priority on repair work, but more repair personnel and equipment had been redeployed to Warmwell, Middle Wallop, Kenley and Biggin Hill, together with more AA guns and some PAC batteries. If Tangmere was not operational as an airfield, it still was as a Sector Station, a very important role in coordinating the units in the area; both there and at Biggin Hill, the local commanders had set up a second command post outside the base, just in case.
The British were reducing their frontage, at least temporarily. More fighter Squadrons had been deployed to airfields not belonging to Fighter Command: Andover, West Malling and Eastchurch. And two more Squadrons had come down from Scotland.

The air fighting was similar to the day before, and both sides were now under strain; this pace couldn't be sustained for long. It is worth mentioning that on one occasion, the fact that the fighter escort commander could communicate with the escorted Kampfgruppe commander saved the bombers from being left alone in the face of enemy opposition. Kesselring's insistence on better radio communications was paying off. The problem was, however, that as the fights moved North, the Bf 109s were beginning to experience range problems. Sperrle first (since many of his fighter bases were farther away from the British coast) and then Stumpff would soon begin experimenting with the new, improved drop tanks.

There were a few noticeable German successes apart from those in air combat and the destruction of ground facilities: i.e., attacks in which British fighters were destroyed on the ground. The best was ErProGr 210's: they came in low over the sea at Rochford and destroyed no less than 8 Spitfires, though they lost two Bf 110s in the process (one to AA and the other probably an accident). A run-of-the-mill level-bomber attack was lucky over Kenley; operational fighters had been scrambled, but three were undergoing repairs and were destroyed.
And finally, Kesselring tried another idea, the unescorted in-depth low-level raid. Two were sent in, one with Bf 110s and the other with Do 17s, a Staffel of the noticeably well-trained KG 76. The Bf 110s were more or less suitable for the task, and, probably also thanks to a good measure of luck, destroyed two fighters at Gravesend for the loss of one of theirs. The Do 17s' stunt was a bad idea, because despite the intermittent radar cover they were reported by the Observer Corps as they headed for Kenley at about 50 meters of height. When they arrived at Kenley, there were no fighters parked save for those not operational, and the defenses were fully alerted; they were hit by MG and autocannon fire and ran across a PAC line, taking losses, and subsequently they were attacked by #111 Squadron. Of the nine Dorniers, one came back unharmed, two were seriously damaged, and the rest were either downed or crash landed irretrievably. Out of 40 crewmen, 9 were killed, 5 wounded, and 5 taken prisoner. They did damage the runways and one hangar, and destroyed a fighter on the ground, but the price was definitely insane and the attempt couldn't be repeated, at least not this deep inland; the trick might still work in places like Westhampnett.

After dark, the Supermarine assembling plant at Woolston and the Short factory at Rochester were bombed. This time, the Kampfgruppen couldn't send a lot of aircraft; the intense activity of the last few days prevented it. On top of that, the Short Bros. didn't produce fighters. It was a luck for the British that the damage at Woolston was light.

The overall outcome for these three days of heavy fighting was 87 British fighters destroyed for 66 German aircraft. It's a 1.3:1 advantage for the latter. Kesselring was told by his intel officers the ratio was 2.5:1, he assumed it was actually closer to 2:1. That was enough to continue trying in this way; but it was a pace neither side could sustain for long. In any case, a spell of unstable weather was forecast for a couple of days.

[Michele]

10.

On August 10, it turned out the bad weather was slightly late; the Western half of the Channel was shrouded in clouds, but it looked line a few hours of decent weather over Kent would be available. The Germans had not planned one of they recursive attack waves on the radars, but they had a contingency plan, which they scrambled to put afoot. Relatively late, while the bad weather front was advancing, Luftflotte 2 launched two classic attacks on Biggin Hill and Kenley, the latter about two hours after the former. Over Biggin Hill, they were slightly better off than the norm; the British weren't expecting a raid because of the worsening weather, the radar network was still degraded, and several forward airfields were not operational. Thus the Germans lost two bombers and one fighter, and the British two Hurricanes (one of which for an engine failure on taking off). Most of the bombs didn't do much damage, but one hit the Sector Station control room, causing painful losses to key personnel. Kenley and Horhchurch took up the slack for about two hours, after which the backup HQ came on line, from a village shop.
The attack on Kenley was a disaster for the Germans. The cloud cover had closed in, and the secondary target (irrelevant: some Army barracks) had to be bombed. Plus, the British were right there, having received accurate interception data this time. Finally, Park had employed staggered attack waves until then, each made by one Squadron. This was sensible, as it allowsedmore flexibility for the next raids, but it also meant the British fighters were always outnumbered. As a rule, this was not going to be important, between the efficient radar network providing accurate interception data (which often allowed the most effective attack, the bounce) and the greater vulnerability of the average German raid. However, at this time the radar network was damaged and the German raids less vulnerable than expected, so Park finally began using couples of Squadrons as a rather common minimum attack strength, starting with this raid. The Spitfires of #64 Squadron had had time to be high up and attack the fighter escort from above, while the Hurricanes of #501 carried out the nerve-wracking but effective head-on pass on the bombers. The tally was four bombers and two Bf 109s for one Hurricane, and Kenley was not touched.
Luftflotte 5 sent in two flights, since the weather was still acceptable over the North sea; both were decoys that turned tail fairly early, not without the British having scrambled fighters of #12 Group.

The weather was uniformly bad on the following day. The Germans decided to take some rest; the serviceability rate needed to improve.
However, they put night raids in: a Knickebein mission over the Itchen factory and two conventional ones against the Woolston compound and the Biggin Hill airfield. Itchen was too small a target, and while the total area of the air base was large, actually hitting something significant at night was highly unlikely; but Woolston was damaged and the deliveries of Spitfires would be disrupted a few days later.

On August 12, the Germans began to understand what Sisyphus must have felt. The sky was reasonably clear, and they began their day with six fighter/bomber and two escorted Stuka raids on radar stations. They found that several of those they had seriously damaged now have makeshift antennas or mobile units; the damaged latticework antennas had been repaired, and there were even brand new ones up. Dunkirk, Truleigh and Rye had a crown of balloons. Poling, on the other hand, had none, but the attackers were bound to discover it had been turned into an AA trap.
At about 10:00, Pevensey went off line, to stay so for the day, Poling had only been defeated because the Germans had once again severed a power line, but the other stations were operational and the radar cover acceptable (the warning time remained shorter, though). On top of that, seven Stukas, four Bf 110s and two Bf 109s were lost to two Hurricanes, a terrible tally.

For the next few days (until August 15) the Germans tried to continue with the tactics they had already used. They achieved some success, both against the radar network and the air bases. However, their high-accuracy, high-effectiveness tool, the low-level raid by fighter/bombers, was becoming expensive. AA guns, which were almost useless save as a form of disturbance against aircraft at high altitude, were reasonably effective against low-flying targets. The British were still short on smaller-caliber, high-firepower AA around the critical objectives, but they were getting better. And more Bf 110s were being downed by ground fire. By August 15, they were down to just 124 operational machines.

Kesselring nevertheless insisted that low-level raids be carried out at least against coastal targets (radar stations and forward airfields). The AA reaction was less effective there, and the Germans managed to keep the radar network always damaged, and those airfields either under repairs or completely closed.

Over this cycle of raids, the kill ratio went to 2.3:1 for the British. Things were getting hard again for the Luftwaffe. The British had understandably begun to adapt to the tactics the Germans were employing. Not that Dowding was happy; he had now 568 fighters (counting only Spitfires and Hurricanes), plus a reserve of some 150. Fighter Command was now downing less enemy aircraft (although in the meantime, the successes of the anti-aircraft batteries were mounting). Additionally, having to scramble the fighters from bases further inland was not of any help.

When tea-time arrived with no further attacks on August 15, the British started to relax. But around 18:40, reports flowed in about enemy aircraft forming up over the German bomber bases in Eastern France and Belgium.
Between 20:00 and 20:30, that is, not long before sunset, the Germans carried out conventional, high-altitude level-bomber raids against the Supermarine plants in the Southampton area, especially at Woolston and Itchen. They were heavily escorted, and the kill ratio for the action was in their favor, albeit barely (1.1:1). Most of the payload was incendiary bombs. With sunset, the raid moved away and the British started working on containing the fires. But at around 21:30, Luftflotte 3 came to strike at the these same targets, which had been marked by Luftflotte 2's fire bombing. The marking had been much more accurate than that done at night with Knickebein, since the bombardiers could see their targets in the last daylight; and the following wave could go in real low and slow, since darkness protected it.
This was another of Kesselring's new tricks; and it worked. The damage was considerable and, although it could be repaired, the deliveries of Spitfires from this industry hub were stopped altogether for four days, and the output remained reduced until the end of the month. The "shadow" factory of Castle Bromwich, far away from the vulnerability of the coast, would produce no more than 37 Spitfires in the whole month of August.

[YLi]

Wow. This is just epic. Wow.

[Michele]

Wow. This is just epic. Wow.

Thanks, you'll have me blushing!

[YLi]

I honestly don't know which TL is more epic, CalBear's Pacific War or this one. Please continue writing so I can get some more samples for comparison.

Also, because I like to learn as much as possible, what are some of your sources for researching this TL?

[Michele]

I honestly don't know which TL is more epic, CalBear's Pacific War or this one. Please continue writing so I can get some more samples for comparison.

Also, because I like to learn as much as possible, what are some of your sources for researching this TL?

History Books
Bekker, Cajus. The Luftwaffe War Diaries.
The German Air Force in World War II (Macdonald,
1967). Dated and biased, but useful for the Luftwaffe’s
point of view.
Bungay, Stephen. The Most Dangerous Enemy. A
History of the Battle of Britain (Aurum Press, 2000).
Probably the most complete, exhaustive, up-to-date
account.
Caldwell, Donald. The JG26 War Diary 1939-1942
(Grub Street, 1996). Short on ambiance and war stories,
but overflowing with hard data, military history, and
photos.
Collier, Richard. Eagle Day. The Battle of Britain,
August 6 – September 15, 1940 (1968). The classic
story, brimming with atmosphere, personal accounts
and anecdotes.
Cormack, Andrew and Volstad, Ron. The Royal Air
Force 1939-45 (Osprey, 1990). The main source for
British uniforms, personal gear and equipment;
includes details on the WAAF.
Deighton, Len. Fighter. The True Story of the Battle
of Britain (Jonathan Cape, 1977). Inaccurate in a
few details, but goes a long way in showing the relationships
between men and machines, careful planning
and wishful thinking.
Price, Alfred. Spitfire Aces 1939-41 (Osprey,
1996). The iconic fighter and its best pilots.
Price, Alfred. The Hardest Day (Arms & Armour
Press, 1988). Painstakingly details all the events, raids
and fights of one day, August 18, 1940.
Price, Alfred and Pavlovic, Darko. Britain’s Air
Defences 1939-45 (Osprey, 2004). A recent and agile
treatment of the defense system, with plenty of photos
and technical details.
Stedman, Robert and Chappell, Mike. Luftwaffe
Air & Ground Crew 1939-45 (Osprey, 2002). The Luftwaffe’s
flight suits, equipment and uniforms, but also
organizational data.
Vasco, John. Bombsights over England (JAC Publications,
1990). The history of Erprobungsgruppe 210.
Wood, Derek and Dempster, Derek. The Narrow
Margin. The Battle of Britain and the Rise of Air Power,
1930-1940 (Arrow Books, revised edition 1969). The
margin was not narrow as far as victory goes, but it was
narrower than it was believed when this book was first
published. It deals with the pre-war buildup and the
actual losses.
Memoirs
Galland, Adolf. The First and the Last (Bantam,
1978). Highly opinionated, but it provides invaluable
insights and it’s a good read.
Townsend, Peter. Time and Chance (Methuen,
1978). Very useful for the atmosphere and mindset
information, though it perpetuates some myths.
Film
The Battle of Britain (MGM/UA Studios, 1969). A
classic movie using the mosaic-of-stories approach, it
stars Michael Caine, Curt Jurgens, but most importantly
many original aircraft and impressive air scenes.
Internet
The Royal Air Force – History Section provides
exhaustive information on the history of the RAF, and
it also includes the following as a sub-section. Available
at: www.raf.mod.uk/history/index.html.
The Battle of Britain is the RAF’s official
history of the campaign. Information about the
squadrons, the aircraft, the airfields. It includes
data about the opposition, too. Available at
www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html.
The Luftwaffe 1939-1945 is a non-official site
detailing the German Air Force’s organization, orders
of battle, and unit histories. Available at www.ww2.dk.
The Battle of Britain 1940 is the site of the Battle of
Britain Historical Society. It contains extensive quotes
from original documents. Available at www.battleofbritain.
net/contents-index.html.

[YLi]

Thank you for typing up that huge list of sources. I'm going to be lucky if I actually find the time to read just one of those books.

[Michele]

Thank you for typing up that huge list of sources. I'm going to be lucky if I actually find the time to read just one of those books.

Well... I had already typed it long ago.
If you can read just one of those, start with Bungay, I'd say.

[eltf177]

Very impressive. Please continue!:)

[Michele]

11.

August 16 saw unpredictable weather, and therefore some rest for the aircrews (not for the ground crews, though).
For August 17, Kesselring issued orders to use the renewed British radar capability against itself.
Around 10:00, many small-sized bomber formations were detected again well in advance, again over Luftflotte 2's area, and followed on their progress. When they were over the Pas de Calais, the trackings seemed to close in, and they crossed the Channel as one wide cloud. To the operators and officers observing it, it seemed headed straight towards the center of London. When over the coast, it split suddenly, taking the operators by surprise; the attack on Dover was not intercepted at all, the one on Rye was tackled belatedly, only the fight over Dunkirk began with a good British interception.
These were level bombers, flying high, without many chances of mowing down an antenna; but, apart from the off chance of a lucky hit, these attacks softened up the defenses around the real targets and distracted the crewmen – as yet another unannounced wave of low-flying Bf 110s swooped in.
The mission had become very difficult and dangerous; even though the defenders were a bit shaken by the high-level attack, and taken by surprise, the targets still bristled with guns, there were balloons to dodge, and the dust raised by the level bombers' payload didn't make things easier. Even so, at a high price, the Zerstörers were successful and downed two antennas at Dover, putting it out of action for three days. Rye took some damage, but it would be back on line by the evening.

The Germans pressed their advantage, attacking into the breach. Many small raids were sent against the airfields, to confuse the enemy and to do some damage on their own, while the Stukas reappeared again in numbers with the large one, against Dunkirk. Their accuracy was telling, and this time the radar station took very heavy damage.
The only problem for the Germans was that, in order to achieve this new hole, they had once again expended more aircraft than they could afford… 3 Stukas, 8 Bf 110s, 11 level bombers and 6 Bf 109s were downed on this day alone, for the loss of 10 enemy fighters. The toll was light for Stukas because of the damage to the radar network and since the defenders were already committed to fend off many other raids.

The Germans kept pushing for two more days; casualties mounted on both sides. The British were now operating almost entirely from second-line airfields. The alarms were already late and inaccurate to start with, because of the degraded radar system; and the scrambled Squadrons now tended to arrive late or too low. The Luftwaffe was now often using feints: raids started on a course, seemingly headed on a given target, then halfway through the Channel or on the coast veered off to the real one.
On the other hand, the Germans now had range problems for their fighters, which they tried to counter with the drop tanks. However, they were eating through these stores faster than they expected. The fighter/bombers had to keep returning over the radar bases and the forward airfields, to make sure these places remained out of service, and the Bf 110s' numbers were really dwindling.
A noticeable success was achieved on a diversionary raid by Luftflotte 3; a junior officer made a mistake at the peripheral base of Exeter (#10 Group), and 7 Hurricanes were destroyed on the ground by a Bf 110 raid. The attackers arrived undetected, skimming the sea, and strafed the dispersal area. A Bofors battery had just been transferred from that airfield to the Poling radar station.

Meanwhile, on August 18, back in Germany, Hitler met with Keitel, von Brauchitsch, Raeder and Goering, who was enthusiastically optimist. He believed the air offensive to be on the verge of destroying the RAF, and said so; he added that it was possible the air defeat alone would bring the British to the negotiation table. Once unable to defend London from bombing, they were likely to try and cut their losses. Raeder also hoped so, because he was still very much worried about the Royal Navy. He did everything he could to prevent any naval operation, lamenting the barge fleet was not going to be ready before September 15, and that the window of opportunity for the invasion would be very short.
However, given Goering's rosy report, Hitler decided to go ahead with the preparations for Unternehmen Seelöwe. If the British would sue for peace just thanks to the Luftwaffe, so much the better; otherwise, the air superiority over the Channel and the coast was going to allow the invasion to get through, on September 15. The planning and preparations kicked into the highest gear.

On the same date, another combined twilight/night bombing took place, this time against the Hawker plants in Kingston. This time the British expected the second punch and put out most of the fires timely, and the damage done was only moderate. But the deliveries of Hurricanes would be delayed for a day of two anyway.

On the following day, only a few raids were launched; Kesselring was redeploying his assets. Luftflotte 2 got reinforcements from the other two; Luftflotte 5, in particular, was left almost only with coastal and recon aircraft. Luftflotte 3, apart from the transfers to Stumpff's command, sent in three small high-altitude conventional attacks against mixed targets (Tangmere, the radars of Poling and naval objectives in Portsmouth). There were only enough bombers in it to force the British to engage, but few enough that there were about 3.5 fighters per bomber. Damage to the ground targets was minimal, but Fighter Command's reaction was weak, belated, and costly – to the British fighters.
Sperrle complained with Berlin for the transfers, but his complaints were intercepted by Wever.

Also on August 19, the Kriegsmarine carried out its one exercise off Boulogne. Fifty barges were used, half of which powered and the other half towed. When they made a 90° turn towards the coast, a barge capsized and another lost its tow. When reaching the beach, the masters of the powered barges opened the gaps amongst them, fearing collisions. About half of the troops were unloaded within an hour of the first man ashore, another barge capsized, two failed to reach the shore, several did land but far away from the planned landing zone. The masters of three barges lost control while running aground, and their vessels ended up parallel to the beach line, which prevented the ramps from being lowered. This exercise was carried out over a short distance, with perfect weather and in broad daylight, and of course with no opposition. This was officially classed as a success. Privately, Raeder's case of cold feet got way worse.

That evening, another meeting took place, in Bentley Priory. Dowding received the visit of Air Marshal Newall, Chief of Air Staff, and Sir Archibald Sinclair, Under Secretary of the Air Ministry. Both visitors were worried about what was going on; the evidence seemed to be that Fighter Command was losing the battle, and Newall, in particular, made no mystery of the fact that his confidence in Dowding was decreasing. Several options were discussed. Trying to keep all airfields open seemed either impossible or at least very difficult, even taking into account the emergency measures already adopted to intensify the repair works. Withdrawing from the battle, redeploying the fighters to the North, and letting the Germans do what they wanted along the coast, would be suicidal: the core of the British aircraft industry, and other key factories, would be destroyed in a relatively short time. Then there was the currently adopted solution: trying to fend off all the enemy attacks while keeping most of the fighter force more to the North. In that way, the fighter force wasless vulnerable, but also way less effective, and the result seemed to evolve towards a seriously contested air space along the coast. This might become unsustainable, especially if and when the Germans launched a final offensive to accompany their dreaded invasion attempt.
But Dowding had a fourth policy to propose... late that night, the visitors left, their faith in Fighter Command restored.

[whatisinaname]

Will be interesting to see what Dowding’s fourth option is?

[Astrodragon]

I'd heard about the trial landings, but not how bad they truly were :) I dont think people not in the UK or pehaps northen France realise how unpleasant the Channel can be in even normal summer weather.

One point that might amuse; I was at a panel this year at Worldcon, where one of the panelists explained that a few years aho, they found the original plans in the German archives, the ones with the German Navy's comments all over it...:)

Who says the germans cant do sarcasm....:D:D

[Markus]

One point that might amuse; I was at a panel this year at Worldcon, where one of the panelists explained that a few years aho, they found the original plans in the German archives, the ones with the German Navy's comments all over it...:)


For Op. SL? Like the comment "the Army does not know anything about conducting amph. ops"?

[Astrodragon]

For Op. SL? Like the comment "the Army does not know anything about conducting amph. ops"?

yes, these are what they wrote on their copy of it..they were, it seems, a trifle underwhelmed by the practicality of it...:D:D

[dogsbody]

This is great, most exciting. I almost forget it's not real.

Excellent work, Michele.

[Michele]

12.

Kesselring had been reviewing reports together with Deichmann and Oberst Schmid of the Luftwaffe intelligence. They did cut their pilot's claim a bit; even so, they ended up with an inflated figure of the enemy losses.
The evidence seemed clear, however. First of all, it paid to keep the radar stations under attack. True, aircraft were lost while bombing them, but the British, too, lost fighters while defending them; additionally, the British reactions appeared to be slower, less accurate, than when they had their wizardries intact. Some recent raids against air bases were not even intercepted, while in the days when the radars had not been touched, no raid went unscathed.
Second, even though Kesselring's remained wary of the intelligence figures, it would have seemed the British were down to some 300 to 350 fighters (the real figure on August 20, only counting Spitfires and Hurricanes, was actually 511 in the units, plus some 100 in the reserve). The British counterattacks seemed to grow weaker by the day, which would have confirmed that either they were really this down, or had decided to spare their strength.
Third, the tactics of bombing the air bases repeatedly seemed to be working; if the Germans were doing a Sisyphus job with their destruction, the enemy was facing a similar task with their repairs, and many airfields were clearly not in use any more.
Kesselring decided to continue with the current plan.
By then, however, he was very worried about conserving his. The Bf 109 force had markedly decreased, but it was still large enough in his view. The bombers had started with a large surplus, considering that they needed to be always heavily escorted; but the problem that was developing was with crews. Many bombers made it back damaged, and they could often be repaired. But a bomber arriving damaged would usually unload wounded or dead crewmen, and the quality of his personnel pool was decreasing.
The Stukas were at a bare minimum for their future task in the support of the invasion.
Finally the Bf 110s, which he had always considered the most expendable, had indeed been expended; not only they were down to 91 operational machines, but there were predictable problems with personnel quality and morale.
On the other hand, with the enemy strength also waning, his units' losses should soon be decreasing. Kesselring concluded there was a chance of breaking Fighter Command in the 25 days before Seelöwe, without ending up with a broken Luftwaffe, too.

August 21 came to be known as "the Hardest Day" among Fighter Command crews. The radar network was still badly degraded after the previous day's renewed pinpoint raids that, at the expense of four Stukas and two fighters, had destroyed the Dunkirk transmitter and severed Dover's power cables once more. The warning time was short and the data unclear.
Stumpff's crews compounded that by achieving bombing height only over the Channel, with what seemed to be two large raids. Actually they split up in five smaller ones, each with about one Gruppe of 25-30 level bombers and no less than 60 fighters. After changing course over landmarks, they headed for Eastchurch, Horchurch, Gravesend, Biggin Hill and Kenley. One of these bases (Eastchurch) had no fighters there and indeed it did not belong to Fighter Command, but three of the others were Sector Stations.
Meanwhile, Luftflotte 5 did its usual North Sea tour (this time, the British did not even scramble fighters from East Anglia) and Luftflotte 3 carried out a smaller diversionary raid against Tangmere and Westhampnett.
In the face of this gigantic mass of 130 bombers and 300 fighters, the British hurried to scramble their defenses. Three Squadrons (one of them from #10 Group) engaged Luftflotte 3's diversion, and no less than 21, that was almost all the rest of #11 Group, were scrambled to engage the main attacks. They were 231 fighters in all, mostly in waves of two Squadrons each, which pitted about 22 British fighters at a time against each group of 60 German ones. Two British units had just deployed South from Scotland, were largely unexperienced and took severe losses, and another one was bounced from above. Even so, the Luftwaffe lost 12 bombers and 8 fighters, for a loss of 17 British fighters.
But the worst was still to come. The bombing was reasonably accurate at Hornchurch and Biggin Hill. At Biggin Hill, the Sector Station HQ was damaged, the backup should have taken over – but a German bomb destroyed the local telephone exchange. At Hornchurch, the Sector Station was destroyed, and no backup location had been prepared there. Kenley took some damage, and its personnel was shaken, but they had to take up Biggin Hill's tasks, while a way less experienced officer in North Weald had to replace his Hornchurch counterpart.

This was the situation, when, some 20 minutes after the last bomb had fallen, the first Observer Corps' report was in with low-flying intruders across the coast. It was most of the remains of the Bf 110 force, swooping in against two other targets (Rochford and West Malling, the latter a mistake) and, again, Kenley and Biggin Hill.
The British had almost nothing ready to counter them. They sent out the one Squadron of #11 Group that had not been committed, but this was the first time they engaged a target flying under 200 meters of height. They attacked the enemy, but failed to achieve anything and actually took losses: #151 Squadron lost one fighter to air-to-air combat and another one to a hill. The first two Squadrons to engage the previous wave were ready and they took off, but, due to the situation of the control network, failed their interceptions. Four units of #12 Group took off, but, although they didn't form a big Wing, climbed to altitude even if their targets were hopping over the hills; which had the same result, they arrived late. The Bf 110s destroyed 25 fighters on the ground, further heavily damaging Biggin Hill, for the loss of one of theirs.
That single loss was fateful, however; it was the Gruppe commander of II./ZG 76. His second in command took over, but the Zerstörers had suffered heavy casualties, and this was a junior officer; flying nap of the earth, he mistook Croydon for Kenley. The former had never been bombed because it was already in the London area, and indeed, a couple of bombs ended up hitting civilian buildings. Three civilians died.

The day continued with further Wartung raids against already bombed airbases and radar stations, and further small dogfights; the British were clearly exhausted. The final tally was 46 British fighters destroyed in a single day, for 27 German aircraft. It was indeed the bleakest day for the RAF.

However, such a pace couldn't be sustained by the Germans, either. The following day, only smallish, half-hearted engagements took place, and August 23 was another day of sudden summer storms. Both sides took some rest.
Kesselring received a message from Goering. The OKW was asking for more attacks against key industrial and military targets, especially naval ones, with a view to paving the way for Seelöwe. Kesselring had little time for such a dispersion of his dwindling strength. He decided that some night raids by small numbers of bombers would do; he wouldn't be risking too much and he'd be able to show some reports.

The Germans changed tack on August 24. No less than 9 small raids were sent in, one every half hour. The first was actually a dogfight trap, with 6 Bf 110s playing the role of the bombers amongst 51 Bf 109s; in the second, there was just a Staffel of half-empty Ju 88s. In the following ones, the proportion of bombers grew steadily. The British controllers were initially surprised, but actually Park's staggered-scramble policy was able to deal with such a threat better than with the swamping tactics, and the outcome was more favorable to the British (a 1.3:1 kill ratio). The targets were the radar stations again, and damage on the ground was minimal, these being mostly level bomber raids.

On that night, three raids attacked sundry targets unrelated to the air battle: Portsmouth, Liverpool and the Thameshaven oil terminal. This area was bordering on London, and indeed some bombs fell over the East End, hitting the church of St. Giles.
Taking into account the previous bombing at Croydon, too, the War Cabinet authorized a retaliatory night mission against Berlin, selecting industrial and military targets (the Siemens compound and the Tempelhof airport). The night was cloudy and 28 bombers managed to drop two bombs within the target areas. The rest either plowed farmland or peppered residential areas.
There was a quick escalation. The Luftwaffe kept applying the same tactics as before during the day, therefore it only had small bomber forces to spare for the night attacks; but given the inaccuracy inherent in trying to hit at night industrial targets within such a sprawling city as London, they were enough to make the Londoners feel targeted. And when 8 Berliners were killed on August 27, it was time to take gloves off: unrestricted city bombing was allowed by both governments.
Kesselring had doubts, though: would direct daylight attacks on London serve the purpose of gaining air superiority better than what he had been attempting until that time?

[Astrodragon]

Kesselring seems far less believing of the inflated RAF losses reported in the OTL. Is this just him, or is it a deliberate change?
I seem to remember that in the OTL the RAF losses, and the number of estimated remaining fighters, were kept to by Luftwaffe intelligence even though the pilots didnt believe them and kept reporting that they were wrong.

[Michele]

Kesselring seems far less believing of the inflated RAF losses reported in the OTL. Is this just him, or is it a deliberate change?
I seem to remember that in the OTL the RAF losses, and the number of estimated remaining fighters, were kept to by Luftwaffe intelligence even though the pilots didnt believe them and kept reporting that they were wrong.

The intention is to allow the Luftwaffe to carry out a better show, by changes that are essentially within reason, and which can mostly be reasonably tracked back to the POD (Wever survives his accident).
Indeed, if you go back to 2., you will see that it's Wever who notices when cross-checking the captured Polish data and the intel assessments, that there must be something wrong in the assessments.

And the problem was not just with the intel. The intel people started with shoddy estimates. The pilots kept reporting, yes - that they were shooting down about 3 times what they were actually shooting down. So the two aspects fed into each other, throwing the whole picture off the wall. If the intel guys kept guessing wrong, that was not in small part the pilots' fault (that applies to both sides, of course, but as I mentioned, the British had an advantage, the physical evidence - crashed enemy aircraft to count).
If aircraft MGs finally got cameras, there is a reason - pilots over-reporting.

[whatisinaname]

Another great part, looking forward to part 13.

[MUC]

I have a point to make:


Since the RAF losses are greater here than in OTL, wouldn't it be reasonable for Fighter Command to ask for assistance in attacking German airfields?
How about having the RAF go over the Channel to bomb the German airfields?
Bomber Command would probably suffer serious losses, the Germans would be hit too however.

[Michele]

Bomber Command did something of that in OTL and in this ATL, but it's not a very useful help.

For starters, Bomber Command and Fighter Command were not on the best terms when it came to cooperation. Air Marshal Portal already believed in the bomber's theory of strategic bombing, and initially did not want his assets diverted "for the purpose of bolstering Fighter Command, the AA defences and the ARP before these have really been tried and found wanting". In OTL he changed his mind, maybe because he found those wanting; so yes, the same comes to pass in ATL.

But, second, the bombers' target would be the invasion, not the air-to-air battle. That's what happened in OTL and happens in this ATL, too. And rightly so.
The British bombers could (and did occasionally) go to bomb enemy airfields at night. They tended to achieve virtually nothing due to a host of problems. Airfields are difficult to target; they include lots of empty space; airstrips are easily repaired, and, last but not least, the Germans had plenty of them. Some were more important than others (namely, fighter airstrips crammed into the Pas de Calais corner to reduce range problems), but exactly these were mostly makeshift installations, even easier to repair. Look how hard is the Germans' work to keep enemy air bases out of commission, with daylight bombing and low-level precision attacks.
Which brings us to the alternative: the bombers could use daylight. In that case, their losses were prohibitive. Yes, the Germans lacked the British integrated radar-based defense network, but had radars all the same, and plenty of fighters. Look at the casualty ratios of the December 18th, 1940 anti-shipping raid.
Of course, that's without fighter escort. One might argue that the British bombers should be sent out with fighter escort, and that the German airfields in the Pas de Calais were within range of the British fighters. To that, it should be pointed out that the Germans also suffered heavy bomber losses in OTL during the Battle of Britain – with heavy fighter escort. On top of that, admitting the bombers needed fighter escort to do the thing they were built for was not in the cards this early in the war, not for Bomber Command officers. And if they had accepted that, then you'd have one more stubborn opponent to this scheme, Dowding himself. Fighters, in his mind, were a defensive weapon, needed to defend _Britain_, not bombers.

That is not to say the bombers didn't play a part in OTL and don't play one in this ATL. In OTL, after Portal accepted the fact that they had to contribute, they were intensively used, but mostly not against the Luftwaffe's airfields – against the Kriegsmarine's barges. Keep reading.

"Mostly not" means that the British bomber did attack airfields and aircraft factories between the beginning of July and October 31st, 1940. 17% of their missions were against airfields, and 14% against the aircraft industries. But none of that was very successful or very important, and increasing the percentages would not have been really very useful. Much more important were the missions (36%) dedicated to sinking the German barge fleet.

[Michele]

13.1

Another Luftwaffe staff meeting was held on August 29, in Paris. Wever met with Kesselring, Sperrle, Stumpff and their chiefs of staff. The main point in the agenda was how to implement the daylight attacks on London, which had become a political necessity.

These top commanders could not rule out the possibility that the British, faced with extensive destruction in their capital, might decide to sue for peace. Possibly they were just waiting for a face-saving excuse, which would allow them to seek for terms.
On the other hand, however, it was likely they would not. In that case, the daylight attacks on the city had to serve the overarching purpose of the whole campaign: shooting British fighters down, thus achieving German air superiority, if not air supremacy, a key factor for the success of Seelöwe. Wever stated that when planning the missions, causing damage to ground targets came second; exploiting the circumstance to engage Fighter Command and defeat it in the air came first.
This went down well with Kesselring. Over the past few days, the British countermoves had been weaker. It was possible the Luftwaffe was winning its fight; but, everything considered, the Feldmarschall was seriously concerned that the British were simply giving up ground, withdrawing their fighters North, and saving their strength. Even with drop tanks for his fighters (of which, anyway, the stocks were quickly decreasing), the Germans could attack British fighters only so far North; if all of them should retreat to the Midlands, they would have been effectively be out of range. If that happened, and if they managed to redeploy South again when the invasion date came, that would be bad news for Seelöwe.
Therefore, going for London made sense. It would force the British to come up and fight.

The first massive daylight raid against London took place on September 1. The target were the Surrey Commercial Docks to the South of the Thames, and Kesselring had selected four somewhat understrength Gruppen to attack these, equipped with Heinkels and Dorniers. These 86 bombers flew out in a close square formation. They were escorted by 327 fighters, almost a 4:1 ratio. About a hundred of them flew ahead, with drop tanks, in a large Freijagd action to sweep the skies, while another third flew open cover high over the bombers. The remaining third served as close escort.
But the British initially thought that the raid on London was way larger than this, and for a very good reason: while they crossed the Channel, the Germans had 71 bombers more and 163 fighters more, right behind the formation above. The British thought the whole air armada was heading for the docks, but actually, this second force split out over Sevenoaks to attack Kenley and Croydon. Kesselring was exploiting the cover of the London attack to keep up with his single-minded policy.

As expected, the British reacted in strength. A single, high, very large signal on the Dunkirk screens (the station was back on line now) was something the battered Fighter Command could still deal with well. As the enemy crossed the Channel, the first Squadrons to scramble were already at a useful altitude, and everyone else in #11 Group was alerted. The first fighter-to-fighter action took place already over the coast, and Parks fed his Squadrons in couples into the running battle. The British fighters were outnumbered (as they almost always were), but before the escort and close escort German units could make their numbers be felt, the British usually had already done their passes. Things were different against the free-hunting forward Bf 109s, among which the aces of JG 26 and JG 51. But then again, when they were seriously committed in a dogfight, they had a chance to down British fighters, but they were also peeled away from their vanguard role.
The British dealt out more than what they took – as long as the main attack formation is considered. Indeed, in the fight against the bombers, which did unload their bombs over the docks, the British suffered 31 losses, but downed 44 enemy aircraft; most of the British casualties were caused by the Freijagd sweep. Leigh-Mallory's big wing (no less than 5 Squadrons having formed up over Duxford) did show up and they also engaged this raid.
However, the diversionary tactics worked. When the radar operators noticed the split, it was late. The attack on Kenley was intercepted from below and at a bad angle, and the British here suffered more losses than those they caused. The raid against Croydon went in unchallenged; this force was then attacked belatedly, while withdrawing. What was worse, #85 Squadron had just landed to "pancake" (rearm and refuel) at Croydon, and it was hit on the ground. The tally of these two attacks was 14 British fighters destroyed for the loss of 5 German aircraft. Overall, the day's balance was less than a 1.1:1 ratio for the RAF. And Croydon remained not operational throughout the following day.

That day, however, only the dangerous drudgery of keeping the forward airfields and the radar stations as out of service as possible was undertaken by the Germans. The effectiveness of this policy was decreasing, because neither Stukas nor Bf 110s were used (in order to spare their dwindling numbers), and also due to the law of diminishing returns. Casualties were low on both sides.

September 3 came with some indifferent weather, so in order to keep up with the insistent demands from Berlin, the enemy capital was bombed at night. This didn't convince the British to come to terms, and two bombers were uselessly lost to unknown causes.
A different night mission was carried out by a handful of seaplanes and Dorniers from Denmark; they tried to keep at least some pressure up against the damaged Hawker plants at Kingston-upon-Thames. This was about the most the depleted Luftflotte 5 could do at this time, but in the event they missed their target entirely.
On the same day, an inter-service meeting was held in Berlin among the chiefs of staff. As Unternehmen Seelöwe was getting nearer, it also became clearer that it was a terrible gamble. The chiefs came up with countless details that had not been hammered out, unknown factors they had no way to discover, and time was running short for everything.
All of this, however, might not matter – provided that the Luftwaffe was really able to deliver what Goering had promised a few days before. Wever had been pushed in a tight corner by his boss. However, it was true that Kesselring was faring reasonably well. It was true his fighters seemed to be winning the battle. Reluctantly, Wever gave a cautiously favorable forecast. Seelöwe went ahead.

Well before the dawn of September 4, another massive raid against London was in the making – or so it seemed to British radar operators. The bombers had taken off first and gathered over the fighter bases in the Pas de Calais; the fighters took off about half an hour before the first light and the large ("300 plus") formation headed straight for the docks. Most of #11 Group's Squadrons were alerted.
At dawn, however, the huge raid was on the coast and it split to hit the radar stations of Dover and Dunkirk and the already out-of-service airfields of Hawkinge and Manston. These being level bombers at considerable height, the additional damage was scarce, and the limited actions that only a few of the British fighters managed to develop ended up in basically a draw.
But the real attack was actually against Rochford, Hornchurch, Gravesend and Eastchurch. 34 Do 17s, 21 Bf 110 fighter/bombers (including the 12 survivors of ErProGr 210), and 43 Bf 109s flying on drop tanks had closed in skimming the North Sea waves, and appeared roughly at hangar height with the dawning sun right behind them. At Rochford, attacked by half the bombers, the timing was perfect; the Spitfires of #222 were lined up for scrambling, the defenses were unprepared, and 8 British fighters were destroyed on the ground for no German loss; the handful of escorting Bf 109s strafed the personnel. At Hornchurch and Gravesend the timing was not that good. At the former, the operational enemy fighters had all taken off, and actually #54 Squadron was still not far; it was recalled and it downed 4 German aircraft for the destruction of 4 Spitfires under maintenance (and 1 Blenheim). At the latter, attacked late by the Germans with respect to the diversionary raids, the locally based Squadron was widely dispersed, having just been stood down, and the Germans lost 1 Bf 110 to the flak, while destroying 3 Hurricanes. Finally, Eastchurch still had no active fighter squadron based there, but Park had taken care to send a couple of old trainers that might resemble fighters, and a handful of unrepairable hulks, made up as serviceable aircraft, to reinforce the Germans' continuing mistake. The raiders later reported the destruction of 7 fighters for no loss, but actually they had scored no point at all – and their leaders remained convinced Eastchurch was a worthy target.
In any case, the three other airfields had been seriously damaged; apart from the airframes mentioned above, hangars were hit, personnel killed, runways cratered. The initial forecast was that Gravesend would be operational again by the evening, but the Dorniers had scattered lots of antipersonnel mines and time bombs; in the end, it would take three days. And the morale was low; the men began to feel they were fighting a losing battle.
The bad thing about this surprise raid was that it would the last time drop tanks were used before S-2. The Luftwaffe had not planned to drill through the stock so quickly, and the deliveries were late, so the remaining ones had to be spared.

Once more, the Germans had managed to surprise the British with feints and unconventional tactics, and had succeeded in dishing out something more than what they had taken. While reviewing the reports and the intel analysis for the previous week, that evening, Kesselring thought the campaign had a fair chance of succeeding. He still had two or three tricks in his bag, and given that by now he was left with just 10 days to Seelöwe, it was almost time to use them.

[Astrodragon]

mm, Kesselring seems just a bit fixated on those airfields....:)
Wonder if thats going to bite him at some point?

Slightly surprised the RAF havent made more use of decoys and so forth - the British were very good at this sort of thing later in the war.

Also, it doesnt look like the Luftwaffe is destroying much more than the factory output..wasn't it around 100 fighters a week at this point?

Looking forward to seeing what kesselrings been kepping back, though :)

[Michele]

mm, Kesselring seems just a bit fixated on those airfields....:)
Wonder if thats going to bite him at some point?

Slightly surprised the RAF havent made more use of decoys and so forth - the British were very good at this sort of thing later in the war.

Also, it doesnt look like the Luftwaffe is destroying much more than the factory output..wasn't it around 100 fighters a week at this point?

Looking forward to seeing what kesselrings been kepping back, though :)

The average in the first nine months of 1940 was 327 fighters delivered per month (and the figure is above 400 if you include the last 3 months). And it is roughly 100 per week, yes, during the battle.
Which ain't bad at all, and better than what the German industries were doing.

Nevertheless, there are several factors to take into account.
First, the Germans in this ATL have attacked and will continue to attack the aircraft industries. More often, with more determination, and with better results than in OTL.
Second, what counts is operational aircraft at any given time. Fighters with the units but not serviceable don't count (and the tempo of operations, the destruction of hangars, the strafing of ground personnel etc. all contribute to reduce the serviceability rate). Fighters in the reserve and with training schools and OTUs don't count, at least until they are not transferred to front-line units.
Third, the production figure above includes aircraft suitable for night fighting (Blenheims and if I'm not wrong the first Beaufighters). I suspect it also includes some run of Defiants. It might also include the naval fighters, but I think not.
Fourth, aircraft downed by the enemy are the majority, but by no means the only cause of losses during a sustained campaign. Mere operational attrition takes a toll, heavier than one usually expects, especially today. The Norwegian campaign was undoubtedly a difficult one for the Luftwaffe, from the point of view of the environment, the operational conditions, the wide range of tasks to carry out etc. They lost a total of 260 aircraft in that campaign. Care to guess how many of those went down to accidents?

Additionally, there is the usual problem with hindsight. You are right to focus on airframes, but you are using hindsight. You know the British training programs were working way better than the German ones and were churning out more pilots than the Germans expected, and that most Squadrons had more pilots than aircraft; you know that many British pilots parachuted to safety and were back in the saddle the day after having been downed. The Germans did not know about the former and could only reasonably guess the latter. Additionally, they had this tendency to overstate the importance of the personal qualities of the warrior. So they thought that in defeating Fighter Command, killing pilots was at least as important as destroying airframes, if not more.
Of course that helped, but airframes were the narrower bottleneck.

However, the Germans did not know that. Whence the stress on engaging the enemy in the air. Kesselring and Wever are less obsessed with that, as you noticed, in this ATL. But they still cannot know much of the above details.

[Michele]

14.

The weather was rather bad on September 5, and variable on the following day (night bombings took place, without results worth of note). Dowding exploited the circumstance for his second last major redeployment before the invasion. That an invasion was going to be attempted was confirmed by a mounting swell of intel reports. So he entrusted the protection of all of Scotland to the FAA fighters and a Blenheim squadron. The Midlands was to be defended by #141 and #264, with their Defiants, by a handful of Gladiators, by the experimental Whirlwind Squadron (#263; although it was far from ready for action, it had just been declared operational anyway) and by some more Ble