WI Lord Halifax is appointed PM in 1940?

[Don_Giorgio]

By 1940 Chamberlain's mishandling of the peace and his equally reckless handling of what is usually called thw Phoney War led to his departure from 10 Downing Street. Halifax was a relatively popular candidate for the post of Prime Minister, but hurriedly ruled himself out, arguing that he would not be able to direct the war from the House of Lords. Despite his reputation as an appeaser, once war broke out Halifax was opposed to any unofficial dealings with Germany, even with thw German Resistanse, with a view to negotiating an end to the war. His desire for peace was overrriden by his distrust of Hitler, so that he was largely immune to peace offers of any kind from Germany.
WI Lord Halifax was appointed PM instead of Winston Churchill in 1940? How is this altering History? Any thoughts?

[Milarqui]

AFAIK, Lord Halifax was an advocate of making peace with Germany as long as the British Empire was preserved. This would stop war in the Western Front really soon, and Nazi Germany would be able to concentrate completely in the Soviet Union, which could end in total victory for the Germans or in a possible stalemate if the Soviet Union is lucky enough. The only way in which the SU could win would be with the Americans making a Lend-Lease treaty in exchange of help in the war against Japan, or maybe even bases and/or territories in Kamchakta and the lands near the Bering Strait.

If Japan is still into the Axis, they could very well demand at least a part of British colonies in East Asia, which could either lead to other war or could be accepted by Britain.

I could be perfectly wrong, of course...

[Anaxagoras]

The only way in which the SU could win would be with the Americans making a Lend-Lease treaty in exchange of help in the war against Japan

SU? What does Syracuse University have to do with anything? You must be talking about the USSR. But I digress...

If Lord Halifax had become Prime Minister, I am not convinced that he would have made peace with Germany, though he might have don so. Either way, it's not good for the UK, because Churchill was an entirely unique individual who was the ideal warlord for the moment. I cannot imagine Halifax emerging as the leader which Churchill was and I cannot imagine Halifax havign the ability to rally the British people the way Churchill did.

[Slacker]

Halifax was actually working to rearm Britain and abandoned appeasement well before Chamberlain. I doubt he would have negotiated peace with the Germans, although I think the British would've been even more conservative in regards to grand strategy-I can see Halifax delegating a great deal of the decisions to the General Staff, as the reason he turned down the position wasn't because of his spot in the House of Lords, but rather because (despite service in WW1) he felt he wasn't up enough on matters military.

I imagine there'd be MUCH LESS support for the Soviets in Britain, and to be honest post-war relations between the US and UK and the Soviets on the other would be much worse than OTL. Halifax hated the Commies.

[Weaver]

Well, if you take notice of historian John Lukacs, "Five Days in London" etc., if Halifax had beem appointed PM, it was certain that a peace with Hitler would have been worked out. Even Churchill himself played around with the idea, but Cabinet ultimately decided to fight on simply because of their distrust of Hitler's word.

It was a very close run thing though, and had Halifax been at the helm, and Hitler had offered satisfactory guarantees, my money is on a peace in 1940.

After all, it made a lot of sense. The true nature of the nazis was far from obvious at that time, and there was widespread belief in the British ruling class that Germany could keep Bolshevism out of Europe. A British Empire allied to the Reich...the whale and the elephant...would have been a formidable combination.

Mind you...God help humanity in that scenario.

[Anaxagoras]

Halifax hated the Commies.

Yes, but not any more than Churchill did.

[David S Poepoe]

It was a very close run thing though, and had Halifax been at the helm, and Hitler had offered satisfactory guarantees, my money is on a peace in 1940.

After all, it made a lot of sense. The true nature of the nazis was far from obvious at that time, and there was widespread belief in the British ruling class that Germany could keep Bolshevism out of Europe. A British Empire allied to the Reich...the whale and the elephant...would have been a formidable combination.

Mind you...God help humanity in that scenario.

Peace does not equate being allied. Britain would have negotiated for peace in order to prepare for war. There most likely still have been feelers put out to the United States with an eye towards eventually facing Germany together. Some sort of Anglo-American Alliance would have emerged and I think its likely that Hitler would eventually have turned on the British - and you can't quite forget that something will happen in the Far East.

[Michele]

... and Hitler had offered satisfactory guarantees, ...

Such as? He wouldn't disarm. He wouldn't withdraw from occupied lands. And his word was worthless. I don't see how any guarantee could have looked satisfying.
Halifax was very willing to grant Germany a position better than the one it was after 1918. He thought Germany would both need and deserve that. He was also well aware that the problem was bridging the gap between such a proposition, and Hitler's insatiable demands.

An armistice might have been worked out. A subsequent renewed falling out would be extremely likely. Think how much time did the Peace of Amiens last.

[Blue Max]

First of all, Halifax would almost certainly have to build a "Crisis Government", which would include Winston Churchill in one way, shape or form. Winston can be counted upon to be hawkish, and distrust of Hitler is obviously a big problem. I think peace would be unlikely.

It's quite possible that a peace deal is fully explored but Halifax is simply unable to trust Germany--or that Halifax essentially demands more than Hitler will accept: A pullout of all of Western Europe, Norway, and Poland. The Last would simply never happen. Furthermore, the sudden introduction of Italy into the war is likely to further complicate diplomatic arrangements.

So, we have a war where Halifax is in charge. Most critically, relations with the United States would probably not be as amenable as OTL, and this could mean Sledgehammer goes forward in 1943 instead of attacking Italy, which could screw the war in Europe somewhat, but would not fundamentally change its outcome with the Soviets in Eastern Europe and the USA in West Germany. Indeed, a 1946 endgame against Germany would probably see the deployment of nuclear weapons against Germany and possibly Italy, if they aren't immediately interested in surrender.

The war would be over, and probably not fought as well, but the Halifax would at least have presided over the victory and a successful outcome. People would wonder whether the Allies could have done better, but a victory is a victory, and Halifax would become a Hero for his efforts to win the war, even though other people could have done a better job.

[FletcherofSaltoun]

First of all, Halifax would almost certainly have to build a "Crisis Government", which would include Winston Churchill in one way, shape or form. Winston can be counted upon to be hawkish, and distrust of Hitler is obviously a big problem. I think peace would be unlikely.

It's quite possible that a peace deal is fully explored but Halifax is simply unable to trust Germany--or that Halifax essentially demands more than Hitler will accept: A pullout of all of Western Europe, Norway, and Poland. The Last would simply never happen. Furthermore, the sudden introduction of Italy into the war is likely to further complicate diplomatic arrangements.

So, we have a war where Halifax is in charge. Most critically, relations with the United States would probably not be as amenable as OTL, and this could mean Sledgehammer goes forward in 1943 instead of attacking Italy, which could screw the war in Europe somewhat, but would not fundamentally change its outcome with the Soviets in Eastern Europe and the USA in West Germany. Indeed, a 1946 endgame against Germany would probably see the deployment of nuclear weapons against Germany and possibly Italy, if they aren't immediately interested in surrender.

The war would be over, and probably not fought as well, but the Halifax would at least have presided over the victory and a successful outcome. People would wonder whether the Allies could have done better, but a victory is a victory, and Halifax would become a Hero for his efforts to win the war, even though other people could have done a better job.

I'm not sure I agree with this. Churchill has been lauded as the great war leader, but during the war, he was critisised within Parliament due to his leadership. A famous quote I remember, but cannot remember who made it was "The Prime Minister debates like he is fighting, and he fights like he is debating."

Poland and Norway would obviously be sticking points in any peace deal, but could potentially be overcome. This would render a defeat for Britain, but assuming that the Nazis dont make any demands over British territory and do not occupy France or Norway then a deal may have been dooable.

In such a situation you probably see a Communist Germany after a bloody war.

Should the war continue, then I cannot see the war being that different. Germany would still be defeated and the main reason would be the Soviet Union. Halifax would use his skills on foreign affairs to rally as much support in the States and the Commowealth as possible, remember he was foreign secretary so would have experience and as such I disagree with the point re.leverage in America.

The one area where we would be worse off is that the Churchillian speeches would not go into fokelore.

[Admiral Canaris]

I liked the scenario from "Victory of the Luftwaffe", when Churchill was ousted and then went to America to preach against Roosevelt, losing him the elections. Not too plausible, but fun.

[The BigI]

My guess would be that Lord Halifax would have sued for peace while desperately rearming to rjoin the war in 41-42.

[whatisinaname]

My guess would be that Lord Halifax would have sued for peace while desperately rearming to rjoin the war in 41-42.

Agreed, used "peace" to buy time for the Empire to rearm and expand its military, also upgrade the Royal Navy etc with modern equipment.

[V-J]

Halifax would almost certainly have asked Hitler (covertly through diplomatic channels) for what sort of terms were on offer; whether there would have been a final peace agreement is very much more debtable. Hitler was certainly very eager to make peace, though.

[Churchill]

I think with Britain out of the war Turkey and Vichy France would have declared war on the USSR and Moscow would have been taken in 1941.

[General Zod]

Halifax would almost certainly have asked Hitler (covertly through diplomatic channels) for what sort of terms were on offer; whether there would have been a final peace agreement is very much more debtable. Hitler was certainly very eager to make peace, though.

Well, Hitler's terms will indeed be relatively lenient, in that they won't ask pretty much nothing from British hide: he was deeply regretful to have warred the British Empire, which he regarded as a positive "Aryan" force. He would ask for nothing but British recognition of German war gains and exclusive sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

So peace terms would include:

recognition of German annexations and suzerainety in Czechia and Poland (expulsion of governments-in-exile).

recognition of Vichy regime as the legitimate government of France (expulsion of De Gaulle and Free France).

recognition of peace treaties between Germany and France, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands.

recognition of German sphere of influence over Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania and strict neutrality in any future conflict between Germany and URSS.

Germany and Italy would surely claim an hefty compensation for the "aggression" of Britain and France against Germany, but any price would be paid by defeated France: at the very least, France would have to cede Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg to Germany, Savoy, Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and Djibouti to Italy. Further cessions would be quite possible, such as the rest of Lorraine to Germany, Azure Coast and/or Algeria to Italy, French Flanders to Dietsland. Netherlands and Belgian-French Flanders would be set up as German satellite Dietsland, Wallonia as another German satellite, likewise for Norway. France would be subject to heavy limitations for her Army and Navy, and would keep her Vochy para-fascit government, but military occupation would be lifted.

[FletcherofSaltoun]

I think with Britain out of the war Turkey and Vichy France would have declared war on the USSR and Moscow would have been taken in 1941.
Thats by no means a certainty.

Whats to stop Britain supplying the Soviets, regardless of any agreement with Germany upon a German declaration of war in the east? Sheer size and weight of numbers made the USSR virtually unbeatable so IMO, as long as Hitler does not act in a sane manner and the Reich is safe in the west, the best hope the Nazis would have would be the Soviets accepting a compromise peace favourable to Berlin. Should this not happen, eventually, Germany gets royally fucked by the Red Army.

I mean, even if the Germans took Moscow, there would still be thousands of miles of unconquered Soviet territory and given the work of the partizans behind the lines, any campaign would turn into a logistical nightmare for the Nazis. Nothing would be certain.

[Churchill]

Thats by no means a certainty.

Whats to stop Britain supplying the Soviets, regardless of any agreement with Germany upon a German declaration of war in the east? Sheer size and weight of numbers made the USSR virtually unbeatable so IMO, as long as Hitler does not act in a sane manner and the Reich is safe in the west, the best hope the Nazis would have would be the Soviets accepting a compromise peace favourable to Berlin. Should this not happen, eventually, Germany gets royally fucked by the Red Army.

I mean, even if the Germans took Moscow, there would still be thousands of miles of unconquered Soviet territory and given the work of the partizans behind the lines, any campaign would turn into a logistical nightmare for the Nazis. Nothing would be certain.

Around 70 extra divisions would ensure far better progress.
The Turks and French if they come in would be very useful too.
Would expect the Japs to invade by 1942 as well.
By 1943 Stalin would be coming to terms.

[FletcherofSaltoun]

Around 70 extra divisions would ensure far better progress.
The Turks and French if they come in would be very useful too.
Would expect the Japs to invade by 1942 as well.
By 1943 Stalin would be coming to terms.

Why do the Turks suddenly come in on the fight? I missed that on your last post. I very much suspect that they would remain neutral. As for the French, its debatable. Yes, they would maybe come in and add troops to the war but that does not change the end outcome.

As for the Japanese. They were defeated by the Soviets earlier. Even given a Nazi invasion in the west, they would most likely be very cautious and await something of a Nazi victory in European Russia. In addition to this, China was not an easy campaign.

Besides, you said have Stalin come to terms?

This was a racist war intent on destroying the Communists and Jews from Europe. The only negotiation I think Hitler would have done with no direct threat to Germany and Germany deep inside the USSR would be with a bullet in the back of Stalins head. I doubt Germany would negotiate. As such, Soviet win. Even bigger than OTL.

In reality though, the final outcome would depend on the UK, USA and Japan.

[Michele]

Well, Hitler's terms will indeed be relatively lenient, in that they won't ask pretty much nothing from British hide: he was deeply regretful to have warred the British Empire, which he regarded as a positive "Aryan" force. He would ask for nothing but British recognition of German war gains and exclusive sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

So peace terms would include:

recognition of German annexations and suzerainety in Czechia and Poland (expulsion of governments-in-exile).

recognition of Vichy regime as the legitimate government of France (expulsion of De Gaulle and Free France).

recognition of peace treaties between Germany and France, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands.

recognition of German sphere of influence over Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania and strict neutrality in any future conflict between Germany and URSS.

Germany and Italy would surely claim an hefty compensation for the "aggression" of Britain and France against Germany, but any price would be paid by defeated France: ....


Not what Halifax would have swallowed. With these "lenient" terms, the peace talks would never have started for serious. There is a temporary stalemate, and the British, be they right or not, are convinced time is on their side.

[Churchill]

Why do the Turks suddenly come in on the fight? I missed that on your last post. I very much suspect that they would remain neutral. As for the French, its debatable. Yes, they would maybe come in and add troops to the war but that does not change the end outcome.

I would this the Turks would come in with no British threat against them and a lot to gain in the Caucasus.

As for the Japanese. They were defeated by the Soviets earlier. Even given a Nazi invasion in the west, they would most likely be very cautious and await something of a Nazi victory in European Russia. In addition to this, China was not an easy campaign.

The Japs where ready to come in when the Germans reached Astracken.
The Imperial army in Manchuria was increased vastly in 1940 and 41 for this purpose.

Besides, you said have Stalin come to terms?

Once the Germans reached the A-A line in 1942 they may well be satisfied and with the Germans still with the upper hand Stalin may will give them what they have.
If not the Germans will take more in 1943.

This was a racist war intent on destroying the Communists and Jews from Europe. The only negotiation I think Hitler would have done with no direct threat to Germany and Germany deep inside the USSR would be with a bullet in the back of Stalins head. I doubt Germany would negotiate. As such, Soviet win. Even bigger than OTL.

No doubt many Slavs in the conquered territory would be moved East or exterminated.

In reality though, the final outcome would depend on the UK, USA and Japan.

Answers above.

[FletcherofSaltoun]

I would this the Turks would come in with no British threat against them and a lot to gain in the Caucasus.
Which they would and could not be certain of, as any potential peace deal between the UK and Germany would almost certainly keep this clause secret. Besides, they would potentially have equally as much to lose. I suspect calmer heads would have prevailed in the Turkish government. By any means this is totally uncertain, and IMO unlikely.

The Japs where ready to come in when the Germans reached Astracken.
The Imperial army in Manchuria was increased vastly in 1940 and 41 for this purpose.

I refer you to the Battle of Kalkhin Gol (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkhin_Gol#Aftermath). Following their defeat, the Japanese decided that they would change tactics and never attack the Soviets again.

The Japanese, however, while learning never to attack the USSR again, made no major changes to their tactical doctrines. They continued to emphasize the bravery and courage of the individual soldier over massing force and armor. The problems that faced them at Khalkin Gol, most importantly their lack of armor, would plague them again when the Americans and British recovered from their defeats of late 1941 and early 1942 and turned to the conquest of the Japanese Empire

So again, uncertain, and IMO unlikely.

Once the Germans reached the A-A line in 1942 they may well be satisfied and with the Germans still with the upper hand Stalin may will give them what they have.
If not the Germans will take more in 1943.

Hitlers aim was the Urals. That was the aim of Barbarossa to my knowledge. The Soviets would never accept this. As such any peace is unlikely. The Germans would never, IMO accept terms with the Soviets unless the Nazi Empire was threatened from the west.

No doubt many Slavs in the conquered territory would be moved East or exterminated.

If you accept the was was one of racism and imperialism, then you must see the Nazi viewpoint of distaste for negotiating with subhumans(in their view). As there can be no negotiation, do you deny the Soviets would win a long term war with Germany?

[Admiral Canaris]

Well, Hitler's terms will indeed be relatively lenient, in that they won't ask pretty much nothing from British hide: he was deeply regretful to have warred the British Empire, which he regarded as a positive "Aryan" force.

Actually, his opinion of Britain had changed a lot by then, as von Ribbentrop had spent the last few years regaling him with stories of how decadent and judaised the British were: According to him, it was ruled by quasi-Bolsheviks and a cosmopolitan, Francophile elite of degenerate nobles and Jewish businessmen. von Ribbentrop hated England a LOT after they'd made fun of him during his tour as Ambassador...

[General Zod]

Thats by no means a certainty.

Whats to stop Britain supplying the Soviets, regardless of any agreement with Germany upon a German declaration of war in the east? Sheer size and weight of numbers made the USSR virtually unbeatable so IMO, as long as Hitler does not act in a sane manner and the Reich is safe in the west, the best hope the Nazis would have would be the Soviets accepting a compromise peace favourable to Berlin. Should this not happen, eventually, Germany gets royally fucked by the Red Army.

I mean, even if the Germans took Moscow, there would still be thousands of miles of unconquered Soviet territory and given the work of the partizans behind the lines, any campaign would turn into a logistical nightmare for the Nazis. Nothing would be certain.

It is those hyperblown statements about "invincible" and "unconquerable" USSR no matter the odds that make me find Sovietwank insufferable. First, if the Germans really took Moscow and the Russian heartland (i.e. the front on the Volga), the rump USSR is truly royally fucked, as they have lost all their European major manpower and industrial centers. With what they still have in Siberia and Central Asia, they are down to the level of Spain as manpower goes and Italy as industry goes, in no way able to sustain any kind of major conventional warfare. Sure, they have the stretegic depth and residual resources to retreat on the Urals and wage a mega-Vietnam guerrilla campaign against the Wehrmacht, which might become a serious attrition problem for the Germans in say 10-20 years (the Fatherland scenario). If anything, the Wehrmacht will have a bigger mega-Afghanistan guerrilla problems from all those Russian peasants in occupied territories who object to be exterminated to make room for German Lebenstraum, but that's another matter. But as long as any form of WWII major conventional warfare is concerned, the days of the USSR as any kind of great power and signfiicant threat to the Nazi Empire are truly over the moment the Whermacht reaches the Volga. There is no way in Hell or Heaven the manpower and industry of Siberia and central Asia can ever get remotely close the one of the Greater German Reich.

Besides, this specific scenario is truly a dream one as far as Barbarossa is concerned: Britain out of the war in mid-40, so no occupation of the Balkans, no North Africa, Italy, or France fronts, no strategic bombing, no occupation of France, no anti-air personnel, and the German industry can draw on its full capabilities, plus the ones of Norway, Italy, France, and Benelux, to arm the Wehrmacht. Hitelr here is the unquestioned master of the European continent, so the populace of Europe will be much more amenable to their fascist vassal regimes, and Germany can draw a substantial amount of manpower from France, Spain, Italy. Industrially, it's the whole capability of Western Europe vs. Soviet Union. And it's almost a given that with these odds, the Wehrmacht will penetrate much more in depth than OTL. The more they advance, the less the Russians have available in terms of manpower and industry. When the Wehrmacht reaches the Volga, it's endgame.

[Admiral Canaris]

It is those hyperblown statements about "invincible" and "unconquerable" USSR no matter the odds that make me find Sovietwank insufferable. First, if the Germans really took Moscow and the Russian heartland (i.e. the front on the Volga), the rump USSR is truly royally fucked, as they have lost all their European major manpower and industrial centers. With what they still have in Siberia and Central Asia, they are down to the level of Spain as manpower goes and Italy as industry goes, in no way able to sustain any kind of major conventional warfare. Sure, they have the stretegic depth and residual resources to retreat on the Urals and wage a mega-Vietnam guerrilla campaign against the Wehrmacht, which might become a serious attrition problem for the Germans in say 10-20 years (the Fatherland scenario). If anything, the Wehrmacht will have a bigger mega-Afghanistan guerrilla problems from all those Russian peasants in occupied territories who object to be exterminated to make room for German Lebenstraum, but that's another matter. But as long as any form of WWII major conventional warfare is concerned, the days of the USSR as any kind of great power and signfiicant threat to the Nazi Empire are truly over the moment the Whermacht reaches the Volga. There is no way in Hell or Heaven the manpower and industry of Siberia and central Asia can ever get remotely close the one of the Greater German Reich.

So how does the Reich conquer the Ukraine if it sends it main force to Moscow as was originally planned? (I assume you don't think they could've managed both that and the Pocket) Why do the German forces survive the winter much better in this scenario? Why isn't taking Moscow house-by-house holy hell? And with more troops in the field, doesn't issues like, say, logistics get worse, not better?

The USSR can't be conquered by the technology the Germans have available. In everything, from climate to size to societal organisation, it's optimised for defence.

[General Zod]

Not what Halifax would have swallowed. With these "lenient" terms, the peace talks would never have started for serious. There is a temporary stalemate, and the British, be they right or not, are convinced time is on their side.

Well, since Hitler was genuinely willing to have peace with the British, I can see German negotiators be eventually amenable to concede Belgium, Netherlands, and Norway political autonomy (i.e. no imposition of fascist regimes), as long as they keep strict neutrality and economic cooperation with Germany. Nazi ambitions on these states were rather peripheral anyway.

As it concerns France, well, Vichy regime is already in charge and it occurred by homegrown French political developments in the face of the defeat, it was not really imposed by German bayonets like collaborators in Netherlands, Belgium, or Norway. French far right simply seized the right moment to claim power, but in the face of French exaustion after the defeat, it had a genuine following. At the peace table, it would be quite specious for Britain to deny it legitimation, and the moment the UK starts peace negotiations, De Gaulle and Free France are a political nullity and a lonesome rogue general. Their only legitimacy came from British belligerance, or an uphill political battle to claim French public opinion back away from allegiance to Petain, which was years in the making (until 1943-44, French Resistance had a fringe following).

No doubt that Germany and Italy will claim a redress of Versailles' wrongs and satisfaction of their long-standing irredentist and colonial claims against France: at the very least, this means Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg to Germany, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunis, and Dijbouti to Italy, plus huge military limitations to France to ensure it does not be any menace to Axis anymore, enough to administer her colonial empire and no more. Of course, if Vichy France is willing to lend an hand in the coming anti-Bolshevik crusade (as it shall most likely be), some of those limitations will be lifted.

A German Empire in Central and Eastern Europe was Hitler's whole war aim, and if Britain truly wants peace at this point, recognizing this will be unavoidable: anyway, since Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians chose German vassaldom of this own will, this essentially amounts to acknowledging German suzerainety over Czechia and Poland and strict neutrality between Germany and URSS in any coming confrontation. With the difference of Vichy France (which arguably, brought defeat on her own head by choosing war), it's not really different from what Britain would have reaped had she chosen not to give any garantee to Poland in 1939.

Once Britain makes the decision to seek peace over all-out war (which amounts to acknowledgement that the balance of power in Europe is an obsolete concept and sparing the dwindling resources of the British Empire is preferable to spending them to try and reverse a German hegemony over Europe which already exists), this is the kind of peace deal that would emerge.

[General Zod]

So how does the Reich conquer the Ukraine if it sends it main force to Moscow as was originally planned? (I assume you don't think they could've managed both that and the Pocket) Why do the German forces survive the winter much better in this scenario? Why isn't taking Moscow house-by-house holy hell? And with more troops in the field, doesn't issues like, say, logistics get worse, not better?

The USSR can't be conquered by the technology the Germans have available. In everything, from climate to size to societal organisation, it's optimised for defence.

First, if Britain truly signs peace in mid-1940, no Balkans, Mussolini will be given his pound of flesh from French territory and colonies and will be busy assembling troops to take part in the anti-bolshevik crusade, or even if sends an ultimatum to Greece, without British help, the Greeks will rush to grant him anything. Ditto for Jugoslavia entering the Triparite PAct. Not to do so would be suicidal. This means the Wehrmacht can attack the moment they prefer, enough time to take the pocket and turn towards Moscow earlier before winter.

Second, in this scenario, I expect army-size expedition corps from Spain, Italy, and Vichy France. Even Turkey joining the Axis is not unreasonable by this point, if Hitler promises them the West Caucasus (he wanted the Baku oil and Ukraine). Even more troops for the Axis.

Third, logistics is not a God-given physical constant: more Axis manpower means more personnel to clear, build, and adapt railroads. And more troops to clear the partisans.

Fourth: with more troops, and more weapons and equipment since no war production would have been wasted for a naval campaign against Britain, the Germans are in a far better position to occupy the whole of Ukraine and reach Moscow, and withstand Zhukov's counterattack. Truly, contending Moscow will be a urban house-by-house hell, but nowhere as bad as Stalingrad, since the Russians won't have a major river at their backs. Zhukov's counterattack will be the Russians racking the (momentary) bottom of their manpower barrel, before the 1942 conscripts rush in (and less of them, since the Axis is in Moscow and on the Don).

Even if Zhukov's counterattack stops the pressure on Moscow momentarily, it will push the Germans much less further away, with more troops and equipment the Germans are poised to finish the job in Spring 1942 admitting the counterattack really succeeds. If Turkey is Axis, major front in the Caucasus, so no troops for Zhukov, goodbye Moscow. In this scenario, Hitler is suffering no blockade, so he has more access to oil, so he is less anxious to get Baku at the expense of Moscow. OTOH, admittedly, if Turkey is attacking from the south, going for the Caucasus makes somewhat more sense. Losing Baku would still be a severe loss for the URSS, but quite proabably noot so bad as losing Moscow and the Russian heartland.

Fifth: Kalkin Gol or no Kalkin Gol, in this scenario, it makes rather more sense for the Japanese to backstab a weakened Russia with a two-front war than picking a war with a British Empire and a USA which can direct theri whole intact combined might against them. Whereas, in 1941 the URSS can spare no troops in the Far East besides the ones already garrisoning the border. Whereas the Japanese have no such problem. If the Japanese attack, no Zhukov counterattack, so Moscow eventually falls (house-by-house figthing are costly, but without a relief, the defenders ultiamtely fail). No Moscow, and a two-front war, the URSS is KO.

The Germans don't need to conquer ALL of the URSS. They just need to take Ukraine, Moscow, and the Russian heartland, up to the Volga. Without these, Russia has neither the manpower nor the industrial potential to continue any serious conventional war with the Greater German Reich with Siberia and Central Asia (not to mention the Japaneese would be truly stupid not to seize Outer Manchuria and Eastern Siberia, so the Soviet Rump will only have Western Siberia and Central Asia, admitting the latter's nationalists don't get funny ideas..). It quickly becomes a mop-up operation from the Volga to the Urals. At that point, either the Russians beg for peace, or it becomes a long-term Vietnam-style guerrilla war on the Urals between the Siberian rump (which by now will be down to a regional power as manpower and industry goes). Quite probably a big cumulative attrition headache for the Wehrmacht in a decade or two, but conventional war is essentially over.

Of course, the Wehrmacht will have even more attrition headaches from all those Salv partisans who have objections to roll over and die to make room for Lebenstraum colonists, but again, it's a big counterguerrilla problem, the big conventional war is over. Unless one assumes a Siberian rump with the manpower and industry of Italy (to be generous) may be any problem for the whole Wehrmacht. Their only hope is if they can get nuclear weapons before Germany (rather questionable Siberian rump, with all the post-defeat economic and political chaos, can develop the Bomb before Germany).

[General Zod]

Actually, his opinion of Britain had changed a lot by then, as von Ribbentrop had spent the last few years regaling him with stories of how decadent and judaised the British were: According to him, it was ruled by quasi-Bolsheviks and a cosmopolitan, Francophile elite of degenerate nobles and Jewish businessmen. von Ribbentrop hated England a LOT after they'd made fun of him during his tour as Ambassador...

True but trivial. By all accounts, Hitler in mid 1940 was very eager to get Britain to the peace table so he could have hands free for Russia and very marginally interested in any concessions from the British besides acknowledgement of his victory over France and hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe.

[Blue Max]

Not what Halifax would have swallowed. With these "lenient" terms, the peace talks would never have started for serious. There is a temporary stalemate, and the British, be they right or not, are convinced time is on their side.

I would agree with this. The UK would simply be demanding more than Germany would be willing to provide.

If Germany is truly interested in a peace with the United Kingdom, it should have released Poland minus Posen and Danzig and accepted Neville Chamberlain's offer of an "Easy Peace", which would probably be more likely than a peace deal where the UK would have to, at some degree, hand over Indonesia and the Congo into German Puppet Regimes.

Halifax would have been willing to waver where Churchill had stood firm, but even Halifax would not be willing to make peace with these concessions. Indeed, Halifax would probably demand Poland's return and find that Hitler would never allow it. And then it would be over.

As for why Halifax and the USA would not get along, this is modeled on his role as lead diplomat to the USA, where he had several gaffes and embarrassments. I take the view that the people in similar situations would cause similar results, so I'd expect a problem.

[MarkA]

Who would be in Halifax’ government? The Tories who deserted Chamberlain and wanted Churchill as PM were talking with and being supported by, the Liberals and Labour. The latter agreed to a government of national unity if Churchill was PM but they indicated they would not accept Halifax.

If Halifax won the premiership his own party would be split and he would not necessarily have a working majority in the Commons. What would he do? If he called an election, even if it were possible to do so in this crisis, the result would probably be the decimation of the Conservatives.

For the sake of argument even if he succeeded in a vote of confidence in the House, what could he expect from Hitler? Any British PM who stood up and waved a treaty around proclaiming this meant peace with honour with Germany is impossible after Chamberlain.

There would need to be iron clad promises backed up by action like the immediate withdrawal of German military forces from France and from any other country where their presence could threaten Britain. Not going to happen. The removal of any German and their allied airforces from within range of the UK. No way. Some way to neutralise the threat of German naval vessels against the RN and merchant marine. Hitler would never agree. To top it all off the Italian navy would need to be neutralised as well as the army presence in Africa. Unlikely in the extreme.

Why would the British government and more importantly the people accept anything else after the continual broken agreements?

[Michele]

I have to say I find you use certain adverbs with quite fanciful meanings, apparently.

Hitler "genuinely" wanted peace with Britain. Yes, that's true, provided that the British were willing to hand him everything he wanted on a silver platter. That's "genuinely wanting peace" with Hitler. Yes, he might have offered, say, Norwegian or Dutch neutrality. So what? He would have not disarmed, of course, but he would have wanted the Norwegians and Dutch disarmed. In other words, he could have come back whenever he wanted. And who, in Europe, could trust Hitler only on his word? Nobody who wasn't a fool, certainly not Halifax.

If Britain "truly" wanted peace. Here "truly" actually means "at whatever cost". Going for peace at whatever cost had been tried, and proved foolish.

Romanians accepted vassaldom to Germany "of their own will". Here, the meaning is "at gunpoint", and anyway that took place after the moment in which Halifax could have become British Prime Minister. Back in March 1939, Romania had asked the British for help against the German demand of a position of monopoly as to the Romanian foreign trade, and the fame of the British guarantee to Poland tends to make obscure the fact that Romania was also given guarantees. Romania chose the German side because otherwise it would have ended like Poland. They would have been way happier without German meddling.

A final remark: why should Britain accept German hegemony? Only because it had been tentatively achieved, not earlier than a month before, and which was far from proven that it could be self-supporting? But Britain in the past had had way more of an empire overseas, and had never ever accepted the hegemony of one Continental country, and for very good reasons. It had opposed Spain and France. Trying to argue that having one lone Continental superpower was actually good for Britain really doesn't hold water – and even if it did in theory, it runs entirely against the grain of centuries of British foreign policies. Traditions which were probably much more ingrained in Halifax than in the less conventional Churchill, BTW.

[Blue Max]

Who would be in Halifax’ government? The Tories who deserted Chamberlain and wanted Churchill as PM were talking with and being supported by, the Liberals and Labour. The latter agreed to a government of national unity if Churchill was PM but they indicated they would not accept Halifax.

If Halifax won the premiership his own party would be split and he would not necessarily have a working majority in the Commons. What would he do? If he called an election, even if it were possible to do so in this crisis, the result would probably be the decimation of the Conservatives.

For the sake of argument even if he succeeded in a vote of confidence in the House, what could he expect from Hitler? Any British PM who stood up and waved a treaty around proclaiming this meant peace with honour with Germany is impossible after Chamberlain.

There would need to be iron clad promises backed up by action like the immediate withdrawal of German military forces from France and from any other country where their presence could threaten Britain. Not going to happen. The removal of any German and their allied airforces from within range of the UK. No way. Some way to neutralise the threat of German naval vessels against the RN and merchant marine. Hitler would never agree. To top it all off the Italian navy would need to be neutralised as well as the army presence in Africa. Unlikely in the extreme.

Why would the British government and more importantly the people accept anything else after the continual broken agreements?

I seem to recall that part of the situation was Halifax himself not wanting the job. It could be the case that Neville Chamberlain, facing removal, pulls all of the strings he can and puts Halifax in power. Halifax, thence weakened, tries to create a "War Government" as Churchill did OTL. Churchill himself could be the Defense Minister, I would suspect that Anthony Eden would also return to government, as he had bravely resigned over appeasement. Finally, the political left would be included, so Clement Atlee would be in there as well.

Halifax might be considered "Dovish" in British Politics and Germany, but he would not be surrounded by more doves in a crisis government. I think that Halifax's government would not only not survive if he attempted to force a peace deal with Hitler, I think this would cause a political crisis to the point of ripping his political party apart. The people of Great Britain were furious over Hitler's betrayal of the Munich agreement, and I suspect that fury was dominant politically even during the worst days of the Blitz, and probably would have been even if Halifax would have been in power.

Not only would a UK peace deal in 1940 have been national suicide, it would also have been political suicide. There will be no arrangement based on trusting Hitler.

[Admiral Canaris]

First, if Britain truly signs peace in mid-1940, no Balkans, Mussolini will be given his pound of flesh from French territory and colonies and will be busy assembling troops to take part in the anti-bolshevik crusade, or even if sends an ultimatum to Greece, without British help, the Greeks will rush to grant him anything. Ditto for Jugoslavia entering the Triparite PAct. Not to do so would be suicidal. This means the Wehrmacht can attack the moment they prefer, enough time to take the pocket and turn towards Moscow earlier before winter.

Why is Vichy France accepting large concessions to Italy? They're beaten, but not yet complete tools; if Hitler does hand "Il Musse" Nice and Savoy, for example, or Tunisia, that'll make them angry, even if they can't resist directly. Hitler was (being him) pretty nice to Vichy at first, because he wanted a stable puppet, not an occupied state in rebellion (and, from what we see of Vichy, it mostly worked). Why does he reconsider drastically because Britain is beaten? He thought they were already when he made the decision IOTL.

Why is Yugoslavia more willing to support Germany here than IOTL? They're actually better off for British guarantees; remember, Britain has a negotiated peace, not an unconditioal surrender. If the British recognise the new Yugoslavian government and promise it protection, they're better off than they were IOTL, as Hitler will at least consider not wanting trouble from Britain again. And as noted, Britain will be in a "Cold War" at best with Germany; they'll guarantee the independence of anyone that's still independent.

(I suppose you could argue that the Yugoslavian coup wouldn't be sponsored by Britain with Halifax in charge, and thus might not go off, but that's no certainty, especially with Churchill still in the government.)

Likewise, why won't Britain defend Greece's neutrality under these circumstances, assuming that Mussolini would even dare mess with them for fear of provoking a conflict with Britain (he was much more cautious than Adolph)? Hell, I could make the case that Romania and Bulgaria wouldn't join the Axis here if there are believable British guarantees made for them;at the very least, Hitler might thread a little more carefully around them a little longer.

Finally, how much earlier do you intend the Germans to attack the USSR? The original starting date is a dream, what with the spring flood and all. The best you could hope for is probably something in early June, and a couple of weeks might not make all the difference between victory and defeat.

Second, in this scenario, I expect army-size expedition corps from Spain, Italy, and Vichy France. Even Turkey joining the Axis is not unreasonable by this point, if Hitler promises them the West Caucasus (he wanted the Baku oil and Ukraine). Even more troops for the Axis.

Turkey was very neutral, so it's not all that likely that they join, and the value of their forces in a modern war is doubtful; at best, they could serve as occupation/anti-partisan troops. Likewise, the Italian divisions were a mess - too small, too little artillery and support, bad armour throughout; some units like the Alpini were good, but most were mediocre or worse - and Vichy France wasn't allowed an army under the terms; in any case, the Germans used their equipment to good effect themselves.

This brings us back to the point Michele usually raises, and may already have, here (as you know, there are a couple of different threads on this topic right now): the Germans' major problem was never manpower, but equipment and materiel. Volkssturm? Think of Enemy at the Gates, that's what it was like - "You there! Here's a brassard and a rifle! You - here's a brassard and the ammo, don't go too far from the guy with the rifle!"

Third, logistics is not a God-given physical constant: more Axis manpower means more personnel to clear, build, and adapt railroads. And more troops to clear the partisans.

But the troops will themselves need to be supplied, making the situation worse in the short run, even if it does improve in the long run (you're somewhat aware, I take it, of the time it takes to build roads - it isn't done in weeks, or even months in most cases). Railroad is an ever bigger bitch, and on top of that there's a German lack of trains and rolling stock.

Fourth: with more troops, and more weapons and equipment since no war production would have been wasted for a naval campaign against Britain, the Germans are in a far better position to occupy the whole of Ukraine and reach Moscow, and withstand Zhukov's counterattack. Truly, contending Moscow will be a urban house-by-house hell, but nowhere as bad as Stalingrad, since the Russians won't have a major river at their backs. Zhukov's counterattack will be the Russians racking the (momentary) bottom of their manpower barrel, before the 1942 conscripts rush in (and less of them, since the Axis is in Moscow and on the Don).

The real industrial drain for Germany that the Navy was responsible for was the surface ships (esp prestige projects - heavy ships like the Tirpitz), and those wouldn't have been called off just like that. The surface fleet orders were pretty stable; what increased was U-boat production. You could take away some, or even most, of that, I suppose. Still, it's not a huge boon, especially as one must take into account that production lines aren't retooled that easily; a naval yard can't necessarily build tanks, for example, or at the very least not right away.

As noted above, I strongly doubt that both the Ukraine AND Moscow could be taken in the same campaign; even allowing for increased manpower, there are other limits. Light infantry isn't good for much if it isn't supported by something more solid, and it certainly isn't strategically fast if it goes on foot. And I think you're seriously underestimating the time it'd take to take Moscow; IOTL, they barely got there at all in 1941. How long do you think the Germans would have to batter it before it gave in? Not as Stalingrad, you say (I'd disagree, Moscow being bigger and better defended), but what, then? A month or two? That's still time for them to freeze and Zhukov to counter-attack.

Even if Zhukov's counterattack stops the pressure on Moscow momentarily, it will push the Germans much less further away, with more troops and equipment the Germans are poised to finish the job in Spring 1942 admitting the counterattack really succeeds. If Turkey is Axis, major front in the Caucasus, so no troops for Zhukov, goodbye Moscow. In this scenario, Hitler is suffering no blockade, so he has more access to oil, so he is less anxious to get Baku at the expense of Moscow. OTOH, admittedly, if Turkey is attacking from the south, going for the Caucasus makes somewhat more sense. Losing Baku would still be a severe loss for the URSS, but quite proabably noot so bad as losing Moscow and the Russian heartland.

Contrary to the Draka books, the Caucasus is not easily invaded from the South, with its mountainous terrain; that front isn't mentioned much in the histories, but was about as hopeless as Italy in WWI. Turkey's outdated army would not bind up any comparatively large RKKA divisions. As for oil, Hitler might well find himself in less supply here, as he can't bully Romania into selling Germany its full production on credit. Romania and Hungary might well demand cash for their products, or other securities, and if Hitler fucks with them the British blockade is back in action. Mussolini might transit oil throuh for him, but will it make up for everything that's lost?

People in the West tend to miss how much of a rout the Winter Offensive really was. The Germans weren't retreating, they were fleeing; only Hitler's stand-firm orders (much-despised in later contexts, but very useful there) prevented an all-out collapse. In addition, much heavy equipment was lost there that couldn't really be replaced (Germany STILL wasn't at full war production by then); Speer lies a lot, but there he was right.

Fifth: Kalkin Gol or no Kalkin Gol, in this scenario, it makes rather more sense for the Japanese to backstab a weakened Russia with a two-front war than picking a war with a British Empire and a USA which can direct theri whole intact combined might against them. Whereas, in 1941 the URSS can spare no troops in the Far East besides the ones already garrisoning the border. Whereas the Japanese have no such problem. If the Japanese attack, no Zhukov counterattack, so Moscow eventually falls (house-by-house figthing are costly, but without a relief, the defenders ultiamtely fail). No Moscow, and a two-front war, the URSS is KO.

Not that the Japanese Army was very good on the ground (training poor, small arms poor, armour and artillery abysmal), but all right, let's say they mount a major offensive and manage to defeat the local garrisons. Now what? They have an even worse logistics nightmare to contend with than the Germans and suffer the full consequences of winter attack in arctic climate. Not pretty. In addition, Stalin never commanded ALL the Siberian divisions to Moscow; the Soviet Far Eastern Command was essentially self-contained, and while it sent reinforcements to the West, it was never broken up.

And, if worst comes to worst, what'll Stalin do; does he consider the Far East more valuable than Moscow? No. "Fuck this, Georgy Konstantinovich, get everything you can over here now! If the Japanese monkey-men want the frozen tundra, they can have it. For a couple of years, at least..."

The Germans don't need to conquer ALL of the URSS. They just need to take Ukraine, Moscow, and the Russian heartland, up to the Volga. Without these, Russia has neither the manpower nor the industrial potential to continue any serious conventional war with the Greater German Reich with Siberia and Central Asia (not to mention the Japaneese would be truly stupid not to seize Outer Manchuria and Eastern Siberia, so the Soviet Rump will only have Western Siberia and Central Asia, admitting the latter's nationalists don't get funny ideas..). It quickly becomes a mop-up operation from the Volga to the Urals. At that point, either the Russians beg for peace, or it becomes a long-term Vietnam-style guerrilla war on the Urals between the Siberian rump (which by now will be down to a regional power as manpower and industry goes). Quite probably a big cumulative attrition headache for the Wehrmacht in a decade or two, but conventional war is essentially over.

I think you underestimate the Urals factories. And regardless, the Germans can't reasonably achieve all that (beginning at the start; they have enough forces to take EITHER Moscow or the Ukraine, and not be certain of it at that) even so.

[Don_Giorgio]

will be busy assembling troops to take part in the anti-bolshevik crusade, or even if sends an ultimatum to Greece, without British help, the Greeks will rush to grant him anything.

I am not so sure about that... British involved in Greece only after Metaxas's death in 29 January 1941... till that date Greece was fighting Italy by itself... No British troops nor Royal Navy were allowed by Metaxas to enter Greece because he didnt wanted to attract Hitler to attack him...
There is a rumour circulating till today that Metaxas was poisoned by a British agent in order that his successor along with the Anglophile King George II allow British troops to enter Greece...
Plus if Metaxas (being an admirer of the German model) rushed to give everything to Italy he would have faced popular uprising... He had faced one in Crete in 1937 and he wouldnt have risked another...

[MarkA]

I seem to recall that part of the situation was Halifax himself not wanting the job. It could be the case that Neville Chamberlain, facing removal, pulls all of the strings he can and puts Halifax in power. Halifax, thence weakened, tries to create a "War Government" as Churchill did OTL. Churchill himself could be the Defense Minister, I would suspect that Anthony Eden would also return to government, as he had bravely resigned over appeasement. Finally, the political left would be included, so Clement Atlee would be in there as well.

Halifax might be considered "Dovish" in British Politics and Germany, but he would not be surrounded by more doves in a crisis government. I think that Halifax's government would not only not survive if he attempted to force a peace deal with Hitler, I think this would cause a political crisis to the point of ripping his political party apart. The people of Great Britain were furious over Hitler's betrayal of the Munich agreement, and I suspect that fury was dominant politically even during the worst days of the Blitz, and probably would have been even if Halifax would have been in power.

Not only would a UK peace deal in 1940 have been national suicide, it would also have been political suicide. There will be no arrangement based on trusting Hitler.

I agree with most of your post but I am far from convinced that Labour would join a National Unity Government if Halifax was PM. It wasn't ideological (Labour despised Churchill after all) but because Halifax was seen as too weak to be a war leader. His sitting in the Lords did not help and this should not be overlooked.

Even if he were somehow drafted to the PMs job, Halifax himself apparently did not have the stomach for doing the hard yards needed to pull Britain together and fight the war. The rebels in the Tories gravitated around Churchill for a reason it was not just an anyone but Chamberlain movement. Labour had to support a Tory as PM but this not mean it had to be just anyone. Churchill was the only candidate who could fulfil the requirements of all the parties in 1940.

[Churchill]

Which they would and could not be certain of, as any potential peace deal between the UK and Germany would almost certainly keep this clause secret. Besides, they would potentially have equally as much to lose. I suspect calmer heads would have prevailed in the Turkish government. By any means this is totally uncertain, and IMO unlikely.

I refer you to the Battle of Kalkhin Gol (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Khalkhin_Gol#Aftermath). Following their defeat, the Japanese decided that they would change tactics and never attack the Soviets again.

So again, uncertain, and IMO unlikely.

Hitlers aim was the Urals. That was the aim of Barbarossa to my knowledge. The Soviets would never accept this. As such any peace is unlikely. The Germans would never, IMO accept terms with the Soviets unless the Nazi Empire was threatened from the west.

If you accept the was was one of racism and imperialism, then you must see the Nazi viewpoint of distaste for negotiating with subhumans(in their view). As there can be no negotiation, do you deny the Soviets would win a long term war with Germany?

Japanesse Imperial Headquarters ordered the implementation of the revised policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing large scale reinforcements of the Kantogun. To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the "Special Manoeuvers of Kantogun". The 400,600 troops of the Kantogun suddenly rose to over 700,000 and some billion Yen in military funds were allocated. These manoeuvres prepared the use of force against Soviet Union, based upon the prospect that the Russo-German war might rapidly take a favorable turn for Germany. In the event that force was used against the USSR, the new operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted north and east from Manchuria. Additionally the new plan included landings in Soviet Far East islands and coastal areas, and land operations in Outer Mongolia. Japan also had in Manchuria 150,000 to 200,000 troops.
The Imperial Army anticipated the German offensive to commence in 1941-42. The Russians had to transfer several divisions from the Far East to European sectors, but the USSR would never leave Siberia defenseless, even if the war with Germany turned badly for her. It was thought to be almost beyond the realm of possibility for the Soviet Union to participate in a war between Japan and United States, of her own accord, thereby having to wage two-front operations. Certain reports mentioned the sending of 20 or 30 divisions to the European battlefront.

The Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line or A-A line was the proposed eastern border of the Nazi German empire. Operation Barbarossa, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, failed to secure either of the two Russian cities. Adolf Hitler and other Nazi officials believed that the cities of Arkhangelsk in northwestern Russia and Astrakhan in southwestern Russia should mark the frontier between a Greater German Reich and a weakened Soviet Union. Territory east of the Ural Mountains was seen as undesirable. However, the Germans later decided to expand the frontier of their proposed empire to the Urals and send the remaining Slavic populations over the mountains and thus out of Europe. This applied to any Slavs that would not otherwise be recruited for slave labour. With the failure of Operation Barbarossa, this plan was never achieved.

[Churchill]

I agree with most of your post but I am far from convinced that Labour would join a National Unity Government if Halifax was PM. It wasn't ideological (Labour despised Churchill after all) but because Halifax was seen as too weak to be a war leader. His sitting in the Lords did not help and this should not be overlooked.

Even if he were somehow drafted to the PMs job, Halifax himself apparently did not have the stomach for doing the hard yards needed to pull Britain together and fight the war. The rebels in the Tories gravitated around Churchill for a reason it was not just an anyone but Chamberlain movement. Labour had to support a Tory as PM but this not mean it had to be just anyone. Churchill was the only candidate who could fulfil the requirements of all the parties in 1940.

Labour only had 154 seats compared to the Conservative/National Governments 386.

[Chilperic]

Japanesse Imperial Headquarters ordered the implementation of the revised policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing large scale reinforcements of the Kantogun. To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the "Special Manoeuvers of Kantogun". The 400,600 troops of the Kantogun suddenly rose to over 700,000 and some billion Yen in military funds were allocated. These manoeuvres prepared the use of force against Soviet Union, based upon the prospect that the Russo-German war might rapidly take a favorable turn for Germany. In the event that force was used against the USSR, the new operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted north and east from Manchuria. Additionally the new plan included landings in Soviet Far East islands and coastal areas, and land operations in Outer Mongolia. Japan also had in Manchuria 150,000 to 200,000 troops.
The Imperial Army anticipated the German offensive to commence in 1941-42. The Russians had to transfer several divisions from the Far East to European sectors, but the USSR would never leave Siberia defenseless, even if the war with Germany turned badly for her. It was thought to be almost beyond the realm of possibility for the Soviet Union to participate in a war between Japan and United States, of her own accord, thereby having to wage two-front operations. Certain reports mentioned the sending of 20 or 30 divisions to the European battlefront.

The Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line or A-A line was the proposed eastern border of the Nazi German empire. Operation Barbarossa, Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, failed to secure either of the two Russian cities. Adolf Hitler and other Nazi officials believed that the cities of Arkhangelsk in northwestern Russia and Astrakhan in southwestern Russia should mark the frontier between a Greater German Reich and a weakened Soviet Union. Territory east of the Ural Mountains was seen as undesirable. However, the Germans later decided to expand the frontier of their proposed empire to the Urals and send the remaining Slavic populations over the mountains and thus out of Europe. This applied to any Slavs that would not otherwise be recruited for slave labour. With the failure of Operation Barbarossa, this plan was never achieved.


Good to see you back Churchill.

Anyway, Hitler didnt want the land behind the Urals mainly because he didnt see it as useful and anyway, many in the Japanese cabinet wanted to invade Siberia... the Northerners as they were called while the Southerners wanted to strike South into the Pacific. We all know what happened OTL of course.

[Chilperic]

Labour only had 154 seats compared to the Conservative/National Governments 386.

Labour basically said that they would only join a coalition led by Churchill when the war started...

[Churchill]

A few people have mentioned concessions France would have to make to Italy.
Mussolini didn’t actually ask for anything as he didn’t want people to think the Germans where getting him it.
He withdrew his first request for Nice, Tunisia and Corsica.

[Chilperic]

A few people have mentioned concessions France would have to make to Italy.
Mussolini didn’t actually ask for anything as he didn’t want people to think the Germans where getting him it.
He withdrew his first request for Nice, Tunisia and Corsica.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fd/Vichyfrance.GIF/741px-Vichyfrance.GIF (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fd/Vichyfrance.GIF)
You were saying?

[Churchill]

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/fd/Vichyfrance.GIF/741px-Vichyfrance.GIF (http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fd/Vichyfrance.GIF)
You were saying?

Nice map now tell me where are Mussolini's demands?
Buy this book and do some reading http://www.amazon.com/Mussolini-Dennis-Mack-Smith/dp/0394506944

[Chilperic]

Nice map now tell me where are Mussolini's demands?
Buy this book and do some reading http://www.amazon.com/Mussolini-Dennis-Mack-Smith/dp/0394506944

The green blob - Italys occupation zone including Grenoble and Nice???

[Churchill]

The green blob - Italys occupation zone including Grenoble and Nice???

Do you know the difference between a zone of occupation and a territorial concession?

[Chilperic]

Do you know the difference between a zone of occupation and a territorial concession?

Yes, and it would have been run more or less like a part of Italy. It might have been annexed to Italy later on if Hitler had been lenient..

[Churchill]

Let me help you with use of your map for example.
The big yellow bit is a zone of German occupation.
Now look to the right at the blue bit that is a French territoral consession to Germany.

[Churchill]

Yes, and it would have been run more or less like a part of Italy. It might have been annexed to Italy later on if Hitler had been lenient..

Strange of him to give somthing that has not even been asked for.

[Chilperic]

Let me help you with use of your map for example.
The big yellow bit is a zone of German occupation.
Now look to the right at the blue bit that is a French territoral consession to Germany.

I am aware of that, for I am not an idiot.

[Chilperic]

Strange of him to give somthing that has not even been asked for.

But he did ask for Nice, you even mentioned that.

[Churchill]

But he did ask for Nice, you even mentioned that.

He didnt ask for anything for fear of embarresment as having to ask the Germans.
He did make a first request for concessions but withdrew it very quickly.

[Chilperic]

He didnt ask for anything for fear of embarresment as having to ask the Germans.
He did make a first request for concessions but withdrew it very quickly.

Well, he had to ask the Germans about things anyway, such as help for his disastrous attempt to conquer Greece and for the Italian Armys failures in the Libyan Desert.

[Churchill]

But he did ask for Nice, you even mentioned that.

If he has some sense he would have demanded Corsica, Tunisia and Nice.
Then launched an attack or Malta which he could have taken at that point.
With Malta and Tunisia in Italian hands re-supply of the Italian N African forces would have been much better.
Probably would have been enough to allow the Axis to take Egypt when Rommel arrived.

[Churchill]

Well, he had to ask the Germans about things anyway, such as help for his disastrous attempt to conquer Greece and for the Italian Armys failures in the Libyan Desert.

This was a year earlier when Italy was still in a strong possition.

[Chilperic]

If he has some sense he would have demanded Corsica, Tunisia and Nice.
Then launched an attack or Malta which he could have taken at that point.
With Malta and Tunisia in Italian hands re-supply of the Italian N African forces would have been much better.
Probably would have been enough to allow the Axis to take Egypt when Rommel arrived.

Malta would have been hard to take with the RN patrolling the Med and the Regia Marina were no match for them, as was proved at the Battle of Taranto.

[Churchill]

Malta would have been hard to take with the RN patrolling the Med and the Regia Marina were no match for them, as was proved at the Battle of Taranto.

In June 1940 it would have been taken.

[alt_historian]

Labour basically said that they would only join a coalition led by Churchill when the war started...
He was pointing out that the National Govt had a majority anyway, so they could technically have governed as an emergency government, without Labour participation.

[General Zod]

I would agree with this. The UK would simply be demanding more than Germany would be willing to provide.

Possibly.

If Germany is truly interested in a peace with the United Kingdom, it should have released Poland minus Posen and Danzig

This is impossible. For once, it would break current treaties between Germany and the URSS, which agree to put an end to the independent Polish state as "too dangerous" (or somesuch, I don't remember the exact definition of joint German-Russian declaration) for both powers.

Getting an exclusive imperial sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe is the whole German war aim, even before and beside Nazi farnetications about colonialistic "Lebenstraum". If the UK can't accept that what happens in Czechia or Poland is no damned business of hers, there cannot be no peace.

Of course, it goes both ways. In order to have any peace, Germany should agree to leave Western Europe alone (after defanging France, of course) in order to have any peace with Britain.

and accepted Neville Chamberlain's offer of an "Easy Peace", which would probably be more likely than a peace deal where the UK would have to, at some degree, hand over Indonesia and the Congo into German Puppet Regimes.

Yes, this is reasonable, Just like the UK must leave Poland alone, so in order to have peace, Germany must withdraw from Belgium, Netherlands, and Norway, and allow them to recover political independence. No fascist puppet regimes. At most favourable economic deals.

A possible peace deal might be the definition of "zones of exclusion", akin to the spheres of influence Churchill and Stalin negotiated in 1944. Germany agrees to withdraw her troops from Netherlands, Danemark, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and France, and to respect the political independence in such. Neither Germany nor the UK shall introduce or keep troops, planes, or ships in these countries. France shall limit her Army and Navy to the minimum necessary to police the metropolitan area and her colonial empire.

France would also make certain territorial and colonial concessions to the Axis powers: to Germany, at the very least ethnically German areas, Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg. Difficult to say what else, if any, Germany could have claimed in the final peace treaty: possibly the rest of Lorraine, or maybe just the French claims of the old WWI September Program: Belfort, the Briey ore-field, the western slopes of the Vosges. Possibly (even if Hitler was rather disinterested in colonies), the return of Camerun, for prestige and Middle Congo to compense for the impossibility of claiming old British-annexed German colonies. Of course, Italy would also claim their pound of flesh: Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunisia, Dijbouti. Hitelr would have all interest to make Mussolini appeased and less likely to stir troubler in the Balkans.

[General Zod]

For the sake of argument even if he succeeded in a vote of confidence in the House, what could he expect from Hitler? Any British PM who stood up and waved a treaty around proclaiming this meant peace with honour with Germany is impossible after Chamberlain.

Well, there is a big difference. France has fallen. It could be argued that this demostrates the futility of completely containing German expansionism in Europe and now Britain must focus on keeping the British Empire safe and esnruing the security of the Home Isles.

There would need to be iron clad promises backed up by action like the immediate withdrawal of German military forces from France and from any other country where their presence could threaten Britain. Not going to happen.

This is doable (as long as Britain is equally forbidden to introduce her forces there and France disarms, of course). Nazi Germany's expansionistic programs on Western Europe were always rather fuzzy and opportunistic and rather peripheral to the imperial progrma in Central-Eastern Europe. Of course they would keep everything if they could, but they can also give up a safely neutralized Western Europe in order to have a one-front war wit the URSS.

The removal of any German and their allied airforces from within range of the UK. No way.

Withdrawing military forces from Western Europe can be agreed for, if France is disarmed. Of course, since any measure should have to be symmetrical, anything more than that would be unfeasible. I doubt the Uk would agree to demilitarize Southern England in order to demilitarize Reinland.

Some way to neutralise the threat of German naval vessels against the RN and merchant marine.

Well, this is not really feasible, in the sense of impractical.

To top it all off the Italian navy would need to be neutralised as well as the army presence in Africa.


Would Britain agree to demilitarise Egypt and Sudan ?


Why would the British government and more importantly the people accept anything else after the continual broken agreements?

Well, pulling our German froces from Western Europe garantees the national security of the British Isles. About the broken agreements, well, the main argument would be that the Gemran conquest of Western Europe and the fall of France shows that waging a general war in Europe to deny German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe is a costly failure.

[MarkA]

He was pointing out that the National Govt had a majority anyway, so they could technically have governed as an emergency government, without Labour participation.

The problem being of course that the trickle of Conservatives demanding Churchill as leader (not just anyone but Chamberlain) was turning into a flood. The political mood was clearly rapidly moving towards a revolt by Conservative and National backbenchers for someone to take charge and that someone had to be Churchill.

There were over two hundred, maybe around three hundred, government members clambering for action. Chamberlain was no political fool and when he found out about it he became nervous and literally paled when he heard the cries of 'Resign' from the government benches. Halifax had neither the appeal nor the supportand certainly not the charisma needed to win these numbersd back. He refused the job because he knew he could never keep it.

It was vital that Labour be brought into the Unity government. Not all politicans act only in their party interest. At times of crisis they act in the national interest. Partizan politics and ruthless exploitation of the numbers is not the reaction of leaders when faced with such a situation.

[General Zod]

Yes, he might have offered, say, Norwegian or Dutch neutrality. So what? He would have not disarmed, of course, but he would have wanted the Norwegians and Dutch disarmed.

That is not necessary. Really, who could assume that Norwegian or Dutch armies could ever pose a true threat to the Reich. What's truly necessary, for the safety of Germany, is that neither France is allowed to rearm, nor Britain is allowed to station troops in the neutral countries.

In other words, he could have come back whenever he wanted. And who, in Europe, could trust Hitler only on his word? Nobody who wasn't a fool, certainly not Halifax.

Yep. However, once Germany pulls out, she cannot reenter those countries without another war with Britain, and Britain can rearm as much she likes.

If Britain "truly" wanted peace. Here "truly" actually means "at whatever cost". Going for peace at whatever cost had been tried, and proved foolish.

Well, really, up to Munich the Western democracies had not really done anything else but allow ethnic Germans to reunite with their homeland: Reinland, Saar, Austria, Sudetenland. Hardly peace at whatever cost. They had been taken by surprise the one moment Germany had truly trespassed (Czechia) and bretrayed pacts and reasonable claims and reacted by going to war over Germany's next claim.

Romanians accepted vassaldom to Germany "of their own will".

If you wish, they had chosen to be an autonomous vassal, than to refuse to compromise on anything and be destroyed like Poland. One might argue with good reason that had Poland followed the same course, they would have just sacrificed Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia, and some divisions to fight the URSS alongside Germany, instead of the carnage of occupation. Which was the wisest choice ?

Here, the meaning is "at gunpoint", and anyway that took place after the moment in which Halifax could have become British Prime Minister. Back in March 1939, Romania had asked the British for help against the German demand of a position of monopoly as to the Romanian foreign trade, and the fame of the British guarantee to Poland tends to make obscure the fact that Romania was also given guarantees. Romania chose the German side because otherwise it would have ended like Poland. They would have been way happier without German meddling.

True, true, but the harsh reality is that with the resurgence of German and Soviet power in the '30s, the choice in Central and Eastern Europe was to be a German vassal, or a Soviet vassal. Hope to steer wholly independent of both with Franco-British help was wholly futile. A terrible choice, sure, with the horrible regimes both great powers had in the 30s, but the choice would have existed nonetheless. The power vacuum Versailles had created was artificial and Paris or London could not hope to enforce it forever, short of creating United Europe, or bringing the Americans in the area.

A final remark: why should Britain accept German hegemony? Only because it had been tentatively achieved, not earlier than a month before, and which was far from proven that it could be self-supporting? But Britain in the past had had way more of an empire overseas, and had never ever accepted the hegemony of one Continental country, and for very good reasons. It had opposed Spain and France. Trying to argue that having one lone Continental superpower was actually good for Britain really doesn't hold water – and even if it did in theory, it runs entirely against the grain of centuries of British foreign policies. Traditions which were probably much more ingrained in Halifax than in the less conventional Churchill, BTW.

As the outcome of WWII demonstrated, the day Britain could hope or ask and prevent the Continent to unify under one hegemony were over, and had done so since the rise of industrial revolution in Germany, Russia, and the USA. Striving to keep Europe divided among equal powers was futile, they could only expend themselves to substitute one continental hegemony with another: Germany, Russia, the USA, federal Europe. Truly, the options in the 30s sucked, Nazism or Stalinism, but the Britsh elite could only blame themselves for having spawned Hitler from Versailles. They could have had a reasonable co-hegemony with a reasonable and civil Germany a generation before, but they had chosen passive-aggressive France, too weak to ensure any real stable hegemony to Europe, too bullheaded to accept the second-tier rank their resources established. Now, the very most they could do was to keep Western Europe as safe as they could from both ugly regimes, and wait for their decay. As WWII outcome showed, Central and Eastern Europe was unsalvageable anyway.

[MarkA]

Well, there is a big difference. France has fallen. It could be argued that this demostrates the futility of completely containing German expansionism in Europe and now Britain must focus on keeping the British Empire safe and esnruing the security of the Home Isles.



This is doable (as long as Britain is equally forbidden to introduce her forces there and France disarms, of course). Nazi Germany's expansionistic programs on Western Europe were always rather fuzzy and opportunistic and rather peripheral to the imperial progrma in Central-Eastern Europe. Of course they would keep everything if they could, but they can also give up a safely neutralized Western Europe in order to have a one-front war wit the URSS.



Withdrawing military forces from Western Europe can be agreed for, if France is disarmed. Of course, since any measure should have to be symmetrical, anything more than that would be unfeasible. I doubt the Uk would agree to demilitarize Southern England in order to demilitarize Reinland.



Well, this is not really feasible, in the sense of impractical.



Would Britain agree to demilitarise Egypt and Sudan ?




Well, pulling our German froces from Western Europe garantees the national security of the British Isles. About the broken agreements, well, the main argument would be that the Gemran conquest of Western Europe and the fall of France shows that waging a general war in Europe to deny German expansion in Central and Eastern Europe is a costly failure.

All this assumes a defeatist mentality in Britain. This was certainly not the mood among the majority of MPs and probably the population as well.

They all wanted someone to take control and carry on the fight not negotiate a surrender!

[General Zod]

Halifax might be considered "Dovish" in British Politics and Germany, but he would not be surrounded by more doves in a crisis government. I think that Halifax's government would not only not survive if he attempted to force a peace deal with Hitler, I think this would cause a political crisis to the point of ripping his political party apart. The people of Great Britain were furious over Hitler's betrayal of the Munich agreement, and I suspect that fury was dominant politically even during the worst days of the Blitz, and probably would have been even if Halifax would have been in power.

Not only would a UK peace deal in 1940 have been national suicide, it would also have been political suicide. There will be no arrangement based on trusting Hitler.

France is fallen, Britain is alone, and America shall never join a war in Europe unless it's attacked. That's the picture in Summer 1940. The British people has tried to stop Germany's expansion in Central-Eastern Europe, and it has failed, over and over (Norway, Benelux, France). If they are offered a decent peace deal, instead of an uphill struggle with no end or ally in sight, why shouldn't grasp it ? Sure, Hitler is wholly untrustworthy, so they will rearm, fortify their Isles and their Empire, and keep prepared.

[General Zod]

Why is Vichy France accepting large concessions to Italy? They're beaten, but not yet complete tools; if Hitler does hand "Il Musse" Nice and Savoy, for example, or Tunisia, that'll make them angry, even if they can't resist directly. Hitler was (being him) pretty nice to Vichy at first, because he wanted a stable puppet, not an occupied state in rebellion (and, from what we see of Vichy, it mostly worked). Why does he reconsider drastically because Britain is beaten? He thought they were already when he made the decision IOTL.

Territorial deals were essentially left out of the armistice, which was a wholly provisional measure intended to last until peace with Britain. Had Britain signed a peace deal, the treaty with France would have followed. Certain territorial losses were only natural,a nd Germany would have beyond any doubt annexed A-L, Lux, quite possibly part of or all of the rest of Lorraine. It was only natural and wise to give equal satifisfaction to old Italian claims, if nothing else because a surly snubbed Mussolini would have given Germany all kinds of headaches in the Balkans and Middle East. For German interests, fer better a loyal, quiet, and satisfied Italy and a slightly surly France, than a surly, diusloyal, and unpredictable Mussolini that could mess with German plans to no end: Greece, anyone ? There is good argument to say that had Mussolini beeen given more satisfying territorial claims into France at the Armistice, he would have never invaded Greece, and spared Germany a lot of Balkan mess.

Why is Yugoslavia more willing to support Germany here than IOTL? They're actually better off for British guarantees; remember, Britain has a negotiated peace, not an unconditioal surrender. If the British recognise the new Yugoslavian government and promise it protection, they're better off than they were IOTL, as Hitler will at least consider not wanting trouble from Britain again. And as noted, Britain will be in a "Cold War" at best with Germany; they'll guarantee the independence of anyone that's still independent.

It is exceedingly likely that any kind of peace treaty between Germany and Britain would include definition of spheres of influence to be respected, and this would include the British keeping their noses out of Eastern Europe. That was the whole German war aim.

(I suppose you could argue that the Yugoslavian coup wouldn't be sponsored by Britain with Halifax in charge, and thus might not go off, but that's no certainty, especially with Churchill still in the government.)

Would he have such influence, without being PM ? I doubt it.

Likewise, why won't Britain defend Greece's neutrality under these circumstances, assuming that Mussolini would even dare mess with them for fear of provoking a conflict with Britain (he was much more cautious than Adolph)?

Hmm, in the definition of spheres of influence, the Middle East would surely become an exclusive British zone. Hard to say whether Greece would end up in the British or Axis zone.

Hell, I could make the case that Romania and Bulgaria wouldn't join the Axis here if there are believable British guarantees made for them;at the very least, Hitler might thread a little more carefully around them a little longer.

No, really. Germany would never accept any treaty that would not recognize her exclusive influence over Romania and Bulgaria.

Finally, how much earlier do you intend the Germans to attack the USSR? The original starting date is a dream, what with the spring flood and all. The best you could hope for is probably something in early June, and a couple of weeks might not make all the difference between victory and defeat.

Well, true, but with the lack of a second war, the difference boils down to trivial.

Turkey was very neutral, so it's not all that likely that they join, and the value of their forces in a modern war is doubtful; at best, they could serve as occupation/anti-partisan troops.

Anti-partisan troops would still be rather useful.

Likewise, the Italian divisions were a mess - too small, too little artillery and support, bad armour throughout; some units like the Alpini were good, but most were mediocre or worse

So very true, :( WWII Italian Army was nowhere as comparatively good to the other powers as the WWI one (Benito should have been shot thrice for this :mad:) but at least ITTL they would have lost all those men and equipment in Africa.

- and Vichy France wasn't allowed an army under the terms; in any case, the Germans used their equipment to good effect themselves.

They might be allowed to raise troops (under German survelliance) for this scope. Of course, it might be tricky for the terms of the treaty with the British.

This brings us back to the point Michele usually raises, and may already have, here (as you know, there are a couple of different threads on this topic right now): the Germans' major problem was never manpower, but equipment and materiel.

Not having a naval war, anti-air dfense needs, and another front can help. They need to focus war production on nothing but anti-Russian preparation from Summer 1940 onward.

But the troops will themselves need to be supplied, making the situation worse in the short run, even if it does improve in the long run (you're somewhat aware, I take it, of the time it takes to build roads - it isn't done in weeks, or even months in most cases). Railroad is an ever bigger bitch, and on top of that there's a German lack of trains and rolling stock.

But in the long run it will ameliorate.


The real industrial drain for Germany that the Navy was responsible for was the surface ships (esp prestige projects - heavy ships like the Tirpitz), and those wouldn't have been called off just like that.

But you can give them bottom priority, as financing and supplies go.

The surface fleet orders were pretty stable; what increased was U-boat production. You could take away some, or even most, of that, I suppose. Still, it's not a huge boon, especially as one must take into account that production lines aren't retooled that easily; a naval yard can't necessarily build tanks, for example, or at the very least not right away.

Yes, but peace with Britain gives them almost a year.

As noted above, I strongly doubt that both the Ukraine AND Moscow could be taken in the same campaign;

Not in OTL. But here the game is different.

even allowing for increased manpower,

Which was the main limit. With increased manpower, encricled Russian troops can be eliminated more quickly.

And I think you're seriously underestimating the time it'd take to take Moscow; IOTL, they barely got there at all in 1941. How long do you think the Germans would have to batter it before it gave in? Not as Stalingrad, you say (I'd disagree, Moscow being bigger and better defended), but what, then? A month or two? That's still time for them to freeze and Zhukov to counter-attack.

Stalingrad had major river cutting it, which allowed a nice defensive background. Moscow sits in the middle of a plain. ITTL, they will reach Moscow with more troops, more equipment, less exausted (from more manpower), and yes a couple months in advance. Zhukov may or may not counterattack them in time, but since the Germans are stronger, the counterattack itself will not be nowehere as decisive. The spring will find the Germans still on the outskirts of Moscow anyway, ready to finish the job. With no blockade, no such pressant need for oil in Hitler's mind, so they stay focused on Moscow.


As for oil, Hitler might well find himself in less supply here, as he can't bully Romania into selling Germany its full production on credit. Romania and Hungary might well demand cash for their products, or other securities, and if Hitler fucks with them the British blockade is back in action. Mussolini might transit oil throuh for him, but will it make up for everything that's lost?

Again, Romania will be 100% German sphere of influence. The British successfully bargaining on this is about as likely as them bargaining Romania away from Stalin.

People in the West tend to miss how much of a rout the Winter Offensive really was. The Germans weren't retreating, they were fleeing; only Hitler's stand-firm orders (much-despised in later contexts, but very useful there) prevented an all-out collapse. In addition, much heavy equipment was lost there that couldn't really be replaced (Germany STILL wasn't at full war production by then); Speer lies a lot, but there he was right.

With more men, more equipment, and reaching Moscow rather early, the Germans will be in a much better position to withstand it. It fails to make any substantial gains.


Not that the Japanese Army was very good on the ground (training poor, small arms poor, armour and artillery abysmal), but all right, let's say they mount a major offensive and manage to defeat the local garrisons.

Whopps, we lost Outer Manchuria and Lake Baikal.

Now what? They have an even worse logistics nightmare to contend with than the Germans and suffer the full consequences of winter attack in arctic climate.

They could attack far before, in Summer.

Not pretty. In addition, Stalin never commanded ALL the Siberian divisions to Moscow; the Soviet Far Eastern Command was essentially self-contained, and while it sent reinforcements to the West, it was never broken up.

They are still fighting a two-fronts war. Not so nice for supplies.

And, if worst comes to worst, what'll Stalin do; does he consider the Far East more valuable than Moscow? No. "Fuck this, Georgy Konstantinovich, get everything you can over here now! If the Japanese monkey-men want the frozen tundra, they can have it. For a couple of years, at least..."

Quite possible. Of course, if the Japanese get too close to some of those Siberian factories, or resource-rich areas, the territorial loss will not look so harmless anymore. Also, ITTL, the URSS is fighting a two-fronts war against two major powers alone, with no allies. The perspectives about regaining lost territory do not look so bright anymore.

Of course, all-powerful Russia can pull unlimited amounts of conscripts and weapons outta her big bottom, no matter the number and power of the enemies, don't they ? :p:p

Ok, I concede that if worst comes to worst, they could abandon all of Eastern Siberia and the Japanese could never march all the way to Moscow anyway. However, losing say Irkutsk would not be so harmless for Russia.

I think you underestimate the Urals factories.

No, I simply refuse to worship them to the ridiculous proportions Sovietwankers do. Without the industrial basins of Moscow, Ukraine, the Russian heartland, the Soviet Siberian rump would be down to 30-35% of 1941 industrial production, not taking into account the loss of all European Russia resources. Sure, Siberia and Central Asia would have plenty of natural resources (but nowhere as much manpower, sorry) to eventually replenish and exceed lost resources. But by 1941 they were still tapped and accessible (or even known) to a very limited degree. How many decades before they can tap them, with the limited manpower of Siberia and Central Asia, even admitting the latter simply doesn't size the ideal moment to break away from Stalinism, and that the Soviet regime simply doesn't collapse from its obvious massive failure, both very real possibilities ? Do you seriously argument that the Siberian rump could ever hope to keep sustaining a major conventional war against the Greater German Reich, with the trans-Ural manpower and 30% of URSS industry, minus the large swaths of land the Japanese will surely snatch away ?

And regardless, the Germans can't reasonably achieve all that (beginning at the start; they have enough forces to take EITHER Moscow or the Ukraine, and not be certain of it at that) even so.

OTL.

[General Zod]

All this assumes a defeatist mentality in Britain.

Defeatism would be accepting a peace that would cede parts of the British Empire, or disarmement. This is acknowledging the reality that the days Britain could keep Europe fragmented by force are over. It is quite regrettable if they make this correct realization by 1940, when the ugly alternative was between giving half of Europe to Nazism or to Stalinism, but the choice was unescapable*, instead of 1914, when they could have helped a civil peaceful liberal hegemony and unity in Europe emerge, with them as co-leaders.

* Or better it was not, but it would have required enlighted statesmen in London and Washington, interested in fostering the true welfare of Europe by means of ensuring the downfall of Nazism through a just negotiated peace with post-Nazi Germany, and the cointainment of Stalinism, instead of waging a fanatical anti-fascist, anti-German crusade over the corpse of Europe. Of course, that was another issue entirely. The choices in 1940 for Britain were very difficult anyway, since it was only luck and Hitler's monumental stupidity that brought American might in Europe. Up to then, the choice was between Nazi hegemony or Soviet one. In all likelihood, the best course would have been to foster mutual exaustion between the two great powers in their inevitable struggle to the death, by carefully balancing their help or hindrance to either side, in order to contain their spread to Central-Eastern Europe, which was beyond any help anyway. Working for and fostering the downfall of either regime, which only would have ensured the hope of a decent livelihood for that part of Europe.

[Michele]

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That is not necessary. Really, who could assume that Norwegian or Dutch armies could ever pose a true threat to the Reich. What's truly necessary, for the safety of Germany, is that neither France is allowed to rearm, nor Britain is allowed to station troops in the neutral countries.



Yep. However, once Germany pulls out, she cannot reenter those countries without another war with Britain, and Britain can rearm as much she likes.



Well, really, up to Munich the Western democracies had not really done anything else but allow ethnic Germans to reunite with their homeland: Reinland, Saar, Austria, Sudetenland. Hardly peace at whatever cost. They had been taken by surprise the one moment Germany had truly trespassed (Czechia) and bretrayed pacts and reasonable claims and reacted by going to war over Germany's next claim.



If you wish, they had chosen to be an autonomous vassal, than to refuse to compromise on anything and be destroyed like Poland. One might argue with good reason that had Poland followed the same course, they would have just sacrificed Danzig, the Corridor, and Upper Silesia, and some divisions to fight the URSS alongside Germany, instead of the carnage of occupation. Which was the wisest choice ?



True, true, but the harsh reality is that with the resurgence of German and Soviet power in the '30s, the choice in Central and Eastern Europe was to be a German vassal, or a Soviet vassal. Hope to steer wholly independent of both with Franco-British help was wholly futile. A terrible choice, sure, with the horrible regimes both great powers had in the 30s, but the choice would have existed nonetheless. The power vacuum Versailles had created was artificial and Paris or London could not hope to enforce it forever, short of creating United Europe, or bringing the Americans in the area.

As the outcome of WWII demonstrated, the day Britain could hope or ask and prevent the Continent to unify under one hegemony were over, and had done so since the rise of industrial revolution in Germany, Russia, and the USA. Striving to keep Europe divided among equal powers was futile, they could only expend themselves to substitute one continental hegemony with another: Germany, Russia, the USA, federal Europe. Truly, the options in the 30s sucked, Nazism or Stalinism, but the Britsh elite could only blame themselves for having spawned Hitler from Versailles. They could have had a reasonable co-hegemony with a reasonable and civil Germany a generation before, but they had chosen passive-aggressive France, too weak to ensure any real stable hegemony to Europe, too bullheaded to accept the second-tier rank their resources established. Now, the very most they could do was to keep Western Europe as safe as they could from both ugly regimes, and wait for their decay. As WWII outcome showed, Central and Eastern Europe was unsalvageable anyway.

So what you are suggesting is that instead of waging a war Britain was already in, and rearming as it went ahead, the British should wait for the next time Germany goes aggressive on some neutral, and wage war again then (please don't tell that Germany would have no reason to wage war on neutral Belgium – regardless of the assessment we could make about that now, we should not forget that a) the German leadership was not reasonable and b) the British would not believe Hitler if he said that the sun sets in the West). Of course Britain can rearm in the meantime – and Germany, with a free hand all across the Continent, will have become so strong as to be unstoppable. Of course this would be very much to Hitler's liking, yes. OTOH it's as difficult to sell to Halifax as selling him the Tour Eiffel.

You present the Sudetenland solution exactly in the way the Nazi propaganda saw it. I suppose you do that to present the German point of view, but of course here what matters is the British point of view, not the German one.
And from the British point of view, the Sudetenland wasn't just "letting the Germans go with Germany" at no cost. For starters, the Sudetenland wasn't 100% German; turning it over to Germany meant that other people, the local Czechs, would become the unhappy minority. Additionally, giving Germany the Sudetenland meant, with total certainty, doing away with good defensive land containing good fortifications; and, with high likelihood, putting at risk the existence of the Czechoslovakian state itself. Once you start changing state borders, you don't know where you'll end up. Accepting the Sudetenland solution was not a no-cost idea to the British and even more so to the French.
The same can be said, more or less, for every other German enlargement. The Rhineland was rightly belonging to Germany and any soverign state should be allowed to deploy its own troops in its own territory; that said, it being militarized and fortified was not exactly a no-cost idea to the French, and to the British. Letting a potential enemy increase its manpower pool, as with the Anschluß, also is not a no-cost idea. And so on.

I question that Poland would have fared as well as you claim. The less densely populated territories were very much in the Lebensraum area, to be settled by German "colonists". Additionally, Poles weren't, on Hitler's ledge, on the same rung as Hungarians or Romanians. And, of course, you overlook the fate of Polish Jews, a 10% or so of the population, when you state that there would be no carnage.
That said, the wisest choice was obviously not to let the bully take on the smaller guys one by one, in turn, and even help him; the wisest choice was gang up against the bully.

I question that the Central Europan situation could be described as a power vacuum. Under a rational leadership, Germany could have become a prosperous nation. There was no actual reason why it should start invading every neighbor in sight.
That said, of course Britain and France could have contained German naked aggression. Your words might almost seem to amount to subscribing to a "manifest destiny" theory of German grandeur, which would of course be wrong. In the 1934-37 time frame, they had every possibility to slap back any attempted remilitarization of the Rhineland. Germany would not have had the strength to contest that; and with French units deployed there, the rest of the sequence goes in jeopardy. It was assuming that German intentions were decent and reasonable that brought about the June 1940 situation – another reason not to assume that the motive behind the last appeal to reason by Hitler would be decent and reasonable.

I finally have to question again your interpretation of historical facts. If post-WWII was something, it was divided between two powers, one of which, BTW, wasn't a monolithic dictatorship but an alliance. With the course Halifax is somehow expected to take, that wouldn't be the outcome. The outcome would be a monolithic dictatorship holding sway directly on a big chunk of Europe, with a number of prone vassals here and there. Certainly the outcome of the war wasn't good for Eastern Europe. The outcome that would have resulted in Britain stepping back would have been worse for Europe overall, though.

[Churchill]

So what you are suggesting is that instead of waging a war Britain was already in, and rearming as it went ahead, the British should wait for the next time Germany goes aggressive on some neutral, and wage war again then (please don't tell that Germany would have no reason to wage war on neutral Belgium – regardless of the assessment we could make about that now, we should not forget that a) the German leadership was not reasonable and b) the British would not believe Hitler if he said that the sun sets in the West). Of course Britain can rearm in the meantime – and Germany, with a free hand all across the Continent, will have become so strong as to be unstoppable. Of course this would be very much to Hitler's liking, yes. OTOH it's as difficult to sell to Halifax as selling him the Tour Eiffel.

You present the Sudetenland solution exactly in the way the Nazi propaganda saw it. I suppose you do that to present the German point of view, but of course here what matters is the British point of view, not the German one.
And from the British point of view, the Sudetenland wasn't just "letting the Germans go with Germany" at no cost. For starters, the Sudetenland wasn't 100% German; turning it over to Germany meant that other people, the local Czechs, would become the unhappy minority. Additionally, giving Germany the Sudetenland meant, with total certainty, doing away with good defensive land containing good fortifications; and, with high likelihood, putting at risk the existence of the Czechoslovakian state itself. Once you start changing state borders, you don't know where you'll end up. Accepting the Sudetenland solution was not a no-cost idea to the British and even more so to the French.
The same can be said, more or less, for every other German enlargement. The Rhineland was rightly belonging to Germany and any soverign state should be allowed to deploy its own troops in its own territory; that said, it being militarized and fortified was not exactly a no-cost idea to the French, and to the British. Letting a potential enemy increase its manpower pool, as with the Anschluß, also is not a no-cost idea. And so on.

I question that Poland would have fared as well as you claim. The less densely populated territories were very much in the Lebensraum area, to be settled by German "colonists". Additionally, Poles weren't, on Hitler's ledge, on the same rung as Hungarians or Romanians. And, of course, you overlook the fate of Polish Jews, a 10% or so of the population, when you state that there would be no carnage.
That said, the wisest choice was obviously not to let the bully take on the smaller guys one by one, in turn, and even help him; the wisest choice was gang up against the bully.

I question that the Central Europan situation could be described as a power vacuum. Under a rational leadership, Germany could have become a prosperous nation. There was no actual reason why it should start invading every neighbor in sight.
That said, of course Britain and France could have contained German naked aggression. Your words might almost seem to amount to subscribing to a "manifest destiny" theory of German grandeur, which would of course be wrong. In the 1934-37 time frame, they had every possibility to slap back any attempted remilitarization of the Rhineland. Germany would not have had the strength to contest that; and with French units deployed there, the rest of the sequence goes in jeopardy. It was assuming that German intentions were decent and reasonable that brought about the June 1940 situation – another reason not to assume that the motive behind the last appeal to reason by Hitler would be decent and reasonable.

I finally have to question again your interpretation of historical facts. If post-WWII was something, it was divided between two powers, one of which, BTW, wasn't a monolithic dictatorship but an alliance. With the course Halifax is somehow expected to take, that wouldn't be the outcome. The outcome would be a monolithic dictatorship holding sway directly on a big chunk of Europe, with a number of prone vassals here and there. Certainly the outcome of the war wasn't good for Eastern Europe. The outcome that would have resulted in Britain stepping back would have been worse for Europe overall, though.

So what did Britain gain from the war?

[Admiral Canaris]

No, I simply refuse to worship them to the ridiculous proportions Sovietwankers do. Without the industrial basins of Moscow, Ukraine, the Russian heartland, the Soviet Siberian rump would be down to 30-35% of 1941 industrial production, not taking into account the loss of all European Russia resources. Sure, Siberia and Central Asia would have plenty of natural resources (but nowhere as much manpower, sorry) to eventually replenish and exceed lost resources. But by 1941 they were still tapped and accessible (or even known) to a very limited degree. How many decades before they can tap them, with the limited manpower of Siberia and Central Asia, even admitting the latter simply doesn't size the ideal moment to break away from Stalinism, and that the Soviet regime simply doesn't collapse from its obvious massive failure, both very real possibilities ? Do you seriously argument that the Siberian rump could ever hope to keep sustaining a major conventional war against the Greater German Reich, with the trans-Ural manpower and 30% of URSS industry, minus the large swaths of land the Japanese will surely snatch away?

I'm pretty sure those additional resources are NOT enough to conquer all of the USSR to the Urals in the first place, especially after the grinding capture of Moscow, Stalingrad etc. In addition to logistics, there's the matter of numbers. Do you know how thinly stretched the Germans were IOTL? The 1942 front was literally a house of cards. Look at when Operation Uranus cut off Stalingrad. The only thing between the Russians and the Black Sea were three weak divisions, one Italian and two Romanian. If the Soviet intelligence had been better, they'd have swept those aside, taken Rostov and cut off all three army groups to the East (A, B and Don). Wow, war over two years earlier.

Total OTL production of tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers by Germany and the USSR by year:

_________Germany_______ USSR

1941 _______3,642 _______5,600
1942 _______5,070 ______28,000
1943_______ 8,975 ______27,300
1944 ______16,374 ______34,700
1945 _______3,817 ______13,500

Sources:

Chamberlin and Doyle. Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two; revised edition, 1993 [German production]

Samuelson, Lennart. Röd koloss på larvfötter; first edition, 1999 [Soviet production]

[Churchill]

I'm pretty sure those additional resources are NOT enough to conquer all of the USSR to the Urals in the first place, especially after the grinding capture of Moscow, Stalingrad etc. In addition to logistics, there's the matter of numbers. Do you know how thinly stretched the Germans were IOTL? The 1942 front was literally a house of cards. Look at when Operation Uranus cut off Stalingrad. The only thing between the Russians and the Black Sea were three weak divisions, one Italian and two Romanian. If the Soviet intelligence had been better, they'd have swept those aside, taken Rostov and cut off all three army groups to the East (A, B and Don). Wow, war over two years earlier.

Total OTL production of tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers by Germany and the USSR by year:

_________Germany_______ USSR

1941 _______3,642 _______5,600
1942 _______5,070 ______28,000
1943_______ 8,975 ______27,300
1944 ______16,374 ______34,700
1945 _______3,817 ______13,500

Sources:

Chamberlin and Doyle. Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two; revised edition, 1993 [German production]

Samuelson, Lennart. Röd koloss på larvfötter; first edition, 1999 [Soviet production]

These figures would be very different with more Soviet territory taken early on, Italy not knocked out of the war and German and Romania not bombed.
Not to mention greater axis aircraft use against Soviet tanks.

[Churchill]

I'm pretty sure those additional resources are NOT enough to conquer all of the USSR to the Urals in the first place, especially after the grinding capture of Moscow, Stalingrad etc. In addition to logistics, there's the matter of numbers. Do you know how thinly stretched the Germans were IOTL? The 1942 front was literally a house of cards. Look at when Operation Uranus cut off Stalingrad. The only thing between the Russians and the Black Sea were three weak divisions, one Italian and two Romanian. If the Soviet intelligence had been better, they'd have swept those aside, taken Rostov and cut off all three army groups to the East (A, B and Don). Wow, war over two years earlier.

Total OTL production of tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers by Germany and the USSR by year:

_________Germany_______ USSR

1941 _______3,642 _______5,600
1942 _______5,070 ______28,000
1943_______ 8,975 ______27,300
1944 ______16,374 ______34,700