Fall of France

[Chilperic]

Did France have any chance of not falling in 1939-1940? If so, how?

[juanml82]

A lot of people can elaborate further, but an interesting idea (with hindsight) could be to have France-UK attacking Germany while they were attacking Poland, or a little time after that, while the Germans were still repairing battle damage from that campaign and setting up everything for their offensive into France

[Markus]

Did France have any chance of not falling in 1939-1940? If so, how?

Any? Many!

Attack in 39 and Germany is finished as the whole western border was ill defended.

Have Maj. Höhmanns and Rheinberger(?) not crash in Belgium or at least have them carry matches to burn the war plan for a WW1-style attack. The kind of attack the Allies were expecting and preparing for.

Have the Belgians(2 Div.) coordinate the defence of the Ardennes with the French(quick reaction force of 3 Div., 3 Bde.) and the German troops could never cross the Meuse four days after the offensive began. A 24hr delay is enough to ensure considerable reinforcements(4 Div., 1Bde.) will have arrived in the Sedan sector.

Have the CG of the 55. Inf. Div. defending Sedan put more emphasis on combat training.

Conduct counterattacks in a more timely fashion. Not as quick as the Germans, just less slow will suffice.

[karl2025]

I know the Maginot line was pretty ridiculous since there were just a lot of opportunities to go around it, but what if the Belgians hadn't declared neutrality and set up an equally impressive fort system? I mean the one they had was neat, but if it were better, could they have stalled a German offensive and prevented any massive breakthroughs?

[Markus]

I know the Maginot line was pretty ridiculous since there were just a lot of opportunities to go around it,

That was the point of it. Block one approach by forts and place your field army near the other.


but what if the Belgians hadn't declared neutrality and set up an equally impressive fort system? I mean the one they had was neat, but if it were better, could they have stalled a German offensive and prevented any massive breakthroughs?

No need for forts. All they need to do is let the Anglo-French forces into Belgium after the german plan for an attack on Belgium was captured. This way the command structures are all integrated and the fuckup in the Ardennes won´t happen.

[Derek Jackson]

I think I heard that the Ardennes plan was not the original one. Plans for a different attack, which the allies could probably have been blocked got discovered following an air crash.

Plus there are the variabilities of mechanical failure and weather.

I get the impression that Hitler had the luck of the devil from April to June 1940. Had the devil been busy elswhere and perhaps a sympathetic angel been watching our for the French and British...

[Kaiser Kris]

I think I heard that the Ardennes plan was not the original one. Plans for a different attack, which the allies could probably have been blocked got discovered following an air crash.

Plus there are the variabilities of mechanical failure and weather.

I get the impression that Hitler had the luck of the devil from April to June 1940. Had the devil been busy elswhere and perhaps a sympathetic angel been watching our for the French and British...

It wasn't, it was adopted pretty close to last-minute. The Ardennes plan was, in the greatest part, the brainchild of Erich von Manstein and was rejected by the top German brass. Von Manstein eventually got his plan accepted by presenting it directly to Hitler, which angered his superiors enough that he was stuck commanding an infantry divison during the actual campaign.

And Hitler had so much 'devil's luck' between 1933 and 1941 that it's positively eerie.

[MUC]

Wasn't there some sort of German plane landing in Belgium (or was it Holland) by mistake (I think it was a Storch), carrying the plans for the actual invasion plan and which the Allies then captured?
Didn't this lead to changing the plan?
I think the Allies thought at first that the plans they captured were fake and the whole "false landing" incident was orchistrated by the Germans.

[arctic warrior]

Wasn't there some sort of German plane landing in Belgium (or was it Holland) by mistake (I think it was a Storch), carrying the plans for the actual invasion plan and which the Allies then captured?
Didn't this lead to changing the plan?
I think the Allies thought at first that the plans they captured were fake and the whole "false landing" incident was orchistrated by the Germans.

There was as Markus remarks in post 5.

The Storch was forced to land in Belgium in January 1940 and plans carried were not destroyed which had the OKW redraw the attack on France, which were when the Manstein plan came in handy for Hitler to produce to gain the upper hand on the OKW as some point to. Like "I have the needed plans ready! - what have you got?"

Of course such a remarkable incident of your enemy forcing his plans upon you must be looked at as a possible hoax.

[poster342002]

Perhaps if France had itlsef heavily militarised itself and built up it's defences following WW1 in case of such an occurance? It may have held out longer or - with the help of the allies - never been conquered by Germany in WW2.

[Markus]

Perhaps if France had itlsef heavily militarised itself and built up it's defences following WW1 in case of such an occurance?



http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=1911510&postcount=6

[poster342002]

http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=1911510&postcount=6

Thanks! :cool:

[Tyr]

Belgium shouldn't require much in the way of forts if you hide behind the Meusse or later the Scheldt. Its pretty big in a lot of places.

Better coordination is the way though. Both with the Belgians and between the English and French. Attacking would be clever too but perhaps a bit unfeasable without some major changes.

[DuQuense]

There are several major PODs from the Plans not being lost all the way up to Rommel and Guderian obeying orders and stopping after the Ardennes breakthru, to allow the Infantry and Artillery to catch up with them,

[Admiral Canaris]

Even if one ignores all earlier PODs, France needn't have surrendered as early as they did IOTL; the nation wasn't beaten when they gave up and installed Pétain, and Paris could have been defended, as could other lines if the will had been there. We're talking a war that's longer by months, at least. Remember, Germany still took 50,000 casualties in the French campaign; it was a curb-stomp, but the French weren't as utterly pathetic as Wehrmacht fanboys tend to assume.

[Markus]

Even if one ignores all earlier PODs, France needn't have surrendered as early as they did IOTL; the nation wasn't beaten when they gave up and installed Pétain, and Paris could have been defended, as could other lines if the will had been there.

The nation wasn´t beaten, but the war in France was over. Most of the french armny had been destroyed in the north and the rest could have just delayed the Wehrmacht a bit. And the defence of Paris would have resulted in the towns destruction and countlees civilan deaths.



We're talking a war that's longer by months, at least. Remember, Germany still took 50,000 casualties in the French campaign; it was a curb-stomp, but the French weren't as utterly pathetic as Wehrmacht fanboys tend to assume.The french army had 66 divisions -and not the best- while the Germans had 109 in the line and 19 in reserve. And during the decisive phase the french army had been pathetic indeed. Last but not least the Wehrmacht suffered 150,000 casualties during the entire campaign. Compared to WW1 or the allied casualties that was less than nothing.

[CalBear]

How could France have prevailed? Let's count a few ways:

1. Attack the Germans on September 10, 1939 using its massive advantage in troops, mmobility and firepower (wait, that sounds like...)

2. Modernize a few months faster.

3. Allow your Generals to trade space for time (assuming you didn't follow # 1) and attack the German logistical tail from the flanks.

4. Realize you are defending an entire, large, country, not just Paris.

5. Regroup, reorganize and ATTACK. You have much better armor, and more of it, use it. You have sufficient air cover, especially with the RAF in the mix, use it to kill transportation assets.

6. Probably the most important: DO NOT PANIC.

[Kaiser Kris]

Even if one ignores all earlier PODs, France needn't have surrendered as early as they did IOTL; the nation wasn't beaten when they gave up and installed Pétain, and Paris could have been defended, as could other lines if the will had been there. We're talking a war that's longer by months, at least. Remember, Germany still took 50,000 casualties in the French campaign; it was a curb-stomp, but the French weren't as utterly pathetic as Wehrmacht fanboys tend to assume.

Hell, the Germans themselves regarded the French soldiers as brave soldiers and worthy adversaries. I don't have a citation, but I know that Rommel made some pretty complementary remarks about French troops, although I suspect not about their commanders.

The fall of France was the combination of an excellent German plan, very poor French and British strategic handling, grave communications and intelligence mistakes and a bit of luck on the ground. I'd argue that the fall of France was probably more like a 50/50 probability than a certainty, maybe even a little less than that.

[seraphim74]

French had a lot of time to find countertactics against German Blitzkrieg. Unfortunately, they ignored Polish informations about German campaign in Poland. Most of French commanders assumed, that since Polish Army had been defeated so quickly, any reports made by Polish officers were useless. General Maczek, commander of Polish only big motorized unit in 1939 wrote full analysis for his French partners about German tactics. During the fall of France he found his report - the envelope wasn't even opened. Had the French decided "hey, we helped to train those guys, perhaps they know what they're talking about" and had analized Polish reports they might have found countermeasures for Blitzkrieg.
Also, during campaign in 1940 Polish soldiers were often shocked by low morale od many of their French comrades in arms. They saw thousands of them running in panic without weapons, totally uninterested in continuing the fight. OTOH, soldiers of Polish 10th Armoured Cavalry Divison were impressed by French colonial troops, especially the riflemen from Senegal, who were seen trying to gather rifles thrown away by escaping French soldiers. Soon every tank in the brigade had one "adopted" Senegalian soldier, who traveled on tank and fought together with Poles.
Alltogether I agree, that if the French had attacked in September 1939, they would have succeed. But even if not, they could have easily won in 1940 - if they deigned to listen to the soldiers who had already faced Germans.

[Milarqui]

Maybe if they had followed De Gaulle's advice...

I'll explain myself: De Gaulle had said that the Maginot Line, in which France tended to put all its faith in case of war against Germany, was obsolete and would not work, so he suggested that the Army created a Mechanized Infantry unit to deal with attacks. His idea wasn't even discussed by the Army, and when Pétain was given full powers and formed Vichy France, he sentenced De Gaulle to death in contempt of court.

Maybe with the Mech Infantry things would have worked out better for the French...

[Admiral Canaris]

The nation wasn´t beaten, but the war in France was over. Most of the french armny had been destroyed in the north and the rest could have just delayed the Wehrmacht a bit. And the defence of Paris would have resulted in the towns destruction and countlees civilan deaths.

Hm... would a destroyed capital make Britain more or less likely to surrender?

The french army had 66 divisions -and not the best- while the Germans had 109 in the line and 19 in reserve. And during the decisive phase the french army had been pathetic indeed. Last but not least the Wehrmacht suffered 150,000 casualties during the entire campaign. Compared to WW1 or the allied casualties that was less than nothing.

The Allied casualties were naturally much greater, though the overwhelming number were prisoners, not KIA/MIA.

150,000 for the Western campaign? Is 50,000 the KIA, then, or did I just misremember altogether?

[merlin]

The problem was the 'mindset' of all sections of French society wasn't up to the mark.
Political instability, meant the French people were fragmented in their loyalties - there seemed to be less willlingless to die for their country. The military had an 'ideal' world concept of how they wanted the war to unfold - the Germans exhausting themselves attacking the Maginot Line, so reducing the German numerical superiority.
But also as a consequence they planned for a long war - it would be '41 when their re-armament process would have reached a better stage, in aircraft - both home produced and US imports. By then too, the blockade on Germany should have had some effect, more troops from French colonies would be in the line, and more from Britain & its Empire. What was important was to hold the line - in Belgium.
It would have helped, if the Belgiums had supplied their forts with ammunition, if greater liaision had taken place with the Anglo-French. Or indeed in their joint neautrality, if the Belgiums didn't co-operate more with the Dutch.
The trouble was the atitude of the French - on the front line in the phoney war, was any aggressive patrolling to take prisoners undertaken - no, were targets of opportunity fired upon - no.
It was if it was all a terrible mistake, and with a bit of luck it can be cleared up and we can all go home.

[Redbeard]

I'm not so sure that a French attack in 1939 would have been the best option. The French Army was far from ready for war in 1939 and even if they could have defeated the weak German Divisions confronting them initially, they would have been in a weak position once the main force of the German Army returns from Poland. OTOH the Germans were out of arty ammo after the Polish campaign, but nobady knew that, not even the Germans until Oct. 39.

But I think the OTL outcome of the May 1940 campaign relied on a string of butterflies all working on German side, and a more likely outcome would have been the Germans at some time hesitating enough for the French to gain cohesion. Once that happens the German offensive will bog down and the French be in their dream scenario - and without using any major PoD on any side.

The much renowned Blitzkrieg doctrine wasn't develioped before the campaign, but was more like "discovered" during and after, and the speed of advance that first of all took out the French relied on a Commander like Guderian outright disobeying orders to slow down etc. etc.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[Archibald]

Lots of interesting scenarios here
http://atf40.forumculture.net/et-si-c2/
(in french)
I'll try to detail some of them...

Et-si = what-if (enough said!)

Of course there's also this one
http://www.francefightson.org/

The mother of all "France-does-not-surrender-in-1940" whatifs! :)

[Markus]

Maybe if they had followed De Gaulle's advice...

I'll explain myself: De Gaulle had said that the Maginot Line, in which France tended to put all its faith in case of war against Germany, was obsolete and would not work, so he suggested that the Army created a Mechanized Infantry unit to deal with attacks.

They had several armoured divisons in 1940. They just did not use them right/swiftly.



French had a lot of time to find countertactics against German Blitzkrieg. Unfortunately, they ignored Polish informations about German campaign in Poland.

A myth.
1. Poland was a conventional campaign. The Poles were outnumbered and their troops were poorly positioned, that´s why the attackers advanced as fast as they did.
2. "Blitzkrieg" was edit: NOTplanned, it sort-of just happened given the circumstances of the western capmpaign.




150,000 for the Western campaign? Is 50,000 the KIA, then, or did I just misremember altogether?

Germany: 27,000 KIA, 18,000 MIA, 110,000 WIA

France: 92,000 KIA, 200,000 WIA 1,9 Mio POW

UK: 68,000 casualties WIA probably not included. wikipedia says 30,000 were KIA and 34,000 POW



I'm not so sure that a French attack in 1939 would have been the best option. The French Army was far from ready for war in 1939 and even if they could have defeated the weak German Divisions confronting them initially, they would have been in a weak position once the main force of the German Army returns from Poland.

I´m afraid the german Generals of 1940 would not agree.

1. There wasn´t enough fuel or ammo for another campaign. Not for the next six to nine month.
2. Once the French reach the Rhine Germany is f..ed! The heavy industry in the Saar region is gone, the chemical industry in the Rhine/Main are too and the north-south LOCs in the west have been cut.
3. German Generals were appalled at the poor leadership/level of training the Wehrmacht showed in 1939.
4. The French would have had the best defensive position imaginable. Their front is protected by the Rhine, their northern flank by rough terrain of the Eifel and the Moselle.

[Redbeard]

I´m afraid the german Generals of 1940 would not agree.

1. There wasn´t enough fuel or ammo for another campaign. Not for the next six to nine month.
2. Once the French reach the Rhine Germany is f..ed! The heavy industry in the Saar region is gone, the chemical industry in the Rhine/Main are too and the north-south LOCs in the west have been cut.
3. German Generals were appalled at the poor leadership/level of training the Wehrmacht showed in 1939.
4. The French would have had the best defensive position imaginable. Their front is protected by the Rhine, their northern flank by rough terrain of the Eifel and the Moselle.


Nobody, not even the German leadership realised until the Polish Campaign was over, that the German Army was out of arty ammo and would be until spring 40. In that context we need a major and possibly implausible PoD to have the French attack in 1939 (implausible for the French Intel. to know more about German supplies than the Germans themselves). And if the German leadership had realised beforehand that they were so short on ammo I'm not sure the Germans would have attacked at all in 1939 - or it would be the drop to fill Beck's and others cup and they execute the planned coup.

Crushing the weak Divisions facing west will only be a moral victory, the war is won by decisively defeating the main German army returning from Poland, and that can IMO only be done if Germany is deprived of the industry to rearm and resupply the army - i.e. all of Ruhr and possibly southern Germany - and that can't be combined with a defensive position any where comparable to the one taken in OTL. Seen from 1939, and certainly with the available intel., I think the allies were right in sitting it out until they had materiel superiority (1941) - and still seen from 1939 - a German attack before 1941 should have a decent chance of breaking the German back and just make the final offensive easier for the allies - had it not been for the combination of malicious butterflies and incompetent leaders in the most vulnerable selection of time and place (butterflies obviously can sence incompetence and are attracted to it).

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

[Markus]

(implausible for the French Intel. to know more about German supplies than the Germans themselves) And if the German leadership had realised beforehand that they were so short on ammo I'm not sure the Germans would have attacked at all in 1939

The Germans knew it all along, but The Plan(Hitler´s) did not include a war with France and the UK, so going ahead with no ammo reserves and no real defence in the west was OK. So the French could find out, too. They definitely can find out about the low number and quality of troops.



Crushing the weak Divisions facing west will only be a moral victory, the war is won by decisively defeating the main German army returning from Poland, and that can IMO only be done if Germany is deprived of the industry to rearm and resupply the army - i.e. all of Ruhr and possibly southern GermanyNo. First a massive defeat in the west will lead to a collapse of the home front, which was not at all behind a war with France and the UK.
Second resupply will not be possible. Steel and coal production was concentrated in the Saarland(lost), the Ruhrgebiet -the eastern parts of which are possibly lost or under threat- and Upper Silesia.

Even with massive soviet support it took months. With key industrial areas lost and important LOCs cut it´s not possible.


I think the allies were right in sitting it out until they had materiel superiority

They had materiel superiority in late 39, acutally a lot more than in mid 1940.

[burmafrd]

Incredibly poor leadership, terrible morale in many units, the Luftwaffe owned the skies, frankly I do not see the French being able at most to slow things down. Now if they were to hold on untill July, that pretty much ends any chance of a real BOB. the Luftwaffe needed 2 months to get ready- if the French hold off untill July, that means the BOB cannot begin untill september. not likely its tried then due to the need for calm seas for Sea Lion. Now maybe Hitler has Goering give it a try, but I doubt they try as hard and as long with no invasion in the offing. And with no invasion that allows the Brits to be more flexible as well.

Communications was after their lousy leadership the biggest problem for teh French forces. Many of their tanks did not have radios. Outside of Degaule and a couple of others their experience with tanks outside of strict infrantry support was limited. The army was very slow to maneuver and move. Once again leadership and communications was a big problem- and overall the defense first mindset was a huge drag in itself.

[seraphim74]

Originally posted by Markus

A myth.
1. Poland was a conventional campaign. The Poles were outnumbered and their troops were poorly positioned, that´s why the attackers advanced as fast as they did.
2. "Blitzkrieg" was edit: NOTplanned, it sort-of just happened given the circumstances of the western capmpaign.



1. I do not agree. Invasion of Poland was first real test of Blitzkrieg tactics. Concentrated mechanized forces broke Polish lines and raided deep behind them, forcing Poles to retreat from pretty much every position by outflanking them and attacking reserves before they were fully mobilized. German infantry went into gaps made by Panzers and surrounded confused Poles to finish them off. Of course Polish campaign wasn't a full scale Blitzkrieg like in 1940, but it showed German tactics quite well.
2. I think Germans didn't expect such big success in 1940, however you can't say they didn't plan a Blitzkrieg. They concentrated powerful tank force, gave it strong air support, broke in one point French lines and sent their tanks on a long raid, with infantry hasting behind them to consolidate their gaines - and free them to go further. It simply worked better than even Germans had expected.

[Archibald]

Lots of interesting scenarios here
http://atf40.forumculture.net/et-si-c2/
(in french)
I'll try to detail some of them...

Et-si = what-if (enough said!)

Of course there's also this one
http://www.francefightson.org/

The mother of all "France-does-not-surrender-in-1940" whatifs! :)

Three scenarios have been developed at ATF 1940

1- The Petsch scenario

General Petsch is a fictional caracter which take over the French army in 1937. Things don't change a lot until 1940, but the fictious caracter is just Gamelin opposite.
Over these years he introduce some changes
- A fighter division (as in 1918) to temporarily sweep the Luftwaffe over the sky of Sedan
- More antitank weapons
- He refuse the disastrous Dyle-Escault manoeuver (send the french reserve to the Netherlands).
- Night bombing (at moonlight) with the obsoletes Amiots and others Farman
- He LISTEN what the 2eme bureau tell him (German troops are moving near Sedan... beware...)
(OTL French recon aircrafts noticed the German movements right from the 11th may in the afternoon)
Results are outstandings. The Meuse attack is repealed, Guderian is taken prisonier on 13th may (!)
Later Belgium become a fortress, a buffet zone against the next German attack which develop in June.
This end in an kind of 1914-stalemate.

[Archibald]

Scenario number 2

A french victory at Stone - Le Mont Dieu.
Stone and Le Mon-Dieu are located 15km south of Sedan.
There, the Panzer atempted a breaktrough and were smashed to bits by the B1bis heavy tanks. The position held until late may!
So whatif a counterattack had started from this position around 15th may 1940, to fill the Sedan gap ?

The french had heavy guns, while the british had bombers. The two shell and bomb German bridgehead on the Meuse, before the B1bis attack.
The 10th panzer division Panzers and 37mm guns prove totally unefficient against the B1bis (as happened in Stone, Abbeville...) and guess what happened ? The german panick, and Sedan is taken.
There's still German troops on the french side of the Meuse, and they atempt a counter attack on May 17th.
But the french troops and tanks are now... entrechered (in Sedan), just like in WW1. That's the kind of war the french are prepared for, and the German counter attack is broken.

[arctic warrior]

Originally posted by Markus


1. I do not agree. Invasion of Poland was first real test of Blitzkrieg tactics. Concentrated mechanized forces broke Polish lines and raided deep behind them, forcing Poles to retreat from pretty much every position by outflanking them and attacking reserves before they were fully mobilized. German infantry went into gaps made by Panzers and surrounded confused Poles to finish them off. Of course Polish campaign wasn't a full scale Blitzkrieg like in 1940, but it showed German tactics quite well.
2. I think Germans didn't expect such big success in 1940, however you can't say they didn't plan a Blitzkrieg. They concentrated powerful tank force, gave it strong air support, broke in one point French lines and sent their tanks on a long raid, with infantry hasting behind them to consolidate their gaines - and free them to go further. It simply worked better than even Germans had expected.

1. Just look up something like Len Deightons "Blitzkrieg" - the Polish campaign was planned to rely on the German railheads and was a traditional Kesselslacht. It was Guderians running rampant in the East and the other armoured commanders that made the difference.

2. You said it yourself: They did not expect this success and Guderian was told several times to halt by the OKH to make the infantry catch up and secure flanks, orders which he disobeyed. It was planned as a sichelsnitt - to cut through the French lines so that it could be rolled up. It was just too good to be true.

[Markus]

1. Just look up something like Len Deightons "Blitzkrieg" - the Polish campaign was planned to rely on the German railheads and was a traditional Kesselslacht.


That book is from 1979. It not so much a histroy book, that book is history. This one (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blitzkrieg-Legend-Campaign-West-1940/dp/1591142946/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1220117263&sr=8-1) is a bit more up to date. In the Polish Campaing the Armoured Divisions were not concentrated, but evenly dispersed.

[seraphim74]

Originally posted by Markus

That book is from 1979. It not so much a histroy book, that book is history. This one (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blitzkrieg-Legend-Campaign-West-1940/dp/1591142946/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1220117263&sr=8-1) is a bit more up to date. In the Polish Campaing the Armoured Divisions were not concentrated, but evenly dispersed.


Well, they weren't concentrated in one place, that's for sure. However, most of German mechanized forces in 1939 were concentrated in few coprs, which spearhaded German invasion using speed and manouverbility.
XIXth Army Corps (Guderian) - 3rd Armoured Division, 2nd and 20th Motorised Division
XIVth Army Corps (von Wietersheim) - 13th and 29th Motorised Division
XVIth Armoured Corps (Hoepner) - 1st and 4th Armoured Division, 14th and 31st ID
XVth Army Corps (Hoth) - 2nd and 3rd Light (mechanized) Division
XVIIIth Army Corps (Beyer) - 4th Light and 2 Armoured Division, 4 Mountain Division

XIVth, XVth and XVIth Corps were all 10th Army (von in Reichenau). At that time it was rather big concentration of armour, I woudl say, especially with 1st Light Division as aarmy reserve.

What I'm trying to prove is that while Polish campaign wasn't a classic Blitzkrieg ( more a first test), it gave a good insight of German tactitcs which would be helpful for France in campaign of 1940.
And frankly, if Germans weren't planning a Blitzkrieg in 1940 they certainly took great care to gather everything necessary to do it in one place. Interesting, isn't it?

[arctic warrior]

That book is from 1979. It not so much a histroy book, that book is history. This one (http://www.amazon.co.uk/Blitzkrieg-Legend-Campaign-West-1940/dp/1591142946/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1220117263&sr=8-1) is a bit more up to date. In the Polish Campaing the Armoured Divisions were not concentrated, but evenly dispersed.

I know but you have to start somewhere and it was at the forefront of memory. :D

[Markus]

Well, they weren't concentrated in one place, that's for sure. However, most of German mechanized forces in 1939 were concentrated in few coprs, which spearhaded German invasion using speed and manouverbility.
XIXth Army Corps (Guderian) - 3rd Armoured Division, 2nd and 20th Motorised Division
XIVth Army Corps (von Wietersheim) - 13th and 29th Motorised Division
XVIth Armoured Corps (Hoepner) - 1st and 4th Armoured Division, 14th and 31st ID
XVth Army Corps (Hoth) - 2nd and 3rd Light (mechanized) Division
XVIIIth Army Corps (Beyer) - 4th Light and 2 Armoured Division, 4 Mountain Division


Great info! In 1940 the Wehrmacht had 10 Armoured divisions and 6 motorized divisions. Half of each were a part of Panzergruppe Kleist, two more Armoured divisions formed Panzerkorps Hoth operating at Kleist´s northern flank.

[seraphim74]

Yes. Since mechanized forces had proven their efficiency in Poland, Germans decided to use it on greater scale in 1940 against much stronger and better positioned enemy force. I repeat, Polish campaign was a field test for those units. IMHO my point about insight in German tactics still stands.