French/Russian "Nazism" in CP-victorious TL

[General Zod]

If the Central Powers (hereby assumed to include Britain, Grossdeutschsland, Hungary, and Italy; possibly the Ottoman Empire as well) had won WWI, and inflicted on France and Russia a peace deal any bit as harsh as Versailles and Brest-Litovsk, would have been likely for France and/or Russia to develop the kind of aggressively expansionistic, genocidal fascism that OTL was German Nazism ? Would have a French and/or Russian Holocaust been possible/likely ? Which country would have been more likely to develop its own brand of "Nazism", and which, if any, would have fallen to Communism ? Would have the state of Israel still be born, in case of a French/Russian Holocaust ?

[Admiral Canaris]

France is too small to threaten Germany, especially post-victory Supergermany. Russia, OTOH, will be more or less a puppet. So I have a hard time seeing any successful such movement springing up, though there will almost certainly be fringe variants of them, perhaps even violent such.

[Bry]

With Britain involved, the war would have been over quite quickly... Germany would be more likely to take a few French colonies than to annex large swathes of Metropolitan France.

It is often pointed out that if you had asked in 1900 which European country would become obsessively nationalistic, anti- semitic, genocidal etc. etc. then most would have said France. There was a relatively strong proto- fascist undercurrent in the early 1900s, and even in rl France was consumed by paranoia over its seeming inability to reproduce its population in the inter- war period. In the situation you outline I think it is near enough inevitable that extremism would grip the Republic; if not Nazism.

France would urgently seek to co opt Britain in some fashion in a potential war against Germany (a fight against both simultaneously would be impossible)- Perhaps offers of French colonies could be made- Paris taking a more continental approach and more or less neglecting the navy in favour of an army to match the Germans. It is even possible that London would wish to see Berlin a little humbled after its WW1 victory in its ceaseless quest for balance in Europe.

As for Russia, quite possibly the situation would be much the same as rl, though Finland (retaining its Germanic monarchy) and the Baltic states would almost certainly be heavily pro- German.

[Susano]

France is too small to threaten Germany, especially post-victory Supergermany. Russia, OTOH, will be more or less a puppet. So I have a hard time seeing any successful such movement springing up, though there will almost certainly be fringe variants of them, perhaps even violent such.

You cant puppetise Russia proper. Its too large. It will rather become the CPs Vietnam trying to keep unrest and Bolshevists down...

[Admiral Canaris]

You cant puppetise Russia proper. Its too large. It will rather become the CPs Vietnam trying to keep unrest and Bolshevists down...

Why? The Bolsheviks themselves could repress the country after a couple of years. Why would simply introducing a suitably ruthless puppet Tsar and arming his henchmen not work?

[General Zod]

France is too small to threaten Germany, especially post-victory Supergermany.

Not directly, as the major opponent. However, they might well play a role similar to OTL Italy, an aggressive but opportunistic fascism that waits for the right window to stab Germany in the back and preys on some minor in the meanwhile. Especially if the British and the Germans have somehow fallen to complacency and/or got estranged. Only they might have a brand of fascism rather more nasty than Mussolini's, anti-semitic and genocidal from the start.

Russia, OTOH, will be more or less a puppet. So I have a hard time seeing any successful such movement springing up, though there will almost certainly be fringe variants of them, perhaps even violent such.

Well, they might easily follow a course somehow similar to OTL 1990s-2000s. In the first few years after the defeat, they stay subservient to the Allies (esp. if Anglo-German armies put down the Bolsheviks). Subsequently, a more aggressive and expansionist nationalistic leadership takes the power and starts to push for recovering the old sphere of influence of the Russian Empire. Only instead of a nominally democratic autocrat like Putin, in a period where reverence for democracy is much more fleeting, you might easily have full-fledged, naked totalitarianism.

IMO Russia, even if you cut away all the European non-Russian subject nationalities and make them clients of Germany, is too big and strong to be made a puppet for long, as recent history indicates.

[General Zod]

With Britain involved, the war would have been over quite quickly... Germany would be more likely to take a few French colonies than to annex large swathes of Metropolitan France.

On this, I disagree. I think they would do both against a recidivist aggressive France. Partition the French colonial empire with their allies, and cut some hefty chunks of metropolitan France away. Probably try to restore the old HRE border on the Meuse.

Anyway, if you would like to discuss the peace terms, I've started a thread on "Reverse Versailles". Come and contribute. :)

It is often pointed out that if you had asked in 1900 which European country would become obsessively nationalistic, anti- semitic, genocidal etc. etc. then most would have said France. There was a relatively strong proto- fascist undercurrent in the early 1900s, and even in rl France was consumed by paranoia over its seeming inability to reproduce its population in the inter- war period. In the situation you outline I think it is near enough inevitable that extremism would grip the Republic; if not Nazism.

Good point. I heartily agree.

France would urgently seek to co opt Britain in some fashion in a potential war against Germany (a fight against both simultaneously would be impossible)

They tried and failed in WWI. :eek:

- Perhaps offers of French colonies could be made-

Which French colonies, after the war ? Germany, Britain, and Italy would have divved up the spoils.

Paris taking a more continental approach and more or less neglecting the navy in favour of an army to match the Germans. It is even possible that London would wish to see Berlin a little humbled after its WW1 victory in its ceaseless quest for balance in Europe.

Quite possibly. Of course, it remains to be seen if the British would value more the balance of power, which by now they have been forced to give up in order to contain France and Russia, or the strategic partnership with Germany against the United States and the resurgence of Russia. It must be taken into account that after WWI, even OTL Britain started to abandon the old concept of safekeeping the balance of power in Europe with shifting alliances against the dominant European power of the moment, in favor of protecting its European interests by building strategic partnerships with reliable permanent allies.

Of course, something else might happen to distract Britsh attention and energies heavily: e.g. a war with the USA for control of China in the 1920s or 1930s.

As for Russia, quite possibly the situation would be much the same as rl

If you mean something like a fascist Putin, I heartily agree.

[Admiral Canaris]

Well, they might easily follow a course somehow similar to OTL 1990s-2000s. In the first few years after the defeat, they stay subservient to the Allies (esp. if Anglo-German armies put down the Bolsheviks). Subsequently, a more aggressive and expansionist nationalistic leadership takes the power and starts to push for recovering the old sphere of influence of the Russian Empire. Only instead of a nominally democratic autocrat like Putin, in a period where reverence for democracy is much more fleeting, you might easily have full-fledged, naked totalitarianism.

IMO Russia, even if you cut away all the European non-Russian subject nationalities and make them clients of Germany, is too big and strong to be made a puppet for long, as recent history indicates.

Of course, Soviet Russia was not defeated in war, not occupied, and there were no victors interested in keeping it down. It also had massive nuclear stockpiles to avert overt military action. By contrast, Russia ITTL, assuming a war broadly similar to the OTL WWI Ostfront, will be bankrupt, indebted, devastated and without any armed forces. Would the Germans allow them to rearm with anything but light infantry to put rebels down? I doubt it. The Russian government would have its hands full keeping what it had left together.

Footnote: I read that the Germans actually planned to insert a German noble as the new Tsar, once the Bolsheviks were thrown out. The source was a What If?-style book, so it might not be accurate, but if it was, would he allow such an ideology to take hold?

[Faeelin]

Footnote: I read that the Germans actually planned to insert a German noble as the new Tsar, once the Bolsheviks were thrown out. The source was a What If?-style book, so it might not be accurate, but if it was, would he allow such an ideology to take hold?

IIRC, the Swedes tried something like that once.

How'd that work out for you guys?

[Faeelin]

It is often pointed out that if you had asked in 1900 which European country would become obsessively nationalistic, anti- semitic, genocidal etc. etc. then most would have said France. There

What about France in the 1900s makes it appear more anti-semitic than Germany?

[General Zod]

Of course, Soviet Russia was not defeated in war, not occupied, and there were no victors interested in keeping it down.

Well, IMO this is not entirely correct. OTL America certainly was highly interested in containing Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, by pulling ex-Soviet non-Russian nationalities and ex-satellites in its economic and political sphere of influence. But it has lacked the might to do it thoroughly (by squandering it in foolish Middle East ventures), as current news indicate. And as usual, Old Europe lacks the spine to do anything else but appease, pacifism and Euroskepticism be thrice-damned, for all that a properly-funded pan-European army could steamroll the Russians and a pan-European buyers' cartel could contain Russian schemes to use oil and gas furnitures for political advantage. :mad::(

It also had massive nuclear stockpiles to avert overt military action.

This is true. I heavily bet that the Ukrainians curse the day they gave up their nuclear arsenal, these days.

By contrast, Russia ITTL, assuming a war broadly similar to the OTL WWI Ostfront, will be bankrupt, indebted, devastated and without any armed forces. Would the Germans allow them to rearm with anything but light infantry to put rebels down? I doubt it. The Russian government would have its hands full keeping what it had left together.

This is quite true... in the first years after the war. But a decade or two later ? Let's assume a ruthless totalitarian/nationalist regime seizes power in Russia and starts to push for heavy industrialization and rearment. Even without non-Russian European territories, a Russia with the resources of the heartland, Siberia, and Central Asia, which goes for something like the industrialization and weaponbuilding that Stalin did in the 19030s could be a serious threat to a complacent Germany/Britain.

Footnote: I read that the Germans actually planned to insert a German noble as the new Tsar, once the Bolsheviks were thrown out. The source was a What If?-style book, so it might not be accurate, but if it was, would he allow such an ideology to take hold?

Heh. I've always been terribly skeptical over the true effectiveness of these dynastic schemes, by themselves, to keep unruly nations into line. Either there are other very good reasons (either common strategic or economic interests, or military pressure) to sustain the alliance, or the puppet dynasty will eventually "go native" and align with the true geopolitical interests of their nation, or it will be swept away by some coup.

Anyway, what's the title and author of the book ? I'm always on the lookout for good Ah stories. :)

[Tom_B]

The French Right in any CP wins (incl. mildy favorable negotiated settlements)
TL would have 3 components which would be mutually hostile:

1] Orleanists -- Look to restore the French monarchy with the Orleans line. The nucleus for this group would be Action Francaise. Orleanism goes hand in hand with being UberCatholic. There would be some antiSemitism from this group but also very AntiMasonic.

2] Full Bonapartists -- Want to restore French monarchy with the Bonaparte line.

3] QuasiBonapartists -- Want a French strong man to take charge. A spiritual descendant of Napoleon not a physical one. For a while this group would be several groups centering on different strong men who want to play Nappy but there would be a winnowing process. These groups would tend to be more antiChurch and most of them would regard Clemenceau as sort of a grandfather.

[Admiral Canaris]

Well, IMO this is not entirely correct. OTL America certainly was highly interested in containing Russia in the 1990s and 2000s, by pulling ex-Soviet non-Russian nationalities and ex-satellites in its economic and political sphere of influence. But it has lacked the might to do it thoroughly (by squandering it in foolish Middle East ventures), as current news indicate. And as usual, Old Europe lacks the spine to do anything else but appease, pacifism and Euroskepticism be thrice-damned, for all that a properly-funded pan-European army could steamroll the Russians and a pan-European buyers' cartel could contain Russian schemes to use oil and gas furnitures for political advantage. :mad::(

Well, but there was no military occupation, and Russia was never defenceless or completely bankrupt. Its independence was never seriously contested. By comparison, the Germans could and would do anything they liked in a defeated Russia after a hypothetical WW1 victory. They would not be satisfied with the ex-Empire puppets; they would very much wish to keep Russia itself on a short leash, and there would be nothing to stop them.

This is true. I heavily bet that the Ukrainians curse the day they gave up their nuclear arsenal, these days.

Or not; Some people today thinks something as little as the ABM defences make Poland a target for Russian missiles. As if it was not one already...

This is quite true... in the first years after the war. But a decade or two later ? Let's assume a ruthless totalitarian/nationalist regime seizes power in Russia and starts to push for heavy industrialization and rearment. Even without non-Russian European territories, a Russia with the resources of the heartland, Siberia, and Central Asia, which goes for something like the industrialization and weaponbuilding that Stalin did in the 19030s could be a serious threat to a complacent Germany/Britain.

They would have to be very complacent indeed to allow first that a hostile regime takes over in their biggest de facto colony (and major headache), then that it massively rearms, no doubt in violation of whatever terms it might have been pressed to acknowledge. On that scale, that could not be hidden, nor its purpose. Additionally, as I understood it the Germans wanted to keep Russia poor, as an economic colony that would sell them raw materials in return for their industrial surplus. They would not support any industrialisation, and with the economic terms Russia would have been given, it should not be hard for them to discourage such investment. Massive reparations and/or occupation costs would also make such a proposition difficult for the Russians.

Hitler was allowed to get away with most of what he did early on because people thought the Versailles Treaty was crippling, unfair and humiliating (which it arguably was). Would German opinion have such feelings for the "primitive" Russians?

Heh. I've always been terribly skeptical over the true effectiveness of these dynastic schemes, by themselves, to keep unruly nations into line. Either there are other very good reasons (either common strategic or economic interests, or military pressure) to sustain the alliance, or the puppet dynasty will eventually "go native" and align with the true geopolitical interests of their nation, or it will be swept away by some coup.

Perhaps. But I do think Germany would exercise tight controls over whoever ended up in charge of post-Bolshevik Russia. I just cannot see them allowing massive industrialisation and rearmament.

Anyway, what's the title and author of the book ? I'm always on the lookout for good Ah stories. :)

Me, I don't remember, it was a while back I read it. It might well have been one of the original What If? series.

[Earling]

First of all you need to define which Germany it is who has won this war.

Because while the Nazis might be willing to pay hand over fist to keep Russia subdued and broken, a social-democrat run 'uber-Sweden' would not. Deploying hundreds of thousands of soldiers to defend/prop up the puppet states/occupy French colonies and so on will be expensive enough without funding soldiers to occupy substantial numbers of Russian territories as far as Moscow.

Initially the Russians shall be kept on a tight leash indeed. Bolshevikism shall probably be crushed as its hard to see a joint Anglo-German operation failing to take St Petersburg. An attempt shall likely be made to put in place a constitutional Tsar, although he will likely suffer from all the problems of the Weimar Republic. Russia afterall doesn't have much of a middle class to rest the Tsar upon although I guess you could create one over the course of a generation, one bound to an Anglo-German bougeois culture. They might go for an absolute Tsar but such would be a considerable danger. If he rests on the native Russians then the Germans have no leverage and if he rests on German bayonets he shall face the constant threat of a coup, and given the costs of such, he likely suffers the fate a certain Hapsburg in Mexico.

I don't see fascism as inevitable in France, any more than it was inevitable after 1871. France likely suffers from some instability, but may well resolve that she must face the new situation. She cannot face down Britain and Germany alone, or likely face those two with any manner of European allies. If she is to be isolated upon the continent she may well pursue trade connections across the Atlantic with the USA, a USA which would have to be slightly nervous if Britain and Germany are carving up the world between them as South America would certainly look a tempting target for future imperialism.

[General Zod]

Well, but there was no military occupation,

Military occupation of the whole European Russia is a bloody huge affair. I am doubtful even the combined forces of Britain and Germany would be willing to engage, or if they tried, they could sustain the effort for long, when they also have the Balkans, France, the Middle East, and China to settle down. Crushing the Bolsheviks is one thing, but occupation of Russia for decades...

and Russia was never defenceless or completely bankrupt.

1990s Russia came close. It was saved by rising oil and gas prices.

Its independence was never seriously contested. By comparison, the Germans could and would do anything they liked in a defeated Russia after a hypothetical WW1 victory.

In the few years after the victory, sure. That is why ATL Bolsheviks probably got to say hello to an Anglo-German firing squad. :D But long-term occupation is another thing.

They would not be satisfied with the ex-Empire puppets; they would very much wish to keep Russia itself on a short leash, and there would be nothing to stop them.

Apart from the costs of the multi-million army you need to occupy Russia, that is.

Or not; Some people today thinks something as little as the ABM defences make Poland a target for Russian missiles. As if it was not one already...

Indeed. That's why methinks Ukrainians will pester more and more for NATO and EU membership in the coming years. I notice Poland was quite swift to welcome those ABMs after the Georgian crisis. ;)

They would have to be very complacent indeed to allow first that a hostile regime takes over in their biggest de facto colony (and major headache), then that it massively rearms, no doubt in violation of whatever terms it might have been pressed to acknowledge. On that scale, that could not be hidden, nor its purpose.

I agree it's not a given, but it's precisely what happened with OTL Germany.

Additionally, as I understood it the Germans wanted to keep Russia poor, as an economic colony that would sell them raw materials in return for their industrial surplus. They would not support any industrialisation, and with the economic terms Russia would have been given, it should not be hard for them to discourage such investment. Massive reparations and/or occupation costs would also make such a proposition difficult for the Russians.

Germany may not support industrialization, but Russia has sufficient internal resources to bootstrap its industrialization itself. Massive reparations on France and Russia are certainly quite likely, but history shows they are also quite difficult to enforce effectively on the long run. IF Germany can and will sustain the costs of a long-term occupation of Russia, it can certainly direct its economic development the way they please. IF.

Hitler was allowed to get away with most of what he did early on because people thought the Versailles Treaty was crippling, unfair and humiliating (which it arguably was). Would German opinion have such feelings for the "primitive" Russians?

Again, it's not a given. But I can certainly see reasons for German and British opinion swing both ways.

Perhaps. But I do think Germany would exercise tight controls over whoever ended up in charge of post-Bolshevik Russia. I just cannot see them allowing massive industrialisation and rearmament.

Keeping a long-term tight control over Russia (or China) takes a lot of effort, politically, militarly, and economically. A great power like Britain, USA, or Germany may or may not maintain the willpower to exercise it. I won't deny it may happen, but I can also easily see TLs where they give up.

Me, I don't remember, it was a while back I read it. It might well have been one of the original What If? series.

What a pity. :( But I don't see to remember it among any AH book titled What If ? that I've read.

[Admiral Canaris]

Military occupation of the whole European Russia is a bloody huge affair. I am doubtful even the combined forces of Britain and Germany would be willing to engage, or if they tried, they could sustain the effort for long, when they also have the Balkans, France, the Middle East, and China to settle down. Crushing the Bolsheviks is one thing, but occupation of Russia for decades...

Right. I did not mean that they would occupy all of the country; I imagine that would be left to local flunkies. Though OTOH, in Russia you don't really need complete control of the countryside; the railways were what was important. Holding those is much cheaper but still puts a stranglehold on them.

1990s Russia came close. It was saved by rising oil and gas prices.

Not THAT close. Have you read about, say, the deal the French pressed Baron Wrangel into in order to grant him their limited support? I don't think Germany would have been any nicer.

Indeed. That's why methinks Ukrainians will pester more and more for NATO and EU membership in the coming years. I notice Poland was quite swift to welcome those ABMs after the Georgian crisis. ;)

Not that they have much of a chance joining NATO... still, they'd be fools not to try.

I agree it's not a given, but it's precisely what happened with OTL Germany.

Yes, but Germany had a functioning industrial base already; they didn't have to build one from scratch. And it's not like they didn't have trouble financing their rearmament, mefo bills notwithstanding.

Germany may not support industrialization, but Russia has sufficient internal resources to bootstrap its industrialization itself. Massive reparations on France and Russia are certainly quite likely, but history shows they are also quite difficult to enforce effectively on the long run. IF Germany can and will sustain the costs of a long-term occupation of Russia, it can certainly direct its economic development the way they please. IF.

Not too difficult, if the will is there, as the Rhineland Occupation showed; IOTL, the German reparations stopped because Britain didn't care enough about them and France knew they couldn't act against Germany alone. But in this scenario, it's not a weaker power attempting to enforce the payments. Plus, most of what investment there will be in Russia will most likely be German, anyway.

Again, it's not a given. But I can certainly see reasons for German and British opinion swing both ways.

It might happen. Then again, it might not; I suppose it might depend on whether the Kaiser can defend his position from the Socialists.

Keeping a long-term tight control over Russia (or China) takes a lot of effort, politically, militarly, and economically. A great power like Britain, USA, or Germany may or may not maintain the willpower to exercise it. I won't deny it may happen, but I can also easily see TLs where they give up.

They might be evil and bill the Russians for the occupation, like the Nazis did with France.

What a pity. :( But I don't see to remember it among any AH book titled What If ? that I've read.

"What If: Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been".

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_If%3F_%28essays%29

[General Zod]

The French Right in any CP wins (incl. mildy favorable negotiated settlements)
TL would have 3 components which would be mutually hostile:

1] Orleanists -- Look to restore the French monarchy with the Orleans line. The nucleus for this group would be Action Francaise. Orleanism goes hand in hand with being UberCatholic. There would be some antiSemitism from this group but also very AntiMasonic.

2] Full Bonapartists -- Want to restore French monarchy with the Bonaparte line.

3] QuasiBonapartists -- Want a French strong man to take charge. A spiritual descendant of Napoleon not a physical one. For a while this group would be several groups centering on different strong men who want to play Nappy but there would be a winnowing process. These groups would tend to be more antiChurch and most of them would regard Clemenceau as sort of a grandfather.

This is true, but there are good counter-objections. First, on a general point, European monarchical and non-monarchical Rights are typically willing to unite behind a charismatic strongman as long as he promises that monarchy will be restored "eventually". Cfr. the precedents of Franco and Horthy. Second, and more important, this is also true for France as well. Cfr. the precedent of Petain and Boulanger. The latter's takeover only failed because Boulanger got cold feet at the critical moment of the coup.

Therefore, I have little doubt that the three components of the French Right could unite behind a sufficiently charismatic and politically-talented military strongman.

[General Zod]

Right. I did not mean that they would occupy all of the country; I imagine that would be left to local flunkies. Though OTOH, in Russia you don't really need complete control of the countryside; the railways were what was important. Holding those is much cheaper but still puts a stranglehold on them.

About this, I would agree with Earling's analysis. It may be done, no doubt, but it is also quite possible that at some point, a progressive Reichstag would force the withdrawl of troops from Russia proper.


Not THAT close. Have you read about, say, the deal the French pressed Baron Wrangel into in order to grant him their limited support? I don't think Germany would have been any nicer.

Heh. About this, I would see the Anglo-Germans as willing to offer slightly more generous terms to the Anti-Bolshevisk. For one, victorious Germans would be more willing to keep the commies away from power in an area that directly borders their Eastern European empire. Also, if the Anglo-Germans manage to win the war with less effort than OTL Entente, as it is likely, they would be rather more willing and able to gut the bloody Bolsheviks. This would be also true if the UK stays neutral.


Not that they have much of a chance joining NATO... still, they'd be fools not to try.

Heh. Georgia now has a snowball's chance in Hell if joining NATO. Ukraine, I would deem it a definite possibility, if the new USA Administration plays their cards right and Old Europe doesn't get too much of cold feet. Ukraine is too big and strong for Putin to crush in a limited war. Anyway, this is arather interesting issue, but probably fit for another thread.


Yes, but Germany had a functioning industrial base already; they didn't have to build one from scratch. And it's not like they didn't have trouble financing their rearmament, mefo bills notwithstanding.

Yep, but Stalin's precedent shows that a ruthless Russian dictatorship can bootstrap an effective industrial base from scratch. Quite likely not as big as Soviet Union, since they would miss Ukraine's resources.

Not too difficult, if the will is there, as the Rhineland Occupation showed; IOTL, the German reparations stopped because Britain didn't care enough about them and France knew they couldn't act against Germany alone. But in this scenario, it's not a weaker power attempting to enforce the payments. Plus, most of what investment there will be in Russia will most likely be German, anyway.

Oh, sure, as you point out, it's just the issue of long-term political will. Germany needs to stay dtermined to pay the economic, political, and military prices of long-term occupation of Russia. It can be done, but it's not a given. Esp. since post-war Germany will be largely democratic, probably with a constitution and political system akin to monarchical Gaullism, albeit imperialist. A crossbreed of Britain and Sweden.


It might happen. Then again, it might not; I suppose it might depend on whether the Kaiser can defend his position from the Socialists.

And the Centre Party. Exactly.


They might be evil and bill the Russians for the occupation, like the Nazis did with France.

An effective solution, but it needs to be politically feasible, since this Germany will be imperialist but democratic, like the USA or Britain, and also they need to manage the exaction successfully: the USA, tried, and failed, in Iraq.

"What If: Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been".

I'll reread it. Pressently such a detail escapes my memory of the book, but I suppose it would be in the Germany WWI victory scenario. It has been some time since I read it. Good book, but it has the main defect of many "true" historians writing AH: they get cold feet about their subject, so they spend 90% of the time discussing factual history or justifying the PoD, 10% discussing what would actually happen in the counterfactual scenario. Rather boring, for the AH buff. ;)

[LordInsane]

And the Centre Party. Exactly.
And the Liberals. Less enthusiastically by the Nationalliberale, certainly, but still.

[General Zod]

Because while the Nazis might be willing to pay hand over fist to keep Russia subdued and broken, a social-democrat run 'uber-Sweden' would not. Deploying hundreds of thousands of soldiers to defend/prop up the puppet states/occupy French colonies and so on will be expensive enough without funding soldiers to occupy substantial numbers of Russian territories as far as Moscow.

Initially the Russians shall be kept on a tight leash indeed. Bolshevikism shall probably be crushed as its hard to see a joint Anglo-German operation failing to take St Petersburg. An attempt shall likely be made to put in place a constitutional Tsar, although he will likely suffer from all the problems of the Weimar Republic. Russia afterall doesn't have much of a middle class to rest the Tsar upon although I guess you could create one over the course of a generation, one bound to an Anglo-German bougeois culture. They might go for an absolute Tsar but such would be a considerable danger. If he rests on the native Russians then the Germans have no leverage and if he rests on German bayonets he shall face the constant threat of a coup, and given the costs of such, he likely suffers the fate a certain Hapsburg in Mexico.

Good analysis. And yes, Germany in this scenario would in all likelihood be imperialist but democratic, a crossbreed of Britain and Sweden.

I don't see fascism as inevitable in France, any more than it was inevitable after 1871.

I never said it would be inevitable, only a likely possibility. And for the record, post-1871 France almost went proto-fascist with Boulanger.

[Earling]

I never said it would be inevitable, only a likely possibility. And for the record, post-1871 France almost went proto-fascist with Boulanger.

Hmmm, I think calling old-guard reactionaries "fascists" is perhaps stretching the term. Would you consider Salazar a fascist? I guess you could say yes, although it seems perhaps a tad simplistic if you start naming any reactionary regime as fascist.

All in all I guess an authoritarian right-wing nationalist government is the most likely outcome. It may adopt broadly fascist economic policies, so heavy industry and a pursuit of autarky, in so much as it doesn't want to rely upon Germany and Britain for reasons of patriotism. On the otherhand France has always had that left-wing republican streak, so its hard to see any government pleasing everyone, they are just too divided. Then again your reverse-Versailles might push everyone to the right, especially if there is no real communist power to speak off once the Bolsheviks are crushed.

[General Zod]

Hmmm, I think calling old-guard reactionaries "fascists" is perhaps stretching the term. Would you consider Salazar a fascist? I guess you could say yes, although it seems perhaps a tad simplistic if you start naming any reactionary regime as fascist.

All in all I guess an authoritarian right-wing nationalist government is the most likely outcome. It may adopt broadly fascist economic policies, so heavy industry and a pursuit of autarky, in so much as it doesn't want to rely upon Germany and Britain for reasons of patriotism. On the otherhand France has always had that left-wing republican streak, so its hard to see any government pleasing everyone, they are just too divided. Then again your reverse-Versailles might push everyone to the right, especially if there is no real communist power to speak off once the Bolsheviks are crushed.

I suppose a Boulanger-like regime might not be strictly defined fascist. However, neither it would be an old-guard reactionary regime a la Salazar or Pinochet. It would be an authoritarian right-wing nationalist, expansionist-revanchist regime, likely headed by a charismatic strongman with a military background, which would follow broadly fascist economic policies and use broadly fascist ideology and propaganda. Primacy of the State, privileged destiny of the nation, military expansionism, hatemongering.

[Admiral Canaris]

About this, I would agree with Earling's analysis. It may be done, no doubt, but it is also quite possible that at some point, a progressive Reichstag would force the withdrawl of troops from Russia proper.

I suppose that is so.

Heh. About this, I would see the Anglo-Germans as willing to offer slightly more generous terms to the Anti-Bolshevisk. For one, victorious Germans would be more willing to keep the commies away from power in an area that directly borders their Eastern European empire. Also, if the Anglo-Germans manage to win the war with less effort than OTL Entente, as it is likely, they would be rather more willing and able to gut the bloody Bolsheviks. This would be also true if the UK stays neutral.

If the war is quickly won, the terms will likely be less punitive; possibly, there will not be any (successful) revolution in the first place. I was working under the assumption that the Eastern War would still be a drawn-out affair.

Heh. Georgia now has a snowball's chance in Hell if joining NATO. Ukraine, I would deem it a definite possibility, if the new USA Administration plays their cards right and Old Europe doesn't get too much of cold feet. Ukraine is too big and strong for Putin to crush in a limited war. Anyway, this is arather interesting issue, but probably fit for another thread.

Right. Suffice it to say that I doubt France would let them in.

Yep, but Stalin's precedent shows that a ruthless Russian dictatorship can bootstrap an effective industrial base from scratch. Quite likely not as big as Soviet Union, since they would miss Ukraine's resources.

Stalin was also presiding over a sovereign country that did not have massive debts (Lenin wrote them off unilaterally, a major reason for Soviet Russia going unrecognised for quite some time). As such, the Communist government also had an altogether different degree of control over the economy, something that I suspect the Germans would frown upon their "friendly" Russia assuming. And they cannot sell Baku oil or Ukrainian grain to finance the heavy equipment.

Oh, sure, as you point out, it's just the issue of long-term political will. Germany needs to stay dtermined to pay the economic, political, and military prices of long-term occupation of Russia. It can be done, but it's not a given. Esp. since post-war Germany will be largely democratic, probably with a constitution and political system akin to monarchical Gaullism, albeit imperialist. A crossbreed of Britain and Sweden.

That depends; a glorious victory might give the monarchy the prestige it needs to remain in power.


And the Centre Party. Exactly.

They would, however, be more sympathetic to the monarchy, especially after seeing the Bolshevik example (assuming, once again, that there was a Revolution).

An effective solution, but it needs to be politically feasible, since this Germany will be imperialist but democratic, like the USA or Britain, and also they need to manage the exaction successfully: the USA, tried, and failed, in Iraq.

France was democratic when they occupied the Ruhr. People in this time and age were much less squeamish abut such matters than is the case today.

I'll reread it. Pressently such a detail escapes my memory of the book, but I suppose it would be in the Germany WWI victory scenario. It has been some time since I read it. Good book, but it has the main defect of many "true" historians writing AH: they get cold feet about their subject, so they spend 90% of the time discussing factual history or justifying the PoD, 10% discussing what would actually happen in the counterfactual scenario. Rather boring, for the AH buff. ;)

Right. There was some interesting stuff there, though.

[MerryPrankster]

What about France in the 1900s makes it appear more anti-semitic than Germany?

The Dreyfuss Affair.

Mobs and mobs of people shouting, not "kill the traitor" but "kill the Jew."

[General Zod]

If the war is quickly won, the terms will likely be less punitive; possibly, there will not be any (successful) revolution in the first place. I was working under the assumption that the Eastern War would still be a drawn-out affair.

According to previous and ongoing discussions on the duration of the war, we may assume that the war would be significantly shorter than OTL, certainly not 4 years. How much shorter essentially depends on the role of UK, whether active belligerant on the Alliance's (especially if from the start) or friendly neutral. Personal estimations are in the range of 1-2 years, most of it to subdue Russia, indeed. Even in the worst scenario, I highly doubt Russia can stand more than a couple years, although.

Since it would be a total defeat, with huge loss of territory, a revolution is highly likely, proabaly successful in ending autocracy (Feb. 1917), not necessarily to put radical revolutionaries into power (Oct. 1917), that's subject to butterflies.

As it concerns peace terms, IMO the duration of the war essentially reflects in the degree of punitive viciousness reparations go into. No matter the duration, peace terms would be highly punitive as territories and colonies go. Russia gets a Brest-Litovsk deal, France loses the rest of Alsace-Lorraine, French Flanders, Italy's claims, large part or all of her colonial empire (how much depends on British colonial greed). That kind of punitive peace was Germany's war aim, and Italy would be quite greedy to feast on French booty.


Stalin was also presiding over a sovereign country that did not have massive debts (Lenin wrote them off unilaterally, a major reason for Soviet Russia going unrecognised for quite some time). As such, the Communist government also had an altogether different degree of control over the economy, something that I suspect the Germans would frown upon their "friendly" Russia assuming. And they cannot sell Baku oil or Ukrainian grain to finance the heavy equipment.

According to the Nazi precedent, it is not a given nor unplausible that Germany and her allies may fall into complacency and let a resurgent Russian nationalist leadership repudiate the debt. It is true that a Russia proper cannot rely on natural resources of Caucasus or Ukraine to finance the debt. They can exploit the resources of Siberia and Central Asia for that. But since they need to be developed, it is correct to assume TTL Russian industrialization will be somewhat slower and reduced than OTL. Likely still enough to rebuild Russia as a great power, although.


That depends; a glorious victory might give the monarchy the prestige it needs to remain in power.

Oh, I have no doubt that in a victorious German Empire the prestige of the monarchy will be boosted enough to establish it for the foreseeable future. But I have also severe doubts that it will remain the semi-autocratic compomise it was under Bismarck. I picture a democratization either/both before the war (a successful CP suggests a more politically wise pre-war leadership, if they gain British friendship for good, and that heavily suggest some form of democratization) and/or after it, as the mass parties claim full constitunalization and greater power share as the price of their loyalty during the war.

I do not visualize full British parliamentarism as necessary or likely, rather abolition of the Prussian unequal electoral system, and a government both responsible to the Reichstag and the Kaiser, with the latter keeping vast reserve powers in foreign and defense policy, legislative initiative for the Reichstag, but veto power for the Kaiser. A constitution rather similar to a monarchical French Fifth Republic.

France was democratic when they occupied the Ruhr. People in this time and age were much less squeamish abut such matters than is the case today.

And good for them. Pacifism is the senile illness of democracy. :mad::eek:

[Admiral Canaris]

According to previous and ongoing discussions on the duration of the war, we may assume that the war would be significantly shorter than OTL, certainly not 4 years. How much shorter essentially depends on the role of UK, whether active belligerant on the Alliance's (especially if from the start) or friendly neutral. Personal estimations are in the range of 1-2 years, most of it to subdue Russia, indeed. Even in the worst scenario, I highly doubt Russia can stand more than a couple years, although.

Since it would be a total defeat, with huge loss of territory, a revolution is highly likely, proabaly successful in ending autocracy (Feb. 1917), not necessarily to put radical revolutionaries into power (Oct. 1917), that's subject to butterflies.

As it concerns peace terms, IMO the duration of the war essentially reflects in the degree of punitive viciousness reparations go into. No matter the duration, peace terms would be highly punitive as territories and colonies go. Russia gets a Brest-Litovsk deal, France loses the rest of Alsace-Lorraine, French Flanders, Italy's claims, large part or all of her colonial empire (how much depends on British colonial greed). That kind of punitive peace was Germany's war aim, and Italy would be quite greedy to feast on French booty.

All right, I can go with this.

According to the Nazi precedent, it is not a given nor unplausible that Germany and her allies may fall into complacency and let a resurgent Russian nationalist leadership repudiate the debt. It is true that a Russia proper cannot rely on natural resources of Caucasus or Ukraine to finance the debt. They can exploit the resources of Siberia and Central Asia for that. But since they need to be developed, it is correct to assume TTL Russian industrialization will be somewhat slower and reduced than OTL. Likely still enough to rebuild Russia as a great power, although.

Depending on Japanese involvement, they might also face trouble in the Far East. Depends on how far out of hand Britain (and America) allows them to get.

I still doubt Russia on its own would have the capital for a Stalin-like industrialisation. They would not be able to seriously challenge the German industrial base, although if we do posit a complacent, Socialist Reich, they may well give them an initial scare and bloodied nose.

Oh, I have no doubt that in a victorious German Empire the prestige of the monarchy will be boosted enough to establish it for the foreseeable future. But I have also severe doubts that it will remain the semi-autocratic compomise it was under Bismarck. I picture a democratization either/both before the war (a successful CP suggests a more politically wise pre-war leadership, if they gain British friendship for good, and that heavily suggest some form of democratization) and/or after it, as the mass parties claim full constitunalization and greater power share as the price of their loyalty during the war.

I do not visualize full British parliamentarism as necessary or likely, rather abolition of the Prussian unequal electoral system, and a government both responsible to the Reichstag and the Kaiser, with the latter keeping vast reserve powers in foreign and defense policy, legislative initiative for the Reichstag, but veto power for the Kaiser. A constitution rather similar to a monarchical French Fifth Republic.

I'm not good enough at '20s German politics to make any educated guesses on details of how such a compromise solution would play out, especially with the various butterflies from an earlier victory and different wartime alliance system; quite possibly, total war will not be required for any length of time, and casualties will not be as horrible as IOTL, making the populace less sceptical to the government. There is also the matter of the Army's own political power and increased prestige, and perhaps also the incorporation of German Austrian areas to consider.

And good for them. Pacifism is the senile illness of democracy. :mad::eek:

Not necessarily, but pacifism has been a trend for half a century or so now.

[General Zod]

All right, I can go with this.

Of course, a radical revolution attempt is still quite possible in France and Russia just after the war, due to the combined effects of ongoing Allied naval blockade, total military defeat, and severe territorial losses.


Depending on Japanese involvement, they might also face trouble in the Far East. Depends on how far out of hand Britain (and America) allows them to get.

OH, IMO by all means they will grab the Outer Manchuria, nor I can see UK or USA begrudging them that land. If they get greedy for all Russian Far East, UK or USA might get alarmed, or they might just be happy to redirect Japanese ambitions there instead of China proper, which is their real interest. Anyway, Far East and South East Asia are the big geopolitical post-WWI hot spot ITTL. A meery dance between UK, USA, Japan, and Russia here, and I absolutely foresee some kind of really big war exploding here in the 1920s-1940s. Leadership of Asia absolutely needs to be settled for good among global superpowers (UK and USA) and regional great powers (Russia and Japan). The only certainety is that Germany will sit it out: they are far too busy managing their empire on the other side of Eurasia. However, this Asian Great War may or may not get conflated with France and Russia seeking a rematch in Europe.

They would not be able to seriously challenge the German industrial base, although if we do posit a complacent, Socialist Reich, they may well give them an initial scare and bloodied nose.

Oh, this is just what might be needed to have a second European great war. TTL likely could and would still get its World Wars, only they do not really need to grow as destructive as OTL. Which is all for the good.


I'm not good enough at '20s German politics to make any educated guesses on details of how such a compromise solution would play out, especially with the various butterflies from an earlier victory and different wartime alliance system; quite possibly, total war will not be required for any length of time, and casualties will not be as horrible as IOTL, making the populace less sceptical to the government. There is also the matter of the Army's own political power and increased prestige, and perhaps also the incorporation of German Austrian areas to consider.

OTL '20s German politics are as different from TTL as day and night. No defeat, no revanchism, no revolution, no hyperinflation. However, the different alliance system both assumes and favors a moderate shift towards democratization before the war. The Center and Social Democrats had been steadily climbing towards full partecipation in the political system before the war, and their wartime loyalty only makes the case stronger for moderate reform. Essentially, the German Empire needs three basic things to stabilize its political system: abolition of the unfair Prussian electoral system, some kind of parliamentary responsibility for the government, and expansion of the welfare system. All these things are quite feasible with a decent leadership of the Empire before and after the war. This is entirely compatible with strengthened prestige and vast reserve powers of the Kaiser and the Army. Quite probably, they claim a vast swath of influence in foreign and defense issues, and the Army stays as venerated socially as OTL USA or Israel. The main effect of the incorporation of German Austrian areas will be to make the Center party stronger. The Czechs will follow the path of the Poles and the French minorities. The German Empire is far too strong and compact for them to have any realistic chance of breaking away, barring a collapse as total as OTL 1918. So they will be slowly assimilated, the sting of Germanization being lessened by economic prosperity and the pride of belonging to one of the world's superpowers.

[Faeelin]

The Dreyfuss Affair.

Mobs and mobs of people shouting, not "kill the traitor" but "kill the Jew."

All this does is prove that some antisemitism existed in France; not that it was worse than Germany. How many Jews were officers in the German army?

[Faeelin]

I'm not good enough at '20s German politics to make any educated guesses on details of how such a compromise solution would play out, especially with the various butterflies from an earlier victory and different wartime alliance system; quite possibly, total war will not be required for any length of time, and casualties will not be as horrible as IOTL, making the populace less sceptical to the government. There is also the matter of the Army's own political power and increased prestige, and perhaps also the incorporation of German Austrian areas to consider.


Why would Austria be incorporated?

Anyway, we need more details on how and when the war ends, or this is a bit hard to talk about. Like, does anyone seriously imagine the Silent Dictatorship stepping down for the Socialists?

How will they pay for the war? Handwaving about reparations aside...

[Ion_StormH]

Haha, that's about the same thing my new TL covers. But it'll be a fascist alliance between France/Spain/Italy and Portugal + Russia who's a bit pissed about British/German dominance.

[LordInsane]

Why would Austria be incorporated?

Anyway, we need more details on how and when the war ends, or this is a bit hard to talk about. Like, does anyone seriously imagine the Silent Dictatorship stepping down for the Socialists?

How will they pay for the war? Handwaving about reparations aside...
If enough German (and, vitally, Austrian) leaders gets into their heads that Austria-Hungary isn't salvageable, then the primary impetus for not unifying in the last fourty years is gone. Since they just won the Great War, the other Great Powers could be expected to not protest overly;). But, only if Austria-Hungary isn't salvageable in some form (at least, if salvageing operations would be too costly, and draining, for victorious, but war-tired Germany).

The Silent Dictatorship wouldn't want to, but... how much could they get away with? They essentially got into power on 'winning the war', with the war won, what motivations, other then 'keep the Socialists out' could they come up with? There's probably, even in the more Conservative portions of German society, a great deal of support for, at the very least, returning to a pre-Great War 'business as usual', so their position may not be strong enough to keep in power. And if the economy crashes (due to your next point) when they still keep on to power, that's not so good for them, either.

Paying for the war is a big issue. Er... I guess they would try to do something like OTL, only not burdened by having to pay reparations (only loans), and there being no need to break Versailles. So... problems ahead for Germany. Which, depending on the sequence of events, could either be good for German democracy, or bad.

[Faeelin]

The Silent Dictatorship wouldn't want to, but... how much could they get away with? They essentially got into power on 'winning the war', with the war won, what motivations, other then 'keep the Socialists out' could they come up with?

Perpetual war for perpetual peace; there's the intervention in Russia, for instance. And all that unrest postwar. Ludendorff et al. don't strike me as the type to back down on their own.

[General Zod]

Well. A-H being partitioned just after the war is a nifty and entirely likely way for Germany to deal with the intractable internal problems of A-H instead of wasting time and effort to keep the Hapsburg in charge. But my big idea is that a victorious CP TL arises from A-H getting partitioned before the war, in 1866-1870. This solves a lot of the weaknesse of the CPs: Ther Germans may uses the resources of Cisleithania (and keep the Czech in line) much better than the Hapsburg, the Hungarians go from unruly minority to proud owners of their own middle power, the Italians are made an ironclad ally of Germany by being given their eastern claims. Provided the Ottomans don't go Entente, these changes are more than enough to let the CP win. I also hypothesize that a more intelligent German leadership causes the British to stay a friendly neutral or ally with the CPs. Also the USA never enter the war since Germany wins too early (or is never subject to naval blockage thanks to British friendship or alliance)

The position of the British greately influences the duration of the war. I assume a SuperGermany-Hungary-Italy-Ottoman Empire team can win WWI by 1917 if UK is in the Entente. If UK is neutral or allied to the CPs they can do it by 1916. You can find ideas about this TL in the "Reverse Versailles" thread.

A shorter war also means that Germany will be in a rather better shape at the end of the conflict, especially if they aren't subject to British blockade throughout. Yep, Ludendorff and Hindenburg will try to keep the power and influence they developed during the war, but they do not need to go into a naked dictatorship. Provided they are able to stabilize the economy, and are smart enough to allow the Center party and the Social Democrats some long-needed internal reforms (assuming they were not implemented before the war, as a conseguence of the PoD), they will be enourmously popular and can stay into power in a democratic way. They have saved Germany from its implacable enemies in its most dangerous hour and won it an Empire. Again, provided they can provided the necessary political compromises and manage the economy, they can be easily voted into power and become Chancellor or Minister of War or of Foreign Affairs or whatever scheme they can concoct to share power between the two of them. They will have their hands full for some years managing the peace treaties, stabilizing the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe vassals, wiping out the Bolsheviks, keeping France subdued, etc.

They just need to give the German people some tangible political and social reward for the war effort (expansion of the welfare system, universal suffrage in Prussia, a government responsible both to the Reichstag and to the Kaiser) and they can get all the popular support to stay in power democratically. They were very, very popular during the war.