Treaty_of_Versailles questions.

[docfl]

It seems to me most treaties have an end date. I have not been able to find an end date for the Treaty of Versailles.
I know some simply stated (correctly) that it was a cease fire for 20 years. What would of happened if the treaty expired without the 2nd world war?
Could Britain and Germany and maybe the US convince the French to re-negotiate?
Or do you think even if a different peace settlement would Germany still want to rebuild for a round 2 after the end of the treaty?
docfl

[aktarian]

Well, it was a peace treaty so that means it was open ended. Defeated side had to do abide by it or try to change it.

The ceasefire quote refers to the fact that author predicted that in 20 years Germany will try to remove it by force of arms since he predicted that France will not drop the limitations.

[Zmflavius]

The peace treaty was intended to last "for all time." The military restrictions were to be permanent, as were the territorial changes. The timetable for reparations was to last for 66 years, until the 1980s.

The 20 years quote was by Ferdinand Foch, who claimed (accurately) that it would result in another war in 20 years. He also compared it to a capitulation by France, and insinuated that the allied negotiators had betrayed France, so I'm inclined to take his prophetic abilities with a grain of salt, and call it a lucky guess.

[The Oncoming Storm]

As has been often said in previous threads about Versailles, the problem was not that it was a harsh treaty on Germany, it's that war weary public opinion in the Entente nations was not prepared to pay the price of enforcing it's terms meaning you got the worst of both World's, a humiliated Germany looking for revenge and victors lacking the political will to face it down until it was too late. Had Britain and France enforced the Treaty to the letter then there's no way Germany would have had a chance to try and get even.

[MSZ]

International treaties don't usually have an "expiration date", unless directly stated otherwise. They exist as long as their parties agree to their terms. Some provisions of the Versailles Treaty had a fixed period of time, such as the Rheinland being occupied for 15 years. Others were meant to exist "ad infinitum". However, since it was a "peace treaty", unilateral withdrawal from it, as well as breaching the terms to a point where it is made void, would legaly mean an "end of peace", thus giving a possible "casus belli".

[Devolved]

Versailles was a perfectly reasonable treaty when you consider that approximately 17 million people had died in the war.

The apologists will always complain about double standards but the treaty of Brest Litovsk imposed by Germany on Russia showed that the Germans accepted the principle that the winner dictates terms.

As others have said the main problem was that many of the terms were not enforced and France was pretty much abandoned within 5 years to face Germany alone. With no Habsburg Empire and no Czarist Russia on it's doorstep Germany came out of WW1 safer than it had been for generations

As far as changing the treaty was concerned there were already modifications taking place throughout the 1920's and these modifications also took place under Hitler. Everything could have had a happy ending if the Germans didn't decide to invade other countries after 1938.

[Zmflavius]

Originally Posted by Devolved

Versailles was a perfectly reasonable treaty when you consider that approximately 17 million people had died in the war.

The apologists will always complain about double standards but the treaty of Brest Litovsk imposed by Germany on Russia showed that the Germans accepted the principle that the winner dictates terms.

As others have said the main problem was that many of the terms were not enforced and France was pretty much abandoned within 5 years to face Germany alone. With no Habsburg Empire and no Czarist Russia on it's doorstep Germany came out of WW1 safer than it had been for generations

As far as changing the treaty was concerned there were already modifications taking place throughout the 1920's and these modifications also took place under Hitler. Everything could have had a happy ending if the Germans didn't decide to invade other countries after 1938.

Firstly, let us compare the treaties as OTL. OTL Brest-Litovsk took 25% of Russia' land, 25% of its industry, and 90% of its coal mines, and imposed a 6 billion mark war indemnity, terms we all agree were ludicrously harsh. Versailles, by comparison, took 13% of Germany's land, 16% of its coal mines and a minimal part of its industry, plus a 132 billion mark war indemnity. Furthermore, unlike Brest-Litovsk, there also were the major military limitations.

On its face, the Brest-Litovsk appears to be far harsher, but this ignores the extent to which the war indemnity was damaging. The size of the Versailles war indemnity, 132 billion marks, and paid in installments of 2 billion a year, caused similar damage to the German economy as Brest-Litovsk, primarily since the way in which the indemnity was paid, through natural resources, industrial goods, and to an extent, industrial equipment and patents, had a similar, if not greater damaging effect on the German economy as Brest-Litovsk. Given that the value of the Russian industry, either in itself or as a percentage of the Russian economy, does not begin to approach the Versailles indemnity, I would say that the Versailles indemnity was far harsher than the Brest-Litovsk territorial losses.

In regards to the safety of Germany, the idea that Germany was safer with no Habsburg empire is ludicrous, given that the Habsburgs were their allies. The lack of a Czarist Russia is worse; the only reason the Versailles treaty could even be called lighter than Brest-Litovsk was because the allies didn't want to damage Germany to the point where it would simply become a Communist puppet state. The idea that a Germany with the aforementioned military limitations was supposed to serve as anything other than a battleground as opposed to a staging area (for the USSR) is nonsense. Admittedly, Germany, did come out lighter than it would have with a Czarist Russia. If a Czarist Russia also got to negotiate, it is very likely that the Ruhr and the Rhineland, plus a more significant portion of its eastern territories would have been lost, in addition to the OTL losses. The allies most certainly did not have an extra serving of the milk of human kindness, not that the Germans had any special bonus in this area.

Versailles was certainly less harsh than Brest-Litovsk, but this was almost certainly not dictated by any special moral advantage on the parts of the Allies, but rather the situational realities.

However, because most of the terms had been abandoned by the 1930s, the Treaty in practice became much lighter than Brest-Litovsk on paper, except that Brest-Litovsk in practice ended up being equally light. The USSR, did, after all, manage to regain virtually all of the lost territory.

Having said that, Germany certainly, by electing Hitler, "solved" its problem by digging a hole with a spiked bottom and diving straight in. It certain could have been possible, had the Germans elected a rational leader, that there would have been a happier ending for all the involved parties.

And another thing; 44% of those deaths were CP deaths, and the CP actually lost more civilians than the Entente powers, largely due to starvation. There were also a significant number of dead after the Armistice, mostly due to the continuing allied food blockade, despite there being massive shortages in the CP territories.

[Devolved]

Without getting sidelined into an argument about Versailles my point was that Germany had shown that they had no problem with the idea of the victor dictating terms. So complaining about Versailles was a little hypocritical IMO.

If they didn't like it then they could have re started the war but they chose not to and signed.

Brest Litovsk was rendered void by Germany's defeat so the Russians escaped.

My point about the Habsburg Empire was that yes they were Allies but they were also another power bloc that balanced out German dominance in Central Europe. With the Habsburgs gone and the creation of smaller states Germany's influence would ultimately be stronger once the dust from the war settled. Germany after 1918 had no major enemy and was not in danger from anyone.

Not having an airforce, tanks or U boats caused no security problems for Germany in the period before 1933 and the Czechs, Poles, Danes and Austrians made no invasion attempts. No one was trying to invade or threaten them. All they had to do was keep to the agreements that they signed. They didn't do that.

In the end because they complained so much about Versailles and tried to make out that they didn't really lose the war the Germans simply ensured that the Allies in WW2 would insist on Unconditional Surrender. This ended all discussion.

[Zmflavius]

Originally Posted by Devolved

Without getting sidelined into an argument about Versailles my point was that Germany had shown that they had no problem with the idea of the victor dictating terms. So complaining about Versailles was a little hypocritical IMO.

If they didn't like it then they could have re started the war but they chose not to and signed.

Given that the Versailles treaty was not negotiated, but actually written by the Allies, and presented to a German envoy, I would imagine that implies that there was not actually a choice. Sign or die, in the most literal sense possible.

Brest Litovsk was rendered void by Germany's defeat so the Russians escaped.

Which is precisely what the Germans did in the 20s. Comparing the paper Brest-Litovsk to the Versailles reality is incongruous.

My point about the Habsburg Empire was that yes they were Allies but they were also another power bloc that balanced out German dominance in Central Europe. With the Habsburgs gone and the creation of smaller states Germany's influence would ultimately be stronger once the dust from the war settled. Germany after 1918 had no major enemy and was not in danger from anyone.

What exactly do you think France in the West intended to do, not what they ended up doing once they ended up not being able to enforce a treaty. For that matter, what do you think the USSR intended? This whole idea of exporting violent revolution wasn't especially comforting to anyone in Europe, which is why the Allies let the Germans off "easy," because they were geographically in the right place to hold off the Soviets.

Not having an airforce, tanks or U boats caused no security problems for Germany in the period before 1933 and the Czechs, Poles, Danes and Austrians made no invasion attempts. No one was trying to invade or threaten them. All they had to do was keep to the agreements that they signed. They didn't do that.

1923, Ruhr, a country which can't protect its beating heart, let alone its borders is not a country being treated like a country. Nor was Wilhelm Cuno some proto-Hitler, he objected towards his country not being treated like a country. I would say that there's a marked divide between Wilhelm Cuno's policies and Hitler's policies, to equate the two and state that both were equally dishonest men leading a country which at both times was equally dishonest is also wrong. Would, for example, would you say that in the event of a German victory, attempting to enforce Brest-Litovsk because the USSR declares it abrogated be the USSR refusing to keep an agreement in signed?

In the end because they complained so much about Versailles and tried to make out that they didn't really lose the war the Germans simply ensured that the Allies in WW2 would insist on Unconditional Surrender. This ended all discussion.

Which is a distinct issue from whether Versailles was harsh or not.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Devolved

The apologists will always complain about double standards but the treaty of Brest Litovsk imposed by Germany on Russia showed that the Germans accepted the principle that the winner dictates terms.

The main complaint that I have seen was that it worked so poorly. It was not harsh enough to permanently crippled Germany, considering the willingness of France to spend money to enforce the terms. To realistically enforce the terms of the treaty, France would have needed to station a half million or more troops on German soil for the rest of time. And it was not soft enough for Germany to learn to accept over time.

Only dead armadillos are found in the middle of the road.

Sometimes in life you have to make hard choices, and France tried to dodge the hard choices, and France paid for this decision in a harsh manner.

Originally Posted by Devolved

Without getting sidelined into an argument about Versailles my point was that Germany had shown that they had no problem with the idea of the victor dictating terms. So complaining about Versailles was a little hypocritical IMO.

It is also human nature. Neither the German hatred of the treaty or France being unwilling to pay for enforcing the treaty is surprising.

[Adler17]

At first, comparing Versailles and Brest-Litowsk is one of the biggest errors one can easily make. Brest-Litowsk was hard. Yes. But remember who was there to negotiate for Russia. Lenin. And he should be kept at bay as much as possible. The Czar was still offered in 1916 to get Poland back, if he made peace.

What did RUSSIA lose in Brest? Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia. Look, what RUSSIAN territories were indeed lost. None. Indeed this treaty was giving many peoples the right of self determination.

Versailles was OTOH a dictate. It was not acceptable. And indeed it was broken by the Entente as well. The Versailles treaty did provide several clauses, in which the Entente powers were oblieged as well. So disarmament was to be started once Germany was disarmed. Indeed that never happened. In 1932 France severely fought against it. So why some here complain, that the Germans broke the treaty, if the Entente did the very same? Oh, and the right of self determination was hurt. No plebiscite in the Corridore, the Sudeten to the Czechs, Austria not to reunite with Germany... The other treaties with the other CP are the very same.

Oh, and there were invasions by Poles. And then the French and Belgish invasions. And the Germans could do nothing. Indeed the Cordon sanitaire of the French was more a reason of rearmament in Germany than any other thing. If it would not exist, there would be no need of such big forces. But as long as Poland, the Czechs and France (and later even the USSR!) were allied, and in a way, that even an offensive war would trigger a war of this coalition versus Germany, the breaking of the military clauses of Versailles was a neccessity for a surviving Germany, regardless, who the chancellor of Germany was called (unfortunately he was a mad Austrian in the 1930s and 40s.).

Versailles = WW2.

Oh, the German generals were asked in 1919, if they could continue the war. They said no. The Germans would not have signed Versailles, if it was harder. Then the French would have had to invade- and face an Afghanistan type war. Not nice. Also then the chances of Germany becoming communistic, which was the fear of everyone, would be very high.

Adler

P.S.: We all regard Versailles as a punishment. But many punishing clauses were officially not meant as such.

[aktarian]

Originally Posted by Devolved

Without getting sidelined into an argument about Versailles my point was that Germany had shown that they had no problem with the idea of the victor dictating terms. So complaining about Versailles was a little hypocritical IMO.

So? Being hypocritical hardly prevented countries from acting the way they acted. And still do. As for people saying B-L was OK, Versailles wasn't it's a clear case, "B-L was them, Versailles is us. They deserve it because it's them, but we don't deserve because this is us."

[Cook]

Originally Posted by docfl

I know some simply stated (correctly) that it was a cease fire for 20 years.

The comment “This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20 years” was made by France’s Marshal Foch at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

During the summit Foch and French Prime Minister Clemenceau had argued strongly that the Rhineland needed to be detached permanently from Germany and either be made part of France or granted independence as a French protectorate so as to permanently deny Germany the position necessary to launch a swift attack on France. Britain’s Lloyd-George and the United States’ President Wilson had rejected the French proposal and instead had allowed France the right to occupy the Rhineland for fifteen years so as to ensure that Germany kept to the provisions of the treaty, after which time France would be obliged to withdraw. Foch’s statement was based on his assessment that Germany could re-arm for a war of revenge in five years from the moment the French withdrew. He wasn’t far off; the French actually withdrew five years early, in 1930 and Germany commenced rearmament in 1935, five years later they launched the invasion of Belgium and France from the Rhineland.


Foch’s comment was also probably his assessment of the long term will of the French people to enforce the terms of the treaty after they had withdrawn from the Rhineland as well. Had the French continued to enforce the treaty it is unlikely that there would have been a Second World War, or if there had, it would have been either much shorter or considerably delayed.

The reason being the following:

Article 42

Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine.

Article 43

In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44

In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

On 7 March 1936, without prior notification, Hitler sent his forces to remilitarize the Rhineland in direct violation, not only of the sections of the Treaty of Versailles listed above, but also of the Locarno Pact signed in 1925. As such he had committed a hostile act and one that threatened the basic assumptions of France’s national security; France had full legal justification to use military force to expel the German armed forces from the Rhineland and reoccupy the German territory that they had left only six years before. Had they had the will to do so they had more than enough forces to do so; the Wehrmacht had sent nineteen infantry battalions to occupy the Rhineland, a total of 32,000 troops out of overall army strength of 250,000. This was backed by Luftwaffe strength of only ten available armed aircraft. France, without calling up reserves had 320,000 troops available in mainland France, there were also 100,000 native troops in North Africa that were able to be moved to the mainland on short notice. The French air force was also sizable. If there were a battle for the Rhineland it would have been decidedly one sided even if the French hadn’t mobilized their huge army reserve.

In fact there would not have been a battle for the Rhineland even if the French had reacted; Hitler was bluffing and had given orders that no resistance was to be offered to any French reaction. At the first sign of trouble his forces were to march out of the Rhineland as quickly as they had marched in; Germany simply lacked the strength for a fight. Conscription had only been reintroduced the year before, rearmament had barely started and the Luftwaffe had just celebrated its first birthday and consisted of mostly training aircraft.

Had they decided to do so the French could have marched into the Rhineland in strength, unopposed and because of the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, fully within their rights to do so and to remain until the situation in Germany improved, depriving Hitler of the mining and industry of the entire Rhineland including the Saar, and exposing the Ruhr industrial heartland of Germany to bombardment should fighting breakout.

If that had happened, the mystique of Fuhrer infallibility that started then and grew with each successive back-down by the western powers in the years that followed would have been stillborn. Hitler would have faced more resistance internally to Germany’s path to war. Even if the bumbling German opposition to Hitler had never improved, Hitler would still have been faced with French control of the Rhineland buffer, the broad obstacle of the Rhine itself, in some places half a kilometre wide and swiftly flowing, as well as ground east of the Rhine itself.

Instead the French did nothing for two reasons, the first being Hitler’s perfect timing; France was only six weeks away from an election and military action, even though it could be fully justified, would have been hugely unpopular with the French electorate. The second reason is that France in the interwar period never did anything unilaterally, insisting on consulting London first on everything. This was rather odd since the British, even if they were interested in stopping Hitler (which in 1936 they were not) didn’t have any means with which to do so; the French had been persuaded in 1919 not to annex the Rhineland by assurances from the British that they would send an army to defend France if it was ever threatened again, but when the time came, instead of the forty infantry divisions they’d counted on, only two understrength British divisions would have been available to send to France.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Adler17

At first, comparing Versailles and Brest-Litowsk is one of the biggest errors one can easily make. Brest-Litowsk was hard. Yes. But remember who was there to negotiate for Russia. Lenin. And he should be kept at bay as much as possible. The Czar was still offered in 1916 to get Poland back, if he made peace.

What did RUSSIA lose in Brest? Finland, Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia. Look, what RUSSIAN territories were indeed lost. None. Indeed this treaty was giving many peoples the right of self determination.

This is very funny! You claim that giving Estonians their cherished right of self determination was a good thing - and you also claim that giving Poland back to the czarist russian dictatorship would have been a good thing. Try to make your mind up, can you?

[Adler17]

Michele, you willingly twist my words. I only said, that Russia could make a very mild peace up to 1917. After the October Revolution, well, that's a different topic. I never said, it was a good thing to give Poland back to the Czar.

Please argue in a civilized manner.

Adler

[Adler17]

Originally Posted by Cook

The comment “This is not peace. It is an armistice for 20 years” was made by France’s Marshal Foch at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

During the summit Foch and French Prime Minister Clemenceau had argued strongly that the Rhineland needed to be detached permanently from Germany and either be made part of France or granted independence as a French protectorate so as to permanently deny Germany the position necessary to launch a swift attack on France. Britain’s Lloyd-George and the United States’ President Wilson had rejected the French proposal and instead had allowed France the right to occupy the Rhineland for fifteen years so as to ensure that Germany kept to the provisions of the treaty, after which time France would be obliged to withdraw. Foch’s statement was based on his assessment that Germany could re-arm for a war of revenge in five years from the moment the French withdrew. He wasn’t far off; the French actually withdrew five years early, in 1930 and Germany commenced rearmament in 1935, five years later they launched the invasion of Belgium and France from the Rhineland.


Foch’s comment was probably his assessment of the long term will of the French people to enforce the terms of the treaty after they had withdrawn from the Rhineland as well. Had the French continued to enforce the treaty it is unlikely that there would have been a Second World War, or if there had, it would have been either much shorter or considerably delayed.

The reason being the following:

Article 42

Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine.

Article 43

In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44

In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

On 7 March 1936, without prior notification, Hitler sent his forces to remilitarize the Rhineland in direct violation, not only of the Treaty of Versailles, but also of the Locarno Pact signed in 1925. As such he had committed a hostile act and one that threatened the basic assumptions of France’s national security; France had full legal justification to use military force to expel the German armed forces from the Rhineland and reoccupy the German territory that they had left only six years before. Had they had the will to do so they had more than enough forces to do so; the Wehrmacht had sent nineteen infantry battalions to occupy the Rhineland, a total of 32,000 troops out of overall army strength of 250,000. This was backed by Luftwaffe strength of only ten available armed aircraft. France, without calling up reserves had 320,000 troops available in mainland France, there were also 100,000 native troops in North Africa that were able to be moved to the mainland on short notice. The French air force was also sizable. If there were a battle for the Rhineland it would have been decidedly one sided even if the French hadn’t mobilized their huge army reserve.

In fact there would not have been a battle for the Rhineland even if the French had reacted; Hitler was bluffing and had given orders that no resistance was to be offered to any French reaction. At the first sign of trouble his forces were to march out of the Rhineland as quickly as they had marched in; Germany simply lacked the strength for a fight. Conscription had only been reintroduced the year before, rearmament had barely started and the Luftwaffe had just celebrated its first birthday and consisted of mostly training aircraft.

Had they decided to do so the French could have marched into the Rhineland in strength, unopposed and because of the treaties of Versailles and Locarno, fully within their rights to do so and to remain until the situation in Germany improved, depriving Hitler of the mining and industry of the entire Rhineland including the Saar, and exposing the Ruhr industrial heartland of Germany to bombardment should fighting breakout.

If that had happened, the mystique of Fuhrer infallibility that started then and grew with each successive back-down by the western powers in the years that followed would have been stillborn. Hitler would have faced more resistance internally to Germany’s path to war. Even if the bumbling German opposition to Hitler had never improved, Hitler would still have been faced with French control of the Rhineland buffer, the broad obstacle of the Rhine itself, in some places half a kilometre wide and swiftly flowing, as well as ground east of the Rhine itself.

Instead the French did nothing for two reasons, the first being Hitler’s perfect timing; France was only six weeks away from an election and military action, even though it could be fully justified, would have been hugely unpopular with the French electorate. The second reason is that France in the interwar period never did anything unilaterally, insisting on consulting London first on everything. This was rather odd since the British, even if they were interested in stopping Hitler (which in 1936 they were not) didn’t have any means with which to do so; the French had been persuaded in 1919 not to annex the Rhineland by assurances from the British that they would send an army to defend France if it was ever threatened again, but when the time came, instead of the forty infantry divisions they’d counted on, only two understrength British divisions would have been available to send to France.

Please keep in mind Germany was not able to defend herself. Also the French were, among the other states, the first, who broke the Versailles treaty, as they did not demilitarise.

Furthermore they had signed a treaty amendment with Stalin in 1936, in which both nations were willing to mutual assistance in case of war- regardless, who started it. That was a violation of Locarno.

Adler

[Catspoke]

Versailles was reasonable at its 2 core values.
Demilitarize Germany, use what Germany had been spending on military stuff to rebuild/repay the victorious countries like France who suffered damage since the war was fought on her soil.
Self determination. Yes these were done ad hoc and often were rigged against Germany but did follow at least generally what the people wanted.

If Germany when handed the treaty, would have said: "we accept this, except for this one part about ....", the Allies might have been willing to relent on that one point, but instead Germany objected to almost everything, which to the Allies could only say take it or leave it.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Adler17

Michele, you willingly twist my words.

Not that I see.

I only said, that Russia could make a very mild peace up to 1917. After the October Revolution, well, that's a different topic. I never said, it was a good thing to give Poland back to the Czar.

So was it a bad thing? This "mild" offer would have meant leaving the Russian autocratic czar in control of all those non-Russians, right? No rights of self-determination, right?

Please argue in a civilized manner.

Just asking you if you can explain what looks like an extremely funny outright contradiction on your part. if you can't, no problem for me.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

Versailles was reasonable at its 2 core values.
Demilitarize Germany, use what Germany had been spending on military stuff to rebuild/repay the victorious countries like France who suffered damage since the war was fought on her soil.
Self determination. Yes these were done ad hoc and often were rigged against Germany but did follow at least generally what the people wanted.

If Germany when handed the treaty, would have said: "we accept this, except for this one part about ....", the Allies might have been willing to relent on that one point, but instead Germany objected to almost everything, which to the Allies could only say take it or leave it.

It is a nice theory, but not true. The ToV was a take it or we resume the war. If it had been a negotiated peace, then your point would be valid.

[Catspoke]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

It is a nice theory, but not true. The ToV was a take it or we resume the war. If it had been a negotiated peace, then your point would be valid.

Yes, it was presented as take it or leave it. But if the Germans said we would take it, and accept the terms willingly, but we really don't like this one war guilt clause, I can't imagine the Allies would fire up their war machines again for something like that.

If I were the Germans though I would care only about territory, military clauses and economic clauses can always be reversed later, territory is the toughest, perhaps the Germans should have insisted only on exact terms of how peblicites would have been held before signing, i.e to avoid how the Eupen-Malmedy thing as mentioned in Article 34 tuned out.

Article 34

Germany renounces in favour of Belgium all rights and title over the territory comprising the whole of the Kreise of Eupen and of Malmedy. During the six months after the coming into force of this Treaty, registers will be opened by the Belgian authority at Eupen and Malmedy in which the inhabitants of the above territory will be entitled to record in writing a desire to see the whole or part of it remain under German sovereignty. The results of this public expression of opinion will be communicated by the Belgian Government to the League of Nations, and Belgium undertakes to accept the decision of the League.