raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Russia was awfully inclined to go on the offensive to meet the needs of its Allied partners in WWI, a little bit more than the other way around even. For instance France after the Nivelle offensive opted out of major offensives for almost a year. What if the Russians were a little more selfish in their WWI strategies.
First one: 1917 - The Provisional Government does not promise a big summer offensive against Germany, but supports a grand siege strategy for the Allies, relying on reequipping its army and maintaining it in the field while gearing up for a major effort in 1918 when the Americans should be on the continent. Arguably, such a decision by Russia, while very vexing to the western allies, would probably not put France in existential danger. After all, the Germans had very few reserves until the last quarter of 1917, and in February 1917 had to give up substantial territory in the west. So, what political and military consequences would flow from Russia maintaining a flexible defensive strategy throughout 1917 in Europe, with possibly only major offensives against the Turks, who are far from significant German succor?
Second one: 1916 - WI the Russians don't do the Brusilov offensive but try to build up for a big effort in 1917, having witnessed their total ass-kicking in 1915. To take some of the edge off of this and do somethign, they do stay on the offensive against Turkey, maybe even resulting in forcing the Ottomans to leave Kut alone. Still, this is a bit more dangerous than doing the same thing in 1917. Could this lead to answer to my WI challenge of France falling but Russia winning in WWI?
Third one: Is there anyway the Russians could have extricated themselves from the German storm in 1915 with more skill and fewer losses than in OTL?
First one: 1917 - The Provisional Government does not promise a big summer offensive against Germany, but supports a grand siege strategy for the Allies, relying on reequipping its army and maintaining it in the field while gearing up for a major effort in 1918 when the Americans should be on the continent. Arguably, such a decision by Russia, while very vexing to the western allies, would probably not put France in existential danger. After all, the Germans had very few reserves until the last quarter of 1917, and in February 1917 had to give up substantial territory in the west. So, what political and military consequences would flow from Russia maintaining a flexible defensive strategy throughout 1917 in Europe, with possibly only major offensives against the Turks, who are far from significant German succor?
Second one: 1916 - WI the Russians don't do the Brusilov offensive but try to build up for a big effort in 1917, having witnessed their total ass-kicking in 1915. To take some of the edge off of this and do somethign, they do stay on the offensive against Turkey, maybe even resulting in forcing the Ottomans to leave Kut alone. Still, this is a bit more dangerous than doing the same thing in 1917. Could this lead to answer to my WI challenge of France falling but Russia winning in WWI?
Third one: Is there anyway the Russians could have extricated themselves from the German storm in 1915 with more skill and fewer losses than in OTL?