|
|
|
#61
February 23rd, 2009, 02:31 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Glad to help! And since this is your timeline you can do whatever you want  !This little recon aircraft push by the Germans may just push the allies to build better (and more mobile) radar! What about the allies putting up bombers with radar on board? Early airborne control aircraft! I was not aware that the C version of the AR234 was actually produced, I will follow your link to read about it!  Anyway I am just throwing out suggestions for how the Allies might react to these new German aircraft, take whatever you want that I am throwing out and well...throw out the rest!
__________________
Time it's like a big ball of wibbly wobbly, time-y wimey, stuff. 
|
|
#62
February 23rd, 2009, 04:38 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Don't know much about early AEW, so I may not use it? The link is only a link to a pic of one of the Ar-234Cs in a field Feel free to keep "throwing out suggestions" for this TL  Thanks Whatisinaname
|
|
#64
February 24th, 2009, 07:50 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
The Ho-229 will have a small apperance, but will not play a major role in this TL. Thanks Whatisinaname
|
|
#65
February 24th, 2009, 01:29 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
).So you as you can see the US was already working on this and would only take a bit of work to pull it in. As I recall from other sources the P-61 also had airborne radar and there were night fighter variants of F4U and P-47 that had airborne intercept radar that might work as early warning. I think the British were working on similar systems that would go into Mosquitoes and Buefighters (sp?). So it would not be a huge stretch to let the Allies realize they need AEW and position some to cover the major targets. Especially when the Germans start bombing with AR234 bomber variants! Quote:
 oh well I found some other links that had descriptions. Thanks for the heads up though. Quote:
Oh I will, I will you have hit on one of my special favorites - WWII aircraft what-ifs, I have been fascinated with WWII aircraft and their history for...well a very long time . (Since as my kids say, I'm old as dirt!) And I have to say you are doing a great job so far! 
__________________
Time it's like a big ball of wibbly wobbly, time-y wimey, stuff.
|
|
#66
February 24th, 2009, 02:25 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
__________________
History is the sum total of things that could have been avoided. - Konrad Adenauer My first tentative attempt of a TL at AH.com. Last edited by Jonathan Kan; February 24th, 2009 at 04:11 PM..
|
|
#67
February 24th, 2009, 05:38 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
__________________
Quote:
|
|
#68
February 24th, 2009, 06:28 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
There was a B17 variant carrying the AN/APS-20 which was more stand-alone than the Avenger. But I don't know if AEW is the answer to jets as at this stage in the war, right up until the early 60s in fact, it was all about height and speed to outperform defensive fighters/flak rather than hiding from radar.
|
|
#69
February 25th, 2009, 12:54 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Quote:
Anyone?
__________________
Quote:
|
|
#70
February 25th, 2009, 04:31 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
The AN/APS20 was a search radar, more like the big radars on a ship or ground station, so it searched a wide area. The sorts of radars on Beaufighters and Mosquitos were small and only faced forward, the planes had to be directed to the general area of the enemy by the ground radar network before it could detect the target. The difference between the Avenger and B17 with the same radar is that the Avenger would datalink it's contacts down to a controlling ship which would then direct the air battle, whereas the bigger B17 carried multiple scopes and communications so it could direct the air battle itself. I think the war ended before the B17 AEW really took off, the Constellation was the next step but the British Shakelton was similar.
|
|
#71
February 25th, 2009, 05:07 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
|
|
#72
February 25th, 2009, 07:51 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Agreed, it would be a waist of aircraft fro the allies. Whatisinaname
|
|
#73
February 25th, 2009, 11:14 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Here is part 4, enjoy
4. July 1944 Total deliveries of the Me-262-A1a’s for the month of July is 58 from the Augsburg production facility, this does not include those aircraft that had been damaged (in various accidents) and returned to service with their original unit. The bulk of these 58 aircraft would be sent to Kommando Nowotny to replace the losses that this unit would incur during July, the remainder would be sent to EKO 262 to continue to build up that unit’s number of Me-262 and to replace losses. Production of the Ar-234 in both its forms is now slowly picking up, but production is well below that of the Me-262. EKO 262 EKO 262 was now getting into it stride, but it was not without its own problems the lack of a tandem-seat Me-262 was causing problems. A large number of Me-262’s had either been damaged or written of due to accidents by trainee pilots or pilots converting from piston engine aircraft, these accidents were causing more losses than through combat. At the end of July 1944 EKO 262 is reformed into Ergänzungs-Jagdgeschwader 2 (EJG 2) as a proper training and operational conversion wing for potential Me-262 pilots. This will be another step in the right direction for the development of the Me-262 and other German jets as well. On the 18th July 1944 Hauptmann Werner Thierfelder is killed in action, command of EKO 262 is turned over to Hauptmann Horst Geyer, Hauptmann Geyer will remain in charge unit EKO 262 until it is disbanded and reformed into Ergänzungs-Jagdgeschwader 2 (EJG 2) at the end of July with Hauptmann Geyer becoming commander of the III Group of the EJG 2. For its relatively short operational life (February to July 1944) EKO 262 has performed very well in its primary training mission, EKO 262 has also managed to shoot down over 200 enemy aircraft, these are mostly enemy reconnaissance aircraft, but also shooting down 23 enemy bombers. Kommando Nowotny Kommando Nowotny was formed on the 2nd June 1944 in Achmer and Hesepe with Stab/Kommando Nowotny from Stab III./Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26), 1./Kommando Nowotny from 9./ZG 26, 2./Kommando Nowotny from 8./ZG 26 and 3./Kommando Nowotny (new). Thus its strength was now 3 Staffeln and a Stab flight. On the 30th June 1944 Kommando Nowotny attained operational status with a complement of about 40 Me-262A1a jet interceptors. This would be the first full scale use of the Me-262 for use against allied bomber raids against Germany. Kommando Nowotny would suffer the same problem as EKO 262 the lack of adequate training on these new aircraft would lead to more losses though accidents than combat throughout the operational period of Kommando Nowotny. Examples of losses throughout July are as follows, 4th July engine failure on landing at Hesepe 75% damage Oberleutnant Alfred Teumer killed, 5th July out of fuel resulting in an emergency landing on the Autobahn near Braunschweig 10% damage, 12th July out of fuel resulting in an emergency landing at Bramel 10% damage, 14th July undercarriage failure during landing at Braunschweig-Waggum, 28th July Crashed on takeoff at Achmer 99% damage Oberleutnant Paul Bley killed. But on the positive side, losses from combat were very low, once the jets did manage to get into the air and assuming no technical problems, they could not be caught by any allied aircraft, as long as the pilots did not commit to try and dog fight with allied escort fighters, this did prove to Hitler that once these training difficulties had been ironed out the Me-262 would be able to deal with the allied bomber raids (though Hitler in this respect was living is a world of his own as Hitler assumed that this would be an easy task!) The tricky parts for any jet pilot was during takeoff or landing when his aircraft is most vulnerable to attack, piston engine fighters had to be assigned to Kommando Nowotny to protect the jet during takeoff and landing, ways would be needed to jet the Me-262 into the air much more quickly and also land safely. KG76 With the 9th staffel of the III group of the KG 76 now operational with 16 Ar-234B-2’s, the other two staffel’s (10th and 11th) of the III group are now starting to receive there own Jet bombers admittedly at a very slow delivery rate. By the end of July 1944 the III group of the KG 76 would have all three staffel’s fully operational, much to the delight of Hitler. But with only 40 odd Ar-234B2 on strength, the bombers of the III group of the KG 76 will make very little impact in Normandy, beyond the fact that none of the bomber operations during July where intercepted by allied aircraft. One of the main reasons is that the KG 76 is deploying its Jet bombers in staffel strength of between 10 to 12 aircraft per mission, this has the advantage for the Ar-234B2 of being able to quickly being able to form up and such a small number of aircraft are much more likely to be able to penetrate that allied fighter screens over Normandy than a much large formation. The III group of the KG 76 will concentrate on nuisance raids against allied supply routes and supply dumps, that have been identified by there Ar-234B1 reconnaissance counterparts, in an attempt to assist OB West in slowing up the allied advance through Southern France. In this respect the III group of the KG 76 will achieve some modicum of success, while bombing allied supply lines and supply dumps, the weapon of choice in this type of mission will be the cluster bomb with the SD-2 bomblets. Each time the III KG 76 would attack a supply route, this attack would cause a traffic jam, and this intern would allow additional attacks by the Ar-234B2 in two’s or four’s. These kinds of attacks would for the most part, would stop traffic along one route for 24 hours, but usually for only a few hours. These attacks did have a limited effect in slowing up supplies to the front line in late July as the allies tried to break out of Normandy, if more Ar-234B2 had been available then it may have had a much more devastating effect on the level of supplies getting to allied front line units. Allied reaction to these Jet bomber attacks is out of all proportion to the numbers that the Germans are able to deploy, Churchill calls the introduction of the Jet aircraft as the “greatest menace to the allied invasion of France and they must be stopped.” This is on top of the V1 attacks on London and the twin menace of Jets and V1 launch sites diverts a considerable number of allied fighters and bombers to seeking out and attempting to destroy their bases, instead of attacking the German Army and its supply routes in France. Attacking the V1 sites was easy for allied airpower as they were fixed, but the Ar-234 were operating from concealed bases, with each staffel operating from its own small base. This was essential as if one base was attacked the entire III group would not be either destroyed or put out of action. This reduces the amount of allied airpower available in Normandy this intern reduces the losses to the German Army. On Hitler’s orders all Jet operations were to maintain maximum concealment wherever possible and not to reveal there location, this applied more to the bomber and reconnaissance units than the fighter units operating within Germany. British and American Reaction The allied military leadership was now viewing the introduction of these Jets with increasing worry, the British are just starting to introduce the Gloster Meteor, with the first 20 aircraft were delivered to the Royal Air Force on 1st June 1944 with one example also sent to the US in exchange for a Bell YP-59A Airacomet for comparative evaluation. No. 616 RAF Squadron was the first to receive operational Meteors, 14 of them on the 14th July 1944. The squadron was based at RAF Culmhead, Somerset and had been previously equipped with the Spitfire VII. The RAF initially the Mark 1 Meteors are reserved the aircraft to counter the V-1 flying bomb threat with No. 616’s Meteors seeing action for the first time on 27th July 1944 with three aircraft active over Kent. After some problems, especially with jamming guns, the first two V1 “kills” occurred on the 4th August 1944. The Meteor equipped No. 616 Squadron would account for 14 flying bombs by the end of August. The anti-V1 missions of the 27th July 1944 were the Meteor’s (and the Royal Air Force’s) first operational jet combat missions. With a top speed if 417mph (660 km/h) the Mark 1 Meteors speed was not much better that the current crop of piston engine fighters, it would not be until early December 1944 with the introduction of the Mark 3 would see the speed difference be closed, but not completely matched. Several more RAF fighter squadrons are converting to the Mark 1 Meteors. The US was even worse off at this time than the British, with the Bell P-59 Airacomet, with one of these aircraft, the third YP-59A was supplied to the RAF in exchange for a Mark 1 Gloster Meteor. British pilots found that the aircraft compared very unfavourably with the Mark 1 Gloster Meteor that they were already flying. (The YP-59A also compared unfavourably to the propeller-driven P-51 Mustang!) Even with the unfavourable reports of the Bell P-59 Airacomet from the USAAF it was decided to introduce the Bell P-59 Airacomet into limited operational service as the P-59B, there is little difference between the P-59B and the prototypes and the P-59A. This would prove to be a very costly mistake of the US and force the US in a different direction until other US jet fighters could come fully into service. Both the British and the Americans were well behind the Germans in the introducing of Jets into front line service. Western front On the 2nd July Von Rundstedt is removed from his command and replaced by Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, Rommel is not even considered by Hitler to replace Von Rundstedt. Initially von Kluge and Rommel do not get on, because Hitler had told von Kluge that the situation needed someone like von Kluge to get things moving and the situation was not as bad as either Rommel or Von Rundstedt had reported, but after a few days after getting to grips with the situation von Kluge agreed with Rommel’s assessment that the Allies would breakout eventually. So von Kluge decides to try and set-up a new defensive line along the river Seine and the river Evie and potential buffers points between the current front line and the Seine and Evie rivers against an eventual Allied breakout, in this idea von Kluge had one problem Hitler, who would not want to give up all of southern France. Field Marshal von Kluge would use a clever tactic to convince Hitler that the river Seine and to a lesser extent the river Evie needed to be defended against French resistance attacks, by using divisions that need to be refitted to guard these crossing points while refitting, also von Kluge suggests to Hitler that part of the 15th Army could be used to guard part of the river Seine between Paris and the Channel. On the 10th July, Hitler agrees to these ideas, as they seem to follow his orders about holding France and not giving up an inch of land. Thus von Kluge would earn his nickname among the troops and his fellow officers, was der kluge Hans “Clever Hans.” Hans was not part of his given name, but a nickname acquired early in his career in admiration of his cleverness (klug is German for clever) and is derived from a curious reference to a celebrated horse Clever Hans reputed to have been able to do arithmetic and remember calendar dates. Inadvertently, Hitler has given von Kluge some ability to withdraw troops from the front and position them at strategic points to “rest and refit”, this will help when the Allies attempt to breakout of the beachhead as the retreating troops will be able to withdraw though these strong points (bridges etc) before these bridges etc are destroyed to slow up the allied advance. On 17th July Rommel’s staff car is strafed by a RCAF Spitfire piloted by Charley Fox Rommel (near a French town named Montgomery!) is hospitalised with major head injuries, von Kluge now assumes direct control of Army Group B and try’s to speed up the processes of withdrawing damaged divisions to guard the designated “strong points”, but without weakening the overall front. On the 18th July Hitler orders that the three uncommitted panzer divisions the 9th, 11th and 19th be moved to the east of Paris to guard the river Seine crossings, to release troops to the front, these divisions will move by night to avoid allied fighter bombers and start to arrive at the river Seine by early to mid August. On the 20th July 1944 a plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler and to take power by means of a plan called Operation Valkyrie (Unternehmen Walküre) fails. Operation Valkyrie was approved by Hitler and on the face of it was intended to be used in the event that disruption caused by the Allied bombing of German cities caused a breakdown in law and order. Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg played the key role in the plot and was in charge of Operation Valkyrie, because of his position von Stauffenberg was allowed access to Hitler for making reports and for carrying out the other intended use of Operation Valkyrie. 20th July Plot The 20th July plot was the culmination of the efforts of the German Resistance to overthrow the Nazi regime. Its failure, both in Hitler’s “Wolf's Lair” (Wolfschanze) Headquarters and then in Berlin’s Bendlerblock, led to the arrest of more than 5,000 people, to the execution of about 200 people, and to the destruction of the resistance movement. It would later be proved that von Kluge was involved in the plot to kill Hitler but changed sides once von Kluge found out that Hitler was still alive, this would not save von Kluge, but would buy him some time before Hitler found out. General Friedrich Fromm, Commander-in-Chief of the Reserve (or Replacement) Army (Ersatzheer), was implicated in the conspiracy. Fromm’s removal, coupled with Hitler’s suspicion of the army, led the way to Himmler’s appointment as Fromm’s successor, a position he abused to expand the Waffen SS even further to the detriment of the rapidly deteriorating German armed forces (Wehrmacht). Unfortunately for Himmler, the investigation soon revealed the involvement of many SS officers in the conspiracy, including senior officers, which played into the hands of Bormann’s power struggle against the SS because very few party cadre officers were implicated. Even more important, some senior SS officers began to conspire against Himmler himself, as they believed that he would be unable to achieve victory in the power struggle against Bormann. Among these defectors were Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Heydrich’s successor as chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, and Gruppenführer Heinrich Müller, the chief of the Gestapo. Himmler would initially prove to be an able administrator of the Replacement Army and was able to introduce limited improvements into the Replacement Army, but not much else. Bormann would go onto support Galland against Goring in January 1945 this would lead to the Bormann/Speer/Galland alliance (also known as the “Gang of Three”) against Goring in increasing the numbers of Jets being produced and how they should be deployed and used operationally and keeping Goring well out of the loop. Operation Cobra On the morning of the 25th July, visibility was good, and the attack went ahead at 9.40 am, allied medium and heavy bombers dropped over 3,300 tons of high explosive on the target area. Once again, bombs fell on US as well as German positions. The US ground casualties on 25th July from the bombing are 111 killed and 490 wounded. Several factors contributed to the bombing errors, including the small size of the target and the fact that wind blew smoke from the bombs towards the US positions. Some bomber crews bombed into the smoke rather than clearly identifying there targets. Given the technology available it is difficult to see how these errors could have been avoided. The assault units recovered rapidly from the bombing. Despite heavy casualties in some units, only one battalion needed to be replaced; every other unit attacked that morning. Some units are delayed but the attack commenced by 11.00am. German units are devastated by the storm of bombs. The elite Panzer Lehr Division is rendered completely ineffective by the bombing. Tanks are overturned, positions are destroyed and surviving personnel are often stunned into incoherence. Command and control largely broke down, and two-thirds of the division’s personnel are casualties. The initial allied infantry attack went slowly. To some extent this may have been because units had gotten used to very slow, cautious movement through heavily defended bocage fields. Initial German resistance is weak. However, as the attack gained momentum as the thin crust of the German position gave way with nothing behind it. The first day’s advance of 4,000 yards, at a cost of over 1,000 casualties, was followed on the 26th July by an 8,000 yards advance. Field Marshal von Kluge was initially slow to react, but once he realised what was happening he orders some units to regroup (withdraw), to the bridges that are under those division control that where “refitting”, allowing the German army units to delay the allies but not stop them from there advance. This action helped slow up the allied advance, as the allies had to rebuild the destroyed bridges, as the German army units withdrew. During the few days the Hitler was not directly commanding his armies, von Kluge slowly withdrew his forces from the allied line of advance, using the excuse that he was regrouping his forces for a counterattack, but von Kluge was now treading on very thin ice with Hitler. With the two Ar-234 reconnaissance units Sonderkommando Sommer and Götz (now equipped with the Ar-234B1) operating to back-up what Field Marshal von Kluge was doing, by the end of July, Hitler was now back in full command of his armies, though he did not entirely approve of what von Kluge had done, Hitler could not undo what von Kluge had started either so reluctantly Hitler orders a steady regrouping of troops (withdrawal) until a counterattack can be launched. On the 30th July of 1944, near Les Loges in Normandy, three Jagdpanthers from schwere Panzer Jaeger Abteilung 654 ambushed a squadron of British 6th Guards Tank Brigade destroying some 10-11 Churchill tanks in a short period of two minutes. At the same time, other squadron of British 6th Guards Tank Brigade opened fire at three Jagdpanthers causing crews of two of them to temporarily abandon their vehicles (because of damaged tracks), while the third one retreated, followed later by the remaining two Jagdpanthers that had been hastily repaired. These three Jagdpanthers had halted the British advance in that sector for 24 hours this fact was not lost on the German high command, that small (company sized) and highly mobile battle groups could slow up or even stop allied advances. This would now become the German weapon to slow up the allied advance and allow time for the Seine line to take shape. Jagdpanthers would be grouped into independent schwere Panzerjager Abteilungens - heavy anti-tank battalions (with 3 companies with 14 vehicles each and 3 vehicles in battalion HQ) and those that operated as part of Panzer Division. The first Jagdpanthers were issued to schwere Panzerjager Abteilung 559 and 654 and reached the frontline in Western Europe in June of 1944. Only 654th had full compliment of 42 vehicles, while 559th had only 14 vehicles available. These Panzerjager Abteilung’s would prove very useful at delaying that allied advance, where they were used, the allies thought that they where Tiger tanks and at battalion strength, not the company strength that they were deployed in. These Jagdpanthers units would cause problem way beyond the numbers that the German’s had deployed. The Panzerjager Abteilung 654 would be deployed to both Panzer Group West and the 7th Army, while Panzerjager Abteilung 559 would be deployed to Army Group G, to help in its withdrawal from southern France in August 1944. The Jagdpanther was also seen as a much better tank destroyer than the other models currently in production Hitler would order that production be concentrated on this tank destroyer and ceasing the production of most of the other tank destroyer versions, including to daft Jagdtiger, production of the Jagdpanther would steadily increase during late 1944. East and West Hitler’s actions on both the Eastern and Western fronts had saved several of his armies from being wiped out Hitler had only given permission for withdrawal once the jet reconnaissance had proved the need for withdrawal this fact was not lost on the military commanders in the East or the West. Hitler’s commanders would use the reconnaissance jets evidence to allow them to conduct a more elastic defence this intern would inflict many more casualties on the enemy than the enemy were inflicting on the German Army (mostly in the East). Hitler was now becoming to rely heavily on information from jet reconnaissance, this would help Galland. Me-262 Kills and Losses July 1944 The Me-262 units have by the end of June 1944 shot down 102 allied aircraft, for 34 combat losses (twenty-two pilots killed), but losses due accidents and technical failures stands at 49, with 27 jets written off killing 23 pilots. Most of the combat losses during July would come from Kommando Nowotny, Kommando Nowotny would only last into the first two weeks of August, before being disbanded and reformed into a more permanent unit. To be continued.
|
|
#74
February 25th, 2009, 01:38 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Second why would a Theater commander have any say in this at all? There are already home defense aircraft in Britain, they can and should be used. If they can't hit the jet on the way in they can vector to hit it on the way out. Additionally the TL specifically had the jets used for some tactical recon - over the East front and Normandy. I assume there will be additional cases where tactical fighters could be vectored if the Allies would get their act together and get some AEW aircraft in the air. I am also a bit skeptical of the jets always out running the piston fighters, there were documented cases in OTL where a piston fighter with altitude advantage could run down a jet. Not common but possible. BTW whatisinaname - good update! I look forward to some more.
__________________
Time it's like a big ball of wibbly wobbly, time-y wimey, stuff.
|
|
#76
February 25th, 2009, 05:34 PM
|
|||
|
|||
|
If you accept that piston engined planes would have difficulty intercepting the Ar 234as a recon plane and you only plan for the occasional interception, then it could never make any real difference other than to remind the Arado pilots they are not immune to interception. That I would think would make it a good thing for them.
BTW if we look at only army targets in W Europe and go on say 50 division force, that’s 17 Korps ; 6 armies & 2 army groups. With each raise in command the area of responsibility increases. So if we agree one flight to cover each division and 2 for each Korps ; 4 for each Army & 8 for each Army Group that’s roughly 124 flights. But since we don’t know when the Arado’s would fly, you need to cover daylight hours at least, which is 16-18 hours. Since each plane can be only expected to fly ~ 6 hours per day total that means you’d need a squadron of a dozen planes to ensure a flight could be airborne during daylight. That’s 4 per flight x 3 planes per slot x 124 sectors or 1488 aircraft to cover each army sector with a flight of planes during daylight hours. Since the weather would never be any good and radar controlled intercepts would get many false alarms you’d need more than a flight to cover the sector effectively. More likely you’d need a squadron airborne over each sector. That means your figure has just doubled or tripled to 3000-4500 region. So this becomes increasingly impractical. Now if your Arado is developed into a medium range bomber with clean speed of > 500 mph, and this employed en mass to attack army targets, then such a diversion of fighters might make more sense, except your shifting your best 1/4 of the fighter force from offense to defense, not a good idea. Last edited by esl; February 26th, 2009 at 01:58 AM..
|
|
#77
February 26th, 2009, 07:43 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
Quote:
Thanks for the support Whatisinaname
|
|
#78
February 26th, 2009, 07:45 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
Quote:
I agree with you post, well put Thanks Whatisinaname
|
|
#79
February 26th, 2009, 08:33 AM
|
|||
|
|||
|
The reaction time of WW2 divisions and corps would be measured in half days or days, so the only need to be photographed two or three times a day to find build ups and movement patterns. Since a plane like the Ar234 can photograph huge swaths of territory in a single pass you don't need huge numbers of planes for recon to be very effective, certainly not enough to keep one over each divisions or corps during daylight hours.
|
|
#80
February 26th, 2009, 11:51 AM
|
|||
|
|||
Re AEW. I have to agree, it's impractical. AFAIK, the airborne sets were either ground-mapping or intercept sets, neither practical for broad air searches, & the CH/Wurzburg (sp?)-type were way too big to go airborne (just on aerials alone, never mind power supplies, 'scopes, operators...).
I also think you're giving too much influence to a relative handful of recce birds. It's not like the Germans flew no air recce, nor the Allies weren't prepared for it. Recall all those phony rubber tanks & things the Brits had: they were designed to fool air recce, & AFAIK, did a pretty good job. IMO, the Ar-234s give you a more tactical recce picture, the ability to know what the enemy's doing right now or in the next few hours, thanks to their speed. That may mean the Allies have to be more careful about FEBA preparations. Maybe I'm underestimating their ability to cover (especially) Britain, tho. Also, & a perennial question about the 262: why isn't it used in Russia? And if I can ask for a personal fave of mine: a forward-cabin FuG-218/Hirschgeweih-equipped NF? Last edited by pacifichistorian; February 26th, 2009 at 12:01 PM.. Reason: "Hirschgeweih" add
|
 |
| Thread Tools | |
| Display Modes | |
|
|
Linear Mode
