AHWI: No schlieffen plan
- Thread starter Brak
- Start date
The "demonstrations of military superiority" assumptions are more likely to be right if the Germans don't actually DOW anybody, Austria invades Serbia, Russia mobilizes, Germany mobilizes, France mobilized, Britain mobilizes their navy.
Germany doesn't declare war on Russia until the Russians cross the Austrian Border (or at least until the Russians declare war on Austria themselves).
In the meantime there are at least a few more days of peace to crash import stuff, ship stuff out to the colonies, fit out merchants as raiders.
Germany has to accept war with a fully mobilized Russia and France but OTL they handled that anyway, and here the front is shorter with another blockade hole.
If the long war happens anyway, sure the Allies have the advantage of France is more intact, but I bet Austrian Galicia won't fall, the province not ruined, no blood on the snow etc...
Last edited:
Why? What prevents the Austrians from messing up and getting Galicia occupied?
The most interesting thing about No Schlieffen Plan, or better, no attack in the West at all, is that Britain is likely to remain neutral. Although some cabinet members saw it as a moral duty to defend France against a German attack, no such moral duty existed to support a French attack on Germany.
It is not in the British interest to wipe Germany off the map, since that would mean Russia becoming the strongest power in (South) Eastern Europe. Russia will take possession of the straits, large parts of the Ottoman Empire and Persia will come under Russian influence, and Russia will infiltrate further into the Middle East and toward the British Raj. Russia will become so powerful that it will no longer care about the Anglo-Russian Convention. The only way to contain Russia is to support Germany and Austria-Hungary.
It is not in the British interest to wipe Germany off the map, since that would mean Russia becoming the strongest power in (South) Eastern Europe. Russia will take possession of the straits, large parts of the Ottoman Empire and Persia will come under Russian influence, and Russia will infiltrate further into the Middle East and toward the British Raj. Russia will become so powerful that it will no longer care about the Anglo-Russian Convention. The only way to contain Russia is to support Germany and Austria-Hungary.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
You're correct - that's how it works best as a militarily supported alliance-diplomatic strategy, in support of their Austrian ally's military response to a bedeviling political terrorist problem.
The front is shorter and there is another blockade hole, because of Belgian and Luxemburgian neutrality, yes? You meant "advantage" of a France more intact, of course.
Austrian Galicia would not fall? --- Well, if the Entente are all DoW'ing in solidarity for Serbia, the Russians are attacking Austria-Hungary. Are you saying the Austro--Hungarians themselves somehow halt invading Russians at the border? How and why are they able to succeed at doing this? Or would it be because German military units/Divisions/Armies, not committed to any cross-border offensives, could be fairly quickly deployed via Silesia, Cracovian, Hungarian railways to decisively reinforce the defense of Galicia or decisively repel any Russian invaders?
I would agree with the that the Germans would be able, within a relatively short amount of time, to halt or repel any Russian invasion of Germany's own eastern territories of East Prussia, Silesia, or Posen. Likewise, the Germans would be able, within a relatively short amount of time, to halt or repel any French offensive into German Alsace-Lorraine.
Maybe, assured of German mobilization and protection, but with German forces in Germany flexible to move in any direction and not overcommitted to the west, Austria's own deployment won't get mixed up and confused. They can proceed with their original and pre-war unmodified plan of offensively concentrating against Serbia to win that war, while refraining from offensive attempts in the east against the Russians, and leaving a minimal, flexible defensive screening force there, keeping the fortresses in support.
In strategic terms, quite possibly or probably not as crucial an ally as France.
If Britain holds off on involving itself in a Germany versus continental Entente fight 1914, later intervening in 1916 seems like an almost surefire way to get the worst of both worlds, having a war, and being on the losing side. Staggering/delaying British entry would give Germany and the CPs too much time to wear down or outright defeat the Serbs and the Russians, and attrite down the French, so that none of the three are as much of an asset when Britain starts fighting Germany on the ground. Also, Britain's DoW against Germany was probably critical in influencing the decisions of littoral European (Italy, Portugal, Greece) and non-European (the Dominions, Japan, the USA) to join the war, so they won't join and contribute until London does. All to Franco-Russian-Serbian detriment.
Oh, a delay in British entry into the war until 1916 is almost certainly enough for Germany to win, if a win is defined *down* moderately to the crushing of Serbia and having Russia peace out with the loss of border territory. And it could be sufficient to lead to a more drastic defeat of Russia, putting any timetable for impact of British blockade, submarine warfare or provoking US entry beyond wartime relevance, and thus enabling a thorough defeat of France any British Expeditionary Force in Western Europe as well.
Nope, in fact, if Britain is neutral for a whole year or two before going to war with Germany, the USA will probably become accustomed to as brisk and profitable a wartime trade with Germany and Austria-Hungary (as purchasers of southern cotton, midwestern grain, POL, fertilizer) as with France and Russia. While France and Germany will raid each other's flagged commerce with surface and submarine raiders, France will not be able to impose a close or distant blockade on Germany, nor vice versa. Germany, likewise will probably follow cruiser rules when employing submarines against French and Russian merchant ships and not sinking neutral merchants without warning, unless they wish to bring Britain into the war instantly.
But would the French truly believe their Entente Cordiale pal would apply that to them?
How much better would "the optics" for declaring war look for the Cabinet answering questions from Parliament in the public in this alternate August 11, 1914, compared with OTL 3 August, 1914. In OTL, Germany had DoW'ed Russia, and issued ultimata to France to back off from defending its borders and Belgium to let it pass, with troops on the march. In the alternate August 11, 1914, while Austria-Hungary might be shelling/attacking Serbia (as also happened OTL), Germany would not have declared war on anybody who had not declared war on her first. If it were fighting French or Russian soldiers anywhere it probably would not be on their soil but still in a phase of defending its own soild from their attacks or encountering Russian forces who had invaded the territory of their Austrian ally.
Well, the Germans need to decide which thing they wish to do. Diplomatically and optically, west-first, even if limited and leaving Belgium (but probably not Luxemburg) uninvaded and inviolate, is still quite a different thing than attacking *no* neighbors, and declaring war on noone, and fighting in the first instance only defening the Austrian ally's and one's own soil.
I hadn't thought of the arguments in favor of this. Good point. Still, this seems to be an argument in favor of deploying in this way in order to inflict maximum attrition on the French Army via operational means, without as much promise as the Schlieffen Plan to either a) compel the entire French Army to fight to the death ready or not and possibly get killed in the first campaign defending vital centers, or b) seize vital resources and terrain from the French for follow-on campaigns that the French must also reclaim at all costs if they wish to regain their strength. Compared to this, the plan you discuss could damage and defeat many French units, but not necessarily beyond repair or reconstitution, and they would have most of their command and industrial and demographic resources available for reconstruction of their forces in real time. So the approach works best for a theory of victory that assumes a negotiated peace conference is more probable than a war of attrition to the last man and last ounce of national perseverance and strength.
Assuming a refused German right has defeated the French left after this has advanced through the Ardennes, then the Germans could opt to then go on the offensive in the West.
I think the main problem with most "Germany goes East" PODs/TLs is that they require a very significant shift in German thinking that goes beyond purely military matters.
The Schlieffen Plan wasn't created in the void, it had a context to it. A two front war was considered hard or even impossible to win in the long term, and the Schlieffen Plan was the way German thinking had to face that prospect. Quite simply, it tried to cut one of the fronts short before it even began. In hindsight we know the OHL engaged in a lot of wishful thinking to arrive at the conclusions they did, especially when Motlke kept the gist of already unlikely-to-succeed plan with even less resources than Schlieffen had envisioned.
Suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that Moltke the Younger is replaced by an unnamed general who recognizes the Schlieffen Plan is little more than a fantasy. After arriving to the conclusion that France can't be knocked out of the war easily, and seeks to find another alternative. German military planners had recognized the dangers of a two front war, but the other option, Russia, is evidently impossible to knock out quickly. This brings us to the first big problem: German military thinking would need to somehow accept the risk of a protracted two front war as a prerequisite for a Russia first strategy.
In hindsight, we know that this could've been a valid strategy, with how unstable Russia was. Would the Germans work under the same assumptions, tho? From their perspective, they would have to fight a several years long war in Russia against their strategic depth, at the risk of ending like Napoleon, and after that, they would still need to beat the French into capitulation.
That doesn't sound so bad knowing the what happened OTL, but politically, the OHL going from "home by Christmas" to "best case scenario is a several year long grueling campaign into Russia" wouldn't be easy to justify. From here there are two options: either the Kaiser and his cronies dismiss our unnamed general for defeatism, or they accept his carefully though assessment. The first option escapes the present discussion, but the second one brings us to our second problem: German political thinking wouldn't have acted the same if the assumed the consequences of going to war in July 1914 were several years worth of war and more uncertainty over the result. Of course, OTL the Schlieffen Plan was also a gamble, but to put it roughly, the Germans had believed their own fantasy and were irrationally confident of the Plan, to the point where no suitable back up plans were prepared. A shift to a Russia forst strategy requires a lot of analysis that would dispense with such illusions, and German actions in 1914 (and before) would reflect that.
Going more for the political angle, and again with the power of hindsight, it's easy to see that Germany could win the most by dismembering Russia and creating a network of satellites states, a la Brest Litovsk, that would have provided a safer alternative to overseas colonies that were vulnerable to the British. Once again though, what we can ascertain with hindsight clashes with German thinking of the time. The dominant current of thought in Germany back then was Weltpolitik, which argued in favor of an expanded overseas empire and a blue water navy fit for it. Even if it succeeds, a Russia first strategy would naturally end with more gains in the East and a more lenient peace in the West, which doesn't fit well with this. The situation vis-a-vis the British would also be unchanged without any channel ports, and they were considered the main rival by the naval lobby and adherents of Weltpolitik. All in all, German ambitions would need to flip and be moderated to being a continental power, at least for the time being. This is easier said than done when the momentum the Weltpolitik movement carried for decades by 1914.
TLDR, getting Germany to go east is way more complicated than someone in the OHL deciding so.
The Schlieffen Plan wasn't created in the void, it had a context to it. A two front war was considered hard or even impossible to win in the long term, and the Schlieffen Plan was the way German thinking had to face that prospect. Quite simply, it tried to cut one of the fronts short before it even began. In hindsight we know the OHL engaged in a lot of wishful thinking to arrive at the conclusions they did, especially when Motlke kept the gist of already unlikely-to-succeed plan with even less resources than Schlieffen had envisioned.
Suppose, for the sake of the discussion, that Moltke the Younger is replaced by an unnamed general who recognizes the Schlieffen Plan is little more than a fantasy. After arriving to the conclusion that France can't be knocked out of the war easily, and seeks to find another alternative. German military planners had recognized the dangers of a two front war, but the other option, Russia, is evidently impossible to knock out quickly. This brings us to the first big problem: German military thinking would need to somehow accept the risk of a protracted two front war as a prerequisite for a Russia first strategy.
In hindsight, we know that this could've been a valid strategy, with how unstable Russia was. Would the Germans work under the same assumptions, tho? From their perspective, they would have to fight a several years long war in Russia against their strategic depth, at the risk of ending like Napoleon, and after that, they would still need to beat the French into capitulation.
That doesn't sound so bad knowing the what happened OTL, but politically, the OHL going from "home by Christmas" to "best case scenario is a several year long grueling campaign into Russia" wouldn't be easy to justify. From here there are two options: either the Kaiser and his cronies dismiss our unnamed general for defeatism, or they accept his carefully though assessment. The first option escapes the present discussion, but the second one brings us to our second problem: German political thinking wouldn't have acted the same if the assumed the consequences of going to war in July 1914 were several years worth of war and more uncertainty over the result. Of course, OTL the Schlieffen Plan was also a gamble, but to put it roughly, the Germans had believed their own fantasy and were irrationally confident of the Plan, to the point where no suitable back up plans were prepared. A shift to a Russia forst strategy requires a lot of analysis that would dispense with such illusions, and German actions in 1914 (and before) would reflect that.
Going more for the political angle, and again with the power of hindsight, it's easy to see that Germany could win the most by dismembering Russia and creating a network of satellites states, a la Brest Litovsk, that would have provided a safer alternative to overseas colonies that were vulnerable to the British. Once again though, what we can ascertain with hindsight clashes with German thinking of the time. The dominant current of thought in Germany back then was Weltpolitik, which argued in favor of an expanded overseas empire and a blue water navy fit for it. Even if it succeeds, a Russia first strategy would naturally end with more gains in the East and a more lenient peace in the West, which doesn't fit well with this. The situation vis-a-vis the British would also be unchanged without any channel ports, and they were considered the main rival by the naval lobby and adherents of Weltpolitik. All in all, German ambitions would need to flip and be moderated to being a continental power, at least for the time being. This is easier said than done when the momentum the Weltpolitik movement carried for decades by 1914.
TLDR, getting Germany to go east is way more complicated than someone in the OHL deciding so.
Last edited:
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Could the German follow up offensive make it to Paris and key ports serving Paris before culminating and the assembly and formation of adequate French units to block them?
There where several guys did where against Schlieffen just didn't got the command seat,the guy become Belgium military governor was ironically one
The fact that they didn't get the command despite their logical objections only strengthens my point, tho.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
And maybe if OHL is saying that is the only type of result the Army can deliver in the next decade, the German government says, “nah this Serbian crisis is not an opportunity for war”.
Exactly, that's where I was going. Having Germany go east while everything else stays the same isn't realistic.
Yes and no. The fact that the people who happened to be in charge adhered to the plan was indeed a factor, but I explained at length how the OHL couldn't easily break with currents of politcal thinking and political expectations that went beyond them. In fact, overestimation of their own capabilities and poor strategic thinking were a problem all throughout Wilhelmine Germany and hardly restricted to the Heer.
Maybe if the objective is to control North Sea ports they could gamble that France either won't honour its treaty obligations or will be too slow to act. They then take Belgium and Netherlands and hope to defend the Scheldt line aiming to get a stand off. Plan B is to go for Alsace Lorraine and then offer to return it or pull back in return for indefinite cease fire.
Would it work? Probably not, but it gives a chance of a quick resolution in the West that could be good enough to effectively cripple the Russians in the East. And it isn't as much a strain on logistics as Schlieffen.
Would it work? Probably not, but it gives a chance of a quick resolution in the West that could be good enough to effectively cripple the Russians in the East. And it isn't as much a strain on logistics as Schlieffen.
Germany had enough warning that the conflict would likely emerge out of something in the Balkans that would make it an Eastern conflict that they should have had alternative mobilization plans - with one of them prioritizing the East. They should have announced that they viewed this as an Eastern issue, they were mobilizing solely to protect Austria, they would not launch an attack in the West but would fight back if attacked, and they had no quarrel with France or the UK.
They would privately assure the UK that they would not use their navy to raid the French Coast or impose a blockade on France.
The UK would probably stay out. France might attack AL but the French public would probably be a bit lukewarm about the war and when Plan 17 failed with heavy casualties, France might even propose a resolution.
In the East they would be successful against Russia and the Austrians would not take as heavy a beating. Serbia would be crushed. The CP would emerge much stronger in the East with additional territory and new "buffer states" making it harder for Russia to attack. They would be in much better shape for a future conflict in the West.
They would privately assure the UK that they would not use their navy to raid the French Coast or impose a blockade on France.
The UK would probably stay out. France might attack AL but the French public would probably be a bit lukewarm about the war and when Plan 17 failed with heavy casualties, France might even propose a resolution.
In the East they would be successful against Russia and the Austrians would not take as heavy a beating. Serbia would be crushed. The CP would emerge much stronger in the East with additional territory and new "buffer states" making it harder for Russia to attack. They would be in much better shape for a future conflict in the West.
IMHO it was a wee bit more complicated.
First it should be taken into account that esp, the militaries (I know of some politicians as well but with them I'more familiar though far from IMOO comprehensively sufficient tbh) from at least 1905 onwards 'offered' at least 3 different narratives:
One for the public
'everthing's fine we will beat whoever attacks us even if we are forced to attack first (into whatever direction)'
Another for the politicianswhere they 'promised' whatever these wanted to hear in keeping the military spending as high as possible, i.e. 'promising' a shortest war - as the politicians were all and esp. much more frightened on the prospect of war at all which since the work of Jan Gotlib Bloch - if only sufficient funding would be there
Yet another between themselfwell acknowleding the necessities and inevitability of a long and the whole nation encompassing war as they were alraedy tought by Molte the Elder. Even Moltke the Minor - in privat at least - had on several occasions acknowledged that.
and mayby a fourth narrative before them selfNO iedea at ALL what might/could/should/would happend
Hope we somehow muddle through with what we got/have/get
And each of their talking 'partners' (see above) had at least as many opinions regarding their differing talking partners.The Military knew very well that the next war would become one of attrition and that to the last minute but for the sake of not alienating the 'Bloch'ed public opinion and securing support they told the fairy tales of 'home at X-mas' alike.
Mayby telling might be that neither Schlieffen when already retired - nor Moltke the Minor EVER offered any though on what should happen after the french army was knock out of the game and what operations should have been condcuted against Russia.
Unfortunatly I never ever came across an explanation for this very lonesome and only personaly made decision of Moltke the Minor since including the mobilisation period 1912/1913 there actually were for many years fully worked out plans for a war on two fronts against Russia as well as against France. For the period of 1913-1914 there was at least a study (no fully fledged plan) for.
(Infos on can be found in the appendix of this IMO have-to-be-read work regarding the Schlieffen plan(s))
Actually ... as late as the change from July into August 1914 all it would have taken to overcome the 'Schlieffen-Plan' having become a 'Moltke-the-Minor' plan would have been
... an order by the Kaiser. Full.Stop.
... or... that he wouldn't have got 'cold feet' and let it Moltke the Minor have it his way in the very late evening from 1st to 2nd August
... or... getting Groener - chief of military transportation and railwayissues - to the 'crown council' on 1st August when the mobilisation was ordered to bust Moltke the Minors lying about the impossibility of shifting sufficient troops to the East still from this very moment and in time (aka ~ 2 weeks time) (what can be read in his daughter post mortem published Memoires).
Last edited:
Probably not. The logistics constraints and French reserves would probably be enough to keep the Germans out of Paris even assuming a crushing victory in the Ardennes.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Very creative and interesting! But what is the German purpose, objective, and endgame here? Occupy the North Sea ports? - for later long-term naval use? So no one else has them? To own their Belgian and Dutch hinterlands to territorially buffer and secure most of northwest Germany including the Ruhr, and absorb the agricultural and industrial capacity of these small but rich states? OK - these are all feasible military missions that get *some* tangible reward, but the do not engage or damage the threat of the French Army.
But the hope of the French staying out, and not intervening against Germany, seems slim to none. France already has its treaty obligations to Russia, and we assume since this grows from the July Crisis Germany declared war on Russia even if not attacking across the border, and its backing Austria, and there are joint Franco-Russian mobilization and attack obligations by treaty, France desires Alsace-Lorraine back, and German expansion into the Low Countries now poses a new, independent threat to French national security. Seizing the Low Countries and North Sea ports also poses a national security threat to Britain and can be read as a sign of hostile intent, in addition to treaty breaking.
So invading and occupying the Low Countries, while an achievable short term military fait accompli, seems a way to activate an uninjured French Army and undiminished French homeland against Germany, alongside a British Empire, including the dispatch of the ready BEF.
There would be no sense in "going for" Alsace-Lorraine, since Germany already possesses it. Did you mean some other piece of territory?
Now offering to return Alsace-Lorraine to France in 1914, in return for France standing aside from any Russo-German war, and even any German conquest of the Low Countries, that would be a different bargain, and gamble entirely. *If* France can be brought around to agree, it could be a worthy net trade for Germany, but much suspicion, anger, pride, and political opposition would have to be overcome to reach and sustain any deal like that.
The devil would be in the details of implementation. It could be against the 2nd Reich constitution to yield Alsace-Lorraine, beyond simply being wildly unpopular. Germany would require material safeguards that France would not cheat and begin military operations against Germany, after a peaceful reoccupation of Alsace-Lorraine, despite pledges not to do so as part of a deal. The French would have to risk throwing their important allies (Russia) and partners (the esteem of Britain) under the bus for the chance to get Alsace-Lorraine back,, while facing the risk that Germany might cheat on yielding back the border provinces, or retake them by force.